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SUMMARY
This thesis proves the h)qpothesis that it is timely and beneficial to articulate a Model of
taxpayers’ rights as a guide to best pracdce in tax admim’stradon. It frtst finds a rationale
for a Model in legal and fights theotT and concludes that a Model is necessary, dmely and
a realistic option in the context of curxent developments in tax administxation. Next, it
articulates the principles that shot~ld underlie any Model. These are drawn from
txaditional analysis of tax systems and refined to provide a standard approach and
interpretation. It is noted that.the content of any Model will be determined in part by the
approach taken to its interpretation. A classification of taxpayers’ fights in the context of
the type of enforcement daat gives thetn application prmddes the basis for a detailed
analysis of enforcement mechanisms. The analysis is conducted in the light of recent
developments in the application of constitutional laxv and altemalive dispute resolution
theory. The substatIdal part of die thesis comprises a detailed analysis and articulation of
the ptimatT and secondat3’ legal and adininisttadve fights that should be available to
taxpayers in conjunction xvith a comprehensive framework of principles of good
governance and good practice. A wide~anging comparative analysis and synthesis of the
substantial available literatt~ce in both law and other disciplines provides support for the
articulation of a Model of taxpayers’ rights. The Model is appropriate for use as a guide
m best pracdce m tax adufinistration.
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~HAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND TO TI-Lg RESEARCH AND INITIAL JUSTIFICATION
In 2003, Messere, De Kam and Headyt identified major trends in taxadon and benefits
during the second half of the 20th Century. The trends included: increased social security
contributions; the adoption and expansion of Value Added Tax (’VAT’); structural changes
to personal income tax, corporate income tax and taxes on capital; changes to the
tax/benefit treatment of families; and changes in the tax mix, in part to make tax systems
more efficient and more effective.2 The reforms to implement these trends were associated
with significant improvements in tax adn~fistradon.3 The tax laxv was increasingly used to
facilitate tax administration; new management techniques and computerisadon changed the
way the system was adtninistered; and voluntat3’ compliance completely transfon-ned the
approach to tax adtniniatrafion.4
In a wider context, folloxving the Second Worm War, there was significant
development ha the protection of hmnan rights. The United Nadons Charter and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights sparked a proliferation of human rights treades
and conventions.5 Some of these, notably the European Convention on Human Rights,
took a role in the protection of human rights previously guarded jealously by domestic
K. Messere, F. de Kam and C. Heady, Tax Polig,; Theo*y and Pracli¢e ht OECD Cotallde* (Oxford, OUP,
2003), ch. 2.
Ibid.
Ibid, pp. 30-31.
Ibid.
¯ . & Ettt~peau Convention o~* Human Rights (4d~ edn., Oxford,C. Ovey and R.C.A. Wlute, Jacobs    IY/hite: The
OUP, 2006), ch. l.
Chapter !
laxv.6 The strengthening human rights focus saw the introduction across the world of
constitutions contahfing ~trong human rights protection and numerous charters or bills of
fights. The strength of this movement coincided in part with tim inexorable spread of
democratic government and the Me of law.v A significant feature of almost all rights
documents was die broad exclusion of matters pertaining to taxation.8
Yet, in 1987, the international Fiscal Association held its first seminar on TaxatioJt
and Human Rights.9 It explored a range of tax tnatters influenced by the application of Ore
Ertropean Convention on Hmnan Rights. In the years dmt followed, it was found that both
international human rights instruments and domestic protection of hmnan rights began to
inflnence tax matters. Albregtse and Van Arendonk in 1998 published a compilation of
papers from a 1996 European Fiscal Studies Conference, which explored the growing
range of protection for taxpayers in a number of European countfies.I° This was followed
by a range of articles and bookK exploring the influence of hmnan rights on tax matters3t
The tnajor changes in tax administration, meamvlfile, had altered die way revenue
aufllodfies were treating taxpayers, particularly as dmy sought to encol~rage voinntary
compliance \vith die tax law32 As a reflection of this, in 1990 die OECD released a report
of a slmmy of taxpayers’ rights and obligations,t~ The report focused not on human fights
influences, but the relationship of taxpayers’ rights to the compliance and enforcement
Ibid., p. 4.
Ibid., pp. ab6.                                                        .
Discussed, for example, in P. Baker, ’Taxation and tim Europe,’m Conventmn on Htwaan Rights’ [2000]
B~iti*h Tax Re,&w, 211, 213.
International Fiscal Association, Ta.x’atio*~ a*~d Human R~hls (Rotterdam, Ktuwer Law and Taxation
Publishers, 1988).
D..&lbregtse and H. Van Arendonk, Ta:,;Oayer Protectiott il~ the European Union (London, Kluwer Law
International, 1998).
For example, P. Baker, above n. 8; C.O. Lenz, ’The Jmdspmdence of the Eu*opean Cottrt of J us t ice in Tax
Matters’, (1997) 2 EC Tax Review, 80; S. Ravent6s, ’Recent income Tax Cases before the European Court
of Justice: Impact on Furore Tax Pobcv in Europe’ 0998) 38 IBED Btdletitt, 336; R. Persson-Osterman,
¯
’Human Rights in the Field of Taxation: a Vmw from Sweden (199) 2 Fhe Cambtzdge ~ eatboo of Em~pemt
Legal Sl~die;, and M. Lang (ed.), Direc! Taxatiom Recettt ECJ Developments (Tlm Hague, Kluwet Law
International, 2003). Further examples are used tltroughout the thesis.
K. Messere, F. de Kam and C. Head),, above n. 1, p. 31.
OECD, Ta:,7Oaysts’ Rights attd Obligations: A Sm~g), of lbe Legal ~ituatiott in OECD Cowttties (Pads, OECD,
1990).
powers of revenue authorifies.t4 The ~port reflected the increase in interest in taxpayers’
rights and that interesf was reflected in the subsequent growth in the number of
administrative chatters of taxpayers’ rights.~5
Somedfing of a two-strand approach to taxpayers’ rights developed. The ~evenue
authorities concentrated closely on relafng the development of rights to the improvement
in the reladonslfip between the revenue authoritT and taxpayers.16 This is reflected by then
Australian Commissioner of Taxation, Michael Carmody, in 1998, when he said in a paper
aptly entitled, ’Future Directions in ’Fax Adn~fistrafion Or Cotmamnit), Confidence: The
Essential Building Block’:iv
At the end of the day, any tax system relies on die underlying support of the
community. Equally, any tax administration will only be capable of perfom~ng its role
effecfivdy it" it has the confidence of the cotranunity in the way it goes about its job. It
is dfis recogaaifion that is fundamentally shaping ottr approach to tax administration.
A number of international reports were issued reinforchag the importance of taxpayer
right protection. For example, the OECD Centxe for Tax policy and Admtmaistradon
Ibid., p. 7.
Described e.g., in D. Bentley (ed.), Taxpaye,s’ Rights: An Itmmational Perspective (Gold Coast, Revenue Law
Jouxnal, 1998); P. Baker and A-M. Groanhagen, The Pmteclion of Taxpa.yeta" Rights - An International
Codiflcalion (London, European Fhaancial Fortma, 2001); M. McLennan, "The Principles and Concepts ha
tbe Development of dm Taxpayers’ Cbatrer’ (2003) 32 Attstralian "Fax Review, 22; S. James, K. Murphy aa~d
M. Reinhart, ~]ae Taxpayer s Cba~ter: A Case Stud}, ha T~a~ Administration’ (2004) 7 Journal of Amtraliatt
Taxation, 336; and S. James, K. Murphy and M. Reinhatt, ’The Citizen’s Cbaztet: How such [nitiafives
might be More Effecfve’ (2005) 20 Public Po/i~y atMAdminishation, 1.
A comprehensive analysis and review of the researcb to the late 1980s can be found ha J.A. Rod~, J.T.
Scbolz and A.D. Witte (eds), I/ohme 1 - Taxpayer Compliame: An Agettdafor Reseat~’h and J.A. Roth and J.T.
Scholz (eds), Vohtme 2 - Taxpayer Compliattce: Sodal Sdence Perspectives (Permsytvania, University of
Pennsylvarda Press, 1989). Later research is reviewed in J. kXfickerson, ’The Changing Roles of Taxpayez
Audit Programs: Some Recent Developmants ha the Australian Taxation Office’ (1994) 4 Revenue Law
Jottmal, 125; J. Hasseldine, ’How Do Revenue Audits Affect Taxpayer Compliance?’ (1993) 47 IBFD
¯ " 48 IBFD Btdlelin, 328; G.S. Cooper
Bulletin, 424; V. Tanzi and P. Shome, ’A Pnmer on Tax Evasmn (1994)
(ed.), Tax Avoidance a~td the Pade of Law (Amsterdan~, I]3FD and ATRF, 1997); and V. Braithwaite (ed.),
Taxittg Democracy: Understandi*tg Tc~\" Avoidance attd Eva*loft (~Mde~shot, Asbgate Publislfing Ltd, 2003).
.... or Community Confidence: The Essential BufldhagM. Carmody, ’Future Directions m Tax Adnmusnatton
Block’ ha C. Evans and A. Greenbattm (eds), Tax Administration: Fadtg the Chal/etge* of the Future (1998
Prospect), ch. 16.
3
published ha its Tax guidance serie~, .Pffndp]es of Good Tax" Administralion - Practice Note
(2001) and Ta~,7~ayer Rights and Obligations (2003),*8 which stressed the importance of
outlining and commmffcating to taxpayers their rights and obligations. The IMF Manual on
Fiscal Tranapap~no’ said that ’Taxpayers’ rights should be clearly stated’.19
However, conunentators began to explore a larger framework for taxpayers’ rights
looking beyond rights as a basis for improved compliance towards a broader rights
context.20 Tiffs formed the basis for and was specifically raised by most contributors in the
author’s 1998 comparative work on taxpayers’ rights.2! Saxwer’s 1999 work called for an
international statement on taxpayers’ rights so that consistent rights could be developed.22
Baker and Groetlliagen argue forcefidly for an international codification of taxpayers’
rights.~
To bring together the t~vo strands: taxpayers’ rights supporting voluntat3’ compliance;
and taxpayers’ rights in the broader legal application; reqmres a more substantial theoretical
framework and classification of rights than is available in the general literature. Both relate
to tax adi~inisttation and together covet the legal and administrative aspects of taxpayers’
tights. The OECD statemeuts of best practice identify some of the more h~apo~tant rights.
Ho\vever, they ate brief and restrict themsdves largely to admiiffsttative rights in the
context of inaproving voluntat3’ compliance. There is a stated need for a comprehensive
statement of taxpayers’ rights covering both the adi~isttadve and the legal. The statement
should be ~ounded in a framework that goes beyond compliance to encompass the legal
theoretical basis for taxpayers’ rights.
~ Available at <~>, l Novetnber 2006.
19 Fiscal Affairs Depa~ent, Mattual ot~ Fiscal Ttntt~patvno’(Waslfmgt°n DC’ IMF’ 2OO1)’ p" 20"
~0 Above n. 15, and see also, e.g., D. Defik in ’Right to Right Tax Laws’ (2000) 28(3) 1ntetga& 110; A.
l-Iatlq,ard, ’Treating Taxpayers Right: Taxpayers’ Rights wid~ Special Reference to Hong Kong’ (2001) 9
Asia Padfic Lair Review, 133; and A. Saxwer, ’A Comparison of New Zealand Taxpayers’ Rights with
Selected Ci~61 Law and Common Law Comxtries - Have New Zealand Taxpayers Been Short-Changed ¯
(l 999) 32 Vaoderbilt Jour**al of T~at~snalio*ta/ Law, 1346.
D. Bentley, above n. 15.
A. Sawyer, abm,e n. 20, p. 1347.
P. Baker and A-M. Gmenhagen, above n. 15.
4
The need is greater in that Mess~re et at,24 idenfi~y that the move to reform continues
unabated. The rationale’for the OECD p~acfice statements is to provide guidance for
revenue autliofifies as they try to develop best practice. Tltis is important both for
developing countries as a standard to folloxv~s and for developed countries as a benclm~ark
for quality assutance]-6 Currently, there is therefore no comprehensive best practice
statement in the area of taxpayers’ fights beyond the nfitfiraal guidance provided in the
OECD practice statements.
Based on tiffs analysis, a guide to best practice in the area of taxpayers’ fights would
be usefifl to a range of groups including:
govermnents, policy advisers and consultants revolved in the reviexv or the reform of
tax systems;
revenue authofities for be.nchmarking and quality assurance;
taxpayer representative groups to provide input into best practice tax admiifistration;
taxpayers to understand the scope and content of their fights; and
researchers in taxation in both legal and non-legal disciplines to understand the legal
framework for taxpayers’ figlits.
24 K. Messere, F. de Kam and C. Heady, above n. 1.
~s Discussed m R.K. Gordon, ’Law of Tax Administration and Procedure’ in V. Thuronyi, (ed.), Cbmparative
Ta.~: Lair (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2003), p. 95, p. 110.
26 The stated aim of the two practice notes, seeOECD, aboven. 18.
HYPOTHESIS
Based on dae cry:rent literature on taxpa} ers rights and noting the gap in the research for a
comprehensive statement of taxpayers’ rights, firmly grounded in legal theory, this thesis
\viii sho\v time
It is timely and benet~cial to articulate a Model of Taxpayers’ Rights as a guide to
best practice ~n tax admitdstration.
The thesis concludes that it is thnely and beneficial to articulate such a Model of
Taxpayers’ Rights (’Model’) given the international demand .for gttidance on best practice in
tax administration. It concludes also that it is possible to articulate a Model as a guide to
best practice in tax adnMlistratitn and does so in Chapter 9 of the thesis.
III METHOD AND OUTLINE
Tbis thesis combhaes d~ree types of legal research method, identified in the Pearce Report2v
in its review of Australian legal education in 1987. First, in the early chapters and xvhere
relevant in the later chapters it uses theoretical research to understand and formulate the
conceptual bases of the legal roles and principles considered. Second, ha understanding
existing roles it employs doctrinal research, ha \vlfich there is the systematic exposition,
analysis and critical evaluation of legal rules and their interrelationships. Tlfitd, the
underlying thread for the research is to propose refotan by providh~g recomanendafions for
change, based on ct4tical examh~ation.
The research uses a mLx of anal)Isis and synthesis as k draws from a broad range of
diverse materials across disciplines and jnrisdicdons. It recapitulates dm relevant elements
of the concepts found ha a wide range of legal theory. From these it expounds and analyses,
d~xough a mLx of induction and deduction, the application of the theot3r, mies and
principles to the development of a Model of taxpayers’ rights. The choice of relevant rules
and standards relies on making commcdons across often dissimilar and unrelated
comparative and international concepts. The proposals for reform are finely nuanced as
they require cridcal understanding of context across diverse jnrisdicdons and simultaneous
appreciation of the implications of developments in the different international fields to take
advantage of what is possible.
Chapter 2 provides the rationale for a Model from an examination of legal and rights
theot3,. It detetanines from the literatnre coveting both theory and practice of tax
administration that a two-tier Model is appropriate to provide guidance on best practice to
both developed and developing countries. It also concludes that the Model need not
include both rights and obligations. The analysis of the literatttre and practice concludes
that in the global context a Model is realistic and that there is significant incentive for states
to adopt the rights contained in a Model.
Chapter 3 analyses a wide range of major reports into tax systems and demonstrates
that they have developed a conm~on set of principles. These principles can be applied in
later chapters to provide iustification for the rights chosen for a Model. Chapter 3 identifies
the difficulties that xvill arise in interpreting the rights contained in the Model based on an
analysis of cuxrent international experience. It recommends that this can be solved in part
by recogulsing both the divergence between legal systems but also the development of
common standards.
~ D. ~eatce~ E. Campbe~ and D. Ha~5~ng~ Au~ra~ia~* Law Sch~s: A Di*@~)te Assessme~tt f~r ~h~ C~mm~mvea~th
Tert~tO, Education Commisdo*t (Canberra, AGPS, 1987), pa~:a. 9.14.
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Chapter 4 first assesses the need.£Qr a guide to best practice ha relation to taxpayers’
figbts in the context of bbth national and haternational developments. It then derives from
a range of legal theftT a classification for the rights chosen based on whether they are
enforced by law or admiuistrafively. This ha turn provides the foundation for the analysis of
the rights in subsequent chapters.
Chapter 5 explores tt~e nature of rights tlu:ough their method of enforcement. It
demonstrates from constitutional and alternative dispute resolution theot3r that there is
scope for a \vide range of measures to enforce taxpayers’ rights effectively and analyses
each method of legislative and administrative enforcement. The Chapter concludes that the
method of enforcement is critical to the scope, content and effectiveness of a right.
Chapters 6 to 8 provide an analysis of individual tights to be hacluded in the Model
based on methods of enforcement described m Chapter 5 and an analysis of internationally
accepted standards of best pta.ctice. Chapter 6 examine~ the ptimat3’ legal rights that
underlie tl~e fundamental operation of the tax system. Chapter 7 analyses the features of
good tax adiniuistration and the rights that flow fi:om it. This hactudes an examination of
taxpayers’ chatters and prhaciples of good admiuisttative practice. Chapter 8 analyses rights
which flow from the essential functions and operation of the tax adi~ainistration. Chapter 8
uses a functional analysis ha exa~r~taing the rights attaching to information gather£ng, audit
and investigation; assessment; sanctions and enforced collection; and objection and appeal.
Chapter 9 proves the hypothesis by artictdating a Model of Taxpayers’ Rights as a
guide to best practice in tax admitfistration.
g
I~trodmtion
SIGNIFICANT LIMITS AND ASSUIvlPTIONS
Although it attempts a comparative analysis, riffs thesis focuses significantly on common
law iurisdicdons in the examples it provides and the theories to Milch it refers. This is an
acknowledged weakness in the analysis behind the Model. The author was constxained in
part by language to materials in English. Ho,vever, the xveakness does not madermine the
Model itself, which reflects a number of international insmwnents, documents and surveys
that xvhen drawn together, produce much coramon content.
The thesis has a strongly Australian emphasis, because that is the iurisdicfion in
w!~ich it was written. Hoxvever, Australia is widely recognised as one of the leaders in best
practice in tax administration, which provides iustiflcation for dfis approach.
The thesis is (onsktained in its analysis in each chapter by the vast literature on
almost every topic that exists both generally and ha each iurisdicdon. The general literatuXe
on taxpayers’ rights is very limited and is reviewed comprehensively. However, the
literature on each specific topic and right is substantial, often warranting many books to
cover the breadth of the topic. It is hnpossible to cover thoroughly each area and the
literature fi:om each iaNsdicdon- The thesis therefore takes the approach that the generally
accepted t’ules and principles provide a basis for best practice. This can be idiosyncratic but
it provides a sufficient framework for discussion, opposition and amendment.
The target of the Model is not the general public, although they would benefit ~om
knoxvledge of the Model. It largely comprises govertmxents, policy makers, revenue
authorities, consultants and taxpayer representative groups. There is therefore no need to
provide an educational document designed to enhance voluntary compliance. It is also
unnecessary to provide a comprehensive tax code contaimng obligations as well as rights.
That goes far beyond the scope of this project.
The Model is based largely in the law and legal theotT. Reference is made to the work
of accountants, economidts and other disciplines. However, the thesis does not pretend to
cover the literature of those disciplhles except insofar as it is directly relevant to issues
considered. It also uses legal research method, which can be distinctly different from
research methodologies used hi other disdplines.
The Model provides a guide to best practice that applies primarily to international
standard setting for domestic laxvs governing tax adrnhfistration. There are some
implications for international agreements and Otis wotdd often mean that the procedures
xvould be more onerous if suggested changes to comply with best practice ate introduced.
The Model is drafted so that it can be adapted for legislative or admim’stxative
enackment. As is made cleat in the thesis and introduction, it is essential to adapt it m the
rdevant context. Accordingly, it does not adopt a drafting st3’le suitable for a partictdar
kind of legislation but is cast ge,nerally for ease of understanding.
The la\v and practice is current at 1 October 2006. Some adjustment has been made
for documents issued during October and the first half of November 2006.
V CONCLUSION
This Chapter has set out the background to the research and the initial justification for the
choice of hypothesis. The h}q?othesis and the outline of the process and method to prove it
are articulated. Asstm~ptions and thnitations clar’ify the scope of the thesis. Chapter 2 now
provides the rationale for articttlating a Model of Taxpayers’ Rights as a guide to best
pracOce in tax admhlisttatlon.
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THE RATIONALE FOR A MODEL
INTRODUCTION
T!fis Chapter sets out the underlying rationale for xvhy it is timely and beneficial to
articulate a Model of taxpayers’ tights as a guide to best practice in tax administration. It
first grounds fire concept of a Model in existing tights theory. The first section shoxvs that
taxation is a restriction on Ore fundamental tights of the individual, individuals accept
taxation to fund the state and the state-provided benefits that flow back to them. Tax is
imposed by la\v, forms part of the legal framework and benefits from procedural rights
witlfin it. However, it is only recen@ that the concept of specific taxpayers’ tights has
developed that could fotan the basis for a Model of taxpayers’ rights.
Section 3 raises Ore problem of subjectivism and relativism in the rights context. It
suggests that unless there is a minimum set of rules that can be agreed, the concept of a
Model is worthless. Section 4 finds the solndon in rights theot’y, wlfich has recognised fire
concept of universally accepted minimnm standards. In doing so, rights theory requires that
standards should be adapted to their context xvhen they are implemented. Secdon 5 queries
whether tax systems are too diverse to discover miohntUn standards. It uses the example of
harmful tax competition to show how such standards can and have developed. Hoxvever, it
notes that implementing taxpayers’ rights requires a different approach from fire exainple
of harmful tax competition and suggests that adopting taxpayers’ tights gives greater
latitude for choice. Setting the Model up as a guide to best practice is more appropriate
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than imposing a set of rules. Given the diversity of tax systems, a t~vo-tier Model of rights
is put forward.
Section 6 sets out the advantages and disadvantages of a two-tier Modal and
concludes that a two-tier Model best deals xvith the disparity between developed and
developing tax systems. It offers a more widely appropriate and adaptable set of guidelines.
They are therefore more likely to be used. Section 7 aclmoxvledges that a Model is possible,
but asks the question whether a Model of taxpayers’ rights is realistic. It analyses tlxe
general development of national and international relationships and trends in the tax
context and concludes that a Model is both realistic and timely. Section 8 considers
whether the Model should include both taxpayers’ rights and obligations. It notes that it is
inaportant to draw a distinction between the publication of a charter or oilier set of rights
to the public and a Model of best practice for tax administrators and pollW makers. The
sec0on suggests that the tax law as a whole sets out taxpayers’ obligations and the purpose
of the Model is to proxfide a set of standards against wlfich just one element of that law can
be assessed. It concludes by favom’ing an approach to standard setth~g that starts with the
basic rights of taxpayers and considers to what extent they should be Ihnited in die interests
of the state requirement to collect taxes.
Section 9 addresses the critical question of what should be the basis of the rights
chosen. It suggests that the basis should be widespread acceptance of standards and that
they should be expressed generally enough so that they can be adapted to the context of
indixddual jm’isdictions. The}, should also fit witlxin the accepted p~inciples that should
underhe any tax system and xvhich are set out in Chapter 3. Section 10 concludes the
chapter by analysh~g the incentives fo~ states to adopt the Model. It focuses on the
correlation between improved compliance and a revenue authority’s relationslxip with
taxpayers; the importance to democratic states of removing opportunities for obvious
~2
The Ralionale for a MMd
abuse of power by the state; and. ;tl~g cor~elarion for developing states bee, veen socio-
econon’dc development’and good governance.
II TAXATION ~MND tLIGHTS
Tire right to tax is founded in recognition of individual property rights. A society that does
not recognise individual property rights of aW kind would find it difficult to levy taxes, as
they are conmaonly understood. Murphy and Nagel have argued that there are two
fundamental conceptions of property rights and that these flow from conseqnentialist and
deontological theories.1 Both are normative theofies.
Consequentialism is arguably based m the theories of Hmne,2 but is perhaps more
recognisable in the classical utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill with its emphasis on
maxinaising individnal preferences.~ It holds that ’the ultimate standard for evaluating a
policy or restitution lies in tire value of its overall consequences’4 and that the net benefit of
individual property rights clearly justifies their protection. As a system of property fights
underpins the global economic system, consequentialist theo~3~ suggests that there is little
argument over the extent of its social utility.
Deontological theories focus on the standards inherent in the law that they argue
should govern its natuxe, or xvhat it ought to be. Lockes and Kant, for example, argue that
the concept of liberty, \vith its stress on the hnportauce of protecting the hbert3’ of one
individual against another, encompasses the protection of mdix4dual propert3’ fights.6 This
L. Murphy and T. Nagel, The Myth qfOwtmvhip: Ta?.’es andJu*t#e (New York, OUP, 2002), p. 42.
Ibid., p. 43.
Discussed extensivdy m N.E. Simmonds, Cettlral Issues in Jmiq)mdettce: Jtt*lire, La*l, and Rights (London,
Sweet and Max’well, 1986) cb. 1.
L. Murphy and T. Nagel, above n. 1.
Discussed Lq L. Murphy and T. Nagel, above n. 1, p. 43.
N.E. SRru~nonds, above n. 3, p. 25.
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supports ’freedom £rom interference in the acquisition and use of property’.7 Even a
Hegelian view, which accepts a broader concept of public interference, recognises the
hnportance of property tights to individual liberty.8
Recognition of individual ptopert)T rights presupposes some element of fibetty of the
individual. It also presupposes a social order that recognises riglits as against other people
and duties and obligations widen that social order.9 On the one hand property fights fore,
part of a citizen’s natoxal entitlement, whereas on the othe~ they promote the general
welfare and social organisation,t° The prerequisites fox taxation ate therefore derivative.
They flow from the existing social order. In deontological theory, taxation itself is not seen
as a fundamental good but is justified as a necessat3’ limitation on individual freedom,aa In
consequentialist theo~3T, taxation is intrinsic to the overall system of propett3’ rights
designed to fund the maintenance and developtnent of the social o~:der and to promote
beneficial economic results.12
Within these broad approaches there are numerous definitions of the concepts of
tights and duties that have developed more recently,t3 Taxation is a specific obligation
imposed under the laxv and the state has the power to collect it. As \xfith a criminal sanction
L. Murphy and T. Nagel, above n. 1, p.
G.W.F. Hegel, T.M. Knox (t~ans.), Philosophy of IUght (USA, OUP, 1967), p. 40.
The process of the origin and development of taxation in social o~ders is beyond the scope of tiffs thesis,
see further, F.H.M. Grapperbaus, Taxes, Liberl_), attd PtvperO’: The Role of Taxation i~t Demoo~tizatiot~ at~d
Naliottal Utti(y 511-1787 (Uitgeve~ii Walburg Pets, 19891, p. 204. So, too, is the natoxe of tl,e obligations,
see a discussion of \V.N. Hohfeld, ~Futtdametttal Legal Conceptions as applied itt Judida! Reasot~h~g attd Otl)er Legal
Essays’ (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 19231, in L.W. Sumner, The MomltSouttdalion of Fa~hts (New
York, OUP, 19871, p. 18 and N.E. Simmonds, above n. 3, p. 129. See further on the balance of rights and
dudes, D.C. Hodgson, btdit~idtcal Dtto’ Mthht a Httmatt tlights Dircomse (Hants, UK, Asbgate Publishhag
Lmtited, 2003), and S. Stoliar, Art ~ttt@,sis of flights (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1984).
L. Mmphy and T. Nagel, n. 1, p. 44.                                          .
J. Fimtis, li* NaO¢ralLatv attd Nalttml Pdghls (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980) postts a type of comraon good
d*at is not ftmdan~ental, but which allows members of a community to collaborate to attain reasonable
objectives (p. t551 supported by a legal system that is specific, not arbitrary and malntahas reciprocity
between subjects of the system and its lawful authorities (pp. 276-277). See also, L. Murphy and T. Nagel,
ibid.
Ibid. Tltis is most cleady seen in the iustificadon for the intxoducdon of new taxes by politicians in budget
speeches or election manifestos.
See, e.g., L.C. Becket and C.B. Becket (eds), EttO’dopedia of Elhic~, Dt¢O’ attd Obligatiotts Vo/~ I at~d 2 (Newc 1 92 \X/N Hobfeld above n 9, H L ~4. Hart, Toe Comept of Lair (2nd edn,5~ork, Garland Publisldaag In ., 9 );" . ¯                  " " ¯ ’ ’              "
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 19941; and R. Alexy, Theoffe d¢r Gmttdre~]~te (3rd edn, F~ankfurt, Suhrkamp,
1996).
14
T& ~ationale for a MoLd
it is direct and enforceable. How the~ elements are conceived shapes the definition of its
naive. For example, No~ick’s strong conception of individual choice and the liberty of the
individual xvould see taxation as necessary to uphold the state’s p~suit of such goals but
limited as fat as possible, given its direct interference xvith the basic concept of maxitxfising
individual choice,t4 Communitafians, such as d’Entr&es, take a subjective view of shared
communit3, conceptions as to what is good.ts They xvould see taxation as a means of
distributing hnportant social goods and that it should therefore have a much wider role.
For all theofies along the continuum, arguably including Mat~dst theories in wlfich
there is litde recogtfidon of individual property rights,t6 taxation is ptima~y concerned
xvith funding the state and redistributing social goods. As with aW exercise of state power
there ate linfits on its exercise. This thesis is concerned with xvhat these linfits should be.
Essentially taxation can be seen as a barometer of the developing balance between
state and individual fights. Legal theory as it affects taxation has always been more
concerned with the structure of the tax system to determine how the tax system should be
used in funding the state and distacibuting and redistfibudng social goods, than xvith
taxpayers’ individual rights. It focuses on the rules governing the level and rate of taxation,
who and/or what should be taxed and how they should be taxed. Histofically, detailed
analysis of rules governing proceduzal fairness in hoxv the tax roles are applied has not
attracted the discussion among fights theorists that it has in other a~eas of the law.tv
This structural focus is not surprising, as the atguments about fl~e fights of
individuals before the law ate played out in other fields of the law. By the time attention
R. Nozick, Anatrby, Stale a,td Utopt) (Ne\v Yotk, Basic Books, 1974), p" 26 et seq"
See, e.g., A.P. d’Entr~ves, Natural Lain (London, Hutcl~inson University Lib~ar},, 1967), ch. \rI and the
discussion in L.C. Becker and C.B. Becket, above n. 13, p. 181 etseq.
?although, ’taxation’ of entides can occur within a Mandst State and is concerned with ftmding the central
state organs and redistributing social goods in much the same xvay as any other society.
Obviously, the general discussions on legal reasoning, from Llewellyn to Dwotkin to Mact~mon to
Ketmedy, could apply equally to the tax law, but it has received little attention in broader theoretical
writing. In contrast, regulator}’ scholars have recently given considerable attention to empirical research in
¯
¯
. ’ " s of jusdce and fairness and how these hnpact ontaxpayer compliance, extending to taxpayers percept*ontaxpayer compliance. For a useful survey of the literature, see M. \’(/enzel, ’Tax Compliance and the
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tarns to taxation, if it ever does, the .legal system is usually sophisticated. Safeguards in
place elsewhere floxv into the taxation area, unless they are specifically excluded. This
exclusion, explored further below, circumscribes the discussion on taxpayers’ rights, for the
general procedural rights applicable to all citizens usually apply to taxpayers.
Increasingly, however, the setwice-oriented culture of private enterprise is being
applied to public adininistrafion. The traditional conmaand and control approach to
enforcement of taxation obligations is giving way to a responsive approach designed to
motivate taxpayers to comply with their tax obligations.18 One result has been an increase
in charters39 However, even here, the focus of charters is on improved serwice delivery and
relationships xvith taxpayers. It is not on broadening the scope of taxpayers’ rights.
It is beyond the scope of tiffs thesis to re-examine the origin and definition of rights.
It xvill follow the standard definitions used in the international charters. Any differences
will become evident in the analysis. There are many theories and they vary in their
dentition of rights.2° The reality is that ptimat3’ political and cixdl rights have been enforced
by the national and international courts, whereas social, economic and developmental
rights largely have not.2~ This is despite efforts to the contrary?2 This thesis focuses on
defining enforceable rights that relate to taxpayers and examinhag the mechanisms for their
enforcement, it does draxv on the weffate theory concept that legal rights have no value
Psychology of Justice: Mapping the Field’ ha V. B~aithxvaite (ed.), Taxiltg Demooao’: U~1detxta~ldi~lg lax
Avoida~1ce alld El,asio~1 (,~dershot, Asbgate PubRsl~g Ltd, 2003), p. 41.
V. Braifl~w~te, ,A New Approacb to Tax Comp~ance’ ~ V. Br~fl~wNte, ibid’, p" l"
Described ~ N. Dea~i, ’Accentuating the Apos~ophe: ~e Ci~en’s Charter’ (1994) 15 PoliO’ Sludies 3,
48.
See, e.g., C. Wellman, ’Concepts of ~ght’ ~ L.C. Becket ~d C.B. Becket, above n. 13, p. 1100.
Discussed genera~y ~ D.M. Bea~, (ed.), Human ~hls a~d Judidal ~t&w: A Co~at~tive Pet~eclil,e
~ordrecbt/Boston/London, Magus Nijboff Pubs, 1994). In descfib~g the EC~ M. Buq~cc~o de
Boer, ’T~ Ma~e~s and fl~e E~ope~ Convention on Hmn~ ~gbts’ ~ Taxalio~* a~td Human ~ght*, A
Xlm~O, ~Case-law, sen~ar pmcee~gs at 4Ist Congress of tim Intema~on~ Fisc~ Association ~mssels,
1987), p. 59 states:
The drafte~s of the European Convention on Human l~ghts ~tended to set up an ~temafional system of
protection for what can be rended as the ’classic~’ pofific~ and c{v~ fights, exdu~ng econon~c and soci~
dghts such as the right to social securig, or the right to work.
See ~e L~*b~g P~ciples on dm implementation of tim International Covenant on Econo~c, Soci~
and COtural l~gbts drawn up m Maas~cbt m ~e 1986 ~d tim ~po,¢ ~the Cbmmittee ott Econom£; Sodal
aM Ctdtut~/~hts to ECOSOC (1990), paras 2 14, ~scussed m K. Drzex~c~, C. ~ause ~d A. Rosas
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ut~less there is associated freedom to ~enioy them.23 In other xvords, there must be the ability
to access the right for it" to be a real tight. Although the notions of right and enforcement
are broader in the tax framework than in many other areas of the law, taxpayers’ rights are
primarily political and civil rights concerned with balancing the rights of individuals with
their obligation to the state.
III TAXATION, THE STATE AND TH_E DIFFICULTY OF RELATIVISM
Although tiffs thesis does not explore the theories of the state, it is fi’om those theories that
the power to tax is drawn. Taxation is ftmdamental to the implementation of the theory of
the state. As the French novelist, Narr, aptly co,reheated in the middle of the tfineteenth
centuDr
, 
’Plus ~a change, plus c’est la m~me chose’.24 It is remarkable given the exponential
increase in the pace of change how much the basic tenets of society remain the same. And
so, too, do the basic tenets of our system of taxation. In Athens, in about 450 BC, Pericles
could argue strongly for the importance of the rxfle of law as the foundation of democratic
society~ - a society inclusive of a basic tax system.26 Diocletian, in about 300 AD
overhauled the tax system of the late Roman Empke to cope with inflation and economic
decline.27 In Norman England, the breadth of exemptions available to strong interest
groups undermined the effective collection of Danegetd.=~ The 1579 Union of Utrecht,
w|fich ’fi_mctioned as a Idnd of constitution for the Republic of the Seven United Provinces
(eds), Sodal Pa~hl* as Huma~t R{ghts: A Europea~t Chal/e~ge, (Finland, h~sdtute for Human Rights, Abo
¯ Miademi Llniversity, 1994), ch. 2.
V.P. Viliaren
, 
’Abstention or Involvement? The Nature of State Obligations Under Different Categories
of Rights’ in K. Drzewicki et ,-d, ibid., p. 43, p. 50.
’The more firings change, the more fl~ey are tile same’, from A. Karr, Le* Gugpe* (6fl~ Series, 1859), p. 304.
C.M. Bowra, in The Gtrek E.vpedence (Cardinal edn, London, Sphere Books Ltd, 1973), ch. 4 discusses the
democratic focus of Athens and the Greek concern with the rule of law. Pericles speaks for himself hi
Thuwdides
, 
trans, by R.E. Warner, Histot), of the Pelopo~mesian li~’a~" (Penguin Classics, 1975), bk 2.37.
C.M. Bowra, ibid.                    " ’ten A Hi*lo*, o Rome lo A D 565 (6th edn, London, Macmillan,
Described in A.E.R. Boak and W.G. Smau~, ,       9 f         ’ ’
1977), p. 445.
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of The Netherlands’29 struggled to introduce common taxation. Even more difficult under
that Union was hnolementation of file non-discfimination clause:3° harmful tax
competition was, it seems, alive and well.
Taxation has operated indiscriminately fl~oughout history and across states with
conflicting values and social goals. As with an}, law, the theory of taxation tends to become
distorted in its implementation. The process of law-making breaks it doxvn into specific
areas of application (quite apart from the influence of lobbyists and interest groups) and
file original theory disintegrates further through the process of case-by-case
interpretation.3~ As Wilhehnsson observes, ’One has to acknowledge the fact that it is
possible to construct several different systems on tile basis of the same concrete legal
matefial’.3~ Wiflfin systems there also has to be flexibility and development using the same
legal material. It is the classic differentiation between law making and interpretation33 and is
one reason why the developmer*t of human rights has been so successful in tiae second part
of the 20th century. Theory is adapted to its context as it is applied. ~ne same approach
applies to taxation and rights related to it.
It is necessary to mention here file origin of law, without any attempt to do more
than stunmafise some of the problems that exist given the current divergent views in legal
theory. Tile source of taxation laxv is constitutional. Most sovereign nations have a
constitution, which fotans, as Kelsen put it, tile Grun&mrna, or source of other taws in tile
hierarchy of laws.34 The fight to tax occupies a special place in tiffs ltieratchy. Where even
constitutions have now been found to be subject to overarcl~xg principles, these are
subject to limitation when it comes to taxation. They do affect taxing rules nonetheless.
7
A.L. Poole, Domesday, Book Io Magna Ca~la 1087~!2 ! 6 (2nd edn, 1986), p. 418.
F.H.M. Grappe~haus, above n. 9.
Ibid.
For a discussion of this process generally, see T. Wilhekmsson, Soda/C?*IIt~I Lair aItd Europea~ I~tteg~ution
(Darmmud~, Ashgate Publislting Ltd, 1995), cb. 1.
Ibid., p. 19.
See, e.g., E.W. Btckenft~de, G,undt-echtstheo~ie u~td Gtrmd~&tsinte~p,~tation (Neue J~istische Wochenscbrift,
1974).
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Where do the overarclJng prindples that govern the actions of sovereign states come
from? Tiffs goes back to ’the origin of the law itself and can be explored across numerous
theories. Natxu:al law theories were evident in various fort:as in early theocracies, in Greece
and m the soplfsticadon of Roman law. They were ft~cther developed by jurists such as
Aquinas and were used as a basis for international law by Grofius. Although natural law is
now limited in its popularity among theorists, it is reflected in the origin of tbe various
hmnan fights charters and many constitutions. Natural law was founded hi absolute
underlying principles.
With the enlightem~ent and the introduction of social contract theory, the
development of relativism in its numerous forms has changed the way law is viewed by
many. Theories based in relativism in its broadest sense noxv must rely on some form of
inductive reaso*Jng to create certainty, where it can be argued that file underlfing premise
of their arguments suggests thet[e is none. Arguably, even positivists, such as H.L.A. Hart,
can only create an artificial and temporat3’ certainty by describing how internal and external
recogilifion can provide an absolute legal system.3s The internal issue of f~:om where the
new ,xt/es (or Dworldn’s preferred ’principles’) are drawr~ in the penumbra of uncertainty,
when the established rules have mn out, is a matter of the personal choice of the }udge.36
The external problem of what constitutes an in, moral law and whether it shottld be obeyed,
again, rests with personal choice.37
Many modem theorists have tended to build on the type of reasotJng that theorists
such as Hohnes and Llexvellyn introduced in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Hohnes
H. Kelsen, The Purr Theoo, of Law (Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1967), p. 8 et seq.
X]fis was raised by R. Dworkin in Taki~g Rights Setious~ (London, Gerard Duck~vordi and Co., 1977) but
countered by N. MacCormick in H.LA. Hat¢ (London, Edward Amotd, 1981), and Legal Reaso*thg arid
LegalTheo~ (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978). A useful discussion can be found in R.P. George (ed.), The
Autottot*o~ of Law (Oxford, OUP, 1999).
H.L.A. Hart, above n. 13, ch. VII. Or as R. Dworkiti puts it in Law’s Emph~ (London, Fontana Press,
!986), p. 225:                                            .
According to law as integrity, propositions of law are true if they figure m or follow from the principles of
iusfice, fakness, and procedural due process that provide the best constructive interpretalion of tbe
community’s legal practice.
H.L.A. Hart, above n. 13, p. 200.
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Chaplet 2
took the cynical viexv that judges inteq~ret the laxv according to thek own perceptions of
what the law should be~38 Llexve[lyn suggested that this process could be analysed to show
an underlying theoretical approach.39 The critical element for this analysis that is present in
most approaches from radical feminists such as MacKinnon to postmodemista such as
Murphy, is that they emphasise the subjective and rekadve mlderpinnings of modem
jurisprudence.4° For most theorists there is now no such tiring as a ’right law’.4t Its
rigbtness depends upon the perception of the part), affected, how it is interpreted and how
it is applied. A law may seem right to the lawmaker, but constitute an ’immoral law’ when
applied to an individual facing circums{ances not considered by the lawmaker, or
considered and dismissed. Focusing on the subjective in tiffs way removes even further the
possibility of finding an absolute standard. How can the universal exist given the
differences in subjective reality across the globe?
Philosophically, tiffs creates a major difficult), in the analysis of the taxpayers’ rights
subset of hmnan riglats. If there cannot, by definition, be such a tiring as a universal human
right, it suggests that an}, attempt to define a subset of universal rights is futile. It follows
that, relying on constitutional and internationally agreed protection of taxpayers’ rights
does not necessarily provide an agreed basis to begin formulathig a model of taxpayers’
rights. In order to create a model of taxpayers’ rights there must be a minimtun set of rules
to xvhich potential parties can subscribe.
O.W. Holmes Jnr, ’The Path of Law’ (1897) 10 Hat~atd Law Review, 457, 466, reproduced m R.S.
Smt~ers, (ed.) ~*~etica~* ~galTheoo, (Aldershot, Da~moufl~ Pub. Co., 1992), p. 3.
K.N. LleweRyn, ’A ReaRsfic Jufispmdeflce - ~m Next Step’ (1930) 30 Columbia ~v ~vienq 431,
reproduced M R.S. S~mers, ibid., p. 155.
Fo~ exatnple, C. Macedon, Femi~tism U**mod~e& Discourses o*~ Q~ and ~ (C~xbddge, FIa~,ard
U~versig, Press, 198~, a~d P. Mushy, ~osmmdem Pe~spec~ves and Justice’ (1991) 30 Thesis Eleven, 1t7,
reproduced ~ D. Paterson, (ed.) Poslmodet~tism and I~w (Aldershot, Da~m~outh Pub. Co., 1994), p. 3. See
~so an anal)rsis of fiberal subjecth4g, m E. Santom, Autono**o’, D*edo~*~ aM ~tsts: A Critique ~ ~betal
Subjech),iO, ~ordrecht, ~uwer, 2003).
~fis teqmres a ’step of f~th’. Ag such theories are based in the ~eofist’s basic worldview.
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The Rationak for a Modal
IV a PP~\C’FICM~ SOLUTION AND A MODEL OF TAXPAYERS’ RIGHTS
Fortunately, the hmnan fights literature comes to the rescue, for it has recognised this
problem. It is particularly relevant in the context of Africa, given the mix of religions, races
and cultures on that continent. The domination by xvestem culture of the formulation and
content of the earl}, international standards of human tights that claim to be universal is a
matter of significant debate.42 Has the western domination effectively denied basic African
tights or are they universal?43 Should the traditions, customat3’ practices, political and
religious ideologies and institutional structures peculiar to Africa, or parts of it, create a
separate and distinct classification of rights that is culturally specific?+*
These questions were debated at length at the 1993 World Conference on Human
Rights that resulted in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.4s Article 1 states
drat the universal nature of the’fights and freedoms is beyond question. Article 5 affirms
the universality of human fights and that some freedoms are fondamental. It recognises the
cultural specificit3’ of some tights and requires the promotion of both the universal and
culturally specific:46
See A.A. An-Na’im #a~d F.M. Deng (eds), Human Rights ht Aft#a: Cms* CulooM Perspectives, (Washington
DC, Brookings Institute, 1990), p. 15; O.M. Ejidike, ’Universality and Relativity in die African Human
Rights Discourse’, <www.notthagham’ac’uk/law/lulc/itme96/°key’htlm>’ 5 September 2005; S.B.O.
Gutto, Human a~td Peoples’ Rightyfor the Oppressed (Lurid, Lund University Press, 1993), p. 414; L. Lindholt,
Questionittg the Uttivet~ali[y of Human Ri’ghls-Ths Afticat~ Chat#r o~t Httma~t attd Peoples’ Righ~¢ b~ Botswatla, Malawi
attd Mozambique (2ddershot, Dartmouth Pub. Co., 1997), p. 20; and T. Maluwa, ’Discourse on Democracy
and Human Rights in Africa: Contextualising d*e Rdevance of Human Rights to Developing Countries’
(1997) 9 African Jomna/ofbtletTmtionaland CompataEve Lan,, 55. For a broader discussion, see D.C. Hodgson,
above n. 9, p. 114.
W. Schmale, Humat* Rights a1M DiversiO, (Goldbacb, Kelp Publishing, 1993), p. 8.
Discussed in HJ. Steiner and P. ,Mston (eds), Intemalional human t~ghl* i~ r°**lexl (2nd edn" New Y°rk’ OUp’
2000), p. 366 and E. Brems, Human Rights: Unl’versab) atId Diverd~’ (Boston, Kluwer Law Imemational,
200t), p. 25. See further, Y. Gbai, ’Bills of Rigbts: Comparative Perspectives’ in R. Wacks (ed.), Holtg
Kong’s Bil/ofRa~hts: Problems and Prospects (Hong Kong, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong, 1990), p.
15.
Text contained in P.R. Ghandi (ed.), Blacks!one’~ Intet~,alional Hummt Rights Documettts (2nd edn, Oxford,
Blackstone Press, 2000), p. 376.
S~e D. Avton-Shenker, ’The Cbatlenge of Human Rights and Cultural Diversily’, United Nations
Backgtoun’d Note, (1995), <www.un.org/tigbts/dpi1627e.btux>, 1 November 2006 and United Nations,
Vienna Declaration and Programme of ),.orlon,World Conference on Hmnan Rights (Vienna, 14-25 June
1993), <wvav.urdiclmcb/buridocda>, 1 November 2006. "Dtis was supported by the 1993 Tunis
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All human rights ar~ universal, indi,dsible and interdependent and interrelated. The
international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner,
on the same footing, and xvida the same emphasis. \X,]~le the significance of national
and ~egionat particularities and various tfistorical, cultural and religious backgrounds
must be borne in mind, it is the duty of dae States, regardless of dmir political,
economic and cultural systems, to protnote and protect all human rights and
fundameutal freedoms.
The universafity of many of the fights contained in tile African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights supports this approach. The Chatter came into effect in 1986 and 53
African states bad ratified it by 2000.47
The result does not, of course, resolve tile source of the problem. There is no teal
analysis of file basis of ut~ivers~fity in these documents other than the fact that they are
utliversally recognised. We haxm returned to the positivist position, relying on file rule of
recognition. Recognition thus becomes the rationale for adopting file rights and not their
inherent nature. It is argued that recourse to natural law could resolve the issue, but that is
beyond tile scope of fl3is thesis.48 It is sufficient that there is recognition witlfin the human
rights arena, both practical and academic, that it is possible to devdop a model of
minitnum tights to which most can subscfibe.49 Hoxvever, it is also inlportant to ckaxv from
file discussion file reqlfirement that any model should recogrtise file diversity of tile
potential subscribers.
Declaration at die Wodd Conference on Human Rights ia that yea~. See E. Brems, above n. 44, pp. 148
150.                                                                                        "~    r
See generally, U.O. Umozm:ike, The Afiicatt Cbat#r o~ Httmatt attd Peoples’ Rights ~£he Hague, Kluwe Law
International, 1997).
~s D Degk in ’Rigat to Right Fax Lax*s’ (2000) 28(3) httet~a:,’, 110, ably examines the need fog recouxse to
such principles in the tax law context, arguing daat dmy are found commonly in civil law systems.
49 As stated by M. Darmw and P. Alston, ’Bills of Rights in Comparative Pe~specfixe in P. Alston (ed.),
Pt~motitg Human Rights Thtvtgh Bills of Rights: Comparative Perspectives (Oxford, OUP, t999), p. 465, p. 471,
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How does this translate to a model of roles that could govern the administration of
the tax system? The goal is to produce a model of txfles that does not exploit or espouse a
particular xvorldvimv. Rather, it should take only those tales that are conmaonly understood
or accepted. Because there has been little debate in the tax context, a model must draw on
odxer areas of law where the rules are akeady in place. These will often be applied by
analogy and must take account of the specific tax context. Tiffs approach has the advantage
that the lales do not have to be created. They ah’eady exist elsewhere and can be adapted.
There is a rich source of past intetl~retadon and application xvid~l die different legal
systems and internationally that can support the model and give it its credibility and
Returtling to die jurisprudential analysis: adopting taxpayers’ rights from a model, but
integrating them into the context of a particular tax system is a classic example of how law
develops. XY~here past intetpre.tation within the system has proved inadequate for die
current context, the txfle-maker intetnmnes. The new rules are then developed and
interpreted within that legal system in a way that fits the broader legal, political, econotnic
and social context. In dtis way, die future and changing interests within the system are
catered for.
One can use the analogy that Dxvorkin has developed in arguing that judges should
take a literary approach in their interpretation of the law and understand that it is in a sense
shrtilar to a smry.~ The judge as writer should lmow and understand the original context,
the smmture and design of the legislation and ’the donfinant lines’ of past intet13retation.S’
This enables the judge to fit their contribution or chapter into the story to enable its
continuation witlfin its broader themes and structures.s-" Using the exainple of Iris
’There ate ... strong universalist trends which are not only applying international pressure to move
rewards a more standardised model but are also facilitating and bdping to reinforce such convergence.’
R. D~vo~kin, n. 36, ch. 7, and F’~edom’s Law (Cambridge, Harvard Universit), Press, 1996), ch. 1.
Ibid., Fn~edom’s Law, p. 10.
R. Dworldn, above n. 36, p. 228 etseq.
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philosopher king, Hercules, Dworkin~suggests that the }udge should, in her or his decision-
maldng, take account of’the underlying political and moral principles that shape society.s~
The same approach is appropriate for the txfle-maker seeking to integrate a model set of
roles into an}, legal system.
V THE PROBLEM OF DI~rERSE TAX SYSTEMS
Does this take sufficient account of the diversity of systems in which the model might be
applied? It probably does not. Sophisticated tax systems contain complex t~ales govemJr~g
complex transactions. By their vet3’ nature, the}, ate likely to contain rights and obligations
diat go far beyond the reqttirements of a developing tax systenl.54 The most complex tax
systems are those found in the western democratic economies, it therefore makes it easier
to develop more advanced rights and obligations that are generally acceptable to those
economies. That is, indeed, what has happened through the Committee of Fiscal Affairs of
the OECD. The rules developed at this level are not universally acceptable.
"Fake, for example, the development of txtles to govern ’harmful tax competition’.
The concept, the dentition and the need for rules were a product of the OECD. They did
not inidalty elicit broader acceptance. The acceptance they have had has been effected
largely d~tough the econotnic power of the OECD countries, the lin~ited number of
countries targeted and the economically \veak posidon of those targets. Interestingly, the
EU countries witl~n the OECD took forwatd a different and more restxictive initiative
aimed at their own more sophisticated economic framework. The approaches ate worth
exploring in more detail.
Ibid., p. 65.
q2~/~is fom’ts part of the \vider debate fomxd in fot~ams such as the Ummd Nations Development Program.
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Tbe Rationale for a Model
The OECD launched its project on harmful tax competition in 1996. The EU
established its mvn approach to countering harmful tax competition, with the adoption of a
package of measures by the Council in 1997.ss
The EU measures xvere wide-ranging and focused specifically on harmful tax
competition witifin the EU. They included draft directives on the taxation of savings and
the taxation of cross-border interest and royalty payments, together with a non-binding
code of conduct,s6 The code of conduct, although voluntat3’, was intended to work
du:ough political pressure and peer review. Significant debate followed the introduction of
those measures. Hmvever, the existence of that debate illustrated the influence of the
meastttes on domestic tax policy witlfin the EU. Ireland, for example, acted qtticldy m
replace its preferential tax regimes to avoid criticism from other members,s7
In 1998, the OECD produced its Report, HawJ~d Tax" Compelition: Att Emogi*tg Global
Issue (Report).s~ hnplementatio.n of the recommendations in tiffs Report has had far-
reaching hnplications for the nadonal financial and tax policies of those cmmtries listed as
having harmful tax practices. But the reconamendations also have potentially significant
consequences for the national tax policy of member countries.
The Recotrmaendations cover ti~ee areas: domestic legislation and practices; tax
treaties; and international co-operation. All aLtaa to eliminate hamaful tax competition. The
Report ’focuses on geographically mobile activities, such as financial and other set, ice
activities, including the provision of intangibles’.s9 Harmful competition is defined to
include distortion of investrnent flows, attacks on the fairness and integrit3’ of the tax
ss Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting on 1 December 1997 C°ncerning Taxati°n P°licy’ 1998 OJ
(C2) L P. ~"
Resolution of the Council and Representativeso f file G°vemments ° f the Metnber States’ Meeting widtin
the Coua~cil of I December 1997 on a Code of Conduct for Business Taxation, 1998 oJ (c2) 2, p. 2.
s7 See E. Troup and P. Hale, ’EU Initiatives on Tax Harmonization: Do as I Say, Not as I Do?’ (1998) 17
Tax Notes I~ttemalional, 1081.
s~ Other institutions, such as the [MF, Fh’,ancial Stability Forum and Fhiancial Action Task Force, are also
active in contiguous areas such as money laundering, supervision aoA transparency. Space precludes
consideration of d’mse activities in tiffs article.
25
system, discottragement of taxpayercompliance, changing the public spending and tax mix,
sl~ifting the tax btttde~ to less mobile tax bases, and increasing administxative and
compliance costs.6° Key factors in identifying tax havens are: they have no or nomh~al
taxes; they do not alloxv effective exchange of information; the}, lack transpaxency; and
there is no requirement that an actiwiry taking place in the jurisdictio~ should be
substantial.61
The Report recommended the establishment of a Forum on Hatanful Tax Practices
and tiffs was approved.62 Member States were requited to report to the Forum on their own
harmful tax practices by 2000 and to elin~inate them by the end of 2005.63
In 2000, the Foram produced a Report, Towards Global Tax" Co-Operation: Ptw~ss in
Idenl~,i~*g aM Eliminatitg Ha*’**~¢l Tax Practt’ces (’2000 Report’). It identified potentially
harmful preferential reghnes in OECD member countries.64 The 2000 Report also
identified jurisdictions viewed as tax havens.6s Sigtfificanfly, it excluded 15:om tiffs list those
tax havens that made ’a public political comt~titment at the highest level to eliminate thek
hatanful tax practices and to comply with the principles of the 1998 Report’.66
The 2000 Report proposed that at~y tax haven listed that did not commit to
removing harmful tax practices \vould be included in a list of uncooperative tax havens.67 It
also proposed a framework for implementing a cormnon approach to restraining harmful
tax practices.6s Another proposal, which demonstrates how broad the reach of the OECD
is, covered the OECD’s comnfitment to the extension of the work of the Formn to include
Report, p. 8, <www.oecd.org>, 5 September 2006. See also on the OECD website, tim article by R.M.
Hanm~er and J. Owens, Head of C.F.A., Promoting Fair Ta~,r Competitio*~ (2001) ~ w~ch he justifies dm
OECD approach.
Ibid., p. 16.
Ibid., p. 23.
Ibid., p. 53.
Ibid., p. 56. See D~mewot~ fir a Cbllective Memotw~dum qf U~t&~xta~tditg on Elimi~alitg Hat~fid Tax Praetire*
<xm~v.oecd.org>, 1 September 2006.
2000 Report, p. 12, <xm~av.oecd.otg>, 1 September 2006.
Ibid., p. 16.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 18.
Ibid., p. 24.
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non-member econonfies wifla similaJq concerns and which were ’prepared to accept the
same obligations as OECD members’.69 Meetings with non-member countries began in
June 2000 to explore the extent to which they could be involved.7°
After an extension of die coimnitment deadline to 28 Febra~ary 2002 otdy Andorra,
Liechtenstein, Liberia, Monaco, the Marshall.Islands, Nauru and Vanuatu were listed as
unco-operalive Tax Havens.71 All odler tax havens had comnfitted to introducing
transparency into their tax systems and effective exchange of information, subject to the
adequate protection of taxpayers’ rights and the confidendalit)’ of thek infomaadon.72 The
OECD undertook to support committed jurisdictions so that die), could implement those
commitments.73 The 2004 Ptogt~ss Repot¢74 noted considerable progress ’in aclxieving a co-
operative process xvith those countries and jurisdictions outside the OECD that have made
commitments to transparency and effective exchange of information’.
There were a series of .meetings of the OECD’s Global Fur~un on Taxadon that
aimed ’to aclfieve lligh standards of transparenw and information exchange in a way that is
faix, equitable and petanits fair competition between all cotmtries, large and small, OECD
and non-OECD’.7s It is arguable that the whole point of becoming a tax haven and
offering tl~e protection of stringent secrecy laws was because no other arrangement allowed
faix competition on any level between, say, the US and the Republic of Nauscu. The OECD,
to faci~tate action in a number of identified areas, co-ordinated a number of projects
dvcough die Global Forum. These included a factual review of tlie ’legal and athniuistrative
frameworks in the areas of transparency and exchange of information in over eight),
Ibid., p. 22.
~ee The ~ECD~ Pr~je~t ~** Ha~dTax P~r~i~es: The 2~ P~gress R~pa~¢ (‘2~1Rep~rt~)~ <www.~ecd.~rg>~
5 September 2006.
See <wxvw.oecd.org>, 5 September 2006. Nauru and VanuatU were removed by die end of 2003.
2001 Report, p. !1.
Ibid., p. 12.
OECD, The OECD’s Pt~jecl o~ Ha*~*~d Tax Practices: The 2004 P~g*~ss Repot¢ (’2004 Report’), p. 4,
<www.oecd.org>, 5 September 2006.
OECD, A Pt~ces* for Achieving a Global L2vel Pla3’i~tg Field, (2004), p. 2, <wxvav.oecd.org>, 5 September
2006,.
27
countries’.76 The 2006 Report continued what had proved a very effective method of
imposing pressure on both participating and non-participating cotmtries by publication.
The response to tiffs example in the context of taxpayers’ rights and obligations
cottld be txvofold. The OECD could use economic power to require countries to adopt a
model of taxpayers’ r’ights and obligations in tile same way as it has influenced the national
and financial tax policies of those countries listed as having harmful tax practices. The
introduction of taxpayers’ righta would contribute to achieving lfigh standards of tax
adnfinistration ’in a way that is fair, equitable and pei’mits fair competition between all
countries, large and small, OECD and non-OECD’.77 h would support foreign investment,
encourage domestic compliance and thereby broaden the revenue base. Nonethdess, it will
not happen as the economic interests and power of the OECD do not support it as a
’grand’ hfifiative. A perceived fiscal imperative, an uncertain international political
environment driven by fears of terrorism, and a relatively easy target, drove the earl),
success of the attack on legal txales and structures in tax havens. There is no such fiscal
hnperative for OECD countries to require subscription to and application of a model of
taxpayers’ rights and obligations witifin ever3, jurisdiction. Tile target base is also too wide
and, as tile Global Forum members have found, less able to comply.
Tile alternative is for there to be a txvo-tier model, the approach taken by tile EU and
in certain aspects of file OECD guidelines.~8 More developed economies could subscribe to
a more advanced model of taxpayers’ rights consistent xvith the greater obligations placed
on taxpayers in a full), developed, complex and sophisticated economy. Less developed
economies could subscribe to a basic model of taxpayers’ rights consistent with tile level of
development of their economy and their tax system. Given, tile conclusions of the
OECD, Tax C~o-operation: Towa,gs a Ltvel Playing Field: 2006 Assessmetzl by the Global Fot:,mt or* Taxation, p. 8,
<xx~vw.oecd.org>, 1 Septembec 2006,
~ Above n. 75.
~8 For example, the 2006 Report, ibid., p. 10, \vlfich recogmises tim impedLmems to information excba~*ge
found h~ domestic laws tlmt will lead to different levels of compl]mace.
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jurisp;udential and human rights l~erature, tiffs xvould likely prove more acceptable,
proxdded that it was not perceived as a slight on less developed econonfies-v9 It would also
mean flaat development of taxpayers’ rights might be possible in developing countries,
where lhmts on administrative capacit3T, cost and pofidcal constraints xvould make major tax
reform unlikely.8°
An advantage of this approach xvould be the scope for wider acceptance and
inclusion. This point is explored further below in Chapter 3, wbich discusses the
interpretation of a model. Suffice to say that using a two-tiered model allows each
jtrdsdicfion to implement the proposed rights in the context of its oxvn tax system. It can
dien cater for cultural, political, social, economic and other factors specific to that
jurisdiction in the implementation and application of the rights. This is consistent with the
approach of recent human rights literature, discussed above. Nonetheless, the basic rights
are sufficiently rmiversal to allpw recog~fition. Tiffs is of particular interest to taxpayers
acting globally and com~tries seeldng to inaprove foreign inveslanent.81
VI DISADVANTAGES AND ADVANTAGES OF A TWO-TIER MODEL
It could be argued that a two-tier model encot~rages states to adopt the basic level of
protection for taxpayers rather than aspiring to the more advanced level. If an approach
were taken between the two, developing nations would have more to aspire to. This
argm~ent is attractive in that it might lift the level of protection in some jurisdictions, but it
Politics of negotiation o f differing standards.
See generally, D. Newbery and N. Stem (eds), The Tbeo~ ofTaxalion m Developk~g Countde, (Ne\v York,
OUP/World Bank, 1987) and specifically, 200 et seq; R.M. Bird, ’Administrative Dimensions of Tax
Reform’ (2004) 10 Asia Padfi¢ Tax Btdleti~* 134; and C. Grandcolas, ’~,fanagement of the VAT - Improving
the Level of Compliance Using Performance Indicators (200) 12 Ada-Padfi¢ Tax Bttllelilt 6.
See the discussion ~a OECD, OECD GlobaI Fomm ott Intentatio~tal bweslme~t: Attmctit~g Intet~atiot~al Inveslmo~t
for Deve/opmo,t (2003), <www.oecd.org>, 1 September 2006.
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is more likely to lift the level too high for developing countries to participate and to set it
too low for developed countries to see it as haxdng value.
Another argument is that having a two-tier model will make it unlikely that nations
will subscribe to or incorporate the model. Acknowledging that it subscribes only to a basic
model might be a politically sensitive issue for a country that is seeking to demonstxate the
sophistication of its legislative and administrative systems. Developed iurisdicfions may not
see it as relevant to consider a model, given their other treaty comtrfitments.
A third argument is that it is easier to encottrage states to adopt a conmaon
inte/’national standard. It provides a benchmark. Adoption by a number of states puts
pressure on others to follow stilt. By breaking the model into two, there is less clarity on
the benclmaark. States have a choice as to which standards they will apply even \vhere they
choose to use the model as a basis for thek tax rules.
These perceived disadvantages of a two-tier system relate more specifically to the
adoption of an international treat3q charter or standard. In contrast, the aini of a model for
taxpayers’ rights is to provide a guide to states refotaning their tax systems. Tax reform, as
discussed below, is endemic. Policy-makers often do look to international norms when
designing changes to the tax system. A two-tier model would provide guidance at the
appropriate level for particular tax systems. It ~vot~d suggest rules that they cotfld
mcoqmrate to meet best practice. If the model is seen as a guide rather than a prescription,
it is far more likely to gain wider acceptance. As with the Model OECD Double Tax
Convention,82 over tmae the rules it contains may be incorporated into a large number of
systems. At that point, it will become relevant to refer to it as having a more prescriptive
nature, as fl~e roles become the staring point for inter-jurisdictional negotiations on issues
affecfng taxpayers’ rights.
~2 OECD, ModelTa~x" Conventio~t on Ittcome aM Capita/ (OECD, Paris, 2000).
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The tl~reat to nations in the taxpayers’ rights arena is significant]}, lower than in those
areas where their revent~e base is threatened. Also, the pressure to adopt tights is not
sourced internationally in the way it is to support rninhrxum standards of truman tights
generally. There simply is not a general awareness of taxpayers’ rights. For policy-makers in
jurisdictions undertaking reform it is therefore unlikely to be a major political issue whether
they refer to a model of taxpayers’ rights and at which level There are at least three
sigmficant advantages to a two-tier model.
First, as countries go tl~cough major tax term’ms, a model provides principles that can
govern the formulation of the tax rules. Consider an example of where this occurs. T\vo
hafluenfial organisations that have significantly influenced domestic tax policy are the
International Monetat3’ Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (World Bank), a UN agency. Both came out of tim Bretton Woods
Conference in 1944.83 The IMF was designed to act as a catalyst for econo*~fic co-
operation, growth and stability witlfin the international monetat3r system. One of its key
roles has been to extend credit and provide economic relief to countries exf~e~iencing a
wide range of financial difficulties. The World Bank mal, es available project and program
loans to less developed countries on preferential terms and by acting as a lender of last
resort.84 They often operate in tandem.
Both the World Bank and the IMF hnpose conditions on their lending and their
involvement.8s Before agreeing to involvement in a countt3’, the institutions catty out an
Articles of Agreement o£ the Intemafional Monetat3, Fund, <www.im£org>, 5 September 2006.
J. Calm, ’Challenging the New Imperial Authority: "Ilae World Bank and the Democratization of
Development’ (1993) 6 Hatyatff Human Ra~hls Jom~ml, ! 59, 162.
J. Gold, Cotditiona]iO,
, 
International Monetat3’ Fund Pamphle~ Series No. 31, 1979; M. Guitian, Etotd
Couditio*taliO,: Evolution ofPtindples at*d Pmrlfivs, Intemalional MonetaD, Fund Pamp!~et Series No. 39, 1981;
International     Monetary      Fund,     Ik4F     Sttt~lO,     Supplement,      vol.      30,     2001,
<\vxvxv.imf.o~g/extemal/pubs/ft/survey/2OOl/OgOlOl.pdf>, 5 September 2006; and A. Mody and A.
Rebucci, ’Over~4ew’, in A. Mody aod A. Rebucci (eds), IMF St~ppot#d Ptvgtzlms - Recent Staff Research
(Waslfington       DC,       IMF       Multimedia       Ser~4ces       Di~dsion,       2006),
<www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sengmar/2OO6/isp/eng/isp.pdf>, 5 September 2006.
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assessment of the economic and other, conditions in the country.86 From this assessment,
flaey \viii make recormnendadons, usually economic and legal, Although, file), are
increasingly more extensive:87
Bank-approved consultants often rewrite a ~ountt3"s trade policy, fiscal policies, civil
sel~dce requirements, labor laws, health care arrangements, enviromnental regttlations,
energy policy, resettlement requirements, procurement rules, and budgetary policy.
In their involvement with developing nations and nations ha distress, they effectively take
on file role of a sovereign government when they require inlplementation of their
conditions and recorrmaendadons.8s Certainly, their inflnence on the tax systems of
developing nadons and, more recendy, of economies in transition, reflects their sovereign
role. To see dfis, one otfly has to read die technically excellent works put out by IMF and
World Bank experts,s9 which are reflective of their extensive field\vork. It is precisely in the
exercise of this role and inflnence that a basic model of taxpayers’ fights would prove
beneficial.90
One of file clearest examples of the hnpact of conditionality has been the spread of a
broad based consumplion tax (Value Added Tax or VAT).9~ But the fiscal influence of the
Described extensively in j. CahtL above n. 84.
Ibid., p. 160.
Ibid.
J.R.S. Gill, A Diagtmtic Fmmen~ot¢cfor Revemte AdtMnistmtion, World Bank Teclmical Paper No. 472 (World
Ba~k, 2000); C. Silvani and K. Baer, De~igMt~g a Tax Ad,~hdstmtion Reform Strategy,: Ex’pe~iences and Guide/tries
(~XZashington DC, 1997), IMF Working Paper No. 97/30; V. Thuronyi (ed.), vols 1 and 2, TaxLatv
atM Draflit~g (Washington DC, IMF, 1996); V. Tanzi and A.J. Pellechio, 7~be Refomz of Tax AdtniMslration,
IixiF Wor-ldng Paper, kX~P/95/22 (IMF, 1995); P. Shome (ed.), Coa~t~hemive Tax Refomx The Colombia~*
ExT~effe~tce
, 
Series No. 123, IMF Occasional Papers (Washington DC, IMF, 1995); G.P. Jen-ldns,
’ModeroJzadon of Tax Administrations: Revenue Boards and Ptivafization as Instruments for Change’
(1994) 48 IBFD Bul/elin, 75; K. Theodore (ed.), Tax Reflt~* in lhe Caffbbea** (Institute of Social and
Economic Research, Univ. of tbe West Indies, Mona, Jamaica, I992); and R.IX’L Bird and M. Casenegra de
Jantscher (eds), I,apmvitg TaxAd*MMstmtion itt Devdoping Comttties 0Xlasbington, D.C., IMF, 1992).
90 See dxe extensive list o f Teclmical Assistance projects, <www.itdweb-°rg>, 5 September 2006"
’)t A. Tait, Vab¢e Added Tax: Inlematio*ta/Praclice a~td Ptvb/ems (fMF, Waslfington DC, 1988). For the increasing
trand towards tl~e implementadott of a \rAT, see IBFD, Anmta! Repot¢, which publishes each year a
worldwide survey of developments and trends in international taxation, <wwxv.lBFD.org>, 7 November
2006. See also, e.g., ’IM]7 Commends VAT Introduction in Cameroon’ (1999) 18 Tax Notes ltltemaliottal,
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IMF and World Bank goes far beyoiid dfis. Whereas the influence of other institutions is
severely circumscribed, tl~at of the IMF and 9(/otld Bank, widfin certain spheres, is aknost
untJnfited. They deal primarily with developing countries and countries in distress. They
generally attempt to hnplement suludons tried and tested elsewhere, but designed and
modified to fit the peculiar circumstances of the project country. In tiffs context, a model
of taxpayers’ tights would be extremely useful and provide a benclmaark against which to
measure the implementation of different tax systems. A basic model xvould be essential if it
were to have practical application to tax systems starting from a vet3, low base.
Formulation of a basic model for use in the design of tax systems by tim IMF and
World Bank could also form one of the bases for dialogue between those organisations and
developing countries xvhen considering tax policy. The international organisadons have
recognised d~e need for wider representation of developing countries in the policy
dialogue. Tlie IMF, OECD atkd World Bank joindy proposed Deve/opittg the Intenmtio~al
Dia!ogue on Taxations, which has continued as a dialogue invoking a range of international
organisadons concerned with taxation.92
The aim of die Dialogue is to encourage dialogue, idendfy and share good practices,
provide a clearer focus for teclmical assistance and avoid duplication of effort.9~ A model
of taxpayer’s rights would fulfil these criteria and could be die basis for the ongoing
discussion on taxpayers’ lights,94 The success of the international dialogue on the policy
govertfing taxadon of electronic commerce shows bow it has worked elsewhere.9s
1770 and ’IlXEF Welcomes Tanzania’s VAT’ (t999) 18 Tax" Notes Interuational, 1675. The International Tax
Dialogue recognised d~is tzend: its first conference in Ma~:ch 2005 focused on Value Added Taxes:
<wx~-,vitdweb.org>, ! September 2006.
Ibid., part II. See tim International Tax Dialogue website, <wwwitdweb.org>, 1 September 2006.
Ibid., pa~t W.
The papers on the strategic, plarmmg and general principles section of die Organisafion and management
of tax admirtistradon section of die International Tax Dialogue website, <xwmv.itdweb.org>, 1 September
2006, are almost all concerned to some extent with taxpayers’ tights.
See the papers and history of the dialogue, <www.oecd.org>, 1 September 2006, unde~ tim topic ’Tax and
Electronic Comco_erce’, particularly the Reports, such as OECD, Taxalioo attd Elecltv*~i¢ Commetre:
Implementalion of the Ottawa Ta.\’aLiot~ Framework Conditious- 2003 Repot.
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There are some obvious benefits to international dialogue of dais kind. It avoids
duplicadou. It provides a forttm to develop international consensus at the governmental
level. The discussion of international tax policy will be more informed given the range of
participants and their particular perspectives. The dialogue may act as a catalyst to improve
practical co-operation between tax administrations. It is in this area that a basic model for
taxpayers’ rights could be laighly effecth,e.
A second advantage of a two-tiered model of rights is that the international stage is
nmv crmvded with individuals, organisadons and different levels of government, each with
their own agenda. Fluidity is a hallmark of the set and characters. It is underpinned by the
growing international econot~aic inter-relationship. The sheer volume and extent of world
trade and international investment in all its fro’ms ensure that the livelihoods of most
people are inextricably linked to it. One of the most difficult challenges is hmv the
individual govermnent units should manage their revenue collection m dais envirottment.
Tax systems have become increasingly soplaisdcated. They are subject to constant
change and development, as they have to come to terms with evolving economic
imperatives. Managing that change and development includes managing the significant
pressures on the system boda internally, widlin revenue compliance and administration, and
externally, for example, with the development of electronic coturxaerce.
The vetT diversity of expm~ence widsn each system requires the application of
general ptit~ciples to bm~g order out of impending chaos. That order is more effective if it
encompasses both the internal and external elements. It is here, as different units of
go~mrnment seek to carafe out for themselves niches that allow them to operate
independently as taxing agents within the context of an increasingly integrated world order,
that we see the level of that integration. Where economJc or relational inter-dependence is
strongest, there is most convergence between tax systems, and principles have their widest
34
acceptance. Where inter-dependence’ is xveaker, there is less convergence of tax systems
and file general applicati6n of accepted pfindples.
This explains in part the growing influence of supranational organisations and the
success of central governments in controlling the taxing powers in federal systems. But it
alSo explains m part tile limitations of those organisations and governments. The deeper
the level of interaction that must or does occtrc between different authorities, tile greater
tile pressure to reduce transaction costs between their respective tax systems.96 Where there
is little interaction, file pressure is correspondingly reduced.9-~
This interaction and, to a limited degree, convergence, is most obvious between
OECD countries in the area of tax admitfistration. Tiffs xvill be discussed in more detail in
Chapter 7 in file context of information exchange. But there are mm~etous other cases,
from transfer pricing9s to hat~nful tax competition,99 xvhere cormnon or similar
administrative approaches and. systems are being put in place to facilitate revenue
admimstration, collection and protection of jurisdictional revenue bases¯ An advanced
model of taxpayers’ rights is consistent with and could assist tiffs cooperation.
A tititd advantage to a two-tiered model of taxpayers’ rights relates to trade and
investment. With file expansion of hltemafionat trade comes tile associated increased focus
on investment flows. Investment is critical to the heaRh of an economy and tax systems are
designed to attract foreign investment,m° To do that consistently, it helps if the system is
seen to operate with integrity and protect tile basic tights of tim investor.
For a detailed discussion of the transaction cost arguments see R. Coase, ’The Problem of Social Cost’
(1960) Jountal of Law and Economics 1, and R.A. Posner, The Economic~ of Justice (Cambridge M&, Har~,a~d
University Press, 1983).
" theh: trading partners.WRicb is why most cmmtdes only negotiate double taxaUon agreements ~v~th
For example, where die Pacific Association of Tax Adnfinistrators (PATA) devdoped a standard package
of docuurentation for taxpayers applying for an advance pricing agreement on transfer pricing involx~mg
tliose jtmsdiclions. See IllS, Padflc Assodalio** of Tax Admk¢islratotv (PATA) Tm~@r P~id*g Do¢umo,talio~*
Package, found trader ’transfer pricing’, <www.irs.gov/businesses/international>, 5 September 2006.
Discussed above.
For example, see A. Shu and J. Yang, ’ctm~a enacts Incentives to encourage Information Teclmology,
Innovation and Developments’ (2000) 20 Tax’Notes I~,len*alio*~a/, 829. See also, L. Zaheng, L. W~a~g and M.
Gould, ’Clfina establishes special trade zones to encourage export operations’ (2001) 22 Tax ),totes
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The level of sophistication of the tax regime significantly alters die level of taxpayer
protection expected to operate widfin it. For example, a foreign investor would not reqtfire
as high a level of taxpayer protection in a simple regime that does not include taxation of
capital gains, has lhuited taxation of foreign sourced income, does not have a special
regime governing the taxation of transfer pricing and derives a significant portion of its
revenue from indirect taxation. This is mainly because the simpler the regime, the tess
likelihood tbat fllere would be conflict bet~veen die investor and the revenue autllorities at
a soplfisdcated level. For example, there is unlikely to be significant demand for revenue
txdings or for special procedures govet*img transfer pricing audits involving more d~an one
jurisdiction. However, the investor would be atudous to ensure that there \vas basic
taxpayer protectibn and securit3, of invesmient from athittat3, intetarendon. For example, an
investor would be concertled if there was no right of appeal from die decision of a revenue
official or if there were no limits.on the rights of search and seizure by revenue officials.
Clearly, models of taxpayers’ rights will prmdde guidance for revenue authorities in
detetwnining dae minimum expectations of foreign investors. They will also assist advisers
to foreign investors in analysing all die factors affecting the investment decision.
On balance, provided that a model is not put for~vard as a rigid international
staudard, a two-tier approach has merit. It allows flexibility based on relative sophistication
and provides appropriate gnidelines for both developed and developing economies.
VII IS A MODEL OF RIGHTS REALISTIC?
The concept of taxpayers’ rights raises hm~ediate conceras as it sets itself up as a
counterpoint to the exercise of the taxing powers of the state. Taxpayers’ tights are
IttletTmtiotml, 589. For a wider discussion, see S. Bucovetsky, ’Rent See’k/tag and T~o: Competition’ (1995) 58
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generally expressed in terms of an obfigation on the state to act in a certain way or as a
limitation on its powers to make, administer, collect or enforce the tax laws. As discussed
above, the power to tax is fundamental to the operation of the state. Without taxadon of
some kind,mta state that recognises property and liberty could not funcdon unless it has its
own independent source of funds,t°2 AW limits on taxing powers are viewed with
suspicion; hence the early evolution of the margin of appreciation in international tax
txeaties wid* respect to tax matters,l°s
A Changes in Approach to the Ia)Jdts
On a txaditionat analysis, it would seem fair to say that states have little interest in accepting
formal limits on their rights to tax. It has been left largely to the state to detem~ne the
appropriate delicate balance betxveen the wishes of the individual and the utilitarian greater
good of the majority)°4 But this is changing, because the operating framework is changing.
What is our operating f~amexvork? There are different levels of political poxver and
auflmrity. The loxver the level tixe more lhnited is the jurisdiction. Ultimate sovereignty
supposedly rests in tim nation state. Yet, tiffs sovereignty is limited increasingly by binding
Journal of Pub/ic Economics, 337.
Even low tax countries such as Bermuda and Nam’u require some form of tariff, excise o~ other impost to
provide fimds for the operation of file guvermnent.
It could be argued that state ownersbdp of oil wealth in countries such as Brmmi and Saudi Arabia
provides an example.
L. Card Backer, in ’Forging Federal Systems \vqithin a Mattix of Contained Conflict: The Example of the
Emcopean Uuion’ (t998) 12 Ematy Inler*tatiottal Law Revielv, 1331, explores the tensions between what he
sees as ’the crax4ng for normative enforceable uniformity widfin Europe’ (1332) and the reter*don by
nation-states of ’the ulthaaate power to impose norms and to implement law \vithin their respective
territories’ (1333). It is a useful analysis of the broader context that gives rise to states exploiting marghis
of appreciation in treades and the underlying rationale for their doing so. The logic as appfied to the
protection of national sovereiguty extends specifically to taxation, wlilch is one of the areas most fiercdy
protected. See further, FI.C. Yottrow, The Mat~h~ of Appt~datiou Doctrine in the D3wamics of Etovpean Human
RightsJuffspmdence ~Dm Hague and London, Kluwer La\v International, 1996) and F. Jacobs and R. \xTifite,
The Etwopean Convention o~t Humatt 12d~bls (Oxford, OUP, 1996), p. 258.
Handyside v. United K_itgdom, A24 (1976); (1976) EH1LR 737.
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agreements at the supranational level,t°s At all levels, the ftamexvork is determined in part
by the fortnal legal and ~tdnfinisttafive authorit3’ vested in each component, whether an
international organisation, a national government, a state or provincial government, a cit3,
or town council or some other entity vested with civic authority.
However, there is a ft~tther vital dimension to the operating framework: the
voluntat3, and involuntatT cooperation that provides an informal counterpoint to the
exercise of fortnal legal and administrarive authority. Sometimes it is based in delegated
authorit3,. For example, where the revenue authorities in the Pacific Association of Tax
Administrators developed a standard package of documentation for taxpayers applying for
an advance pricing agreement on transfer pricing involving member jurisdictions,t°~ or
where the Australian state of Queensland negotiates special state tax concessions to
persuade a multinational company to establish its regional headquarters there,t°7 Sometimes
it sinaply represents the exercise .of economic or other power. An obvious example (above)
is where the members of the OECD forced a mwnber of small nations to comply with
OECD requirements designed to prevent those nations from allowing money laundering or
practising tax competition.
Tile wbole provides a complex matrix of vertical and botizontal relationships.
Advances in trade, technology and communication have exacerbated the complexity as
different players can no\v relate to other players at different levels in a way that was not
possible until recendy. Individual taxpayers in one jtttisdiction now routinely interact with
Although L. Catfi Backer, above n. 103, argues that pfnciples such as the European subsidJatit3’ concept
ensure that ’supranational entities are litde more that~ well-organized txeiworks of legal obligations among
sovereign states’ (1335). He goes on to state that, ’subsidia~it3’ ultimately rejects the independent power of
the networks of obligations to impose notmative limits on the power of the ,~afion, except to the extent
the natiomstate permits it’. His arguments focus on the limits of supranational bodies to impose
normative limits. Ta-ldng it from the opposite perspective, although nation states are carefol to limit
inroads into thei~ sovereignty, the network of legal obligations (albeit in the taxation area subject to wide
margins of appreciatioa) does result in the slow but incremental erosion of soveteignty.
:\bore n. 98. See further, M. Markham, The TtwtoCer P,idt~g of I*ttatgible* (Uae Hague, Kluwer Law
International, 2005), ch. 6.
Aastralia      Tradecoast,      Atrst~lia      Tradecoast      Case      Slud3’:      Vi~gi~t      Bhte,
<xw, vw.australiattadecoast.com.au/docs/V~rghl-Blue’pdf>, 6 November 2006. See also Australia
T~adecoast, <\wvw.australiatradecoast com.au/AboutAusttaliaTradeCoast/faqs.aspx>, 6 November 2006.
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authorities at all levels in anoth~g jurisdiction d~at dley are targeting for direct
investment.ms Wbere s,ipranational organisadons were once the preseI-ce of member
governments, the OECD Cormnittee on Fiscal Affairs’ (CFA) Technical Advisory Groups
(TAGs) on aspects of the taxation of Electronic Cormrmrce included both individual
taxpayers and representatives from non-member jurisdicdons.m9
The sheer scale of tax administration ensures a level of interaction with the revenue
authority at all levels that 100 years ago wottid have been shnply unimaginable. Revenue
authorities increasingly have contact in some form with ahnost every adult and many
children,u0 It is in dais context that the balance between the interests of taxpayers and the
state is starting to shift in favour of the taxpayer. For the complex and interdependent
reladonsltips between taxpayers and states to flourish it is no longer possible to rely on die
traditional comtnand model of tax athrfinistradon,ln That this is widely recognised is seen
in the proliferation of charters .or statements of taxpayers’ fights,u2 A Model of taxpayers’
fights is therefore realistic in a cbanging world.
B National Lt)nits
At the national level, tax collection is obviously important and any actual or perceived
flu:eat to tax collection is taken seriously. In most jtmsdictions, legislation providing the
financial means for the govermnent to operate warrants favourable legislative process (the
powers of supply in conanon taxv judsdicdons).
10s See, e.g., K. Messere, F. de Kam and C. Heady, ’Tax Aspects of Fiscal Federalism’ in IC Messere, Tax
Polig,: Theo9, a*td P~uctice in OECD Comttffes (Oxford, OUP, 2003), ch. 5.u, See ~her on bus~ess involvement, J. Owens, ’Taxation Issues m Electromc Cot~mtce: Develop~g a
Patmership be~veen Bush~ess and Government’, (1999) 18 Tax Notes lntentationa/, 1587, i. t 6.
no p. Baker and A-M. Gme~agen, The Prolec/ion qf Tax~ayer~ ~hts - An Intet~tational Cod~ication ~ondon,
E~opean F~anci~ Forum, 2001), p. 2.
tu See generaRy, V. Br~w~te, above n. 17.
n2 See ~tfl~er, Intemafion~ Tax Dialog*e, above n. 94.
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This special treatment is carried fl~tough into the procedural application and
operation of the laxv. Th~ poxver of the eourts to reviexv the operation of the tax system is
specifically restricted. Australia, the UK, Canada and Japan provide examples. In Australia,
administrative laxv governs the legality of process and the fights of judicial reviexv of
administrative actions are codified in the Admhtistrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act
1977 (Cth) (the AD(JR) Act). The common laxv rights remain, but in most cases they are
now found ha a clearer form in the AD(JR) Act.113 Under Schedule 1 (e) of the AD(JR) Act,
an}, decision connected \vith the making or amending of tax asseosments or the calculation
of tax or duty is excluded from the jtttisdiction of the Federal Court. The availability of
judicial review of decisions in tax matters is as limited in the UK. Saunders states that in tax
matters, ’potential applicants for judicial review should nornaally use grievance procedures
and the Ombudsman and "an}, system of dispute resolution available before using judicial
review as the ’remedy of last resort’".114
In Japan, the Gy6sei Tetsuzuld H6tls (Bzdministrative Procedure Laxv (APE)) states
in A~ticle l:lI6
The aim of this Law is, in relation to dispositions, admhtistrative guidance and
notifications, to aspire to greater fairness and transparenW ... ha administrative
management by providi~g for conunon matters, and by these means to contribute to
the protection of the tights and interests of the Japanese people.
Ishinaura states that, ’the operation of the APL has been ahnost entirely excluded in the
area of tax adininistration’.117 There is specific exclusion from application to taxation of the
1,3 See also Administrative Decisions (~udicial Review) Act ! 977 (Crib), (the ,LDOR) Act), s. 10.
114 I. Saunders, ’Judicial Review: Successes for fl~e Taxpayers’ [1997] 2 British Tax Review, 105, 106, wifl~ flae
quote from S. Cragg, ’Lord Woolf and Judicial Rm~iew’ (I996) l(4) JtedidalRevie~v.
115 Law No. 88 of 1993. See K. Islmmtra, ’The State of Taxpayers’ Rights in Japan’ in D. Bentley, (ed.),
TaxTbao,eta-’ Rights: Att IttletTtalt}nal Perapeclive (Gold Coast, Revenue Law Journal, 1998), p. 235.
116 Translated by K. Ist~nttra, ibid.
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principles governing administrative management and the general prh~ciples for
a&rduistrative guidance.118
Even where states introduce charters of fights, the rights of taxpayers are restricted.
In Canada, the applicability of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedomslt9 (the
Charter) to taxation m~tters was considered m Thibaudeau v. Ca*mda~° and it was fotmd that
dae Income Tax Act \vas subject to the Charter. However, the couscts have been unwilling
to find taxation laws contrat3’ to the provisions of the Charter, as the very essence of the
tax law is ’to make distinctions, so as to generate revenue for the govermnent while
equitably reconciling a range of necessarily divergent interests’)21 Philipps argues that,
’Gondfier J relied on the "special" status of tax law it support a narrower reading of the
equality guarantee itself, excusing the govetmnent from having to show that the provisions
ate reasonably justifiable on policy grounds’)22 Whether or not the courts use the ’special
status’ of tax law to read dow,n Charter fights, the critical point is that tax law has this
’special status’.
However, these legal restrictions in man}, countries have been balanced by a mix of
legislative and administxative linfits on the power of the state in taxation matters. Australia,
Canada and the UK have introduced adn~listrative statements of taxpayers’ fights. Limits
on the state in Japan ate less obvious,123 but even there, for example, the tax authorities
have introduced a system of advance pricing agreements to provide certainty to taxpayers
m transactions involving transfer pficmg and recognise the inapor~ance of secuthag taxpayer
co-operation, participation and understanding in tax matters)-~4 In a state where the limits
~1~ Ibid., p. 236.
na Ibid.
u9 Constitution Act 1982, Part I; Canada Act 1982 (UtO 1982, Sch. B, c 11, effective 17 April 1982.
t_~0 Tbibaudeau v. Catlada, [!9951 1 CTC 212; 95 DTC 5998 (SCC).
i~1 Ibid., per Gontbier J, p. 392 (CTC) discussed by J. Li ’Taxpayers’ Rights in Canada’ in D. Bentley, above
n. 1!5, p. 130.
*-~ L. PhJlipps, "Fax Law: Equality Rights: Thibaudeau v. Cmtada’ (1995) 74 The Cmtadiatt Bat" Review, 668, 675.
I~ K. Isbhnm:a, above n, 115.
~’~
Indixddual Circular: On die Advance Recogttifion of Arm’s Lengd~ Price Calculations on Intercompany
Transactions [Kobetsu Tsfitatsu: Dokuritsu kigy&kan Kakaku no Santei h666 t6 no Kakuuin ni Tanite]
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are slow to change, it supports the analysis above that changes take place xvhere there is
interaction between diffe’rent systems. It is inevitable in the context of international trade
and the deske to create an attractive location for foreign investment.
In this context there are two significant areas where a model can contribute wittfin
national limits. First, developed countries have an ad hoe approach to taxpayers’ rights.
The Taxpayer Bills of Rights in the Utfited States are hardly bills of rights as they are
normally understood. Rather, they constitute piecemeal amen&nents to the Internal
Revenue Code. The same position is reflected in most OECD countries, where taxpayers’
tights are found spread across tax and other legislation. This is why lists of administrative
rights are used to draw the threads together. Second, for developing countries and
countries in transition, there may be oppormtfities to redraft their revenue laws. As such, it
presents an opportmfit3, to identify the basic rights that any systetn should provide to its
taxpayers, and to include them in the law. Drafters will not find these rights elearly
identified in the tax laws of any OECD countt3,, to use as a precedent. Accordingly, it
makes sense to draxv up a list of those rights that should be found in aW system.
Historically, it may have been of little consequence to introduce a model of
taxpayers’ rights. The national exclusions seemed too wide-ranging for it to have had any
effect. But the changes in approacli in recent decades have completely altered the way tax
systems are administered. This will be explored in detail in later chapters. A Model of
taxpayers’ rights is realistic in the national context.
(1987 Sach6 5-1 Gai 2-ka Ky6d6). See K. Ist~imttra, ibid., p. 243 and PAT.K, above ix. 98. The changing
focus of tl~e Japanese Tax Administration can he seen ha art. 4, NTA, An Outh)te of Japattese Tax
Admittislralion, <\w~,,v.nta.go.jp/category/outFme/englisb/2741/contents.btm>, 5 September 2006.
42
The Rationak for a Model
The posidon is die same at the intemgtional level. There is a lffstory of ensuring d~at the
possibility for interferenc~ in tax matters is limited. In most multilateral treaties that might
odmtwise affect taxation, it is specifically excluded. The WTO provides an example.125
Although, tim focus is on allowing nations to grow dttough competitive advantage in a free
international market1~6 and more than 140 nations in the WTO have agreed over time to
significant reductions in tat’ills and the abolition of quotas,la7 dm lffstot3, of d~e General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI) has been to exclude taxation from its ambit.1-~8
The non-discrimination requirement in fl~e GATT does extend to domestic taxation, wlffch
cammt be used as an insm~tnent to protect domestic goods.12~) The General Agreement on
Services (GATS) also includes a non-discrinfinadon clause but has exceptions for existing
tax treaties and domestic tax laws)3°
However, die WTO provides an excellent example of how die international trade
environment can reduce die apparent limitation on bringing taxadon within die scope of an
international treaty. UtRike in international tax law, international trade law has managed in
its agreements to introduce various forms of adjudication, including binding adjudication.
Tiffs is assisted by fl~e multilateral nature of tim agreements.TM In die case of US Foreign
Sales Corporations (FSC),*sa die Reagan admitffstradon introduced special r~ales so d~at a
FSC, with an adequate foreign presence, could defer tax on a portion of its income. It was
1~ Marrakesh Agreement Establislfing the World Trade Organization, Legal mstntments - Results of the
Urugnay Rom*d, vol. t, 33 ILM (1994), p. 1125, p. 1144. See f~tther <\ww,v.wto.org>, 5 September 2006
and J.H. Jackson, The II’/orld Ttttdi~tg Systet~: Law aM Poli~y of lt~tet~tatio~al Ucottomic Re/a/ion, (2rid edn,
Cambridge,/’*fiT P~ess, 1997).
p-6 For an analysis of competitive advantage, see M.E. Porter, The Competitive AdvatIlage of IXralt~tts (Nexv York,
Free Press, 1998), particularly ch. 12 on Government Policy.
12~ GATT, 30 October 1947, 55 UNTS 194, arts II and XI.
t~a Discussed in A.C. Warren Jr, ’Income Tax Discrimination against International Commerce’ (2001) 54 Tax
1~,tw Revietv, 131.
129 GATT, 30 October 1947, 55 UNTS 194, art. IIt and, A.C. Warren, ibid., p. 142.
*~l* Marrakesh Agreement, above n. 126, p. 1168, arts XJTV, X%qI and }UxL!I.
*~* A.C. Warren, above n. 128, p. 146.
,3~ \’(~orld Trade Organization, Repot* of the Pat~e/, United States’Fax Treatment for ’Foreign Sales
Corporations,’ \XrT/DS108/R (8 October 1999) and World Trade Organization, Repot* of the Appellate BOO’,
United States-Tax Treatment for ’Foreign Sales Corporations’, \xrF/DS I08/~a~B/R (24 February 2000).
For a detailed review, see P.R.b.icDaniel, ’The Puxsuit of National Tax Policies ha a GlobaIized
Environment: Principal Paper: Trade and Taxation’ (2001) 26 Bt~ok/dnJoutnalofltttetstalioaalLa*t~, 1621.
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designed to give US exporters sin~ilar .concessions to those given under consumption tax
reghnes. In 1997, dm EU successfully challenged the t’tries ~ander the WTO Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. The Appellate Body upheld the ruling. In 2001, the
EU successfully challenged the successor legislation to the FSC, the Extraterritorial Income
Exclusion Act of 2000 and t!ffs xvas upheld on appeal,a33
Stephan suggests that dais example shows that the WTO does constrain US taxation
laxvs.134 He argues that the US would be concerned about the econotnic consequences of
failure to comply with WTO rtflings,t35 as continued growth in the global economy and
confidence in it may be undemfined by the instability in the xvot!d tradh~g system caused by
a failure to comply,t3~, Tiffs is borue out by the fact that both rich and poor countries
comply with most WTO rulings,t3v Confidence that the benefits of WTO memberskip
outweigh the costs, including the t!~teat of haxdng to comply with adverse adjudication, is
seen in the membership growth of the WTO.138 As countries comply with WTO rulings,
that act of compliance also reinforces dae weight of those rulings under public international
law and entrenches thek position as an ongoing constraint on domesdc tax policy as it is
affected by those rulings.
Exclusions in hmnan fights treaties allow states a ’Margin of Appreciation’ in matters
critical to die existence and operation of the state. Essentially, in revenue matters, t!xe state
is allowed significant freedoms in the legislation and operation of the tax system. For
example, Ardde 1 of the Fkst Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) as amended by Protocol No 11 states:
For coverage see, eg., ’kVTO Panel Hm~ds US Fourdl Loss Over FSC Replacement Law’ (2001) 25 Tax
Notes httenmtioua/, 234; ’Parties to Resolve FSC Dispute flarougb Negotiation, says Former US Trade Rep’
(2002) 25 Tax Notes httet~mtiotml, 970; and ’Bush Promises ~rFO Compliance, Fails to Lay Out Timetable’
(2002) 26 TaxNote~ Interttatio~tal, 700.Ste han, ’-\mefican Hegemony and International Law: Sheriff o~ Prisoner? The Umted States andP.B.    p ~
The \Vorld Trade Orgaoization’ (2000) ! ChicagoJout~m!ofI#te~talionalkaw, 49, 66.
Ibid.
Ibid., 67.
Ibid., 68.
Ibid.
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Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of Iris possessions.
No one shall be depmmd of his possessions except in the public interest and subiect
to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international
The preceding provisions shall not, hoxvever, in any xvay impair the tight of a
State to enforce such laws as it deems necessat3’ to control the use of property in
accordancewith the general interest or to secure the payments of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.
This xvoutd seem to make aW model of taxpayers’ tights superfluous. Yet, in Sponvttg and
LO)mtvlh v. Swede&~39 the European Court of Hmnan Rights inteq~reted Axticle I to mean
that tlaere must be a fair balance between tile pubfic interest demands of the conununity
and the requirement to protect’individual rights34° The margin of appreciation gives the
state broad powers to secttre the payment of taxes, but the exercise of the right of
sovereignty must be fair, folloxv procedural safeguards and uphold the principle of
proportionality.14~ Although Jacobs and White argue that, ’nowhere is the margin of
appreciation wider than in the area of taxation’,m Persson-~)sterman demonstrates that,
particularly in procedural areas, the ECHR has strengthened taxpayers’ fights,m
The European Union (ELI) provides another example of how convergence between
systems creates a dynanfic environment for the recognition of interests. This is evident in
the ~ades goverrfing taxation. Theoretically, the EU bas limited control over the direct
Series A, No. 52, [1982] ECHR 5, 18.
Followed in James v. U*~iled Kingdom, Judgment of 21 Februat3’ 1986, Series A, No. 98; (I986) 8 EHRR 123,
para. 50.
He**tKch v. Fmt,ce, Judgement of 22 September 1994, Series A, No. 296 A; (1994) 18 El-ERR 440, para. 39.
F. Jacobs and R. White, above n. 103, p. 258.
R. Persson-~)sterman, ’Humm~ Rights in the Field of Taxation: a view from Sweden’ (1999) 2 The
Camb*idge Yearbook of Etovpeatt L~gal Studies.
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taxing powers of individual states.144 But the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has been
quick to strike down irrlpedhr~ents to the hnplementation of the EC Treaty.14s Raventts
puts it forcefally:146
The most serious accusation that has been made against the ECJ is that it is
undermining the taxation powers of the Member States, in other words, it is attacking
the sovereignty of those Member States .... As the SdJumacker decision stated: ’as
Commmfity law stands at present, direct taxation does not as such fall \viflfin the
put~,iew of the Community’ but, and tiffs is the point, ’the powers retained by the
Member States must nevertheless be exercised consistently with Conmaunity law’.
\Vhete national tax provisions coincide with Conm~unity laxv, then all is well; xvhere
tbey do not, Cotm-nunit3, law must prevail.
The development of taxpayet~’ rights by the ECJ has been significant and much of tiffs
jur’isprudence is analysed in more depth in later chapters. That protection of individual
taxpayers was not tim pthnaty intention of the ECJ, but zather to take forward the vision of
the EU as contained in the Treaty,147 does not detract frorn the effect. It rather underlines
the point made above, that where economic or relational inter-dependence is strongest,
there is most convergence between tax systems, and principles have their widest
acceptance. The jurisprudence of tim EQI provides a basis for both many of the principles
tmderlying, and much of the substance witiin~, a model of taxpayers’ tights. It also
m Under A~ticles 90 to 93 of the EC Treaty, as compared xviflx its powers oxrer indirect taxation. See
generally, L.W. Gomaley, EU Taxation Lair (Richmond, Ricbmond, 2005), ch. 1.
1~5 See R. Persson-Osterman, above ta. 143; M. Buquicctfio de Boer, above n. 21; C.O. Lenz, ’The
Jmisprudence of the European Com~ of Justice in Tax Matters’, 0997) 2 EC Tax" Revietv, 80; and S.
Raventds, ’Recent Income Tax Cases before tim European Court of Justice: Impact on Future Tax Policy
in Europe’ (1998) 38 IBFD Bulletin, 336.
146 Ibid.,. IBFD BM/elin, 339 and quothag fVinanzamt Kght-Alsladl v. 3"d)tm¢acker, [1995] ECR I 225.
1~7 j. Bengoe~xa, The Legal Reasoning qf the Eumpema Courl of Jmli~e (Oxford, OUP, 1993), p. 80.
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highlights the need, in the context, of sigrdficanfly hlcreased international trade and
investment, for consist(nt treaUnent of taxpayers’ rights bev, veen }urisdicfions.148
D Conclusion
A model of taxpayers’ rights is both realistic and possible. Ctttrendy the rights are disparate
al~d are interpreted differendy internationally and in individual jurisdictions. However,
dmre has been sufficient convergence in recent decades for principles that have become
wide|y accepted to be included in a model that will reflect the practices of many
jurisdictions and act as a guide for others)49
Baker and Groenhagen make a strong statement for a model:ts°
[N]ew proposals to extend massively the exchange of information bee, veen tax
auflmrifies around the world reqatire a more systematic protection of taxpayers’ rigbts.
There is always room for hnprovement and fl~is is where the process of standard-
setthag comes ha. By exami~fing best practice among existing countries, by identi~,h~g
problems with existing practice, rights can be enhanced ha a \vay which is both
beneficial to taxpayers and, ultimately, to effective tax admhfistration.
VIII SHOULD THE MODEL INCLUDE TAXPAYERS’ OBLIGATIONS?
148A. Sawyer, ’A Comparison of New Zealand Taxpayers’ Rights with Selected Civil Law and Coreanon Law
Countries Have New Zealand Taxpayers Been "Short-Changed"?’ (1999) 32 Vanderbi/! Jour*¢al qf
Tt’ally~lalio~lalLaIl,, 1346, 1347.
149A. Sawyer, ibid. made one of the first calls for an international statement of taxpayers’ tights m one of the
seminal articles on the topic.
15o Above n. 110, p. 5.
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Revenue authorities are given poxvej:s to administer the tax system. These include the
powers of administtatiofl, collection and enforcement. The system itself finds its basis in
primary and delegated legislation, often implemented using administrative regulation. Every
aspect of the administt’ation of the tax system has a beating on an obligation that a taxpayer
owes to the state under the tax laws and regulations. This is reflected in the broad margin
of appreciation given to states under international human ~ights treaties in the area of
taxadon and the positive dug, to pay taxes in some treaties. For example, Article 29 of the
198l African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights states that each individual has a duty
’to pay taxes imposed by taw in the interest of the society’.151 A taxpayers’ duties are
comprehensive.
A model of taxpayers’ obligations would therefore constitute a model tax code, or at
least a model tax code governing the administration of the tax system. There may xvell be
good reasons for devising such. codes. Hussey and Lubick have done just that with their
Basic llYotCd Tax Code at~d Comme~ta~.15~ Thuton~fi’s wide-ranging two volume Tax J~aw
Design and Dtaflit~g, based broadly on the expe~ience of the IMF in developing countries,
provides much useful guidance on the critical elements of such a code.~s3
However, to state it in these terms could be to misinteqoret what proponents of the
inclusion of taxpayers’ obligations in any ~rtodel are saying. The Australian Taxpayers’
Charter includes a number of ’taxpayer obligations’3s4 They set out in sinaple temas the
culture of voluntary compliance that should underfie the tax system. Taxpayers are
expected to:~s5
be ti-uthful in dealing \vith the ATO;
Text in P.R. Gbandi, abram n. 45, p. 332.
W.M. Hussey and D.C. Lubick, (eds), Basic World Tax Code a~td Commet*ta~3, (2*~d eda, Arlington Va, "Fax
Analysts, 1996).
V. Tlmron)~, above n. 89.
Australian Taxation Office (ATO), The Ta.\Tbq)’e*s’ Cha*¢e~; <www.ato.gm,.au>, ! September 2006.
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keep records in accordance with ~he law;
take reasonable cat~ when preparing tax returns and other documents and in keeping
records;
lodge tax returns and other required documents or information by the dne date;
pay taxes and other amounts by the due date; and
be co-operative in dealings with the ATO.
Most of the obligations are mandatory, supported by the law. Others, such as the
expectation that taxpayers will treat ATO staff with courtesy and consideration are simply a
statement of accepted social behaviotm It reflects the emphasis by the ATO and other
revenue authorities that have published similar charters on encore’aging a culture of
voluntary compliance. This approach is consistently taken by the ATO. For example, the
Australian Commissioners of Ta,xafion often express fllis view in thei~ speeches:is6
The role of law argument is a distraction or a ’straw man’ to the extent that it is put to
preclude recognition of the distinct value of taxation. It is a clinical debating
that fMls to recognise that attitudes and values invariably affect tile choices people
make, their preparedness to push the boundaries and the way |aws are applied, t’uled
ou by the courts and, indeed, framed. This is the true nature and influencer of ethical
behaviotm It is about staodards and values set by cotmnunity culture xvhich in turn
directly influence the decisions and behavi6ur of its members.
It is appropriate that published charters should include statements of taxpayer obligations.
They aim at encouraging voluntary compliance and are used both for infoz-tnafion and to
Ibid.
M. Carm0dy, Austxalian Commissioner of Taxation, ’Ethics and Taxation’, speech to dm Edmund Rice
Bushaess Ed~ics Fonmx (Sydney, 28 Octobe~ 1999), p. 2,
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put for~vard the views of the revenue authorities. There are no\v man), examples to choose
from.
The OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration has issued a series of practice
notes for tax adirfinistxations. In its P~indples of Good TaxAdmitlislration,157 it identifies as the
main role of revenue authofities: to ensure compfiance with the tax laws and to focus on
voluntatT compliance. In its practice note, Taxpayer Rights altd Ob]igaliot~s,ls8 it stresses the
importance to voluntat3, compliance of an understanding of basic obligations:
There is a set of behavioural nomls expected of taxpayers by Govermnents. Tliese
expected behaviours are so fundamental to the successful operation of taxation
systems that dmy are legal requirements in many, if not tnost, countries. Widmut this
balance of taxpayer tights and obligations taxation systems could not function
effectively and efficiently.
The practice note goes on to identify as critical, taxpayer obligations to be honest, co~
operative, to provide accurate infomration and documents on thne, to keep records and to
pay taxes on rime. Essentially, it is the same as the ATO’s list.
Hoxvever, fl~e purpose of a model of taxpayers’ fights is different. It aims to identify
basic principles that should underlie any tax system and to provide a consolidated list of the
most important rights tliat it should contahx. In reality, the fights will be found across the
system in different fotans and \vifla different enforcement mechanisrns appropriate to that
particular system. A published charter for taxpayers is infornaational and educational and
directed at taxp~tyers to encottrage voluntatT compliance. It compfises a su~urnat3’ of the
major rights and obligations of xvhich taxpayers should be awaXe. Tlie model, in contrast,
provides guidance to policy makers as to whether an}, tights that should be in place witlfin
157 OECD Committee of Fiscal Affairs Forum on Strategic Management, GAP001 issued 25 June 1999 and
ameixded 2 May 2001, p, 3.
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tlie tax system ate missing. It also provides guidance as to the content of rights and
enforcement mechauistris that may be suitable. To include obligations for educational
pUrposes in such a model is inappropriate because the target audience is different. It is the
role of the revenue authorities to develop such material in the context of their own system.
Indeed, to ensure cotnpleteness, a model designed for policy makers could include
obligations, but it would require the fotantdation of a complete model code of tax
adininistration. That may be beneficial, but it is not necessat3’ as a frost step.
To illustrate, Thuronyi’s edited work, Tax Law Desiglt a,ld Draftitg, identifies as
foundations for any tax system the legal framework for taxation and the law of tax
administxation and procedure3s9 The two chapters provide an ovetwiew of the principal
elements necessm3’ to enact and operate a tax system. The focus is on taxing powers on the
one hand and the execution of those powers on the other: the administration of the tax
system, collection of taxes due .and the enforcement of the tax rules. Both chapters include
discussion of issues that underlie, or can be classified as, taxpayers’ rights. The legal
fratnework for taxation discusses the general principles of taxation and limitations on the
power to make tax laws.t(’° The law of tax administration and procedure includes a specific
section on taxpayers’ rigbts and refers else\vhere to limits on the poxver of the revenue
authority, for example in its powers of investigation.16~ The work is balanced and
authoritative. This volume shows that taxpayers’ rights are but one element of the law
governing tax administration. There is no reason why that element catmot be’ considered
separately.
Most discussions of taxpayers’ rights are derivative. They consider the balance of
state prover and determine to what extent tl~at power should be limited in dealing with its
~s* OECD Conmtittee of Fiscal Affai[s Forum on Strategic Management, GAP002 issued 29 October 2003.
. - , . n ’Laxv of Tax Administration and
~s~ F. Vamstendael, ’Legal Framework for TaxaUon ch. 2, and R K Go[do ,
Pmcedttte’ ch. 4, in V. "II~umnyi, above l~. 89.
l~!, Ibid., pp. 19-31.
~’~ Ibid., p. 103 and pp. 110-112.
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citizens. Tiffs approach forms the basis for the legithnate argument tliat consideration of
taxpayers’ rights should be made in the context of taxpayers’ obligations. An alternative
approach is to staxt with the basic fights of taxpayers and consider to what extent the},
should be limited in the interests of the state reqt~rement to collect taxes. Using this
approach leaves it open to the state to consl:mct whatever obligations it wishes, but sets out
clearly the limits that should apply in the exercise of those obligations. Both approaches
tnay lead to the same cmlclusions. But using taxpayers’ fights as the stardng point goes
back to the prenffse that taxation is itself not a fmldamental good, whereas individual rights
to propert3~ and liberty are.
IX WHAT SHOULD BE THE BASIS FOR RIGHTS CHOSEN?
As discussed earlier, one of the primat3, considerations for inclusion of any fight is a
widespread acceptance. Any right should be expressed in general terms so that it can be
adapted to the context of a particular system. A caveat to the OECD Practice Note,
Ptincip/es of Good Tax Administration,~62 recogtffses this and stresses the varied envitomnent in
wlffch each revenue authority must adrahffster its tax system, with different policies,
legislative envkomnents and administrative practices.
Chapter 3 reviews the basic principles that should underlie any tax system.
Particularly in the last 50 ),ears, these have been identified and developed to provide a
broadly accepted basis for developing tax policy. The principles are relevant and helpful in
the identification of a nmnber of rights that should be included in a model. There are
vafiances in the definition of these principles and the analysis in Chapter 3 attempts to
identi~, the most logical application in the broader context of rights interpretation.
The Rationale for a MMel
It is generally accepted that taxp~5’ers’ rights shoifld be identified and intet13reted as a
species of human right~ and hi the context of the international hmnan rights obligations
into which states have entered. Tills was the starting point for the OECD in its 1990 survey
of taxpayers’ fights and obligations.!63 There is now significant jurisprudence to explore
across a range of international treacles)64
General practice also provides a range of important rights that are included in tax
systems. "Hae OECD identified a fist in its survey.16s The Inter-American Centre of Tax
A&~finistrations/Centto Interamericano de Administraciones Tributarias (CLAT) has been
active in this area. It has a number of usefu! pubfications that provide a so~ce for practices
among its members. 166
The fights that flow from accepted practice in different jtn:isdictions indude different
t3q3es of fight. Some are legislative and others are administrative. The method of
enforcement can alter significa.nfly the content of a right and its application. Chapter 4
provides a classification of rights and Chapter 5 examines different methods of
enforcement.
Anod~er significant factor in determining the substance of a tight is its interpretation.
A model of taxpayers’ rights roves its significance in part, as identified above, to the
increased need for international interaction. However, it has long been recognised that
[tlter13retadon across borders can vai3* greatly.167 In determining fights for inclusion in a
model, it is also important to be aware of different legal systems, different interpretations
OECD, Taxpayet:r’ Rights aM Obligalia~*~ (1990).
Discussed in p. Baker and A-M. Groetthagen, above n. 110 and P. Baker, "Taxation and the European
Convention on Hmuan Rights’ [2000] Btitid~ Tax Ret,iem 211.
Above n. 163.
For example, as early as 1984, the Technical Papers of the 18th General Assembly of the inte~-~M’nefican
Center of Tax Administrators (Cartagena, Colombia, 21-25 May 1984), focused on Compliance with Tax
Obligations. At die General Assembly held m the Donfirdcan Republic (19 Ma~cb 1996), it approved
’Mimmum necessary, at~butes for a soured and effective tax administration’.
Recognised, e.g., for treat3, interpretation, in arts 31-33 of the Viemaa Convention on the Law of Treaties
1969.
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and how they affect the general acceptance and application of the right. Tiffs is discussed m
more detail m Chapter 3.
X WHAT IS THE INCENTIVE FOR STATES TO ADOPT TAXPAYERS’ RIGHTS?
Particularly within the revenue authorities of OECD countries, opinion has changed as to
the value of specific taxpayer protection, in the context of complex tax laws. Tax law
complexity is a focus for criticism and simplification has become a major issue. Part of the
hnpetus for the rewrite of legislation has come from the revenue authorities. The
complexitT of the transactions that has led to complex law has also placed strains on the
adinhfisttadon and compliance functions. Revenue authorities, are constandy striving to
inaprove compliance and make revenue administration more efficient. Their research has
consistendy shmvn that in order to do dtis it seems helpful to have increased cooperation
from taxpayers.1(,8 The OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Admirtistradon PtgMp/es of Good
Tax" AdmiMstralion - Practice Note (GAP001) states:t69
The promotion of voluntary compliance should be dae ptimary concern of revenue
authorities. The ways by xvhich revenue authorities interact wifl~ taxpayers and
employees impact ou the public perception of the tax system and d~e degree of
The principle was recognised in OECD, Ta.\7)ayet:d Ra~ghls aM Obligaliom: A Sut~ey q[ the Legal Situalion
OECD Colloldes (1990) and is stressed in OECD Centre for ’Fax Policy and Adtrfittistration PtitMp/es of
Good Tax-AdmiM*lra6ot¢ - Practice Note (GAP001, 1999, amended 2001), <www.oecd.org>, I0 January
2006. A comprehensi*~e analysis and review of the ~:esearch to the late 1980s can be found in J.A. Roth,
J.T. Scbolz ,and A.D. Witte (eds), Vo/ttme 1 - Taxpayer Compliance: An Agotdafor R~search and .A. Roth and
J.T. SchoLz (eds), Volume 2 - Ta:,payer Compliance: Soda/Sdence Po~peclive* (Pennsylvania, University of
Petmsylvania Press, 1989). Later research is reviewed in j. Wickerson, ’The Changing Roles of Taxpayer
Audit Programs: Some Recent Developments in the Australian Taxadon Office’ (1994) 4 Revemte Law
Jom’m~/, 125; J. Hasseldine, ’How Do Revenue Audits Affect Taxpayer Compliance?’ (1993) 47 IBFD
Bulletin, 424; V. Tanzi and P. Shome, ’A Primer on Tax Evasion’ (1994) 48 IBFD Btd/eti& 328; G.S. Cooper
(ed.), Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law (Amsterdam, IBFD and ATRF, !997); and V. Braithwaite, above n.
17.
GAP001, ibid., p. 3.
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voluntary compliance. Taxpayers who are aware of their rights and expect, and in fact
receive, a fair and efficient treatment ave more willing to comply.
Results of taxpayer compliance research within OECD revenue authorities have
encouraged them to support simplification of tax laws, the introduction of serf-assessment
systems, and to change dlei~ traditional cultures. The revenue authorities are tt3,ing to alter
die way that taxpayers perceive them.t7° The move is away f~otu a cultvxe of ’command
and control with the automatic application of penalties for various forms of non-
compliance’art to a responsive, set,rice-orientation designed to build txust, support and
respect in the coranaudity.172 This ira, dives such diverse responses as comprehensive
taxpayer education, mission statements espousing friendly and efficient collection of
revenue, changes in language, such as calling taxpayers ’clients’, and creation of a service
mentality among staff. An emphasis on taxpayers’ rights is part of dais process.
Taxpayer lobby groups tend to dismiss the validity of the fights and responsibilities
classified here as relationship building.173 They prefer to focus on the creation of legal
fights. There is no doubt that legal fights are hnportant. However, it is also essential to
remember flirt the revenue authofities a~e approaching the process from a different
pe;spective: one which seeks to encourage compliance with the tax law.
The ATO, for example, has undertaken and supported sigraficant research in tlfis
area.17~ Thek research has shown that compfiance is affected by die relationsltip that
taxpayers have with the ATO and its officers,tvs Accordingly, it is no surprise that the
I~0 See e.g., V. °l’huron}4, above n. 89; G.P. Jenkins, above n. 89; K. Theodore, above n. 89; R.M. Bh:d and M.
Casene~a de Jantscber, above n. 89; and CLAT, ’Measures for hnprovhag the level of voluntary
compfiance with t~x obligations: Teclmical papers and reports of the 18th GenerN Assembly of the Inter-
American Center of T~: Administrators’ (IBFD, 1985).
~ V. Br~dth\vaite, aboye n. 17, p. l,
~-~ Ibid. Tltis is clear from taxpayers’ charters, see Chapter 7.
*~ See, e.g. in Australia, ’Charting an Old Course’ (1995-96) 30 "Fa,x’o/iotl ill Austt’alia, 265.
~
,ks is evidenced by the papers presented at the 1993 and 1995 ATO Research Conferences and the
subsequent bienmal ATAX International Tax Administxation Conferences.
I1~ Demonstxated by the strength of tmcpayer engagement in successive speeches by Commissioners of
Taxation and ha fl*e annual ATO Compliance Program, <www.ato.gov.au>, 1 November 2006. See
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Conmussioner’s view xvas that, ’The fact that the Charter encapsulates in a cleat and
concise way the sort of approaches xve are looking for from ATO staff into the furore will
provide them with valuable guidance’,lv6 In fact, it would be surprising if there was not
significant erapbasis on relationship building, given file research such as that by Statans,
who argues that9v7
Prior research has convincingly shoxvn hoxv a single experience with a rude authoritsT
loxvers the recipient’s support of legal authority and indirectly increases non-
compliance with laxvs. One primats, objective of tax audits should be to increase the
legitimacy of tax authorities and tax enforcement rather titan to lower it. IWhen]
taxpayers believed their auditors were polite, conmmnication about interpersonal
treatment reinforced taxpayers’ earlier acquired beliefs and support for tax authorities
and tax laws. However, undignified audits are vet3, cosily for the enforcement systeru,
especially when there is no cb’ange, or refund. The heavy cost is in terms of the loss of
legitimacy in the eyes of the audited taxpayer~ and the other honest taxpayers who are
told about the audit.
The change in the ATO culture over the 1990s reflects the ATO’s viexv of the importance
of file taxpayer relationship with the ATO. Supported by file findings of its reseatch, the
revenue authority earl}, on supported this change in culture as a means of increasing
taxpayer compliance in a xvay that xvas not possible tl~tough its traditional enforcement
further, S. James, K. Murphy, and M. Reinhart, ’Tile Taxpayers’ Charter’ (2004) 7 ]om~lal of Att,hulian
Taxalio1~ 336 and V. Braitbwaite, ’Dancfiag wiflx Tax Authorities: Motivational Postxtres and non compliant
Actions, in V. Braithwaite, above n.17, p. !5.
Quoted in ’Counter Culture’, (1995-96) 30 Ta.\.atiotl i1iAushzdia, 230, p. 231.
L. Stalatas, ’Talking about Tax Audit Experiences: The Procedural Content of Socialisation’, paper
presented at tim Internal Revenue Setx,ice Research Conference (Washington DC, 12-13 November 1992)
and quoted in J. Wicketson, above n. 168, p. 13. The concept of a breakdown in compliance by taxpayers
as a restttt of mxresoh,ed conflicts is consistent wifl~ conflict theory. A major concern for tim ATO is die
fact that once taxpayers establisb negative attitudes and perceptions of tile ATO, dmy are exceedingly
difficult to eliminate. ’Titis is partly because they support each other: negative beliefs validate negative
feelings, and negative feelings make negative beliefs seem fight’. D.G. Pmitt and S.H. Kim, Sodal Co1~flic!:
Es~’alatiou, Stalemate attd SeRlemettt (3rd edn, New York, McGraxv t-fill, 2004) p. 100.
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approach,t78 Tliis approach impacted on die ATO’s guidelines for inter’hal conduct. A
t3q?ical example is the extension of legal professional privilege to certain papers of
professional accounting advisers,t79 It is purely an administxative arrangement, but reflects
flae ATO’s concern over t.lie public perception of its audit activit3r following cases that were
svidely publicised and in which its actions were criticised, such as die Citibat*k Case38°
Anodmr set of guidelines, again aimed at ensuring an acceptable public iniage for the ATO,
acts as a code of conduct, governing the procedures to be followed by ATO auditors in die
event of differences arising widi taxpayers other than over die interpretation and
apphcation of the law.~8~
Increasingly, the research turned to the non-economic factors affecting tax
compliance,t82 Wenzel provides a useftfl analysis o£ the importance of justice perceptions in
tax compliance.~83 The idea was taken up from 1998 by Woellner et al in a major research
proiect wbich went some wa.y towards identif),ing the psychological costs of tax
compliance in Australia.184 Richardson has confirmed by iris research that tax fakness has
an impact on compliance behavinur in the non-western jurisdiction of Hong Kong.185
See, e.g., A. Wird~, ’Changing Taxpayer Compfiimce: The Impact of Buskaess Auditors as Service
P rmfders’ (1994) 11 .*aa¢straltatl Tax Hot~¢m, 63 and R. ~knderson, Taxp% ers ~e People’, paper presented
at ~m 1993 ATO Reseazch Conference (Canberra, 2-3 December 1993).
ATO, Guidelines to Accessing Pt~ssional Accounlitg Advisot~’ Papet~      Guide#tws (2004),
<x~v.ato.gov.au/coworate/content.asp?doc=/content/51665.h~>, 1 October 2006.
F~ v. Cilibattk ~d, (1989) 20 FCR 403.
ATO,    ’Code    of    Se~ement    Practice’    ~der    ~dgemott,    Po’mott    &    Comp/iance,
<x~mv.ato.gov.au/taxprofession~s>, 14 November 2006.
See C. S~dford, Economics ~f Pttblic Fit a ~: Art Emnomic Anal’sis ~ Govos~mott Ex~oMitto~ attd ~ve~me t)t the
UnRed ~tRdom (4tb e~, Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1992), p. 111, where he rex4ewed dm psyclfic costs of
comp~ce and G.P. Je*~s and E.N. Forlemu, Enhandtg Vohmta& Cott~liattce ~ ~dudtg Comp/ia#ce Costs:
A Ta&o,er Sen&e Approach, Development Discussion Paper No. ~8, Tax Research Series No.
(Han,ard Institute for International Development, 1993).
M. Wenzel, above n. 17. ~e chapter takes ~*e ar~ent fo~vard by see~g ’to offer a conceptual
framework for such justice considerations based on concepm~ Os~cfions made ~ soci~ psycholo~cd
justice research’. It also includes a use~l t~onomy of fl~e social psycholoocat justice fiterau~e.
R. Woe~er, C. Coleman, M. Mckerchar, M. Walpole, J. Zeder, m R. Fisher and M. Walpole (eds),
’Idenfi~,~g Om Psycholo~cal Costs of Tax Compfiance’ m Gkbai Challetges i# Tax Admi*ffsO~lion,
~it~gham, UK Fiscal Pub~cafions, 2005), pp. 268-287.
G. ~chardson, ’An Analysis of ~ae Impact of Tax Fmmess Perceptions on T~ Compfiance Behax4or ~ a
Non-Western J~s&cfion: ~e Case of Hong Kong’, a pape~ presented at dm 6~ International
Conference oo T~ Adm~s~afion (Sydney, Austin, 15 16 Ap~ 2004).
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It is clear that as the research momentum supporlk~g the compliance benefits of
being seen to uphold taxpayers’ rights has grown, so too has the acceptance by the revenue
authonttes of the nnportance of taxpa) ers r~ghts. B) 2002, the Australian Comnfissioner of
Taxation could say of taxpayers:186
It is early days yet and xve are at the stage of identifying areas for improvement rather
than solutions. However, some common themes are emerghag. People are 1oo "king for
recog~iition and acknowledgement. The}, want certainty, comfort and reassurance ....
Back to dae first task - delivering on the integrity and fairness promised by The New
Tax System. Australians want assurance that taxes are being collected fairly across the
board .... In the first nine months of dlis year, our audit program has raised an
additional $2 billion in taxes and penalties. We have moved on from the days when
compliance xvas simply about the nmnber of audits you did.
Obviously, raising the revenue required by governments to fund their activities is a primary
task of revenue authorities. However, it is increasingly recogtfised that for greater
effectiveness this should be done in the context of a service-oriented relationship with
taxpayers that builds a perception of the fairness of the tax system. With Otis backdrop,
there are clear benefits to revenue authorities in upholding taxpayers’ rights.
From the state’s perspective there is a further important incentive to protect
taxpayers’ rigbts. Chapter 7 x~dll illustrate the extensive powers available to revenue
authorities. It is not mmommon for revenue authorities to have greater powers of search
and seizure, for example, than those available to the police investigating serious crimes.
Historically, democratic states prefer not to be named for abuses of any form of human
t~6 M. Carmody, ’The Changing Tax Landscape’, address to the Institute of Chartered Accountants
Ausnalia Nem, orkmg Lut~clieon, 3 iMay 2002.
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rights.tS7 Where the powers available to the revenue authorities are so significant, it is
kaevitable that Without appropriate safeguards, there is a likefihood of abuse,t88 It is
therefore in aw state’s interest to introduce the safeguards that will prevent abuse and
ensure that those responsible for revenue administration, collection and enforcement retain
public confidence.
~Hte danger, where there is abuse and it is not checked, is an over-reaction by the
legislature that could undermine the revenue authofity. Tiffs was demonstrated in the
Umted States in the 1980s and 1990s. There xvas clear evidence of abuse of power by the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS).189 Hmvever, the legislative reaction was significant and the
onuffbus bills known as Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2190 and 319t were described by Greenbaum
as ’less an attempt by the legislators to advance the fights of taxpayers than a means by
which politicians improve their stature with the\ electorate by attacking the IRS’.t92
Congressman Sam Johnson from Tdxas, for example, made the colortrftfl statement:1~3
But Otis bill is hnportant because the po\vers of the IRS to investigate and examine
taxpayers are greater than an}, other Government agency. They are intrusive. They are
into out" lives, and it seems that the constimtiona| rights of taxpayers are always
trampled upon but attiring is ever done.
18~ The UK derogated from the ECHR under art. 15 h~ respect of Northern Ireland rather than be fotmd to
he in breach. Withdrawal of tile derogation resulted in a number of cases where the UK was found to be
in breach, to its ob~qous discomfort. See hi. O’Boyle, C. Warbrick, E. Bates, D.J. Harris, Law of the
Europeao Com,enlian on Humall Rt~hts (2nd edn, UK, Le.,fisNexis, 2005), ch. !6.
~a~ p. Baker and A-M. Groenhagen, above n. 110, p. 3.
t89 A. Greenbaum, ’U~fited States Ta.,:payer Bills of Rights 1, 2 and 3: A Path to the Fut~tre or Old Whine in
New Bottles?’ m D. Bentley, above n. 115, ch. 15.
~ot~ An Act to amend tlie Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide for increased taxpayer protections, PL
104-168, signed into law 30 July 1996.
191 .31iI ,~xct to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to restructure and reform tim Internal Revenue
Setwice, and for other purposes, PL 104-168, signed into taw 22jldy 1998.
~v-, A. Gteenbaum, above n. 189, p. 379.
~ Rep. S. Jolmson, ’House of Representatives Debates’, from Tax Analysts, Tax Notes Toda)’ (Lexis database,
24 April 1996).
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Chapter 2
It is not ha the interests of taxpayers; goverlmaent or the revenue authotit3, to undermine
the operation of the tax’system by mrer-reacthlg to abuse of the system by any partT.194
Instead, it is in all pardes’ interests if abuse and the associated reaction that is likely to
follow can be linfited by introducing appropriate standaxds.
For developing economies dlere is a further imperative that encourages the
observance of taxpayers’ fights. Taxpayers’ rights are general]3’ a species of civil and
political fights, although maW administrative rights are not enforceable by law. ICaufmann
has found that socio-economic development is closely linked to the recognition of civil and
political fights,t95 Recognition of rights does not occur automatically as a country gets
richer. Rather the evidence points clearly to:196
the fundamental hnportance of positive and sustained interventions m improve
governance and civil liberties in countt{es where it is lackhag. Indeed, the fact that
good governance is not a ’luxauT good’, to wltich a country automatically graduates
when it becomes xvealthier, means in practical terms fl~at leaders, policymakers, and
civil society need to work hard and continuously at hnproving tliese civil rights and
governance within their countries.
Where they are not observed, Kaufinann’s research across a range of World Bank
projects shows that the likelihood of coreaption and state capture by special interests is
higher.~97 Ttxe better die governance of public institutions, wlficb would include the tax
athxfinisttation, the better would be the development outcomes. These would also be
directly assisted by measures to promote the engagement of citizens with the tax
Arguably, fl~e response £f the Australian Government and rite ATO to systematic abuse of the anti-
avoidance provisions by taxpayers in the 1980s, encouraged in part by a formalisfic approach by dae com:ts
to interpretation of tax legislation, has resulted m an overly complex tegulatmT enx~otmmnt, whicb
successive governments have since tried to clarif3" and simplif3,.
D. Kaufmarm, ’Human Rights and Governance: "It~e Empirical Challenge’ in P. Alston and M. Robinson
(eds), Human Ra~ghts mid Deve!opmet~’: Towatds 3,4tttua/ Reitfon’ement (Oxford, OUP, 2005), p. 352.
Ibid., where flmse conclusions are d~awn from tim evidence presented in s. 2.s.
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a&ninistradon, which in ttma is shown to encourage the control of corruption and
enhatacement of corpora(e etilics.198
XI CONCLUSION
Tt~s Chapter began by explomag the concept that tile exercise of the power to tax is an
infringement of fights to property and fiberty. Taxpayers’ rights, as with human fights
generally, provide the limit to dm powers of the state. They balance the requirement to
raise revenue against file fights of individuals. Even though relativism and subjectivity
require any right to be adapted to its context, the human rights cotmnunit3, has accepted
diat there are universal standards.
General acceptance forms the basis for a Model of taxpayers’ fights. Given the
increasing integration of the global economy, the perceived fairness and integrity of a tax
system is becoming more important. Tile free flow of funds and file ease of international
investment mean dlat govermnents catmot afford to ignore the tights of taxpayers. The
diversity of tax systems emphasises file need for generally accepted standards.
The Chapter showed that it is generally accepted that taxpayers’ rights should be
identified and interpreted as a species of human rights and in the context of file
international hmnan rights obligations into which states have entered. This was the starting
point for" tile OECD ha its 1990 survey of taxpayers’ rights and obligations)99 There is
Ibid., discussed with a case study on Boli~da hts. 3.
Ibid., La s. 3 and s. 5. Not surprisingly, but related indirectly to this argument, M.L. Ross, ’Does T~xation
Lead to Representation’, in a paper presented at an IDS Taxadon Seminar (UK, 28-29 October 2002)
<www.ids.ac.uk/gdr/cfs/activities/Taxadon-Serrdnar.html>, 27 September 2006, has found tl~at higher
taxes relative to govermnent ser*~ices tend to make states more democratic over lime. q2Ms suggests that
where taxes are high taxpayers increase their engagement through protest or other means to enst~re the
deliver3’ of government set~ices, thereby expanding the pressuxe for more democratic mechahisms witlmagovernment.
OECD, above n. 163.
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significant additional jufispmdence to..explore both domestically and internationally. It is
therefore timely to consider a model set of taxpayers’ rights.
As the aim is to provide a cormxaon standard of taxpayers’ fights for inclusion in
domestic legislation, it is unlikely that all rights in the model will be adopted as a separate
code in most jtttisdictions. It is orB}, where reform of the tax system includes a new tax act
that adoption of Otis kind xvilt be feasible. However, elements of the model may be
included as they stand into existing tax acts as a separate secdon. Providing tim standards in
the form of a guide to best practice is therefore appropriate.
It was made clear in the Chapter that the ahn of tiffs thesis is not to provide a
comprehensive tax administration code. Such a code would cover both fights and
obligations. The aim of the thesis is to consider one element of the rules govertfing tax
adiuinistrafion: those rules dealing xvith taxpayers’ rights.
For many jurisdictions the. modal will provide a standard to act as a form of qualitT
col~trol. "Fax policy makers xvill be able to measure the quality of the fights afforded to
taxpayers against an objective international standard. It will provide legitimacy and
reassurance where policy makers are stfiving to achieve best practice. Domestically it xsdll
provide support for the revenue compliance programs. It will also assist revenue autimfities
and the judiciary by allowing them to assess issues brought before them comparatively,
taking account of decisions on similar issues elsewhere that may helpfully be decided on a
uniform basis. It is likely that commonality of problems in the adnfirfisttation of tax
systems will increase, even if the move towards harmonisation of substantive rides is stow.
The Model xvill need adapting to the context of each jm-isdiction. States will need a
degree of latitude in the imptetnentation of the individual fights. To maintain that flexibility
the Model must remain relatively broad in its articulation of standards. Tliat said, the value
of the model will depend upon a genuine attempt to inaplement the fights contained in it.
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Ushag a two-tiered model provides developing countries unable to comply with all
rights contained ha the model the opporttmity to ensure that at least the basic ~igbts are
protected ha fl~eir iufisdicfion. The model should therefore identify the basic fights in each
a~dcle, with any additional recommended fights that should be present in all sopbJsficated
tax systems.
The fights that flow f~om accepted practice ha different }urJsdictions include different
types of right. Chapter 4 provides a classification. Some are legislative and others are
administxative. The method of enforcement can alter significantly the content of a fight
and its appfication and tiffs is explored in Chapter 5.
Taxpayers’ rights have come of age. They are an increasingly inapottant element in
any consideration of tax reform. Vociferous domestic interest groups and the need to
reassure foreign investors will continue to drive govermnents to focus on taxpayer
protection. The incentive to ’,maprove compliance will conrinue to encourage revenue
authofities to inaprove perceptions of fairness and integrity ha the adininistration of tax
systems. A model of taxpayers’ fights will provide a useful tool for all of the participants in
the tax system nationally and internationally. Before classifying the rights, Chapter 3
outlines the principles that underlie a tax system generally, and therefore the fights within
it, and identifies issues tbat arise in the interpretation of fights.
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CI~PTER 3
PRINCIPLES AND INTERPRETATION
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2 provided a theoretical basis for taxpayers’ rights drawn from the rights literatt~te.
It developed the concept of a two-tiered ModEl as a timely, beneficial and realistic response
to die move towards standards in a domestic and international context. Chapter 2
concluded that a Model would need to be based on generally accepted t-t0es, wlfich could
be adapted to fit the context o~ individual jurisdictions.
In Chapter 2 two hnportant limits on the Model were raised. It was noted that there
are accepted principles that underlie die structure and operation of tax systems and the
roles they contain. Any rights included m a Model would need m comply broadly witl~in
these principles. Chapter 2 also noted the diversity of different systems and the need to
apply the Model contextually. T!ffs raises the second limit: interpretation of the Model. The
t~vo issues are connected. They are both lhmts on the Model. The interpretation of the
rights included in the Model is aided by a clear understanding and application of the
principles on which they are broadly based.
Chapter 3 notes first that aldmugh there are accepted principles, their specific
definition varies a[tnost as often as the reports on tax systems in which they are appear.
The first part of the chapter draws from a number of the more hnportant reports on tax
systems a definition of the basic principles that should broadly apply to the Model. These
are used to provide support throughout the remah~ng chapters for the rights chosen for
inclusion m the Model.
65
The second part of Chapter 3 ~oalyses the interpretation of Model rights once the),
are chosen. It acknoxvledges the problems of blttrred definitions and sets out a number of
barriers to common interpretation. Chapter 3 concludes with a reconm~ended initial
approach to interpreting Model rights. It can be adopted in any jurisdiction and sits broadly
on the principles underl)~ing the Model.
Tiffs chapter sets the framework for analysis of taxpayers’ rights, as opposed to other
rights. Taxpayers’ rights must be examined not only in the context of the broader righ~ts
discussion, but in the context of the tax policy discussion.
II BASIC PRINCIPLES
Adoption of income taxation as a primary source of revenue by goverrmnents has a
relatively short history. Tiffs has some advantages. Particularly in the last 50 )Tears,
principles, such as those identified in 1776 by Adam Smith,~ have been developed to
provide a broadly accepted basis for developing tax policy. The theoretical basis for an
equdtable and efficient tax system proxdded by such eminent scholars as R.M. Haig and
H.C. Simons is widely understood if seldom adopted.2 The more widely used principles
that draw on public finance theory, but xvhich blur the economic definition, are
nonetheless relevant and helpftfl in the identification of a ntm~ber of rights that should be
included in a model of taxpayers’ rights and in providing a basis for others. Because they
have been abstracted from the theory, there are variances in the definition of these
2
A. Sn’dth mad K. Sunderland (eds), An h¢qttiO, into lhe Natut~ attd Cbusey of lhe Wealth of Naliom (selected edn,
Oxford, OUP, 1993), p. 450.
R.M. Haig, ’The Concept of Income Economic and Legal Aspects’ in R.A. Musgrave and C.S. Shoup
(eds), Readi{g* itt the Economic~ ofTa~,’aliott (Homewood ItI, Irwin, 1959) and H.C. Simons, Petxot*a/Income
"l’a.\-aliot* (Clficago, U~tiversit~’ of Chicago Press, 1938). The unlikelihood of inaplemenfit~g a
comprehensive income tax on net accretions to wealth led to B.I. Bittker raising the question of how to
determine an optkmal second-best policy in % "Comp~cehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax
Reform’ (1967) 80 Harvard Law IOview, 925.
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principles and the analysis m tiffs ahapter puts forward one possible tmiform set of
defufitions in tl~e broadei context of fights interpretation.
The principles underl}~ag tax systems act as values tllat shape legislation. Tax refot-m
has been one of the major trends of the last 50 years,3 which has ensured that these
principles are under constant reviexv. Some reports, such as the Carter Commission Report
of Canada in 1966 have been highly influential internationally.4 The ubiquitous presence of
IMF and other international tax advisers when countfies undertake serious reform of their
tax systetns has also assisted in some cotmnonalit3~ of approach.5
Without exploring the economics underlying current approaches to taxation, it is
worth mentioning the broad context in which the principles have developed. Musgrave,~
one of the most influential public finance theorists, divides the economic functions of
government into:
overcoming the inefficiencies of the market system in economic resot~rce allocation;
redistributing income on a socially acceptable basis; and
smoodxing cyclical flnc~uadons to ensure high levds of employment and price
stability.
K.C. Messete, F. de Kam and C. Heady, Tax" Polig,: Theory and Practice h~ OECD Com¢Oies (New York, OUP,
2003), ch. 2.
Royal Comrmssion on Taxation, Canada (Carter Commission) (Ottawa, Queens Printer, !966). Its
influence discussed in J.G. Head, ’The Carter Legaw: ,Ma International Perspective’ (1987) 4 Australia**
Tax Forum, 143.
See the excellent teclmicai analysis, coveting die drafting experience of such experts in, eg., V. Thuronyi
(ed.), vols 1 and 2, Tax Ianv Dedg~l a*td Dmflillg (Wastfington DC, IMF, 1996); P. Shome (ed.), Comprehensive
Tax Refo*~m The Colombia*~ Ex~ede~tce, IMF Occasional Paper No. 123 (Washington DC, IMF, 1995); G.P.
Jenkins, ’Modernization of Tax Admirdstrafions: Revenue Boards and Pdvafization as InstnJanents fog
Change’ (1994) 48(2) IBFD BM/elin, 75; K. Theodore (ed.), Tax" Refom~ i*~ tt2e Caribbean* (Institute of Social
and Economic Research, Uifiveraity of file West Indies, Mona, Jamaica, 1992); and R.M. Bixd and M.
Casanegra de Jantscher (eds), Imp*~vi~g Tax" AdmiMstmtio*~ in Developing Comlt*ies (Washington DC, IMF,
1992).
R.A. Musgzave, The TheoO, of Public Finam’e (New York, McGraw Hill, 1959) and R.A. Musgrave and P.B.
Musgrave, Public Fimmce i~* Themy a~*d Pmelice (5th edn, New York, McGraw Hill, 1989).
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To aclfieve its econotnic ahns and some form of income redistribution, a government
needs funding. The tax system provides that funding. The shape of the fundh~g process
rests upon tim values underlying the tax system. Alley and Bentley have summafised the
values set out in a number of the tnore important reports and other sources as follows:7
Author Criteria Title
Adam Smith Equality Canons of taxation.
17768 Certainty
Convenience of Payment
Economy in Cotlecdon.
Ca~ter Report- Eqttity The Use of the Tax
Canada Neutrality System to Achieve
19669 Transparency and Accountability Economic and Social
Certainty Objectives
Simplicity
Flexibility
Asprey Report- Criteria for Tax System~
Aus~afia Efficiency
1975m Simplicity
Growih
Stabilisafion
Meade Report - Incentives and Economic Efficiency Characteristics of a
United Kingdom Distributional Effects Good Tax Structure
1978u International Aspects
Shnplicit3~ and Costs of
Admhfistratinn and Compliance
Flexibility and Stability Transitional
Problems
HMSOGreen Practicality, Requiremeot of a Local
Paper Report- Fairness Tax System
United I(Angdom Accountability
198112 Cost of Adn~istradon
Fiscal Dimensions
Financial Control
O’Brien Report Equity Criteria For a Tax
- Ireland Efficiency System
1982~3 Simplicity
Low a&riinistrative and Compliance
Costs
Ridge and Smith Admit~isu’adve Feasibility Economic Criteria for Local Tax
C.R. Alley and D. Bentley, ’Tax Design Principles: Remodelling Adam Smifl~’, (2005) 20 At~slm/ian TaS~
Hom~,’~, 579.
A. Smifll and K. Sunderland, above n. 1.
Canada, Repose of the Raya! Uammisdon o,’., Taxation.,, vol. 2, ’The use of file tax system to act~ieve economic
and 8ocial objectives’ (1966), ch. 1.
tCW. Asprey, Taxation Reviexv Committee, Ftd! Repot (din Asprey Report) (Canberra, AGPS, 1975), p. 13.
Institute for Fiscal Studies [1978], The Stmctm~ and Refom~ of Direct Ta~caliotl, Report of a Committee
Ch,’fired by Prof. J.E. Meade, 0X{eade Report) (London, ~Mlen and Unx*~n).
A#eraalives to Domestic Rates (Cmnd 8449, HMSO 1981).
O’Btien Report 1982, 1st Repot of the Commisdo*t on Taxalion - Direct Taxation, chaired by M.H. O’Brien.
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1991t* :Efficiency ....
Equity and Accountability
Jackson Equity or Fairness Characteristics of an
1994~s Certainty Efficient Tax System
Conveuience of Payment
Economy in Collection and
Compfiance
Transparent.
OECD Neutrality Taxation Framexvork
(Ottaxva) 1998~ Efficiency Conditions (for
Certainty and Shnplicity electxonic commerce)
Effectiveness and Fairness
Flexibility
[CAEW Statutory Pthaciples for a Better
Tax Faculty Certah~ty Tax System
1999iv Simplicity
Easy to Collect and Calculate,
Properly Targeted
Constant, Consultation
Regular Review
Fair and Reasonable
Competitive
James and Efficiency Principles of Taxation
Nobes 1997-ts Incentives
Equity
Macroeconomic Considerations
Equality and Fairness Guiding Principles of
Institute of Certainty Good Tax Policy
Cerdfied Public Convenience of Payment
Accountants Economy h~ Collection
200l~9 Simplicity
Nentrality
Economic Growth and Efficiency
Transparency and Visibility
Minimnm Tax Gap
Appropriate Government Revenues
M. R~dge and S. Smith, L~calTaxaliom The Optio*ts and theA,~ame~t (London, IFS, 199l), Repo~ Series No.
38, May.
P.M. Jackson, %fficient LocM Govermnent Fh~ance: %e Never En~g Stou,’, (!994) m F. Tetu, (ed.),
Toma~ffs ~stmctttti*~: The Dimemions ~ Cbmge in ~cal Government ~ondon, Chartered Insdmte of Pubic
F~ance and Acco~tancy), pp. 55-62.
Co~ee on Fiscal Afros, E/e~ltw~# Commem: Taxation Fmmewot~ Co~Mitiom (!998) also at
<x~mv.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/3/1923256.pdf>, 6 September 2006. (’ORawa T~afion Framework
Con~dons’).
IC,~W Repo~t1999, Towards a Be#er Tax System, T~ FacNg’: Tax G~de 2/OO ~nd°n)"
S. James and C. Nobes, The Econom#s (Ta.vatiom Ptindpks, PoliO’ attd Practice (updated 7fla e~, Prentice
Ha~ Ne~v ""
,    . ~ork, 2004).
American Institute of Certified Pubic Accom~tants, Inc Tax Po~cy, (’~CPA’) Coneepl Stalemenl 1.
~Gm~g P~ciples of Good Tax Po~w: A Framework for Evatuam~g Tax ProposNs’ ~exv York, 2001),
p. 6.
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A De ’iving a Common Meaning
The principles overlap and some lists are more extended than others. After an analysis of
the common meaning of the above principles, Alley and Bentley propose a framexvork of
principles that encompasses most of those listed2° These are set out below, with a brief
description of their common meatting. As in the context of the discussion of tights in
Chapter 2, the principles are based on value judgments,i* There is a core of agreed meaning
but also a penumbra of uncertainty that is explored in the different reports and analyses. If
the principles are to prmfide a sottrce and sometimes a measure in rights analysis it is
important to identify this core of agreed meaning.
1 Equity and Faithless=
’ " i~I axatton system des gn should take account of horizontal aud vertical equity.
It is important fl~at the public perceives fl~e tax system as fair.
Inter-nation equity should be considered for international elements.
From the taxpayer’s perspective, where fairness equates to equity, there are t~vo major
elements that make an equitable tax.=3 It should treat people in similar circumstances in the
same way: this is horizontal equity. It should ensm’e that tax is allocated fakly between
people in different cLtcmnstances: this is verdcal equity. There is a caveat, argued for
example in the Asprey Report, that measmmg equity is not easy24
Above n. 7, p. 621 elseq.
K.C. Messere, Tax PollO’ i~ OECD C}unMes: Choices aM Co*flt?ts (Amsterdam, IBFD Publications BV,
1993), p. 110.
C.R..adley and D. Bentley, .above n. 7, p. 622.
Rofot~t~ of the Austt~lian Taxation S),stem, ILa, TS, Draft White Paper Reform of the Australian Taxation
System, (Canberra, AGPS, 1985) (Draft Wl~ite Pape0, p.14.
~4 Asprey Report, above n. 10.
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This leads to the second principle, that the public should perceive the tax system as
fair. The implementation of tax reform must often contend with aberrations that breach
the principles of eqtffty, but are nonetheless seen as fair. Tiffs is perhaps founded in self-
interest rather than logic. For example, failure to tax capital gains would seem to breach
both ve~:tical and horizontal equity.*-5 Yet, New Zealand has not extended its income
taxation to taxation of capital gains and the public perceive the tax system as fair.26
As an example, Ardcle 3t(1) of the Constitution of Spain adopts both principles and
requi~es that:~
All shall contribute to the sustenance of public expenditures according to thei~
economic capacity ttuough a just tax system based on the principles of equality and
progressiveness, which in no case shall be of a confiscatotT scope.
The perceptions of fairness and equality were seen as hnportant when the Constitution was
passed in 1978. The changing nature of what is perceived as fair is seen ha the requirement
for progressiveness. Although income taxes retnain largely progxessive, the same cannot be
said for the European Value Added ’Fax and some other indirect taxes.
Despite overt and implicit support for the concept of fairness, in the context of tax
policy and the design of the substantive elements of the tax system, for the most part
taxpayers’ fights have been excluded. Thei’ are centxed rather on procedaral lab:hess (or
Neumann’s ’t!fin’ concept of the fade of law discussed in Chapter 4). Tiffs may also relate
back to the discussion of states’ margin of appreciation in Chapter 2. In general terms
states do not brook interference from individuals on matters of broad policy and design. It
as Asprey Report, ibid., cb. 23 and Catter Cormmssion, above n. 4, ch. 15. See also, J.G. Head, ’Capital Gak~s
Taxation - An Economist’s Perspective’ (1984) 1 Auslm/.ian TaxFomm, 148.
~ See the re,flew of the New Zealand system, P.~i. McCa\v, (Chairman), Repot of rise Task Force oft Tax Rejam*
(Government Printer, Wellington, April 1982) and recent work on perceived fairness in L.M. Tan,
’Taxpayers’ Perceptions of Fairness of the Tax System - A PrelM~inary Study’ (1998) 4 New Zealand Journal
of Taxatio** Lair a*~d Po/i~y, 59, 71.
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is seen as largely political, the province of the elected goverimaent, xvhich must obtain
approval of its actions ff~m the legislature rather fl~an from individuals.
The perception of fairness, hmvever, usually relates in large part to the
inaplementation of tax txtles. The manner in wlfich the system provides and enforces
taxpayers’ rights can therefore be critical to the perception of fairness. Likewise, whether a
right adds to g taxpayer’s perception of fairness provides a useful measure of the value of
that right.
A thkd and different aspect of equity and fairness is inter-nation equity, or the
equitable division of tax revenue between countries. This relates to taxpayers’ rights in the
application of negotiated or unilateral solutions to the problem. The devdopment of
general international principles has seen the establislunent of an extensive international
net\vork of tax treaties, which is aimed both at preventing tax avoidance but also and most
important for the taxpayer, ameliorating double taxation2s The tax treaty system has been
supplemented by generally agreed approaches within the OECD in certain areas, such as to
transfer pricing and to harmful tax competition,a Another multilateral example is the
extensive international discussion of electronic cotmnerce designed to overcome the
perceived d~:eat it poses to inter-nation equity by undemainJng sot~tee taxation,s° General
international agreement provides certainty, but leaves open the issue of whether a taxpayer
can realistically rely upon such agreement in the domestic jurisdiction.
Where flae fundamental policy issue underlying inter nation equity is xvhether tax
systems should favour residence or source based taxation, it is the rationale behind the
p~inciple daat is inaportant in the taxpayers’ fights context. The arguments for both
-~?Translated and cited in D.C. Hodgson, b~dDidualDu~’ Mlbil~ a Huma~t Righta Discolttre (Hams, UK, Ashgate
Publis|~g Lhnited, 2003), p. 173.
2s S. Picciotto prm4des a comprehensive tfistotical background in Intet~tatio*tat Business Taxatioll (London,
Greenwood, !992), chs 1 3.
29 Tt~t stir Pddtg Guk/a{hte* ]br MMthtali0na/E ntap*#es and Tax Admh*Bh~tli°*~s (OECD’ 1995) and’ Hm~*~fid Tax
Compelitiom An Eme~gitg Global Issue (OECD, 1998).
~0 For a detailed discussion see R.L. Doemberg, L. kr,Snnekins, W. Hellerstein and . Li, Elect*vnic Comme~ve
atMMullijutiMi,’tio*lalT~axation (New Yozk, Kluwer, 2001) 3.1 and 4.3.1.3.
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residence and source taxation rely on different versions of economic allegiance and
derivation of benefits theories.~’ Either theotT suggests that it is reasonable for a person
benefiting either economically or othet~vise from a jurisdiction to make a contribution back
to that jurisdiction. The benefits provided inchlde the protection of property, which allows
die property holder to make a contribution to the fisc, as discussed in Chapter 2. The
extension of the discussion in Chapter 2 is that there is a p~inciple floxving from rote>
nadon equity that a jurisdiction has a responsibility not only to protect its oxvn allocation of
revemle, but to protect the right.s of its taxpayers ha that process as against other
jurisdictions. In other xvords, it is not enough for a jurisdiction simply to assert its right to
tax. For the full application of inter-nation equity, it should also ensure that taxpayers
required to pay tax are suitably protected in the process.
Tax rules should not be arbitratT.
Tax rules should be as clear and simple to understand as the comptexit3, of the
subject of taxadon allmvs, so that taxpayers can anticipate in advance the tax
consequences of a transaction including knowing when, where and how the tax
is to be accounted.
There should be transparency and visibility in the design and hnplementadon
of the tax rules.
Discussed further in A. Easson, Taxation of Fot~igt~ Direct It, vestmettt (Fhe Hague, Kluwer Law International,
1999), p. 39.
C.R. ARe}, and D. Bentley, above n. 7, p. 622.
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Certainty and simplicity are two of the.most favoured, yet most elusive, qualities of an}, tax
system. The first point is’ that rules should not be arbitrary and this goes to the beart of a
rights analysis, As Adam Smith said,3~
The tax which the individual is bound to pay ought to be certain aud not atbitratT.
Tile thne of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought to be
clear and plahl to the contributor and to every other person.
A certainty that avoids being arbitrary depends on clear statutes and thnely and
understandable adi,aittistrative gnidelhles that are accessible to all taxpayers.~* It is
fundamental to the proper operation of a tax system and underpins many of the rights
discussed in subsequent chapters.
However, it is not alxvays clear what ’certaint},’ means, tn the context of the
introduction of rules governing the taxadon of electronic commerce, the EU issued a
Cotrmmnicafion?S xvl~ich stated that there ’should be certainty about the roles and
compliance should be made as simple as possible to avoid unnecessary burdens on
business’. A 1999 UK Report on the taxadon of electronic commerce stated that, ’the rules
for the taxation of e-commerce should be dear and simple so that businesses can
anticipate, so far as possible, the tax consequences of file transactions they enter into’.~
It is interes~lg that file EU Communication favoars certainty of roles, but simplicity
of compliance. Perhaps it recog~ises the difficult}, in making roles simple. The OECD3v
and UK approach is for the roles themselves to be both clear and shnple. Even if slinplicity
33 A. Smifl~ m~d K. Sm~dedand, above *~. 1, p. 452.
~4 Above n. 19, p. 12.
35 E Commerce and Indirect Taxation: Conununication by dm Conmfission to the Counc~ of Ministers, the
European Parliament and to the Economic .Mad Social Committee: (COM(98)374fmal; 17/6/98).
3~ Inland Revenue and HM Customs and Excise, Electronic Commetre: The UK’r Tax-ation Age**da (’1999 UK
Report’) (London), para. 2.9.
~v The Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Elect*~**£" Commer~’e: Taxatio~ F~amewod~ Co~dilions (OECD, 1998), and p.
6, <www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/3/1923256.pdf>, 6 September 2006, stated that ’The tax ,afles should
be clear and simple to m~derstand so fl~at taxpayers can anticipate fire tax consequences in advance of a
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is confined to makh~g the rules simple to understand, it is a difficult task. The txtles
governing the taxation o~" electronic commerce are an excellent example of the difficttlfies
of translafng complex transactions into simple rules, as the roles will necessarily folloxv the
nature of the transaction. They are often so complex that governments struggle to make
thetr~ certain, let alone simple.3s An admirable aim is to draft the rules clearly, using simple
language. It will aid certainty. Even tl~en, tbe rules will dilly become certain over th~qe, as
they are interpreted and applied. Daring a period of change, as the *xtles are adapted to
cope with the transactions they govern, it is inevitable that they will appear complex. The
rules will be new and there will be different interpretations of their meaning.
Debate in Australia identified some of the difficulties facing policy makers in
implementing the principles of certainty and slinplicit3’. From 1 July 2002, drafting tax
legislation was moved from the ATO to the Department of the Treasm3’ (Treasu*3’)- Part
of the rationale xvas that, as Treasm3’ \vas responsible for fonnulaOng tax policy, it should
have more input into the translation of that policy into legislative design. Bonging policy
and legislative development together aimed to produce a strategic alignment bet~veen
Government policy and its hnplementation in legislation.
On 16 December 2004, the Australian Govertmaent issued its Rep0*l 0n Aspects of Income
Tax Se]f-Assessment.39 It identified the conflict between certainty in rite laxv and simplicity in
the drafting of the laxv:~°
Du~ag the 1980s and 1990s the tax legislation set out ha increasing detail hoxv the la\v
applied in a variety of fact situations. This was seen as desirable because taxpayers
txansaction, including knowing xvhen, where and how flxe tax is to be accom~ted.’
For a useful analysis and literatu*e smx,ey, see M. McKerchar, K. Meyer and S. Kadinsky, ’Making
Progress in Tax Simplification: A Comparison of the United States, Australia, New Zealand and the
United Kingdom’, paper presented at the 7tli International Tax Administration Conference (Sydney,
Australia, 2006).
Austxalian Government, Repose on Aq)e~’~s of Inrome Tax Self-Assessment (Canberra, 2004)
<www.selfassessment.treasm3..gov.au/content/_download/report/15mal_report.pdf>
, 
6 September 2006.
Ibid., p. 66.
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naturally \vant a tfigh level of certaing’ as to xvhether and how the law ,,viii apply in
their particular circumstances. \x:qfile the ’detailed’ approach to laxv does provide
certainty xvhere a taxpayer’s circumstances are specifically addressed by a rule, laws
designed in this way can never anticipate all the relevant circnmstances for every
taxpayer.
As factual circumstances var3’ greatly, covering a wide range of ckcumstances in detail
is likely to result in law that is long and complicated. Complex circmnstances are not
easily clarified tl~ough elaboration in the law, at least not without generating
legislation of inordinate leugth. Indeed, by intxoducing more boundaries between the
legal concepts, potentially there is increased scope for ambiguity and uncertah~t3’.
Long and detailed law can also n{ake it harder to fred the underlying pollq’ intent and
thus increase the risk that the courts will interpret the legislation in a way unintended
by Parliament. When a statute is cast in a very specific way, new ckcumstances can
generate loopholes or inequities, requirkxg thrther specific legislation and so on.
Instead, it suggested tidal Treasm3’ should use a principle-based approach to drafting of tax
The benefits of p~indple-based drafting are theoretically t]~at laxvs tend to be simpler
and shorter, more flexible, more stable, more certain, and because draft laws are then
conceptually sh~pler, it apparent]}’ provides a better basis for consultation. It is probably a
futile exercise to attempt to make the t~ales substantively simple.4~ Hoxvever, fl~e aim is in
line with the EU definition of s~mplicity as keeping the burden of administration and
compliance costs to a mit~mum.
Ibid.
See M. McKerchar et al, above n. 38; J. Pmbble, ~’~qB’ Is Tax Law Incomprehensible?’ (1994) B*ilish Tax
Rel&w, 380; G.S. Cooper, ’Themes and Issues m Tax Simplification’ (1993) 10 Aus!~z*lia** Tax Fo~m, 417;
and the at~alysis m \~(~.G. Gale and J. Holtzblatt, ’The Role of Administrative Factors in Tax Reform:
Simplicity, Compliance and Enforcement’ (Social Science Research Network Journal, 11 February 2000),
<ssm.com/abstract=208289> or DOI: 10.2139/ssm.208289>, 6 September 2006.
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Pdn@/es a*~d Inte~p~lalion
It is appropriate to consider certainty and simplidty together becanse so often there
is a conflict between them, both in terms of legislative drafting and taxpayer compliance.
Attempts to make the roles more certain usually make them less sin~ple to understand. The
shnpler the eales are the less sin~ple they usually are either to comply with or to administer.
In the discussion in Chapters 6 to 8, the rights that provide certainty must be seen in
d~e context of the straggle by revenue authorities to achieve certainty and simplicity in the
face of policy demands. However, poliW should not be used as an excuse to override basic
taxpayers’ rights. In striking dlis balance, the tlfird point, that there should be transparency
and visibility in the design and in~plementation of the tax rxtles becomes more important.
Consultation during policy development has become more common. This must be
seen in the context perhaps of developed common laxv jurisdictions, where there is a wider
tradition of general debate in the fom~uladon and development of the taxv. It is less easy to
require of a jurisdiction which is traditionally opaque. For example, Islfirnura is concerned
that, ’the Japanese govetwm~ent and tax authorities show no sign of promoting the fairness
and transparency of tax procedures’.43 Although the Japanese Nadonal Tax Adininistration
may argue that dos is no longer tile case,44 it would be an issue found in some jurisdictions,
particularly developing counttqes xvithout the tradition or political infrastructure to consult
widely.
In maW OECD jurisdictions consultation is the norm. In Australia, for example,
extensive consultation took place to try and ameliorate some of the costs of compliance
placed on taxpayers xvith file inlplementation of major tax reforms in 2000.45 Consultation
and conuraunication made it easier for revenue authorities to gain acceptance for electronic
43 D. Ben~ey~ (ed.)~ Ta:‘;~a)’e~s, Righ~s.. A~ I~e~a~i~*~a~ Pe~e~ive (G~d c~ast~ Revenue Law J~uma~1998)~ p.
227.
4* Article 4, NTA, ’An Outline of Japanese Tax Administration’,
<www.nta.go.jp/categoty/outFam/english/2741/contents.htm>, 6 September 2006.
*s Review of Business Taxation, A Tax Sygtem Redesig*~ed: Mot~ Cettai~t, Equitable and Durable: Rqoort [Ralph
Report], (Canberra, The Conmmnwealfl~, 1999) and tim New Tax Sys{em Advisory Board and Industry
Partnerships, in ATO, Ta.v at*d the I~lletxel: Second Repot - December !999 Cthe 2nd Report) (Canberra, The
Co*imlonwealth, 1999), para !.3.1.
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compliance and delivery of services; Taxpayers can see the revenue authorities both
keeping in touch with the latest developments and assisting taxpayers to take advantage of
electronic comtnunicafion.4G
The measures of certainty and simplidty relate to a model of taxpayers rights. The),
x*~A1 pet:tneate the analysis of rights in the chapters that follow. The measures are framed so
that they are achievable in an), jurisdiction.
Compliance and administration costs should be minimised and payment of tax
should be as easy as possible.
Efficiency extends, of course, far beyond tiffs point. Hoxvever, the narrow definition has
broad acceptance as a principle underlying tax policy. For example, in the context of
electronic comanerce the OECD Taxalion Framework Conditions pape/4~ defines efficiency
narrowly in temis of minimisafion of compliance and administration costs through
improving taxpayer sen,ice and tax administration. The same approach is taken in both the
EU Communication49 and the 1999 UK Report.s°
a~ ATO, ibid. For examples of roll-out of electronic deliver}, and lodgment with plenty of education and
consultation see e.g., USA, <www.irs.gov/efile/index.btml>, 6 September 2006; UK,
<www.hrm:c.gov.uk/online/index.btm>, 6 September 2006; and New Zealand, <xmwv.ird.govt.nz/online-
serxdces/ke}avord>, 6 September 2006. For research on the effectiveness of education, seeJ. Hasseldine,
’Using Persuasive Comm~micafions to Increase Tax Compliance: What experimental research has (and has
not) told us’ (2000) 15 Au,mdiat: Tax Fo,rt#t, 227; and for a specific sector: J. Hasseldine, P. Hite, S. James,
and M. Toumi, ’Persuasive Communications: Tax Compliance Enforcement Strategies for Sole
Proprietors’ (2006) 23 Co~tle¢¢~po~tty Accotmlbg Research; and K. Bloomquist, ’An Over~,iew of Some Recent
IRS Research on Tm,:payer Compliance Bebaviour’, paper presented at the 7th International Tax
Administration Conference (Sy&~ey, Australia, 2006).
I~ C.R. ,Mley and D. Bentley, above n. 7, p. 622.
48 Above n. t6, p. 8.
49 Above n. 35, p. 7.
so Above n. 36, para. 2.9.
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Pdndp/es and Inte~pretalion
Because minhnismg taxpayer compliance costs and making compfiance easier is
d~ought to hnprove rev(nue collection, it is a pfime focus for tax authorities,s~ So, too, is
atly reduction in dae cost of administering the tax system. It is in these areas that most can
be done in dae short-term to improve co operation between jurisdictions. Although it is a
narrow view of efficiency, potentially it could have the most impact on the widest mtmber
of taxpayers.
Revenue authorities are naturally defensive when claims are made about the high
costs of complialxce. However, the adverse publicity does place pressttre on governments
and revenue authofities to consider compliance costs in formulating and inaplemenfing tax
policies. Tiffs is doubly important where the potentially high costs of admhffstefing and
monitoring a particular fo*an of taxation provide a significant incentive for governments to
stfift dmse costs to taxpayers and third parties.
Adopting the pmiciple that compliance and adm~fistradon costs Should be
mimmised provides a framework for negotiation between the different stakeholders to
detetarrine a fair allocation of responsibilities and associated costs. It also prmddes a basis
for including in the analysis whether taxpayers’ fights will be impacted significantly by a
change m the laxv that might increase compliance and admhfistration costs. Hoxvever,
negotiation of this kind is gairly limited between taxpayer groups and policy makers. If
taxpayers’ fights are to have meaning at the policy level, they should be integral to the
For a wider discussion and details of the literature, see C. Evans, J. Pope, J. Hasseldine, (eds), Tax
Compliattce Costs: A Festsd~dfiforCedtie Sa,tdford (St Leonards, NSW, Prospect Media Pry Ltd, 2001) and the
AT,’,X     Tax     Operating     (Cotnpliance     and     Administrative)     Costs     Database,
<xvww.atax.unsxv.edu.au/compliance/cc.php>, 6 September 2006. See examples from: the US - K.
Bloomquist, above n. 46; the UK - 1999 UK Report, above n. 36, p. 49 and A. Hansford, J. Hasseldme
and C. Hoxvorth, ’Factors Affecting the Costs of UK VAT Compliance Costs for Small and Medium
Sized Enterprises’ (2003) 21 Enviro**ment and Plat~ittg C: Govet~*me*~t w~d Polio;, 479; Nexv Zealand - P. Oxley
and D. El\vela, "Tax compliance costs of New Zealand small businesses, 2004: Desig*fing the Sum, ey for
its Policy Purpose’, paper presented at the 7th International Tax Adrrmaistration Conference (Sydney,
Australia, 2006), and C. Sullivan, Impt~vitg Ta:; Complia*~ce Cost Research - the New Zealwtd Story Conlim~es,
Research Report 1: Measuring the tax compliance costs of small and medinm-sized businesses
(kX:~ellhagton, I1LD, July 2005); Australia - C. Evans, ’Smd)~ing the Studies: An Over,dew of Recent
Research into Taxation Operating Costs’ (2003) 1 eJom~ta/of Tax Researd~, 64 and B. Tran-Nam, C. Evans,
K. Ritcttie and M. Walpole, ’Tax Compliance Costs: Research Meflmdology and Empirical Exddence from
Australia’ (2000) 53 Nalional TaxJouts~al, 229.
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design and fomaulation of both policy and legislation. Tlffs would extend to ensuring that
efficient tax administration is seen as a policy issue not simply for tax administration but to
improve the effectiveness of taxpayers’ fights. Tiffs will be explored further in Chapter 7,
but is also relevant to the mechanisms used to enforce legislative protection, discussed in
Chapter 5.
4 Neulrali~a
The tax system should not impede or reduce tile productive capacit3’ of the
economy.
Business decisions should be motivated by economic rather than tax
considerations. Taxpayers in similar situations carrying out sitn~ar transactions
should be subject to shnilar levels of taxation.
Capital import neutralit3’ and capital exp~rt neutrality should be considered.
Neutrality applies to substantive tax policy and the formulation of the regtflatot3~
framework implementing it. Although relevant to wider legal principles such as non-
discrinfination, those are usually considered in the context of equit3, and fairness.
Neutxality, particularly given its narrow econonffc meatting in the three points, has least
relevance to taxpayers r~ghts.
sa C.R. Mley and D. Bentley, above n. 7, p. 622
8O
Ptincipks aM Interpretation
The system should collect the right amount of tax at the right time without
imposing double taxation or uniutentional non-taxation at both the domestic
and international levels.
The system should be flexible and dynamic to ensure a match with
technological and commercial developments.
The potential for acth,e or passive non-compliance should be nfinimised wlfile
keeping counter-acth~g measures proportionate to the risks involved.
The second point is more of an economic policy point, but the first and third points have
strong implications for taxpayers’ tights. Tax collection is an area perceived as most open
m abuse. Tiffs has been tree throughout tffstot2¢ from biblical times, xvhen the cheating of
tax collectors made it into Jesus’ parables,s4 fl~xougb to some extxaordinat3’ clainas in the US
against the IRS by Congress, resulting in the Taxpayers’ Bills of Rights.5s The discretion
available in tax collection underlies taxpayer concerns that there should be clear rules and
guidelines to ensure the effectiveness of the tax collection process.
From file revenue authorities’ perspective risks to revenue must be mininffsed, while
maintaining a proportionate response. The process of dealing with areas of risk is another
critical area xvhere taxpayer protection is essential xvhile safeguarding the revenue. Tiffs is
particularly tt’ue in the international context. Negotiating to elitrRnate inter-national double
taxation, non-taxation and tax avoidance is a complex and bureaucratic process. It is
assumed that the protection of individual taxpayers’ rights takes place xviflmx the domestic
Ibid, p. 623.
Luke 18:9, 2~e Fitly Bible (New International Version, 1978).
A. Greenbamn, United State* TaxTOa3’er Bill* qf Rights 1, 2 a~ld 3: A Pa/h lo the tVt~ltct~ or Old [f’/hi~te itt New Bottles
in 13. Bentley, above n. 43, ch. 15.
8l
jtmisdiction. Consequently, the mechat~sms to prevent individuals from being double taxed
where an international agreement fails are usually umvieldy and can be ineffective.
It is one thing to ensure the effectiveness of the tax system at the level of
administration, collection and enforcement. It is a much harder task to do so while
preserx4ng the rights of taxpayers. Any model must ensure a balance between the two.
B Maintaini*g t,Se Balance
The ptqnciples will alxvays compete and the art of taxation design is to balance the
principles most effectively in aclfieving the intended pur’pose. As the Carter Commission
put it: 56
We realize that some of the objectives are in conflict, in the sense that movement
toward one goal means that others might be act~ieved less adequately. Simultaneous
realization of all the goals in some degree will constitute success if, as xve hope, our
choices as to the appropriate compromises adequately reflect the [’reformed]
collsetlsn8,
However, acbieving the ptqnciptes, values or goals that underlie the tax system must only
be done in the context of the broader framework of taxpayers’ .rights. Tbe basis tt~at
taxpayers’ rights have in law must alxvays ’tt’ump’ a principle xxdthout such a basis.5v In the
design process, wt~ich is relevant to a model, the pth~ciples should be taken into account to
provide the best outcome for the taxpayer, while preset~ing to the greatest extent possible,
achievement of the balance of goals envisaged by the Carter Cormaaission.
s6 Carter Commission, above n. 4, p. 17.
57 R. Dworkh~, Law’s Empire (London, Fontana Press, 1986), p. 225 and "Faki*g lb~hts Se*iot~s~, (London,
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To the extent that tax policy does not support a balance, there are also concerns for
taxpayers’ tights. For exhmple, purstfit of effectiveness by giving the revenue authority a
xvide discretion is at the expense of certainty. It may seriously undelanine the right of
taxpayers to know how much tax they should pay and provide procedures leading to
arbitratT imposition of taxes.
In considering the rights for inclusion in a model, reference will be made to the
principles outlined in this chapter. They will prmdde a measure and somerimes a basis for
figbts that are included.
III INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTENT
A Inlroduction
In the same way as the principles that are often used as a generalised measure of a
successful tax system have variations in meaning; the interpretations of rights themselves
are often different. This is natural given the range of jurisdictions, both civil laxv and
con’anon’law that have incorporated taxpayers’ rights into their tax systems. The crossover
between similar systems is difficult. That betxveen different systems is even more so. This
secdon explores the reasons for and the substance of some of these barriers to
interpretation and submits that there is a sufficient core of certaintyss in the underlying
meaning of taxpayers’ rights to make exploration of a model xvorthxvhile. In addition, the
principles explored in the first part of this chapter can add weight to that core of certainty.
Gerard Duckworth & Co., 1977), p. 116.
H.L.A, Hart, 7",t)e Conceplofkalv (2nd edn, Oxford, Clarendon Press, I994), ch. VII.
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B Trends kading to blurred Definitions
History has aided the development of rights and common understanding but has
encouraged blurting of definition,s° The Second World War prm4ded a majur impetus for
the international protection of human rights. This was reflected in the establishment of
international agreements on htmaan rights, international courts and conmfissions of human
tights, and national and international organisations designed specifically to protect human .
rights. The difficultT m determining the meatfing of human rights generally is discussed in
Chapter 2. With the focus on human rights, it was inevliable that attention should be paid
m less xvell-defmed areas, such as taxpayers’ rights. Traditional human fights lawyers are
unsure whether taxpayers’ rights should really be categofised as human rights.6° But the
human rights focus of die last 50 years has changed the way people think. Rights, and the
language of rights, have become an integral part of our" culture. Rights are something that
eve*Tone can understand and they are somedmag that eve*Tone wants: they have evolved in
popular consciousness as being very positive.
This development of a rights culture is reflected in the political consciousness and
there has been an increase in co*mnunitT participation in the political process. The
formulation of administrative charters or statements of tights, the introduction of a wider
variety of ombudsmen, advocates and other public or consumer representatives have
gathered momentum in this context. However, the proliferation of different statements of
taxpayers’ rights comes wida a signfificant drawback. With popularity comes generalisation
and blurred definition: taxpayer rights are no exception. Take the debate when Australia
was considering the form and content of a charter of taxpayer rights.
so K. Messere, above n. 21, cb. 5, where there is some discussion of definitional ambiguity and the
irrationality of language. This is a fascthatmg study in itself, but goes beyond the scope of this thesis.
~0 It is only really since the development of case law considering taxation under domestic Charters or Bills of
Rigbts h~ court*ties such as Canada, New Zealand and the EU that there has been wider acceptance of
discussion of tax la\v and taxpayers’ rights in Otis context. Prmtiously, the use of specific exclusions and
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The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) position was that the charter should contain
at ~ew fights protected by law.~ Rather, the ATO argued, a charter should reflect existing
legal rights and administrative concessions; it should also contain a commitment by the
ATO to meet the seth,ice expectations of the commut~ity. The Commissioner of Taxation
expressed particular concern that the introduction of a charter should not clog the courts
and impede efficient ATO adnfiulstration by opening the floodgates to a spate of legal
actions against the ATO. Naturally enough, the ATO also xvanted to use a ch~ter to stress
taxpayer responsibilities,s=
Many professional groups criticised the ATO approach, clahning that it gave
taxpayers notlmag more than they already had. The professional groups wanted legal rights
enforceable at law. They wanted new fights, to fill what they saxv as holes in existing
taxpayer protection. Naturally enougli, when the government folloxved the ATO approach,
many professional bodies denounced the charter as a waste of thne and money.~ However,
it was not a fair conclusion.~*
As often happens in debates of this kind, the parties tended to argue at cross-
puqooses. Until recently there has been litde theoretical exan~ation of taxpayers’ fights. As
a result, there was little cot~text in xvl~ich to place the debate. Arguments put forward
tended to choose a model of enforcement: either a legislated model or an administrative
model. The arguments also proposed a number of rights. However, the fights did not
necessat~y fit xx4tlfin the chosen model of enforcement. Professional bodies tended to
the margin of appreciation doctrine, discussed in Chapter 2, precluded widespread consideralion.
Extracts from the debate described here can be fom~d in M. Carmody, Commissioner of Taxation,
’Taxpayers’ Charter: ,~.TO Perspective’ and D. Williams, ’~Une Taxpayers’ Charter: A Vie\v from file
Profession’, both papers presented at the AT,~X conference on C~rent Issues in Ta~ Administration (I 1
12 April 1996). Also, A. Cam},, ’Taxpayers’ Charter’ (1995-96) 30 Ta.x.alion i~1A~sttz*lia, 543 and Taxation
Institute of Australia, ’Current Topic’ (1995-96) ~0 Taxatio*~ in d*¢sltalia, 230.
As was done, eg., in the Udited Kingdom’s Taxpayer Char ter and New Zealand’s Statement o f Principles.
For example, A. Care},, above n. 61, p. 544, said that, %2ithout legislalive force, the Cliarter will lack
credibility because it becomes simply another ATO brochure - certainly of interest, but of little practical
tmportance....An}, who do seek reliance on it will likely be met with blank looks from ATO counter staff’.
Discussed in detaL! in D. Bentley, ’The Taxpayers’ Charter: More Than a Mission Statement’ (1995-96) 4,
Tax-a&,l in Aushalla Red Edition*, 259 and ’Problem Resolulion: Does the ATO Approach ReaR}, Work
(1996) 6 Reve,me Law Jol~Tta/, 17.
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argue for tights within a legislated charter of rights, some of which could not be enforced
tl~:ough legidative mecharfisms. On the other side, the ATO put froward as
administratively enforceable tights, goals that they could only aspire to. If either side was
aware of the distinction, they did not make it plain. It is not surprising that the debate
became somewhat hot and confiased.
The Australian debate illustrates that, with the introduction of taxpayers’ charters
around the world, taxpayers’ rights have become the subiect of popular discussion; if not at
breakfast tables, then at least in the tax commurfit3’. However, worth\virile dialogue
depends upon a clear consensus on the subject matter. There is still sigtfificant divergence
in approach, particularly where the nuances of culture and a different perspective provide
curious disparities in the way rights are chosen for protection in different jurisdictions.
C Barders to b~te~pretation
The existence of a classification of tights and a model will not provide unifotwrfit3’ of
understanding. The content of each tight will differ according to the tax system in wltich it
is found. Content is determined by numerous factors, the more hnpormnt of which are
identified in this section.6s
An illustration of the importance of interpretation is found m the context of
¯ information exchange.6~ The last decade has seen an increase in the focus on international
transactions and international tax avoidance. The idea of tax authgtities exchanging
information on taxpayers to combat tax avoidance is not new. Hoxvever, its use has only
Interpretation of language is a complex field beyond the scope °f fltis thesis H°wever, s°me discussi°n °f
the most important factors preventing common understanding is essential at a basic level. See fi~rther, in
the context of information exchange, V. Tanzi and H.H. Zee, ’Can Information Exchange be Effective in
Taxing Cross-Border Income Flows?’ in K. Andersson, P. Melz and C. Silfve~berg (eds), LiberAn,,icowm
Sve:,-O]o~Lodin (Stoctdmlm, Kluwe~ Law International, 2001), p. 259.
V. Tat~zi~ Taxa~i~n in m1~n~egrating W~r~d ~X~as~fingt~n DC~ The Br~dngs ~ns~tute~ ~995).
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expa~aded with the advent of sophisticated methods of electtotfic infomaadon gathefing
that can be used equally effectively to transfer large quantifies of reformation quickly and
easily between states.
Infot~rnation exchanges are governed by a range of international agreements. Most of
these are bilateral, but the focus on regional econonfic groupings has ted to some
multilateral agreements. Double tax agreements are the most common bilateral
arrangements containing provisions for the exchange of infotanadon bet~veen tax
authotities. At a multilateral level, in 1995 the OECD Convention on Mutual
Ad,afinisttative Assistance in Tax Matters (OECD Convention) entered into force. Its
objective is to promote international cooperation to help the nafional tax laxvs of the
signatories to operate more effectively, w!file respecting tl~e fundamental fights of
taxpayers. It sees the protection of those fights as being based on the national protection
witlfin the participating jurisdictions.
The OECD Convention attempts to apply the most favourable protection available
m tlie jurisdictions concerned. For example, Article 22 provides that the stricter secrecy
laws in either of two states exchanging reformation will apply to any infot~mation provided.
There is an immediate imperative therefore to reach a conunon understandk~g of the fights
of fl~e exchanging states. It becomes insmediately obvious how tits can lead to confusion
where the states concerned have different languages, different legal systems and different
political, economic and social agendas. It is more difficult than treat?, h~tetpretation. It
requires one state to understand the full content of the domestic rights afforded to the
taxpayers of another state and compare it to its own rules before it can comply with the
terms of an ia~temational agreement to wlfich it is party. This section explores some of the
issues relevant to interpretation.
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Chapte," 3
1 MechanismforEt~*~ement
One of the ma~n influences on content and meaning is the mechanism for the enforcement
of a fight and this is the basis for the classification scheme set out in Chapter 5, where this
issue is explored further. In Chapter 5, it becomes clear that the differences bet~veen
administ~’ative and legislative enforcement of a right provide substantial differences to the
content.6~ An obvious example is xvhere a jtu:isdiction dete*anmes that a taxpayer has a right
to know the penalties that will be inaposed for non-compliance with an aspect of the tax
If the in, position of the penalt3’ and the rate at which it applies is set out in legislation
xvithout aW admfi~istrative discretion, then there is strict liability and the content is
absolutely clear in all situations. In many jtttisdictions, the right to hnpose a penalty for
non-compliance is legislated, sometimes setting out a range of penalties and/or the
maximum rate. Hox~,ever, a broad discretion is given as to when a penalt3’ x, qll be imposed
and at what rate. The content of the penalty provisions xvill depend on the criteria used h~
the exercise of the discretion, how the criteria are applied and xvhether there is negotiation
over the penatt3,. That there is a penalt3, for non-compliance is absolutely clear, but its
application (content) may vary considerably.
2 Nature and Type of Legal 3),stem
The nature of a legal system is crucial in determining the content of the rights of citizens.
Rights are meaningful in countries where the role of lax*, is upheld, and lose their meaning
As stated m M. Darrow and P. Alston, ’Bills of Rights m Comparative Perspective’ in P. Alston (ed.),
Pt~moli~tg i~tuma~ Rt~hls Th*~gh Bills of Rt~hls: Comparalive Pet~ecl/ves (Oxford, OUP, 1999), p. 465, p. 471, m
the context of a comparison of bills of ~ights generally, ’much depends upon the consequences that attach
to the recognigon of a specific list of ~ights, especially m terms of the legal and achninistrafive
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as the t’ule of law disintegrates. The apparent presence of the t’ule of law does not always
mean that it applies to the tax system. Tax adn~listxation, collection and enforcement is
one of the most sophisticated roles of goveroment, and one of the first to break down.
Examples of tiffs were the system in Russia du~ing the 1990s,~s and in many African states
in the t980s and 1990s.69 To all intents and purposes the rule of law is in place, but as far as
the tax system is concerned, the govermnent bureaucracy does not have the resources, the
power, or the trakting to give proper effect to all tax laxvs.
The t}q2e of tegal system and its context will also detet~nme the content of taxpayer
fights: the marked differences betxveen civil and common law systems are quite often also
found among systems of the same kind. Txvo otherwise similar systems of law may have
qnite different structures; for example, the stmctm:e of their appeals systems,s° Darrow and
Alston suggest that the prevailing system of gover*maent and the nature, role and effect of
the legal system must be explored before there can be any real understanding of the
meaning of the t’tries it contains?* There is more common g~ound h~ tim area of taxation
law dian in many other areas of the law. Nonetheless, tax is, in many ways, a gloss on the
legal system, or a legal ectopia, as John Prebble describes it.~ That means that xvhenever tax
is imposed, differences in the substantive laxv govetTfing the arrangeme*lt or ~ansaction to
be taxed xvill translate into differences in tax administxation and procedure. For example,
the constitutional concept of the separation of powers is different in Sweden from die
same concept in common law countfies?S Tkis inapacts on die nature of the ruling system:
consequences fl~at follow and the availabillt), or otlxetavise of judicial remedies’.
~ S. Himes and M. Milllet Einbinder, ’Russia’s tax reform’ (1999)215 OECD Obse*~o;
<wwwl.oecd.org/publicafions/obseta, er/215/e-t~anes.httn>, 5 September 2006.
69 For example, A. Mwenda, Global Co,~r¢ption Report: East Aft#a, (2003), p. 237,
<www.ttzms~arency‘~rg/c~ntent/d~w*a~ad/4449/26756/Ne/22-East-Africa~(Mwenda).pdf>~ 6
September 2006.
70 See, eg., OECD, TaxTbayets’ Pa~hts at¢d Ob/igaliotts (Paris, OECD, 1990) and D. Albtegtse and H. van
Amndonk, (eds), Ta:,Tbayer P~leclion itt the Etcmpea~t U~io*t ~lae Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1998), ch.
II.
7~ M. Darrow and P. Alston, above n. 67, p. 470.
~-~J. Prebble, above n. 42, p. 380.
~ For a discussion of these principles, see A. Hultqvist, Legalilet~p~i~t@e*t vidi, tkomstbe~’kallm?tget~ (Stockholm,
Juristf~Srlaget, 1995), chs 3 and 4.
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file extent to xvhich the National Ta:x Authorit3T in Sweden can provide public rlOk~gs is
arguable, whereas file principle of file separation of poxvers in Australia does not prevent
the ATO from issuing public rulingsd4
3 Language
Care must be taken, xvhen cotnpatting tax systems, to understand the nuances underlying
tile legal or administrative interpretation of file content of rights. An Australian doing
business in Hungal3, and the United I~dngdom might be comforted by the apparent
shnilarifies of those tax systems’ adininistration. The reality could be quite different.
Language is a major barrier to understanding content. Sometimes ignorance of meanings in
a common language is even more dangerous than ignorance of those in a foreign language,
because they are so unexpected. For example, a business operating in Japan would take
care to understand file legal effect of tax circulars, but might asstmae that advance txtlings
proxdded by tax authorities in the different English-speakhlg jurisdictions are broadly file
same because they have the same name, wbereas they are in fact quite different in their
operation and effect2s
Translation of terms that have a technical meaning can lead to misunderstanding. In
the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital (’OECD Modal’), Article 5 uses
the English term ’agent’. In the French it is ’commissaire’. Avert Jones and Ward point out
that this leads to confusion, as the content of tile xvords does not translate exactly2~ Even
where such terms are translated, they are often of value only if the reader understands the
F~r a discussi~n ~n ~s p~t~ see D. Ben~ey~ ‘A ctitique ~f the Swedish n~mgs system~ (199~) Skat~e1‘x~’t!
567,580.
For a comprehensive international review, see See D. Sandier and E. Fuks (eds), Inler~*atio~d Guide to
Advm~re lbdings (Amsterdam, IBFD Publications BV, 1999).
J. Aver}, Jones and D. Ward, ’Agents as permanei~t establishment under the OECD Model Tax
Convention’, (1993) 33 !Tm~pea*~ Taxation 154.
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context of the right, wbJch may tcqub:e detailed knowledge of the administxative and
co~ranercial systems of the relevant jurisdiction.
4 Law
Legal baniers can limit understanding of both content and application of tights. There are
problems of definition. What is a tax m one countt3, is not necessalqly a tax in another
countt3,. What is included in the definition of a fight may not be included in another
counti3,. Mote inaportant, a p~inciple that exists and has substantial meaning m one
jmisdiction, for example, l’otrhv public in France, may not even exist in another, such as the
UK.
5 Polil£’s
There are political bamers to common interpretation of fights. Tlfis can be seen ha the
context of information exchange. Where a state is asked to supply information about its
taxpayers and there are concerns that to do so might discourage foreign investment, the
tights of parties in the state supplying infot"mation may be interpreted strictly so that the
information is not supplied. Tiffs might be even more likely if competitors for that
mvesmxent do not exchange information. Conversely, in the context of international co-
operation to combat tax evasion, govermnents may well come under pressure to read down
taxpayers’ rights in the interest of obtaining a result.
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Technology would not normally impact on the inte,’pretation of the content of rights.
However, given the increase in infomaation exchange, interpreting hoxv ~ights are applied is
sometimes dependent on the qualit3, of the information supplied. Appropriate protection
of infom~ation is only possible if the authorities know xvhat the information is that is being
exchanged. Tiffs nffght be relevant, say, in a multi-jurisdictional transfer pricing audit where
information is being exchanged. Atdcte 22 of the OECD Convention requires sufficient
understanding of the infot-mafion to maintain appropriate secrecy:
To provide for dffs type of concern, in the US, for example9v
In the case of Routine or Automatic Information Exchanges, tile IRS has actively
promoted the use of computer readable magnetic media in file exchange of this t3cpe
of information. In xvorldng xvith its other tteaty/TIEA (I’ax Information Exchange
Agreement) parmers, file IRS has endeavoured to enhance the utility of such
exchanges fl~rough the development and adoption of a uniform set of standards and
specifications relating to record layouts, interchange codes and file physical properties
oftheme~a.
D Intetprem ion of Rghts in the Model
The clauses in the Model will be translated into domestic laxv and admkfistrative procedure.
It is therefore vetT unlikely that reference will be made to the Model or its conmaentaD’ in
the intet-pretadon. Tt~e position is vm3, different for tax treaties based on the O!£CD Model
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snd its cormlaentafies. They remain tr#aties between countries and are governed in part by
international instruments,such as the intet])retation articles 31 to 33 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Laxv of Treaties. It is under the Vimma Convention articles that the
oECD Model and the 1980 UN Model Double Taxation Agreement Convention between
Developed and Developing Countries (’UN Model’) and their commentaries are usually
accepted as aids to interpretation of the treaties.~s
The ahn of the Model is to influence the formulation of policy so that legislation and
administration reflect the rights in the Model, translated contextually into the particular
jurisdiction. The rights that are embraced xvill be affected by a range of factors, including
those identified above, xvtfich will give a slightly different content depending on the
jutisdiction. The substance should remain broadly the same, but the effect may differ
substantially. For example, the right of appeal m tax matters may have little benefit for a
taxpayer on a low income in a jurisdiction xvhere access to the legal system is the province
of a mmofit3, on ltigher incomes. In countries xvith taxpayers on relatively lfigh incomes
and facilitated access to the appeal system, it may be of xvidespread use. The content will
also differ xvhere jurisdictions at sitxfil~r stages of economic development have different
legal systems and appeal processes that have very different effect.
There are further interpretation issues speeific to the Model. When it comes to
inteq3teting the fights contained in a j|misdiction, the inteq3retation will depend very much
on the form of enforcement. The correlation betxveen the interpretations of fights in
different jufisdictions, even when the legal systems are different, is likely to be stronger
where the fights ate legislated. Legislation is formal and in the tax area not dissimilar.
is apparent from \vurks on comparative taxation5~ The legal procedures accompanying
S. Novack, ’The US Experience’ m OECD, Taxation a~di~lvestme#tflows (Paris, OECD, 1994), p. 171.
See, eg., m tim UK, IRC v. Comme*Eba*Ik, (1990) STC 285 and generally, M. Lang, (ed.), Tax
lnte*pt~tatio~ (~]m Hague, Klmver Laxv International, 200!), and F. Ertgelen, I*ttetpretaliott of Tax T~atie.r
mt&r httetTtaliot*al Latv (Amsterdatn, IBFD, 2004).
(2nd edn, The Hague, Klmver Law International, 2004) and V. Thuronyi (ed.), Comparative Tax Law CIqIe
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legislation may differ, but the general,form and structuXe of legislation is broadly similar,s°
It becomes more difficult" xvhen comparkag administrative rights because the administrative
systems are more diverse. Even in an area such as the provision of advance tax rulings,
which has been driven to some extent by international convergence in the drive to attract
foreign investment, there are significant discrepancies in approach,st
The meat~ng of the Model xvill depend on the t}~pe of legal system and the structure
and st3~le of the tax system. The different t3qpes of legal system, or legal families, have
different characte~’isfics,s2 Although Thuronyi suggests that the tl~ree main t3q~es of tax
system are represented by Getanany, the United IgLr~gdom and the United States, he points
out that both courts and legislatt~es in jtttisdictions represented by each of those styles will
adopt somefitnes widely differing solutions to the same problem.~3 The economic and
social context will also have a substantial in, pact on the pl~rasmg and intm?retation of
tights. A complex dispute resolution process suited to an advanced OECD economy wJB
not easily translate to one of the poorer Pacific island nations, where a traditional economic
and social infrastructure with its own idiosyncratic dispute resolution mechanisms
underpins the tax system. Procedures, which form a large part of the content of the tights
in the Model, are particularly open to ctflmral difference, it is straightforward to say that we
should tax capital gains. How it is carried out in an advanced western economy wilt differ
markedly from how it is carded out in a ,qxrat agrarian economy with strong cormmmal
land ownerslfip. Procedural tights must exist in both, but xvith strong nuances to cope with
the divergent contexts.
Hague, Klu\ve~ Law International, 2003).
D. Albregtse and H.P.A.M. van Arendo*ak, above n.70; A. Sa\wer, ’A Comparison of New Zealand
Taxpayers’ Rights wiflx Selected Civil and Conmmn Law Countries - Have Nexv Zealand Taxpayers Been
"Sho~t-Changed"?’ (!999) 32 Vanderbi/t Jom~al of T~nmalional Law, 1345, and P. Bake~ and
G~oediaagen, The Protection of Ta~,Tbrg’et~- Rights- An I,~ter~mlional Codifl~lion (London, European Fhaancial
Forum, 2001).
D. Sandier and E. Fuks, above n. 75.
V. Thuronyi, above n. 79, chs 1, 2 and 5.
Ibid., p. 9.
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As discussed above, tile Model xvi/l have different mea~fing and content depending
on the words used to implement the rights, tn file context of anti avoidance rules for
example, the doctrine of fi’aus ]egis has no equivalent meaning in colrm~on taw
}arisdictions.84 However, even in civil law }udsdictions its meatting and content is
different.~s It is therefore important that the drafters of the legislation or t’ules are clear on
the intended content. They should use teraninology that will give effect to that content
wittmut ambigaity that leads to a reading doxw~ of tim dolts.
The process of interpretation will differ between jurisdictions. For legislated rights it
is not }ust a matter of discerning differences between a more principled civil taw approach
and a cmmnon law approach that examines closely tim wording and construction of the
legislation itsel£ The interpretation will depend vetT much as to ho\v the courts view
legislated taxpayers’ rights - xvhat classification of legislation it falls into. If it is seen as
fon’ning part of file standard law governing adn~nistration of taxation then tile nomlal
roles of interpretation in that jurisdiction will apply. Where it is acknowledged that tile
legislation was introduced for a-particular purpose, tile courts may interpret it in the light of
both the historical intent and tim purpose of tile legislation. In civil law jurisdictions such
as Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands the teleological approach is used to construe
the tax law so as to fulfil the legislative purpose.~ In conunon laxv juxisdictions such as
Canada, Australia, India and Israel a purposive approach is often used to give a broader
construction, particulaxly in the context of general anti-avoidance rxttes.~
Rules sucli as general anti-avoidance rules can be seen as a broader t3qpe of role that has
an overatct~ing application. Taxpayers’ rights should at least be seen in Otis light. A
purposive interpretation is also more likely to support the principles set out in the fttst part
of this chapter, that form the basis for most tax systems.
Ibid., p. 158.
Ibid., pp. 159 160.
Ibid., 1, p. 36 et seq, particularly pp. 1,16-147.
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A preferred approach to interpretation by taxpayers xvill be where taxpayers’ fights,
although contained in a ~ax act, are interpreted in the same way as oilier fights legislation.
The European Convention on Human Rights has been incot]?orated into the legislation of
many member countries and the courts have developed a strong teleological approach to
interpretation to ensnze that Convention fights fitlftl thek object and pur13ose.S8 The effect
has been that an interpretation ’that builds on the rules of public mternalional laxv on the
inteqpretation of treaties’~ is incorporated into the interpretative process of the member
states.
Different methods of legislative enforcement are discussed in Chapter 5. Whether or
not a iurisdiction uses a method that gives stronger protection of taxpayers’ rights clauses
than that afforded to other tax law, courts can provide thek own reinforcement of the tales
through the intetqpretive method they adopt. Tliis has clearly been the case in maint,’mfing
the effect of general anti-avoidmnce txfles.9~ Rishxvorth et at identify some of the influences
on judicial interpretation ~vhere courts recognise the special nature of fights clauses and the
language used?~ Although the authors refer to the New Zealand Bill of Rights, \vhich does
have special status in law, a number of these influences can apply to interpretation of an
ordinary legislative clause. They apply simply where the cotVCt recognises a clause as one
providing a fight and therefore reqtm:ing, in its view, a particutar approach to its
interpretation.
Ibid., pp. 140-141
D.J. Harris, M. O’Boyle and C. Warbrick, Low of the European Co,wottion on Huma*~ ~ghts ~ndon,
Bu~envorO~s, 1995 , p 7, fl~at fl~e Convention ’must be Oven a dynanfic o~ evolufive ~te~retafion’.
C. Ovey and R.C.A. XX~te, Jacobs & White Eu*&~a~ Co,we**lion on Human ~ght~ (3gd e~, Oxford, OUP,
2002), p. 41.V. ~onyi, above n. 84, ch. 5. Aus~a~a provides Nus~afion. ~e co~ts were ~s~ental ~ reading
down ~e effect of d~e generN anti avoidance provision, 0~e Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (C~), s.
260. ~fis led to legislative m~oducfion of a much more det~ed subsffmte m Pa~ ~rA of O~e same act.
However, soon after Pat* ~ZA was ~tmduced, the ~gh Cou~t seemed to reverse its approach to the
mt~retafion of s. 260, ~a cases s~ before it, to We it ~e tee~ecfion rem~ed the same but dm mterp~eta~on xvent fixll c~cle. See I.C.F. .pB,
intended. ~e s ~ . ..... :*-- ~*~a~urne ~e Laxv Book Company Ltd, 1972) fo~ ~m analysis of
its ori~al app~cafion and ]. Woncymer, AuxO~dan Income Tax Pdndples and Po/i9, (2nd e&a, Sydney
BuRe~vozfl*s, 1993), ch. 20, for a description of ~m changes m mteq~refive approach.
P. ~shworfl*, G. Huscroft, S. Opfican and R. Maboney, Tl~e New Zealand Bill ~ ~ghts (Oxford, OUP,
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The first point they make is that some tights are expressed generally, but will have
specific applicati°n’9~ The’ content of a right depends very much on how restrictively it is
applied. An interpretation that recogmises the importance of giving rights meaning will
extend their reach. Administrative review in co~m~mn taxv jurisdictions traditionally has
been somewhat restrictive in scope. Hoxvever, both the courts and the legislature have
recogmsed over the years that as modem bureaucracy becomes more complex, there is
rationale for extending the scope of a&ninistrative review.93 Tiffs recogmtion has led also to
an acceptance by the courts that they xvill themselves on occasions broaden the scope of
judicial review2a As dmy interpret legislated taxpayers’ fights, the courts may adopt a similar
purposive approach simply because the}, are interpretkag rights.
Rishxvorth et al point out that rights ’set a benchtnark for acceptable govermnental
conduct and kaxv’2s It does not mean that the fights have to be encapsulated in a separate
bill of rights to have tiffs effect. It means tlaat xvhen legislation is being interpreted its
application should not fall below the benchmark set by the rights. Obviously, that in itsdf
is a matter of interpretation. However, shnply arfictflating rights in law gives fl~em greater
emphasis aud presence in the n:~inds of judges titan when they are o~fly hnplied. It sets a
standard that develops in content and meatfing over time. in fl~s sense, Rishxvorth et al
identify fights clauses as either confftrmatory or amendato~-T?~ By this tlmy mean that rights
will either confn~n existing values or amend and transfor~n the system through the
introduction of fights that have been previously missing or imperfectly realised2~ An
example of the latter xvas the amen&:aents introduced through the va~ous US taxpayer
2003), ch 2.
See, eg., C. Eimght, FederalAdmi,~iytralive Law (Sydney, The Federation Pressl 200!), pp. 6 7 and O. Hood
Phillips, p. Jackson and P. Leopold, O. Hood Phillips & Jachao~: C~*stil~liona/and Ad*~islra!ive I~a~v (Sfl~
edn, London, Sweet & M.axxvell, 2001), pp. 648 650.
This has arguably been the case m botl~ the UK cases, Assodaled P~vi*tda/Pf~I~*~ Houses ~,. 1~ ed~esbu9
C~rp~,~&,, [1948] 1 KB 223 and Coundl~CivilSet~&e U*~ion* v. Minister for lhe CivilSe*~ice, [1985] AC 374.
P. Rish\vorth et al, above n. 91, p. 26.
rights bills in the 1980s and 1990s, m, cluding for example, reversing the onus of proof in
assessment disputes2~
A further point made by Rishworth et al, particularly pertinent to common taxv
jurisdictions, is that a legislated right could be interpreted restrictively to coincide with its
existing common law meaning or it could be interpreted broadly2~ A broader reading could
widen the interpretation of existing common law fights, extend the scope and effect of the
rights, provide more effective remedies, or do a combination of the three.*°° Simply
legislating an existing right does provide the oppormtffty to revisit its interpretation.
The context and broad approach to interpretation are important. However, as Article
3 of the Model in Chapter 9 includes an interpretation clause, it is usefill to examine ho\v
dais should be applied. Here we can draw on the approach taken in Nexv Zealand, where
the interpretation clause plays a significant role. Although it is backed by other sections that
reinforce the application of the Bill of Rights in instances of potential contradiction,
Rishxvurth et at summatise the methodology applicable specifically to the interpretation
clause that flmvs from the Bill of Rights and the \vay it has been considered thus far by the
courts.~0~ Applying the four steps they idend~, to the Model:m2
1. Is fliere a protected right fliat is affected by another enactment? T!ffs reqt~&es
consideration of the scope of the protected right.
2. Would a suggested meaning or pro-ported application of the other enactment be
inconsistent xvith or conflict xvith the meaning of the protected tight? This
reqttires in part exploration of the limits inherent on the protected rights. If there
is a poter*tial conflict or inconsistency only then does the next step apply.
98 A. Greenbamn, above n. 55, p. 371.
99 P. Risbxvorth et al, above n. 91, p. 39.
~lm Ibid.
m* Ibid., 133.
i~ Ibid.
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3. Is it possible to interpret the potentially inconsistent or conflicting enactment m a
way which avqids dae inconsistency or conflict?
4. If such an interpretation is possible then d~at is the meaning that should be
adopted. If such an interpretation is not possible only then xvoul~ a court make a
declaration of incompatibility. To the extent that an interpretation is possible tbat
lhl~its the incompatibility with the enactment, that interpretadon should be
favoured over an interpretation that does not.
Tl~is is an approach that is famifiar to corm~xon law jurisdictions. Hoxvever, it floxvs
naturally from public international laxv and the inteq~retation approach taken to make
international treaties as effective as possible. This is particularly file case in Ore
hlterpretatio~x of hmnan tights instruments. The adoption of an interpretation clause in tile
Model is explored in more detail in Chapter 5.
E Convergence
Despite ti~e barriers to consistent interpretation across jttdsdicfions, there are a range of
forces, otlaer than economic forces, d~ving convergqnce. They include the interrelationship
between different legal systems, tile conmmn adoption of tile principles outlined in this
chapter and fire wide acceptance of tile concept of taxpayers’ rights discussed in Chapter 2.
It is bdghly unlikely that there will ever be one tax system. Even at the broadest level and
where ti~ere is strong economic incentive, tile EU prm~ides an excellent example of the
difficulties in conforming different tax systems. However, as international investment and
world trade become increasingly hnportant to every jurisdiction, there will be elements of
COnvergence. Tire focus by revenue authorities on improving the efficiency of tax
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administration and procedure has extended across borders. The influence of the IMF and
World Bank, discussed m Chapter 2 has encouraged some broad similafity in approach to
tax administration. The following chapters will illustrate commonality in approach to tax
administration and procedure, where taxpayers’ rights are found.
At die level of specific rights dlere xv~ also be increasing convergence. Although
there is seldom one meatfing for terms used, a cormlmn definition of content develops
over ~ne as clauses are intet]preted in the light of specific cases. The more sophisticated
legal systems begin to reflect in their domestic systems the changes that are encouraged
through membership of international agreements dial set increasingly higher standards.
The framework of fights slowly expands and reinforces those higher standards as a general
expectation xvidtin any tax admitlistration.
Nonetheless, there will be numerous particular fights where die cotmnon definition
is not required or is impossible to find given the peculiafities of different legal and tax
systems. A cormnon conception of effect xvill exist at the higher level. The implementation
to give that effect xvill require widely different measures. Tltis does not undermine
argument for a Model.
It is argued that a Model is ~lxely, necessatT and rdevant as a standard for best
practice hi tax adn~nistration. However, it is important to remember that the Model will be
translated into different legal systems. It will not transform diem into a uniform set of
rules. Tile similarAdes may be misleading as the act and effect of translation are likely to
change the nature and content of the fights to suit die legal system. Hopefully, the effect of
the fights xvill be die same. The outcome will be to provide the filll measure of protection
intended by die Model, but in the context of that legal system. It is therefore important to
understand at fl~is point that die Modal will not resolve differences in tax adn~aistradon
and procedure. That is not its aim. It will rather provide a set of fights d~at should be given
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effect in each tax system. There may be convergence, but that will be because of other
forces of change and not the adoption of the Model.
CONCLUSION
The Yormulafion of an}, tax policy is based on underlying principles that shape the
subseqnent legislation and administrative t’ules and procedures. The traditional pfinciples
used in bencl~narking tax systems are almost all relevant to some extent to taxpayers’
rights. The Model xvill reflect the revised definitions identified in the first part of Otis
Chapter in its formulation of fights. They will help to shape the fights to ensuxe that they
fall x*dtl~ a widely accepted policy framework.
Once the rights are formulated and there is proliferation in statutot3’ instruments and
a&rmfistxative rules and procedures around the world, there will be more interest in the
comparative interpretation of fights.~°~ The jtttispt~dence of taxpayers’ fights xvill grow and
tiffs xvill assist in the development of a comparative view of the interpretation of taxpayers’
tights.’"~ Tbis *nay lead to difficulties. For example, assume a jurisdiction xvith an active
court but an undemocratic government or an economy in the early stages of development.
An acOve court could drive the development of fights more quickly than the legislature
hatended xvhen enacting them. Hmvever, this element in the process of convergence
provides the momentum for setting an accepted benctunark of good practice in tax law and
administration. As seen in Chapter 2, the development of taxpayers’ rights should provide
substantial benefits for the tax adia~nistration as well as taxpayers. Even where the
transplant of legislation is sociologically inappropriate, a pm’posive interpretation by the
The 1990 OECD Sm,-,,ey, above n. 70, was simply an early example of a general deslxe to compare rights
~vttich shows no signs of abating.
This can already be seen from such works as H.J. Ault, above n. 79; V. Thuronyi, above n. 84 and D.
,\lbregtse and H. Van Atendonk, above n. 70.
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courts can redeem the rights clauses and give them meaning that is effective in the
economic, legal, social and cultural context of the tax law for that jt~sdiction, ms
Although the content of rights might change slightly, it is nonetheless important to
establish a frame\vork of rights that can be used in the reviexv of an}, system of tax
administration. As discussed in the context of human rights in Cliapter 2, there can be a
cotmnon understanding of which broad rights are appropriate wittfin a tax system. The test
for a particuiar jurisdiction is whether a broad right of a particular kind exists. Once that is
established, it is possible to examine its content and application. Although they will vat3,
with the legal, social, polilical, economic and culttttal environment, the question is wbether
the protection is sufficient, or whetl~er there are gaps.
Chapter 2 provided the rationale for a Model. Cbapter 3 has demonstrated tlie
importance of keeping the rights chosen in broad agreement xvith the principles tliat
generally underlie tax systems. It has also shown that although interpretation of fights xxCdl
cause tlaeir content to differ in practice, there will be some convergence over time. It is
these differences depending upon context that emphasise the importance of the Model as a
guide to best practice rather than a particular set of noes. Chapter 4 now analyses the
context which gives xveight to the argument that a Model is both thnely and beneficial. It
then proceeds to classit~, the rights contained in the Model in the light of that context.
105 p. Alston, ’A Framexvork for the Comparative Analysis of Bills of Rights’ m P. Alston (ed.), Promoli*g
Human* Rights Through Bil/.r of Rashly: Compa~live Perape~lives (Oxford, OUP, 1999), p. 1, p. 12.
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CHAPTER 4
THE CONTEXT AND CLASSIFICATION OF TAXPAYERS’
RIGHTS
I INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2 identified the basis for a general model of taxpayers’ rights grounded ha rights
fl~eo~3, and in a context of domestic and hatemational acceptance of standard setting in
taxation. The chapter emphasised that the Model should contah~ rights that have general
acceptance and that the rights should be broad enough to be adapted to the particular
context of each jurisdiction.
Chapter 3 set out the principles that underlie the tax system. It showed that they have
broad acceptance and can inform the natttte and content of taxpayers’ rights included in a
model. However, the Chapter also warned that interpretation of the meaning of both the
principles and the content of taxpayers’ rights can be bhtrred across jurisdictions so that
even fights that appear to be the same may have different substance when interpreted in a
different context. Idenfi~,ing the differences can be difficult given the inherent barriers that
hinder easy access to a common meanhag. The chapter concluded that there is a trend
towards some comanonality of meaning, wltich will hacrease with the adoption and
subsequent h~terpretation of rights from the Model.
Chapters 4 and 5 provide the framework for a detailed analysis of the rights in
Chapters 6 to 8. To analyse a right it is essential to place it in context. A broad context is
provided in flae first part of the chapter. It demonstrates the expanding role of gover~maent
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but, in response, the increasing protection of general fights and taxpayers’ fights. It shows
that a Model of taxpayers’ fights as a gnide to best pracdce in tax administration is both
timely and beneficial.
The t)q?e of fight and the rammer of its enforcement governs its nature,
intet~pretafion and application, Tile second part of this chapter provides a classification 6f
taxpayers’ fights in the context of file mechanisms for their enforcement. Chapter 5
explores those mechanisms in detail to identify the strengths and weaknesses of each. It
will be demonstrated that the natttte of file tights included in a model of taxpayers’ fights
depends upon the method of enforcement used.
II THE CONTEXT FOR A MODEL: EXq~ANDING GOVERNMENT
It is beyond file scope of this thesis to provide more than a ct~tsot3, ovet~,iew of file legal
and political environment that must shape an), model of taxpayers’ fights. However, it is
important to provide an overview of recent developments that influence file rxfle-making
environment and the nature of the rules that depend upon it. This in turn provides the
basis for arguing that a Model of taxpayers’ rights is timely and beneficial.
John Milton once said:a
The power of kings and magistrates is nothing else, but what only is derivative,
transformed arid committed to them in trust from the people to the common good of
them all, in \vhom the power yet remains fundamentally and cannot be taken from
them, wifl~out a violation of thek nat0xal birttu’ight.
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That is the basis for democracy and, arguably, it is only in democracies where there is
genuine operation of the role of law2 that taxpayers’ fights can have real meaning.3
Nonetheless, most jt~sdicfions rely for their economic survival tbxough foreign direct
investment on some level of recognition of legal protection, albeit that the protection
afforded to foreign investors is somethnes greater than that provided to cirizens.4
Axguably, what is meant by the rule of laxv can determine the extent to which citizens
can rely on fights given to them by law. Hayek states that:s
Stripped of all technicalities tlfis means that goverument in all its actions is bound by
rules fixed and announced beforehand -rtfles which make it possible to foresee with
fair certainty how the authority ,,viii use its coercive poxvers in given ckcumstances,
and to plan one’s ind[vidual affairs on the basis of dfis kimwledge.
Neumann argues that Otis is ~imply recognition of procedural justice and it is in Hayek’s
effective addition of a moral dilnension to the concept of the role of law that he gives a
broader meaning to the concept that dislinguishes conditions under a free government
J. Milton, In The Tetttttr ofIO)gs attd Magistrates (Glided Lyon, London, Matthew 8inmaons, 16491.
A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Slu@ of lhe Lau, of the Constittttion (10th edn, London, Butte~vorths, 1960), p.
183, was an early proponent of the concept of the rule of law as a feature of tl~e English constitution and
it is a pkrase that has taken on a far wider meardng, e.g., J. Raz, ’The Rule of Law and its Vixme’ ha R.L.
Cumungham (ed.), La’betgy and the Rtde of Lair (College Station, Texas A & M Uulversity Press, 1979), p. 11.
Tlfis is brought home by tim example of the charges leveled at ~fikhall Khodorkovsky, the Russian oil
billionaire, and Yukos, the oil company he controlled, for tax evasion. According to a Special Report ha
The Economist ~{ay 2Pt - 27ea 2005), pp. 24-25, "Last December, in a transaction surreal even by Russian
standards, Yuganskneftegaz, Yukos’s main production arm, was forcibly sold ha another rigged auction, to
a company registered at a prm4ncial grocer), shop.’ iXfi: ,Mxdrei Illationov, President Pulin’s economic
adxqser is reported to have called it ’the swindle of the year’ (at p. 25). Whatever the truth of these
allegations of rough justice, them was a general perception fl~at the rule of law was not consistently upheld
and that this affected taxpayers’ rights in particular.
qq*e PRC has recognised the appeal of a uniform set of tax laws with d*e gradual unification of the tax
regimes for both resident and non-resident corporate taxpayers: discussed in W. Chart and I. Wong, "The
Taxation of Foreign Investment Enterprises and Foreign Enterprises’ (2005) 11 Asia-Pattie Tax Bullelin,
447.
F.A. F~ayek, The Road to Serfdom (London, Roufledge Press, 19,t41, p. 54.
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from tbat under an arbitrary government.6 Neumann calls this a thickening of the rule of
taw.7
Neumatm defines the rule of law as a ttfin concept without added moral content,
where ’there are certain n~aimum external standards for law and for legilimate state action’
that make a system not morally but legally good.8 The tlfin concept provides the basis for
arguing that there is tafle of law in some jtttisdictions although the content of that law that
may be morally repugnant. It is also relevant to the discussion of which fights should be
included in the Model in Chapter 6. Given that taxpayers’ fights exist in some form in an),
jurisdiction that is not collecting revenue tktough arbitrary expropriation of property, it is
helpful to begin tl~ere with a tlfin concept of the txtle of law and add moral content
thereafter.
In examining the ideal context for taxpayers’ fights, ho\vever, arguably it should be a
democratic regime in which the rule of law as a thicker concept can be applied as the moral
dimensions of justice and fairness are more obviously present. This is by no means certain,
as Blackstone obserced, for politicians who exercise the sovereignty of an absolute and
unconditional majofity in a democracy may exercise that power unchecked.9
To counter Blackstone’s concern, democratic government is nowadays based Upon
some form of separation of powers to prevent the re-emergence of the problems seen in
M. Neumarm, The Pade of Law: Poh?id~tg Ethic.r ~agmn, VT, Ashgate Pub~slm~g, 2002), p. 3.
Ibid., p. 5.
Ibid., p. 7, wifl~ an expansion of tim mea~lg of Iris definition in ch. 2. In later chapters Ne~l expires
how moral ~d efltical principles c~ add conmnt effectively m the ~e of la~v, proxdded we are re~sdc
about its ~fi~ me~g. ~e Inmmafion~ Cow,fission of J~sts, The Rule ~w itt a F~e Sode~,, wor~g
paper on dm Rtfle of Law ~ew De~i, ln~a, International Confess of J~sts, 1959), p. 313, is reco~sed
as a ’flfick’ ~eoty of law md is ro~y cdficised by J. Raz, Tlse Attlhoti&’ ~v: Esso,* on ~w a~*d Morally’
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979), p. t96. Sampfozd prox~des a broader ~alysis of flmo*Jes of flxe ~e of
law kt C. Sampford, ~lm~eclivi~, a~d the ~de ~w (Oxford, OUP, 2006), ch. 2.21st cent, conceptions
are explored ~ S. Zifcak (ed.), ~conceivi~g the ~de q~*w ~ndon, Roufledge, 2004).
W. Blackstone, C~mmentaties on lhe ~11,s ~Et~gland (Clficago, U~versig of Clficago Press, 1979), vol. 1, p.
91.
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democracies partictdarly in tim ~st half of the 20th centm3,.t° Theoretically the executive is
responsible, as in the US, directly to the people; or, as in the Westnfinster System, to the
legislature. The legislature is elected by the people. Judicial power rests with the courts.
Judges are usually appointed, not elected, and do not participate in political activity. This
protects them from the necessity of applying the law to satisfy the wil! of the majority. It
enables d~em to maintain the independence necessat3’ to effect the impartial adixaiifistration
of justice and to act as a check on the other branches of gover~m~ent,tt
Largely a feature of the last 50 years, ’making judges responsible for testing the
legithnacy of laxvs passed in the name of the people, against rules and pr~ciples that 9xe
embedded - more or less explicitly - in a constitutional text, has flourished as never
before.’t2 Not traditionally a feature of European jurisprudence, the roles taken by the
Get, nan Constitutional Court, the European Court of Human Rights and the European
Court of Justice have made tiffs approach more acceptable. The drive towards judicial
autonomy has meant that goverurnents not seen as democratic will still usually operate with
at least some of the elements of judicial independence,t3
,u    Developed in the 18th and 19th centuries through the US Constitution in partictflar.
Theorists such as Montesquieu, Locke and Hobbs were influential in the development of
modem constitutional gover~maent. See, e.g., C. Montesquieu, The Spit# oflhe Laws (1989
translation), Cambridge Texts in the Histo*3’ of Political Thought, (Cambridge, Cambridge
Urdversity Press), p. 157. The idea is explored further in D.M. Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of
Law (Oxford, OUP, 2004), ch. 1.
In the US, the political batlles over the confirmation of presidential appointments t° the federal bench
~d Supreme Court sometimes reach epic proportions. See, e.g., ’The battle over the judges: Armageddon
for the Senate’ The Economist, ~ay 21~ - 27t~ 2005), p. 35. The ardcle includes an interesting table (at p.
36), showing that tim percentage of confirmations of presidential judicial appointments to die District and
Circuit Courts ranged from 61.5% for President Clinton in 1999 dttougb to 97% for President Carter in
1977. However, ~:esearch has shown that appointees often do not satisfy the hopes of their pzesidantial
appointers as the}, exercise their independence of thought. See fitt~er, L. Tribe, God Save This Hottottrable
Court: How the Choice of Supreme Court Jmtices Shapes our HistoO’ (New York, Random House, 1985); R.L.Pacelle, The Supreme Co~- ol it- ~ Amedcatt Politics." The Leaa Dattgerous Branch (Boulder, Westview Press, 2001)
and D.M. Beatiy, ibid.
~" D.M. Beat*),, above n. 10, p. 2.
n Mthough the effectiveness decreases with the autocracy of the executive and the proper functioning of
the tax adnfinistration. See, in die historical context of die Venezuelan tax system, M.C. Arocha,
’Cormnents’ in R.M. Bird and M. Casanegra de Jantscher (eds), Impmvit~g Tax Admitdslration itt Devdoping
Cotmtdes (Washington DC, IMF, 1992), p. 336.
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Fundamental to any democratic system is the principle that the organs of
government are subject to mutual checks and balances,a4 However, this is not ahvays
effective. In recent years the executive arm of governments has grown in importance,
increasingly and, perhaps necessarily, usurping the role of the legislature. Many of the
powers that the executive arm exercises are too broad; too complex; too detailed, for the
legislature to be able to participate in, more than to act in a monitoring role. The size and
extent of the activity of the executive and its public service places a heavy burden on the
courts, as they seek to arbitrate on the meaning of the law, particularly when it requires the
overturning of executive decisions. As they exercise their roles in the midst of such
complexity, it will be shown, for example in Chapter 5 in the context of enforcement, that
standards are becoming increasingly useful as grtides for all three arms of government.
Mthough theories of judicial decision-making provide a strong basis for sa}Cmg that
decisions of judges are removed f~om bias and personality, the majority of lower courts
with btttgeoning workloads simply do not have the luxury of time knowingly to integrate
broader issues of principle into their decisions,is Beatty argues that it is time to focus not
on what judges should be doing, but on ’how cot~tts actually exercise their powers of
judicial review’.16 Practice suggests that the deske for the courts to act as a check on the
activities of the executive is not always met.
Discussed in F. VaMstendae~ ‘Lega~ Framew~rk f~r T~a~n~ in V. Th~r~n~ (ed.)~ v~. ~ Tax Lan~ Desi~
and Dmflit~g (Waslfington DC, ~’~, 1996), p. 16. For a gener~ discussion, see P. Keyzer, Comtitutiot~a/~n,
(2nd echh Sy&~ey, Lems Ne~s, 2005), p. 14. Up ~e d spectfica~) m Aus~afia m Ctm ~eng ~t~ . Mi tster~
Im**dgration, (1992) 176 CLR 1 axd M. t~. Ho’den, ~o. 2] (1984) 156 CLR 352. Habermas would ar~e flint
~fis is the appropriate role of ~e ju~cia~,, to rid fl~e process of democracy of its ~eq~fies m~d
arbitra~ess: J. Habermas, Between Facts and No,ms: ConO~ution* to a Discom~e TbeoO, ~v and Demo~aff.
(Canbfidge, ~’~, ~,~T P~ess, 1996), p.107.
Writers such as Dwor~ ~d Posner have large bo~es of work ~at pro~de flae theorefic~ analysis of
decisions even h~ hard cases fl~at surest judges do or should effect such ~tegra~on. In most j~s~cfions
~m larger roarers of p~ciple are reco~sed only at fl~e level of tim lfigher corms.
D.M. Bea~,, above n. 10, p. 34.
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The problem for die courts is that administrative decision-making is often not
subject to the laxv, except m narrow procedm’al areas,t7 This leaves large tracts of what
effectively is the laxv, unguarded by an independent and inapartial judiciary,. Some argue that
it strikes at the heart of the democratic fortn of government. Sir Gerard Bretman, then
Clfief Jusdce of Australia, recalled Lord Hailsham’s statement dlat, ’We live under an
elective dictatorslfip, absolute in theory if !fitherto thought tolerable in practice’.18 The
Ct~JefJustice noted dlat, in Australia:t9
[the] description is close to the maxk....But there are dangers in maintaining a
structure which lel~ds itself to the concentration of political power in the Executive
Government. There is a risk of efficiency turning to tyranny....The traditional checks
and balances are h~adequate to protect minorities and the interests of individuals.
This description may be overly pessimistic. Nonetheless, as the separation of powers
is based on checks and balances, it is timely to consider any means to strengthen the
understanding of how the checks and balances can operate, particularly where one arm of
government in a jurisdiction may be more powerful than another. Guidelines and standards
both domestically and inter’nationally can assist law-makers, judges and administrators in
tlie proper exercise of their powers.
It raises issues for tax admi~stration. Tax law is complex and voluminous. Revenue
authorities are often given extensive discretion. Although the substance of tax law is ahaaost
always subject to review by the courts, tl~is is much less the case in its administration.
Discussed in D. Bentley, ’Formulating a Taxpayers’ Charter of Rights: Setting the Ground Rules’ (1996),
25 Australiatt Tax Review, 97 and ’The Taxpayers’ Charter: More Than a h,fissioa Statement’ (1995-96), 4
Tax’alton i~ Auxlralia Red Edition, 259.
~ In Iris 1976 Dhnbleby Lectttte, cited in d~e 1998 Inaugura] Sir Gerard Brennan Lecture, (Bond Univetsit3,,
Gold Coast, Australia, 21 February 1998), p. 15.19 Ibid., p. 15 and p. 17.
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Taxpayers’ rights are therefore largely concerned with the effect of tax adn’dnistxation as it
is administered by the revenue authority bureaucracy. They provide usefifi checks on
power.
In democratic jul:isdictions there is concern over the extensive power and autllority
of the executive, th*ough its bureaucracy. It is interesting to note that the IMF and World
Bank, in particular, have been providing guidance to numerous cotmtries over a number of
years on the reform of their tax systems. Much of this guidance is based on standards
developed to best ensure success.2° Man}, of these count:des are viewed as fledgling
democracies. Some would be considered undemocratic.21 However, the nature and
importance of revenue collection is such that even in the most undemocratic cotmt~ies this
is one element of tim legal system that all regimes try to ensure operates as efficiently and
effectively as possible.22 Developing countries and those in transition are encouraged in
this approach by the IMP and the World Bank, as discussed in Chapter 2. These countries
face problems where they have either weak courts or a weak bureaucracy.
As noted by V,uistendael,~ in some iurisdictions the judicial system does not
function effectively and this constitutes, ’a substantial impediment to the rule of law in tax
matters.’ This problem is compounded if there are flaws in the operation of the legislature
and executive. Gordon and Thuronyi suggest that tax reform should take place with
appropriate collaboration between tile executive and the legislature.24 The}, note that this is
particularly dif~cult if there has not yet been tile opportuuity to properly establish a tax
V. Thttronyi, above n. 14, vol. 1, xx’vii.
There ate numerous agencies charting democratic development. For a listing of many of the better
recoguised, see the Democracy Research Guide, The National Endowment for Democracy,
<wxw, v.ned.org>, 1 November 2006.
For a ~eview of developments in d~is direction across a range of developing countries, see R.M. BKd and
M. Casanegra de J,-mtscher, above ft. 13.
Above n. 14.
R.K. Gordon and V. Thuronyi, ’The Tax Legislative Process’ in V. Thuronyi, above n. 14, 1, p. 7.
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legislative process.2S It would leave effective responsibility for the legislation and
administration of the tax law squarely in the hands of the executive.
In many jurisdictions, without some adherence to dae rule of law, corruption
flourishes.26 Even hi the most established and stable democracies comapt practices exist
and are routinely the subject of inqtfiries and commissions. However, the d~teat to dae
proper achninistradon of the tax system is most serious in those jm~sdictions where bribeIT
and corruption is rife.-~7
Logically, there would therefore be a conlJnuum that begins with countries that have
little in the way of the rule of law (even in Nemnann’s dfimaest form, i.e. effective but
widmut moral content) and seek to extract revenue from their citizens by methods
generally accepted as inappropriate. Tiffs is most conmaonly seen hi countries experiencing
civil war. Their lack of success in raising the necessatT revenues to support the
gm, emment’s programs xvould usually be reflected in their level of economic development.
Taxpayers’ rights would largely be afien to these jtmisdictions, at least in substance if not ha
form.
Alung the continuum there would be other cotmtfies that, although not fillly
democratic or generally known for a strong system of law, nonedadess would have systems
in place to ensure collection of revenue. These would usually be accompatfied by limited
taxpayers’ fights, such as the right to appeal against an assessment. Developing countries
and countries in transition are often represented in Otis group.~8 The effectiveness of
taxpayers’ rights would depend very much on the operation of the procedural rules and
Ibid., p. 1.
Reflected in the xvork of Transparency International.
C’E. McLm:e, Jnr and $. Pardo R, ’Improving the Administration o f the Colombian Income Tax, ! 986-88’
in R.M. Bird and M. Casanegra de Jantscher, above n. 13, p. 125, p. 135.
Ibid., a rectttrent theme in R.M. Bird and M. Casanegra de J~a~tscber.
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safeguards and the respect by adia~fistration officials for the system?-9 It is as these
jurisdictions introduce reforms of the tax system that there is most scope for use of a
model of taxpayers’ tights in guiding the shape of the legislative and admitfistradve
framexvork.
Luogaz0 identifies the factors that both encourage and mih’tate against change, based
on research in the context of Tanzanian tax reform. Factors that are likely to prevent
change tend to focus strongly on administrators’ fear of loss of autocratic control of the tax
system and include:31
fear by bt~reaucrats of a loss of poxver, particularly if they perceive limits on their
discretion;
fear of loss of revemm as taxpayers embrace their newly-found tights to oppose
prerogative powers over taxation;
fear that carefully cultivated co-operation between govermnent and business that
maintains the stares quo would be upset; and
the costs associated with implementation of reform, including the potential
invalidation of existing taxes.
Ranged against rids focus on retention of control are a range of factors that are likely to
precipitate change over time despite the strength of tile opposition. Many of these factors
Ibid., p. 135. Even in a generally corrupt system, not all tax officials are necessarily corrupt. In the most
authoritarian regime there will be tax officials xvbo hlterpret file regulations more favottrably for taxpayers
than others. See further, O-H. Fjeldstad and B. Ttmgodden, ’Fiscal corruption: A xdce or x4rtue’, (2003) 31
World Development, 1459.
F.D.A.M. Luoga, ’The Viabifity of Developing Democtafic Legal Framew°tks f°r T~xati°n in Devel°ping
Countries: ~omeq ~essol ...............     n~ fr.m T~n~.nizrl Tax Reform Extmtiences’. Lan*, SodalJuslice~ g.~ G/obalDevdopmeltt
(2002(1)), p. 27, <elj.w~mvick.ac.uk/global/issue/2003-2/luoga.html>, 6 September 2006,
Ibid.
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,~e cot~maon to bodl developing and developed comxtries and some of the more important
can be grouped into thxee broad areas.
The first group flows from the sheer force of change driven by the economic, social
and teclmological envirortment.3~- As governments are forced to refom~ thek tax policy to
cope with these changes, the economic imperative of establishing a broader tax base
requires a slffft in approach widen the tax adnffnistration.33 Tiffs drives a response from
taxpayers. Tliey become aware the level of tax they pay compared with the public benefits
dmy receive, particttlarly in developing countries in fiscal crisis, wbere the impact of change
on die taxpayer is greater.34 If taxpayers are suddeN}, required to pay substantially more tax,
they want to see some benefit for their real sacrifice.
The second group reflects the broader issues influencing the context for change. The
focus on governance, integrity and transparency has forced its way into ever3, area of
decision-making. Take d~tee examples: the global response to corporate collapses such as
Enron both legislative and through changes to international accounting stand~ds; the
response of supranational organisadons such as the OECD to issues such as harmfirl tax
competition; and the international implementation of anti-terror legislation. Govetmnents
ate no longer insulated from international pressure to exlffbit at least the semblance of
compliance with agreed standards. More specifically for developing countries, aid and loans
are increasingly linked to genuine progress on good governance, reflected, for example, in
the IMF Co& of Good Praclices on Fiscal Tra*t~oa~n~.35 Luoga relates that in Tanzania public
awareness of the requirement for good governance is forcing the goverrmaent and
K.C. Messem, Ta:,- Po/iO, in OECD Cbutllties: Choices attd Cot~icts (Amsterdam, IBFD Publications BV,
1993), p. 27.
R.M. Bird and M. Casanegra de Jantscher, above n. 13, ch. 1.
F.D.A.M. Luoga, above n. 30, p. 28.
Available at <www.imf.org/extemal/np/fad/trat~s/code.htm>, 6 September 2006.
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bureaucrats to broaden public consultation to engender file public cooperation required to
implement change.36
~lae third ~oup reflects the development of a more orggnised public response to
cliange. Tltis has been more obvious in the political changes forced by the public response
to dubious elections, as in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution of 2004-5 following allegations of
endemic com~ption, voter intimidation and electoral fraud. Even in the most autocratic
regimes, such as Zimbabwe, opposition members of Parliament are emboldened to speak
out against d~e excesses of the txfling reginae.37 Luoga reports that in a developing countt3’
sucli as Tanzania, the growth of multipazty pofitics has ’invigorated criticat scrutiny of
government affairs ....It means therefore the parliament is becoming more accessible to
the public and increasingly receptive to ideas from constituencies in legislating’.3~ Luoga
fimher notes that in developing count.des, taxpayers have been more willing to use their
capacit3, to paralyse the state by refusing to collect or pay taxes)9
Most jurisdictions are now strix~ng to operate within at least Neumann’s thin form of
the nile of law. Even if they are not generally regarded as democratic, the demands of
foreign investment and the other elements of change identified above increasingly reqtti~e
that their tax systems at least reflect the basic rights expected of a stable tax system.
Progress on one front, however, is countered by deterioration of taxpayers’ rights on
another. Many jurisdictions, even thougli they may not have mature or effecfive judiciaries,
will experience ffm domination of the executive in the development of their tax system in
the way identified by Sir Gerard Bretman and Lord Hal]sham. This experience will groxv
with the pleflxora of role-making that is increasingly a feature of modem society. The
F.D.A.M. Luoga, above n. 30, p. 28.
See, e.g., the major amenchnents to the new constitution of 2005 proposed by the Movement for
Democratic Change (but reiected by the Governnxent) to incorporate st~gent human rights protections.
Second Reading of the Constitution ~Mnendment 17 Bill in Parliament, Tuesday 23 August 2005, Hansard
(Zimbabwe).
38 F.D.A.M. Luoga, above n. 30, p. 29.
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advantage of mature democracies is that they at least have the benefit of an active
legislature and the generally effective operation of the r-nle of law m support taxpayers’
rights. However, even the most mature democracies carmot always rely" on their current
systems to ensure taxqpayer protection, given the volmne of ,-tOes that reqltire
implementation.40 The development of accepted standards of administration prmddes a
useful set of arguments against excessive exercise of power.
III THE CONTEXT FOR A MODEL: INCREASING PROTECTION
Tax a&ninistradon is notorious for its complexity and, often, its l~ck of accomltability.4~
One only has to review the search and seizure legislation in a number of jurisdictions, m
see the significant powers of tax administrators.4z On die oilier hand, revenues must be
collected to fund govermnents. There is a tension that will grow with advances in
technology, and as societies become increasingly international in content and oudook.
For those govennnents most focused on the preservation of die t-ale of law with a
broader content, they protect their citizens with a constitutionally entrenched bill of ~ights.
As the executive arm of govetaunent inevitably becomes more poxverfnl in order to cope
39 Ibid.
~0 It is widely recog~fised as a problem. See, for example, the Australian Tax La\vs Amendment (Repeal of
Inoperative Provisions) Act 2006 designed to reduce the sheer volume of legislation in use. "Iqm problem
is discussed in J. Corker},, ’On Literalism, Rule of Law and Due P~ocess’ (2003) 13 Revemte LawJounml, 1,
and in relalion to international complexit), and tax compliance: D.R. Tillingbast, ’Issues of Internalional
Tax Enfozcement’, in H.J. Aaron and J. Slerm:od (eds.), The Ct#is i*t Tax AdttJitffslmlt~n (Washington D.C.,
Bmokings Ins~dtu~on Press, 2004), p. 38.
~1 One proposal for imprm~xg this situation is to make the tax authority independent from the executive
and accountable direcdy to parliament. See, e.g., R. Taliercin, Desig#iJ~gpe~fot~tance: the semi-atttottomot~s revemte
attthoffO’ model itt Afiica attd Latin Amet~?a, Policy Reseaxch working paper series No. WPS 3423
C~’(tashington DC, World Bank, 2004); C. Campbell and M. Bert),, ’Back to the Futtue: Is it Time to put
Revenue Canada into Conurdssion?’ (1995) 43 Cattadian TaxJoutTml, 1901; G.P. Jenkins, ’Moderrfization of
Tax Admiafistrafions: Revenue Boards and Pdvatization as Instrtmmnts for Change’ (1994) 48 IBFD
Bullqin 75; and <www.itthveb.org>, 6 Septembe~ 2006.
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with the speed of change, these goverawnents recognise that it is no longer sufficient that
citizens should have to rely for the protection of their basic tights on limited statutes and
administrative conventions.43 This may not be the only answer to provide some form of
safety net for citizens in the face of the growth of executive prover. However, it is
increasingly popular, as seen in the implementation of Bills of Pdghts in Canada, New
Zealand, South Africa and the U~ited I#dngdom.44
To state that such matters fall outside the scope of a discussion pettahfing to taxation
is to ignore the fact that taxation laxvs affect ever}, transaction undertaken. The beneficial
effect of legislation such as the Canadian Charter and the South African Constitution is
that they provide dear legal parameters within which the revenue laws must operate. This
provides guidance for the executive as it seeks to maintain its revenue base in an
iiaternational environment where taxpayers and other governments are tt3dng to erode it for
their own advantage. In desperate times, govermnents take desperate measures.4s A general
bill of rights assists in the operation of tim rule of law in revenu( matters.
Against tiffs backdrop, the power of executive arms of government x~dll inevitably
increase as society and government becomes more complex. The legislative arms of
govetmnent will pursue *note vigorously their role as the monitor of legislation,a6 They \viii
introduce more rigorous requirements that statuto*3T instruments and other regulations ate
4~ Discussed ftrtfl~er in Chapter 8. ¯
43 See further on tiffs flaeme, D. Goldberg, QC, "Between the Taxpayer and the Executive; Law’s
Inadequacy; Democracy’s Failure?’ [1996] B~ilish Tax Review, 9.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982; New Zealaa~d Bill of
Rights Act 1990; Chapter 2, Constitution of tim Republic of South Africa 1996; and OK Human Rights
Act 1998.
45 And always have: see B. Bartlett, ’How Excessive Govermnent Killed .M~c’ent Rome (1994) 14 (2) Cart
Jout~*al, 287.
~6 Tills was seen in particltlar in the US with dm passage of the so-called Taxpayer Bills of Rights
amendments to the Internal Revenue Code: A. Greenbaum, ’United States Taxpayer BBIs of Rights 1, 2
and 3: A Padl to the Furore o~ Old Whine in New Bottles?’ in D. Bentley (ed.), Tax75a3’ers’ Rt’ghls: At~
I~ttet?ta/ionalPer~pec/ive (Gold Coast, Revenue Law Journal, 1998), p. 347.
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laid before them for comanent. There will be more reviexv by standing cotrmfittees.47
Regulations will be subject to sunset clauses.48 However, the lack of tinae and expertise of
members of parliaments may linfit their effectiveness.49 The role of cou~ts will remain
largely that of interpreling substantive law, with a fe\v exceptions perhaps in the context of
interpretation of bills of rights. The courts will tt3, to maintain due process, but against a
backdrop of their lhnited ability to interfere with the exercise of administrative discretion.
Their significant influence will remain largely confined to the broader policy issues found Js~
bills of rights. However, their interpretation of these rights has the potential to shape the
way that tlie executive exercises its grmving powers.
The significant step forward is the growing focus by govermnents on their
responsibility to their citizens and the need to introduce broad adininistrative protection
against abuse of power. Tiffs trend is likely to continue. A concern is that it may do so at
the expense of rights that are independently created and administered. Administrative due
process xvill be effective for most citizens, who will not notice the gradual increase in
executive power. They will accept the arguments that goverrmaents need xvider powers to
protect laxv-abiding citizens,s° However, admiifistrative protection is likely not to spread
widely enough to protect those citizens who fall] whether immcently or not, outside the
standard operation of goverrmaent adinhffstration.
Valetie Braithwaite argues cogently however, that it is incutnbent upon revenue
authorities to preserve the democratic order by upholding tax system integrity and creating
For a useful description of the changhag balance of power in Westmkaster systems, see Sir G. Brermaaa,
’The Padiament, The Executive and the Courts: Roles and Immunities’, The Bt~mtan Lectures 1998-2001,
(Gold Coast, Bond University, 2003), p. 2. On the effectiveness of standing committees in a Westmfiaster
system, see t-!. Barnett, Conslitulional and Administrative Law (3rd edil, London, Cavendisb PublisbLng Lid,
200l), pp. 619 etseq.
It has become a poficy commitment for some governments. For example, see in the UK, The Better
Regula6on Task Force, Annual Report 2000-2001, p. !9, <www.brc.gov.uk>, 1 November 2006.
An interesting response to tiffs concern is found in the Canadian Librat3, of Parliament, Strategies for
Effective fi4embet~ in a~t Effective Parliament: Report on Fottr Seminars for New Membe*~ of the 38a’ Parliament,
<w\VW.pati.gc.ca/mfoxmation/libraty>, l November 2006.
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the envixonment to maximise taxpayer compliance.sl She suggests that integtit3’ of the
system means that, ’in return for taxes, taxpayers should not only receive goods and
services, but also sound governance that is respectful and protective of democratic
principles and p~ocesses’.s2 Given the nature of a democracy, she asserts that institutional
engagement tktough education and persuasion should be combined with a commitment to
’convert democratically responsive principles of action into concrete operations and
routines in the day-to-day practices of tax officers’.s3
Tiffs ¯dexv is shared increasingly by tax authorities. For example, a past Australian
t.54
Commissioner of Taxation, lvlichael Carmody, regulad) expressed the ¯tew tha .
The conununity has the right to expect that xve are there to protect their interest
within the terms of the la\v and to promote with govetTanent changes to the law
where that interest is being challenged....If ¯ve are to have the community’s
confidence in thek tax administration it is essential they -knoxv hoxv ¯ve are operating,
xvhat to expect of us in their individual dealings with us and also that there are
accessible avenues to seek redress ¯vhere they do not believe we are acting according
to the standards we profess.
It is an approach reflected in the Australian Commonwealth Treasm3 s Review of Aspects
of Income Tax Self Assessment, which recornmended a nmnber of refinements to the
As has occurred internationally xxfifl* dm introduction in several jufis~cfions of ~fi-terrofism le~slafion
flint ~pacts on civ~ ~berfies.               ~        , , ......... ~ ~f fl~e Tax System’ m V. Br~O~waite
, , ~ e fit" ~d Comph~ce" ~e ~emocra~c ivl~agc .........TaxS}stem mt g ~ " 271.
(ed.), Tax’i*g Demoo~9’: UMerstandi**g Tax Avoidm~re mM Evadon (Aide,shot, Ashgate, 2003), p.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 275.                                                 "            ¯           ’     " "
M. Carmod}, Future Dkecdons ~ Tmx A&n~s~afion or Confab" Confidence. ~le Essen~al B~dmg
Block’ m C. Evans and A. Greenbamn (eds), Tax Admi~¢~tmtiom Fadlg the Cha!/e*ges ~the FMm* (Sydney,
Prospect, 1998), p. 255, p. 257 ~d p. 261.
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Australian tax system,ss These, it suggested, would redress the balance of fairness in favour
of the taxpayer and make the tax system more flexible,s6
There is recognition that with the expansion of government, increased responsibi~ty
is placed on the executive in its adn’finistration of the laws. Revenue authorities, as
Braithwaite argues, play a particularly important role in safeguarding democracy and the
rule of law. Although the scope of legal protection is broadened at the lfighest levels, the
day-to-day achnhfistrafion of the tax t’ules and processes falls increasingly within tim
discretion of the executive, so that legal constraint is lhnited and difficult m enforce.
Fortunately, the revenue authorities in many jtudsdictions have recognised their
responsibility to maintain the integrity of the system. Cynics argue that this may be in part
because it increases taxpayer compliance and enables them to perform better against their
targets. Nonetheless, these revenue authorities are demonstrating the ’basic respect for the
democratic principles of participation and accountability’ that legithnates fl~eir actions.5v In
doing so, they are increasingly co-operating to develop appropriate standards of tax
administration.
The context discloses therefore that there is increasing recognition of taxpayers’
rights. This is flowing in two directions. The first is an increase in recogtfition of
fiandamental rights in the context o[ bills of rights and sin~ilar instruments. The second is in
the context o~ the expansion of administrative protection of- rights, given the limits on
general legal protection of taxpayers’ rights in the day-to-day application of" the tax roles
and processes. Development of" acceptable standards o£ taxpayers’ rights is therefore timely
and beneficial. However, it is also inaportant to consider the content of the rights. As will
Australian Govermnent, Reporl on Aspecls of htcome
<www.selt~assessment.treasm3,.gov.au>, 6 September 2006.
Ibid., p. 5.
V. BraiRxwaite, above n. 51, p. 287.
Ta:~" Self-Assessment (Canberra, 2004),
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be seen in the discussion below, the mariner of enforcemer~t can have a significant effect
on the content of a tight, underlining the importance of current trends.
IV AN OVERVIEW OF TYPES OF RIGHTSss
Taxpayer protection varies, depending upon the rights to be protected and the method of
enforcement used to proxfide that protection. Usually, meflmds of enforcement flow
naturally from the rights that a society sees as needing protection. The first question is:
what rights are protected? The list is long. For simplicity, we can identi~T two main types of
rights, which can then be broken down into different classes, according to thei~ method of
enforcement.
The first t3~pe of right encompasses the ordinat3, riglits of most taxpayers who
attempt to comply with the law and want to see fairness and efficiency in the daily
operation of the tax adininistration, collection and enforcement process. These rights tend
to occur at the interface between the tax collection authority and the taxpayer, and focus
on process.
Rights of this kind are protected by both legislative and administrative measures, but,
as discussed below, the scope of the tights depends largely on the nature of enforcement.
The charters of taxpayers’ riglits in Canada, New Zealand and Australia, for example, all
state that the revenue authorities will respect the confidentiality of taxpayer information on
an admim~trative basis. Yet, ha all those jurisdictions, there are also legislated secrecy
prm-isions applicable to officers of the revenue collection authority, prohibiting them from
The classification of rights put fmwazd in tiffs secdon has had a long gestation atld was first set out in D.
Bentley, ’Foftmdali% a Taxpayers’ Charter of Rights: Sei~h~g die Ground Rules’, above tL 17, on which
much of fills part is based.
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disseminating information concerning taxpayers that they have access to because of their
work.s9
The second type of fight encompasses those fights that relate to the specific validity,
operation and application of the tax law. Rights of this khad tend to arise at the interface
between the tax law and die taxpayer.6° They are enforced by law and focus on the
fimdatnental operation of the law and its substance. As such, they usually apply generally,
and not shnply to tax law.61 An example would be a requirement that laxvs should not
discrmm~ate.
Some would argue that there is a third type of fight: the fight to a standard of setwice
and treatment by the tax authority. However, as discussed belo\v, although these so-called
rights are included in taxpayers’ charters they are goals, expectations or promises. They are
a&~grfistrative in character.
Taxpayers’ fights of the same kind can be protected by both administrative and
legislative mechanisms.62 However, as the mechanism affects the scope and nature of die
fight, it is important to idend~, the form of protection and enforcement.
For example, in Germany, procedural tights that govern file operation of revenue
adn~rfisttadon are given detailed stamtorT enforcement.63 One of the main advantages for
taxpayers is that statutotT protection proxddes a fight of appeal to a cotttti64 In Australia,
d~e same tights are given adininistradve protection only. The right of appeal against
Some countries have a variety of protection, but see e.g., in flae United Kingdom, the Official Secrets Act;
ha Canada, Income Tax Act, s. 24t; m New Zealand, Tax ~’tdministration Act 1994, s. 8t; and in Australia,
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (CLt~), s. 16.
Traditionally, taxpayer rights were considered almost exclusively in relation to the powers of tax
authorities and taxpayer dghts of review and appeal. Tiffs began to expand, e.g., in Organisation for
Economic Co-ope~ation and Development, Ta.\7~ayers’ Ba~hls a*td Obligations: A StriVe’ of t])e LegaI Situation inOECD Countffes (OECD, 1990), and D. Albregtse and FI.P.A.M. van Arandonk (eds), Tat,payerProlection &
the European Union ~The Hague/London/Boston, Kluwer Law International, 1998).
As seen in fomaal human tights legislation in Hong Kong, Canada and New Zealand.
As has been done in fine USA and France.
In the German Fiscal Code (Abgabenordnung). The fights are discussed by C. Daibet, "Protection of
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administrative action is, in most jt~sdictions, limited to fight of review of the decision-
making process: that does not protect taxpayer rights in the courts; it simply ensures that
administxative decisions follow the roles of natural justice (in file broad meaning of the
term). So, admimstrative protection has to rely on alternative mechanisms, such as an
ombudsman or problem resolution units within rite revenue authofit3’.
In most jurisdictions, there is a separation of powers between the judicial, the
legislative and the executive areas of government. The perceived benefit of legislative
enforcement of rights centres on this sep~ation, and the right of the coittts to question the
executive’s interpretation of rite lights that tile legislature has given to taxpayers. However,
legislative enforcement is a broad policy tool that does not usually cover the fights that fall
wJti~tin the detailed administration of a tax system.
On the other hand, adrninistrathm enforcement of taxpayers’ rights depends upon
the executive arm of government and usually exists at the discretion of the executive.
Administratively enforced tights camaot be claimed before either the judiciary in its
decisio~-making role, or the tegislatore in its formulation of the tax law. In other words, a
tax authority may provide protection of rights to taxpayers, but usually the exercise of the
protection and rite existence of that protection remain at the discretion of that authority.
Many administxative concessions to taxpayers given by tax authorities operate in this way
and they can provide fights beyond rite scope of those provided legislatively. For example,
in the United I~dngdom the inland Revenue has, from fime-to-thne, issued extra-statutotT
concessions. They pemait taxpayers to ignore the normal operation of the law, xvhere there
are anomalies that produce uniooked for consequences. Extra-statutory concessions exist
solely at rite discretion of the Inland Revenue.6s
6s Atthougb the courts have suggested that there is no legal basis for extra-statutory concessions, VestO, and
Olbet~ v. IRC; (No. 2) [1979] 3 \XrLR 915, they have gained some acceptance. See S. Eden, ~udicial control
of tax negotiation’ paper presented at tim 6th International Conference on "Fax Administration, Atax
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Achninistxative and legislative enforcement combine to form a complementary and
comprehensive framework for the protection of taxpayer fights. By themselves the
protection dmy give is limited, This becomes apparent through the classification of fights.
A A Classification
An analysis of taxpayers’ fights is helped by further classification. Othe~vise there is too
much variation within each of the t3q?es of fights and their method of protection for
meatm~gfitl analysis. The classification that follows pro,rides the practical means to exalnine
tlie main groups of rights within each t3~pe.
Pfimary legal rights focus on the process of law making, and what makes a tax law a
valid la~v. It may be that for a tax law to be valid it must comply with certain critefia. For
example, a tax law may have to be clear in its imposition of a tax; it may have to be certain;
there may be lhnits on its retrospective application. In fltis way, primar3’ legal fights are
interpreted by the judiciary, and constrain the actions of the executive and the legislature.
At the next level of classification there are enforceable taxpayers’ rights. Secondary
legal tights focus on the specific operation of the law. They are concerned with the
protection of rights at both a general and specific level. At a general level, fights will
provide a standard for the operation of the administration, collection and enforcement
processes within the law. For example, there may be fights requiring the confidentiality of
information provided to the revenue authorities or that ever}, taxpayer should have the
tight to a fair and impartial hearing in relation to any tax dispute.
(Sydney, 15-16 April 2004). Discussed further in D. Williams, "United Kingdom tax collection: rights of
and against t~uxpayers’, in D. Bentley, above n. 46, and A. Rowland, ’Is the Revenue Being Fair? Revenue
Statements and Judicial Rex~iew’ [1995] Bfftisb Tax Review, 115. Another example is the use of circulars to
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At the specific level, secondary legal rights protect tax-payers in the context of
individual procedures and specific processes witl~ the law. An example of a right zelafing
to an individual procedure would be where the revenue authority makes a decision, and
there is a requirement to provide reasons for that particular decision. A right relathag to a
specific process wmdd be where there are roles goveta’fing the way that the revenue
authority considers an application for an advance ruling and how such a ruling is to be
made.
It is also possible to protect elements of secondary legal rights administratively. The
mode of protection depends largely on the approach of the authorities in the relevant
jt~scisdiction. Where rights of this kind are protected administratively, they are called primary
ath~ainistrative rights as the}, are also enforceable rights. The nature of secondary legal
rights and prinaary administrative rights does differ, even though the), may appear to
provide the same protection.
For example, take legal professional privilege. It is a right protected by statute or at
conmaon law in maW jurisdictions. In its basic form, it provides professional pri~41ege in
respect of doctmaents passing between lawyers and their clients in certain situations.66
Professional privilege can also be given administrative protection. For example, in
Australia, only lawyers can claim legal professional privilege. By an adininistrafive
concession, the Commissioner of Taxation has extended shnilar rights to certain
documents passing between professional accountants and their clients.67 Lawyers can claim
a narrow privilege that is defined and protected by the judiciary, and that can only be
effect tax law in Japan: see T. Okamura, ’Due Process and the Tax ~ayer (1993) 11 Inter?rational Tax and
Bminess La~v, 125.
Set out, for example, in the Australian cases of Grant v. Dolmts, (1976) 135 CLR 674 and Baker v. Catt~pbell,
(1983) 153 CLR 52; in Canada, Solonsk), v. Canada, (1979) 105 DLR (3d) 745, pp. 755 757; in Germany,
the German Fiscal Code, Abgabenot~tmctg, s. 102(1); hi New Zealand, CommiMoner of InlaM Revenue !,. West-
II7a/ket; [1954] NZLR 19i, p. 219; and in the US, Fisher1,. United Slates, 425 US 391, p. 403 (!976).
ATO, Access and Information Gathering Manual and ATO, Guidelines to Accessing Profession~d
Accmmtmg Adx4sors’ Papers, <www.ato.gov.au>, 1 October 2006.
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overridden by the legislature. Accountants can claim a broader pfivilege that is given at the
3iscredon of the Conmfissioner of Taxation, and which can be withdrawn by the
Commissioner of Taxation at any time. The difference between the rights in riffs example
j~ustrates the fact that legal fights at this level tend to be n,,trroxver in scope than
administrative fights purporting to cover the same ground.
Secondat3, adininistradve fights are fights that cotdd not be legislated efficiently and
d~at are given in the context of detailed processes. An example wmdd be where taxpayers
are given the right to receive thnely assistance from the revenue authority where they seek
help kn meeting their taxation obligations. Tiffs is a more subjective right than the
requirement to give reasons for a decision. It is concerned with hoxv the agents and
employees of a revenue authofity conduct themsdves when they provide set"cices to
taxpayers. A&ninistrafive implementation and enforcement is far more appropriate than an
attempt to legislate protection of such rights.
There are other administrative rights that are not rights at all, but expectations, social
roles, or performance indicators, often described as fights. They are cormnon in
administrative charters. For example, a charter may state that a taxpayer has a right to
polite service and courteous treatment by revenue authority employees. Tiffs is a
performance measure and catmot easily be enforced by the taxpayer. Any assessment as to
whether the expectation has been met is necessafily subjective. It cammt be translated into
a legal rule. On the one hand, it is a social txt/e that taxpayers would like tax officers to
follow, wlfich if they do not, constitutes a breach of social etiquette. On the other it is a
management tool and may be accompanied by a specific performance indicator. Breach of
die role wilt usually restdt in complah~t, a demand for conformity with the role by the
taxpayer and/or the revenue officer’s manager, and in tiffs instance, a return to polite
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treatmem. There is a general ackno\vledgment in society that such complaints and demands
are justified.6B However, the nature of .the rule remains social and not legal.
These social ,~.les have become increasingly important as a reflection of the mutuality
of the relationship that is now becoming conwnonplace in many jurisdictions between
taxpayers and the revenue authority,69 They comprise a substantial component of any
document issued by a revenue authority that sets out the rights and obligations of
taxpayers. Secondat3, administrative rights and rights that are effectively social rules or
unenforceable administrarive goals are perhaps most usefully classified as principles of
good practice.
B AppSca#on
With a classification system in place, it is simpler to make sense of the different q,pes of
rigbts that are given in different jurisdictions. It is also easier to understand wby authorities
have chosen the rights they have in the light of the mechanisms that they use for
enforcement. The next section examines the effectiveness of the classification system.
V CLASSII~’ING TAXPAYERS’ RIGHTS
68 H.L.A. I Iart explored this idea in The Concept of Law (2nd edn, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 55.
69 Reflected in the terminology used in tax documents. In Australia, the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997
(Cth) was drafted to reflect this relationship and the term ’the taxpayer’ was replaced with the more
friendly ’you’. Tills despite tile fact that the mm~ber of taxpayers reading the legislation is minimal.
However, it represents fl~e quantum change in approach in the ATO. See further, M. IX,lcLetmail, ’The
Principles and Concepts in fl~e Development of the Taxpayers’ Charter’ (2003) 32 Auslralian Tax Revielv,
22, and pp. 29 31.
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A classification system must allow a clear analysis, not only of the type of tight, but also its
effect. Otherwise it is vetT difficult to maderstand the true content ofaW fight. To provide
a clear uuderstanding of the operation of the classification system this section works
tl-~ough examples to illustrate each type of tight. Chapter 5 then explores in soIne detail the
methods of enforcement of legal and administrative tights. Chapters 6 to 8 detail the tights
of each tdud that should be included in a Model.
A Et~rceable Taxpayers’ Fa~hts: Ptimaty Legal Rights
Primat3, legal rights are concerned xvith specific reqt~ements of valid tax law. Some are
coveted in the constitution, others through supranational instruments. The remainder fot~rn
part of the general body of legislation. Returning briefly to Netttnama’s analysis of the rule
of taw, the thin and tl~ick conceptions of the tale of law are useful ha detemaining the
nature and extent of some tights. The trick conception includes a significant moral content
and incoiporates the principles discussed in Chapter 3. The t!fin conception can be used to
identi~, the basic tales that are reqttired for a valid law.7° This is explored further in
Chapter 6.
Cottslilutiot~al Protection
Constitutions provide the strongest foran of primary legal fight enforceable by laxv. Some
jurisdictions, such as fl~e United Kingdom, do not have written constitutions. Others do
have constitutions and these may or may not include express protection of rights. Australia
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prmddes an example of a cons6tudon with some express and some implied fights.71 Such
constitutional fights are usually only indirecdy related to taxation, but can underpin the
basic framexvork for the operation of tax achninistration, collection and enforcement.
For example, the Swedish Constitution does not contain many express figiats, but
there is a prohibition against the retroactive effect of tax statutes.72 It reqttires Parliament to
pass a tax statute into law before the new law can have the effect of taxing transactions.
However it is substantially watered down by an exception. This allows proposed legislation
to have effect from the date that detail of an), new legislation is provided to Parliament.
Nonetheless, the details required are sufficient to provide taxpayers with watering as to the
content of new legislation. The revenue base is protected from taxpayers taking advantage
of loopholes in the law between the thne a change is announced and ,vhen it is passed into
law. Taxpayers are protected from the retroactive effect of tax legislation in flae form of a
pmnarl~ legal right. It goes beyond the practice in many countries, where the govenunent
provides a warning, in the form of an atmouncement, that the law will change in an area of
the tax law, and also advises that an), changes that eventuate ,viii take effect from the date
of the announcement.73
The German constitution provides a number of fights to taxpayers (although it does
not contain a bill of fights).74 For example, Ardcle 3 requires there to be equalitl~ before the
law. As it applies to taxation, the Constitutional Court has interpreted dais article to mean
Neumann argues that both Fuller and Raz adopt the tlfin conception. M. Netmaann, above n. 6, p. 7.
Sir Gerard Bretman, "Din Impact of a Bill of Rights on the Role of the Judiciatl’: An Australian
Perspective’ in P. Alston (ed.), Promotittg Human Rights Through Bills of Rt~hts: Comparative Perspectives (Oxford,
OUP, 1999), p. 454
Cbapter 2, para. 10 Regeringsfomlen, 1974 (Swedan). See furdmr A. Httltq*,dst, ’T~zpayers’ Rights in
Sweden’ in D. Bentley, above n. 46.
Discussed c~m~rehensively in C. San~pf~rd~ Rett~spectivity attd ~he Ru~e ~f Lan~ (~xf~rd~ ~U~ 2~6)~ ~. ~ 56
et seq. In Australia, awareness of this problem has lessened the instances over time but there is no pfimatl’
legal right preventing it. In the past, taxpayers have sometimes waited well over a year for the detail of
legislation to be revealed that was already supposed to be governing everyday transactions. For example,
legislation governing die tax treatment of employee share schemes took 20 months from its
atmouncement in the 1994 Budget to the passing of the Taxation Laws ¢Lmendment Bi~ (No. 2), 1995.
See C. Daiber, above n. 63.
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d~at those with an equal abilit3r to pay tax should bear die same tax burden. The Court has
held that a tax on real estate breached this prhlciple, as it placed a heavier tax burden on
the relevant taxpayers than they would have borne had they invested in other fotans of
property,v5 Tax applicable to investment income was also found to breach the equality
principle, as there was no mechanism in place to enforce withholding tax on interest,
fl~ereby favollring it as a form of investment.~6 The Gernlan constitution also protects
information, privacy, propert3,, and a fight of appeal2~ Clearly, taxpayers are protected, not
shnply in the procedures available xvithin die tax system, bnt also in die substance of die
tax law, wltich must comply with basic constitutional principles to be effective.
Constitutional bills of fights, to the extent they apply to taxpayers, provide a stronger
form of protecfinn for prhnary legal fights. Canada and South Africa provide examples. Li
writes, ’The Charter is tile supreme taw in Canada. Its effect on Canadian laxv and legal
development has been profound. The axea of taxation is no exception.’78 The fundamental
tights entrenched in Chapter 3 of the Soufll African Constitution have had a similar
impact,v9 In both countries the introduction of a bill of fights has resulted in die
amendment of die hlcome tax law to remove conflicting provisions.
However, the content of primary legal rights differs between jurisdictions, as noted in
Chapter 2 in die discussion of die diversity of tax systems. For example, the Supreme
Court of Canada has not followed die liberal approach of the German Constitutional Court
to equal treatrnent. It has been reluctant to find that provisions of die income tax law
breach constitutional fights, and has taken the view that the essence of the income tax law
is ’to make distractions, so as to generate revenue for the government while equitably
2 Bv137/91 of 22 June 1995, BStBL II 1995, 655.
27June 1991, BVerfGE, vol, 84, p. 239.
See C. Daiber, above n. 63.j. Li, ’Taxpayers’ Rights in Canada’ in D. Bentley, above n. 46.
R.C. Williams, "Taxpayers’ Rigbts in Souflx Africa’ in D. Bentley, above n. 65, p. 282.
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reconciling a range of necessarily divergent interests’.8° In Symes v. TheQuee&~1 to take one
example, dxe Supreme Court held that a restriction on the amount of deduction of child
care expenses did not have a disproportionate impact on women to the extent that it
breached s. 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Canadian Charter).
Taking a rather narrow approach, as compared xvidi the German Constitutional Court, ’it
held that although women were more likely to bear the social costs of clfild care, there was
no evidence that women were more likely to bear the financial costs of cl~ild care, and that
s. 63 affected only the financial costs of child care’.82
However, there is some dement of convergence as judges take into account the
development of the law in other jurisdictions. The South African Constitulional Court has
tended to look more towards North American decisions for gttidance than to European
decisions. This is not sml}rising given the closeness in much of the content of die South
African and Canadian bills of rights.
For example, application of s. 8 of the Canadian Charter, the right to privacy,
resulted in the restriction of Revenue Canada’s powers of search and seizvace, and
amendinent of the relevant prox~tsions of the Canadian Income Tax Act.83 Certain
requixements xvere introduced to satisfy s. 8, including the need for prior judicial
authorisadon for an}, search, and that the judge must have discretion as to whedier a search
warrant should be gxanted. South Africa has strong search and deizure powers available to
revenue officials under its Income "Fax Act. They reflect those in its Investigation of
Serious Offences Act, which were challenged under die privacy provision in the
Constitution, in DA Park-Ross v. The Directo*; Qfflce for the Im~estigation qf Sedous Economic
Thibattdeau 1,. C}mada, [1995] 1 CTC 212, 392.
[1994] 1 CTC 40. See the general discussion hi J. Li, above n. 78.
j. Li, Ibid.
Ibid., and see R.C. Williams, above n. 79. The Canadian Income Tax Act, s. 231, was amended in 1986
and then again in 1994 in an effort to comply with the requirements laid down by the Supl:eme Cottrt of
Canada intllNR v. I~gerlnc, 11984] CTC 506 ~md Baron v. Cattada, [1993] 1 CTC 111.
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Qff.olces.84 The right to privacy is similar to that in the Canadian Charter, and the court
tm~ed to the Canadian jurisprudence for assistance m detemKqing ’whether the search and
seLzure provisions of the Act impaired the right of privacy no more than was necessary to
achieve the objective of the Act’.us
On the basis of the Canadian decision ha Hloger v. Southam,86 the court found that the
search and seizure provisions were unconstitutional. It did so on the grounds that there
was no ’prior authorisation of the search and seizure, usually in the form of a warrant, by
an impartial and independent persqn ~vho was bound to act judicially in so doing’.87
The coutrs in Canada and South Africa may not take a broad approach to substantive
matters, but, as can be seen from these few examples, they do try to give effect to the
propose of the Charter in procedural matters. It is pertinent to note the difference in
protection afforded primat3, legal rights between jurisdictions with and without bills of
rights. Both Canada and South Africa had search and seizttte powers in their Income Tax
Acts similar to those in most cotmnon laxv countries that did not require prior judicial
authorisafon of searches by revenue authorities. Tiffs approach can be contrasted xvith a
Ci~dl Law country, such as Sweden, where there is a tradition of requiring court approval
for investigations involving search and seizure. There, the concern is that even tiffs is
insufficient, which means the existence of a right of action under the European
Convention of Human Rights is seen by commentators as very important,s8
It underlines the increasing influence of supranational protection on primary legal
rights. The legal basis for taxpayer protection is broadening. As with constitutional
1995 (2) SA 198 (C).
R.C. Williams, above n. 79.
(1985) !4 SCC 0d) 97 SCC.
R,C. Williams, above n. 79.
A. Hultqvist, above n. 72.
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protection,
apparent.
it is often only indirecdy applicable to taxation, but the effect is becoming mote
2 Sttpranaliona/Protection
Supranational protection comes in two main forms: where a treat), autotnatically has the
force of law xvithin a participating state, and where a treaty has to be translated into
domestic law before it is recogtlised by the mtmicipal co~.~ts.89 There is little consistency in
approach, but the distinction is important, as the r~ght of a taxpayer to claim a right
depends upon recognition by a municipal court that the taxpayer can make such a claim.
Most common law jurisdictions require that ’treaties cannot operate of tliemselves
within the state, but require the passing of an enabling statute’.9° In contrast, Article VI
Section 2 of the United States Constitution provides that a ratified treaty immediately
becomes part of mmlicipal laxv, without further enabling legislation. The Netherlands,
France and Germany all accept that treaties form a part of the domestic laxv. However,
xvhere the Netherlands requires no translation,91 both France92 and Germany93 may require
enabling legislation if treat), provisions require domestic action for them to have effect.
Treaties often require that the provisions should apply in the domestic law of tlie
signatories. For example, the members of the European Union have all had to give direct
mtmicipal effect to the provisions of the Treaty of European Union. This means that the
89 Important here is not so much the monist and dualist debate, but rather the process by which treaties are
recognised in municipal law.
9o M.N. Shaw, httet~¢atiotta/Law (3rd eda~, Cambridge, Cambridge Universit3~ Press, 1995), p. 114 and p. 123.
Expressed by Lord At "ldn in Attot~9’-Ge~let~/for Cam~da v. Atlor*to’-Genet~lfor Onlaffo, [1937] AC 326, 347-
348.
91 Under art. 94 of the Netherlands Constitution, if a statute conflicts with a treat3, provision, taxpayers may
claim its non-applicabilit3’. See R. Somrnerhalder, ’Taxpayer Rigbts in the Netherlands’ in D. Bentley,
above n. 46.
92
~.N. Shaw, above n. 90, p. 125.
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provisions may be invoked by individuals in municipal courts. Judicial acceptance of this
principal is based, fittingly, in a tax case.
In Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlatldse AdmhJislratie der Belaslingen,94 a chemical product
was imported into the Netherlands from Germany. The rate of import duty was challenged
under Article 12 of the Treat}, establlslfing the European Economic Community. It was
argued that the chemical product was reclassified by the Netherlands customs authofities,
effectively increasing the duty - a restdt which was prohibited under Article 12. The
Govermnent of the Netherlands submitted that individuals could not invoke the provisions
of die Treaty. The European Court of Justice found that the Treat), imposed obfigations
and also conferred tights on individuals. The tights conferred can be both ex~press and
hnpfied.95
The effect for taxpayers is to extend their protection beyond the provisions of their
own }urisdiction. The European Union Treaty (EU Treaty) prowides an interesthag example
of the effect of a regional trade agreement, albeit the most pervasive and sophisticated of
its kind. The econotnic focus means that protection under the Treaty is often more
applicable to taxpayers than those under specific human rights treaties. Man), of the leading
cases under the EU Treaty consider discrimh~ation between EU Member States. It is a
considerable advance in fight protection that individuals can bring their govetaunents to a
supranational court, wlfich can reqtRte those governments to give effect to the prhlciples
embodied in an intetnational treat),.
Of the nunlerous tax cases under the EU Treaty, a small sample illustrates the kind
of protection of primary legal fights available to EU taxpayers.96 In a leading case from
,xat. 59 of the Basic Law.
Van Gettd ett Lots v. Nederlandse Admittistmlie der Belaslitgen, Case 26/62 [1963] ECR 1, [1970] CMLR 105.
Van Germ et* Lots v. Neder/andse Admittistratie der Be/a*titget~, Case 26/62 [1963] ECR 1, 12, [1963] CMLR
105, 129.
Fo~ a more comprehensive red’Jew of the effect of the EU Treat3,
, 
examined from the context of
Germany, see C. Daiber, above n. 63.
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1983, the Avoir Fiscal Case,9v the European Court of Justice found that the French
Govet, mnent was discriminating against branches and agencies established in France by
insurance companies based in other Member States. Branches and agencies established in
France were not able to utilise shareholders’ tax credits on the same terms as could French
companies. The Cmttt held that this xvas a breach of the EU Treaty, especially the freedom
of establislurtent (Art. 52 EU-Treaty). The regional economic focus is clear. The EU Treat),
did not allow outright discfimination by a Member State in favour of its mvn nationals even
in tax cases. This was reflected in m,o later cases: Bieh/v. Luxemboutg98 and R v. I~tlaM
Reve#ue Comm#siotto~, Ex pat# Comme*’zbank AG.99 In both cases, the European Court of
Justice fom~d that Member States could not deny the fight to repayment of overpaid tax, if
that denial only applied to non-residents. Such action was discfiminatot3’ and a breach of
the EU Treaty. A similar approach was taken in cases where employees were denied tax
deductions because they xvere not resident in a Member State,m° and where companies
xvere denied the deduction of tax losses,ml They uphold the principle of inter-nation equity,
discussed in Chapter 2.
Although the European Court of Justice provides support for p~nary legal t:ights, in
most cases even within the EU the support is lh~ited. Tlie EU Treat), provides for laws to
be made by the Council and Commission of the Etttopean Union, mah-dy in the foma of
regulations and directives,m2 A prhnatT aim is m harmonise the laxv of the Member States.
As James and Oats have stated, ’the main ahn of corporate tax hammnisation is to Feduce,
Commi.~siott v. Fmtt~, Case C270/8311986] ECR 273.
Bieh! v. Adminislmlion des conMbutions dtt gm/td duchd de ~’embottrg, Case C175/88 [1990] ECR i 1779.
R v. Itdattd ~vetme Comou}sionets, Expat# Commetgbat~k AG, Case C330/91 [1993] ECR I-~017.
For example, Marlin Bachmaun v. Be~ium, Case C204/90 1992 ECR 1-249; Commission ~ the
Commuoities v. Be~ium, Case C300/90 [1992] ECR I 305; and Fitmttzamt KbIn~ltstadt v. Schttmacker, Case
C209/93 [1995] ECR 1-225. See fi~ther, C. D~ber, above n. 63, ~d J. S. Schwarz, ’Tax Disc~afion
Trends m E~ope’ (t995) 8 SA Tax ~vie~t5 91.
Markr ~ Spencerpk v. HalsO, ~ ln~ector (Ta.ves), Case C-~6/03 [2006] Ch 184.
A~. 249 of tim Treag, estabfislfing ~ae E~opean
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if not remove, distortions arising as a result of cross border investment’.1°3 However, larger
econOmiC concerns are of little help to the taxpayer. ~lqae taxpayer is concerned with the
protection from discrimination that is available in a court of law when harmonisation is
given effect. Tiffs will only happen where a Directive is self-executing and intends to give
rights to individuals,m4 Because tax hatqmonisation is pthnafily concerned with eliminating
distortions between systems, most Directives are unlikely to provide fights sufficiently
detailed for taxpayers to rely on.ms Supranational support for pfimatT legal fights should
therefore not be overstated.
Regional trade agreements are one source of support for ptimat3, legal fights. Human
tights treaties are another. The European Convention for the Protection of Hmnan Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, more commonly known as the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR), has been signed by all member states of the Council of Europe
and is incmporated into the law of the European U~ion by virtue of Article F(2) of the EU
Treat},. This Axticle requires that members of the EU ’shall respect ftmdamental fights, as
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from tim
constitutional traditions co~urnon to the Member States, as general principles of
Conmmmt3, law’.m~ Hoxv the signatofies to the ECHR, including the members of the
European U~tion, ensure the protection of the guaranteed fights is left to the individual
states.
As witl~ most human tights treaties, the scope is limited within the ECHR for
protection of fights relating to taxpayers. Article i of Protocol 1 of the ECHR specifically
S. James and L. Oats, ’Tax Harmonisation and the Case of Corporate Taxation’ (1998) 8 Revemte Law
]ou.ml, 36.
See C. Daiber. above n. 63.
Directives that relate to tax include the Merger Directive (434/90/EC), the Parent-Subsidiary Directive
(435/90/EC), and the Directive on Mutual Assistance Between Member States of the European Union
(799/77/EC),
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provides for states to secrete payment of taxes. The Convention tends to apply to taxpayers
where the application of the tax law breaches another protected right, for example, where
criminal provisions apply to a taxpayer and there is a q~estion as to whether the taxpayer
has received a fak trial.1°7 More extreme taxpayer positions that inevitably appear from
time to time, have been rejected. Article 9 of the ECHR provides for the right to freedom
of thought, conscience and religion. The European Conmaissiont°8 found that tax paid by a
Quaker could be used for defence purposes, whatever the concerns of the Quaker.t°9 Court
jurisprudence suggests that Article 9 does not extend to where a state has a neutral
institution or practice that requires an individual to participate in an activity that is inimical
to the individual’s belief, hoxvever conscientiously held.n° For the most pazt, the cases have
held that taxes do not relate to conscience, but apply neutrally and ~enerally in the public
sphere.ltl
Where the ECHR has been influential in the tax context, is to ensure that there ate
procedural safeguards available to taxpayers, and proportionality in the treatment of
taxpayers. Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR gives states a wide margin of appreciation
in the way they secure payment of taxes. But the European Court of Htunan Rights has
t0s D. Williams, abo~re n. 65. See also, D. Williams, EC Tax Law (London, Longman, 1988), pp. 19-20.
~07 The operation ~u~d interpretation of the ECHR is discussed in M. O’Boyle, C~ W~rbfick, E. Bates, D.J.
Harris, Law of the Earopean Com,ottion on Human Rights (2nd edn, UK, LexisNexis, 2005), and C. Ovey, and
R. kXrhite, ’Jacobs and Wtfite, The European Convention on Human Rights’ (4th edn, Oxford, OUP,
2006).
~08 ~e Ettropean Commission for Human Rights can heat a case only if national zemedies have been
exhausted. It provides a report ha wlfich it gives an ophfion as to whether flaere has been an inf~zkqgement
of the ECHR. Only then can fl~e case be heard by fl~e Europe:m Court of Human Rights, and many cases
are settled once die opinion of fine Conm~ission is given.
Io~ C v. UtdtedlO)~gdom, Case No. 10358/83 (1983) 37 DR 142.
~10 D. Gonfien, D. Harris and L. Zwaak, Law attd Practice of the Etttvpean Cotwettlion ott Hto~att Rights attd the
Umvpean Soda/ChatCer (Strasbourg, Comtcil of Europe Publislfing, 1996), pp. 265-268.
~I The same approach is taker* in interpreting constita*fional rights of a shnilar kind. For example, J. Li, above
n. 78, writes in respect of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, that ’no taxpayer has succeeded
m con\~acing a cmtrt flaat flae payment of tax is a violation of die fight to freedom of conscience and
religion’.
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fomad hi favour of taxpayers where it reds that a state’s actions have upset the balance of
interests between the individual and the state,u2
For example, Article 6 of the ECHR protects the right to a fair trial, but it does not
mention the tight to silence or the tight not to incrin~nate oneself. Yet, in Funke v. F*v~nce,
these tights were found to be necessat3’ for a fair trial, in the context of a customs
investigation,u3 The right was earlier found to be broad enough to govern the provision of
infot~nation about business records and legal persons,I~a The Court in Funke held that, ’the
relevant legislation and practice must afford adequate and effective safeguards against
abuse’.I15 The facts showed that, in relaoon to a customs investigation involving entry,
search and seizure, ’in the absence of any reqrtirement of a judicial warrant the restrictions
and conditions provided for in law, ... appear too lax and dill of loopholes for the
interferences m the applicant’s fights to have been strictly proportionate to the legithnate
am~ p~sued’.116
Not all human rights t~eaties have as tfigh a standard of protection to extend to
taxpayers. Cases heard by the Inter-American Coimnission on Human Rights tend to focus
on protecting the basic procedural rights taken for granted in most Western European
democracies3~7 Nonetheless, for tax systems in the most soplfist~cated democracies, the
ECHR offers some salutary lessons. The finding against the government in Fu,~ke would
apply equally in Australia. There is no requirement for a warrant in the Australian Taxation
Office’s poxOers of search and seizure, nor is there provision for a taxpayer to claim the
Europea~ Court Human Rigbts judgment of HettOic]; v. France, 13616/88 [1994] ECHR 29 (22 September
/994), Series A No. 296-A.
European Comet Human Rights judgment of Funke v. E~ttce, 10828/84 [1993] ECHR 7 (25 FebraatT
1993), Series A No. 256-A.
Sadgtd Sgettttil v. F*u,~ce, Europeat~ C~mmission af Human ~ghts, App~cafion No. 11598/85, Repoa of 30 May
1991, 14 E~ 509. ~e app~c~t was a comply ~fimd by shares ~d no objection was rinsed.
Above n. 113, para. 56.
Ibid., para. 57.
R.S. Da~4dson, The I~ttet~Ameticatt Humatt ~ghts S3~tem (~Mdershot, Da~ou%, 1997).
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right to silence and the ptixfilege against selfdnctimination, whereas both are available in
crircfinal investigations. ~s
Taxpayers’ tights are generally specifically excluded from human tights agreements.
Yet, it is in the different forms of supranational protection that tawpayers wilt see an
unexpected, albeit limited, increase in thek primary legal rights by implication and
association. On the other hand, in some areas, their traditional tights will be intentionally
eroded.
Trading blocs and other international interest groupings ate creating a proliferation
of multilateral and bilateral treaties. Treaties of cooperation usually include statements of
principles that ate intended to apply in some form to the citizens of signatories. Where
OECD countries are involved there is significant pressure fi:om their own and other
OECD citizens and representative groups to include references to human tights. Although,
whether or not human tights are mentioned, as xve have seen in Europe, economic
cooperation normally includes some consideration of such concepts as freedom of
movement of goods and non-discrimination. As soon as such concepts become part of the
general jt~isprudence of a country, whether or not they are translated into the domestic
legislation, they can start to influence the co~ts to provide more substantial primary legal
rights.
3 Legislative P~tection
Prhnary legal tights are most comtnonly afforded protection tl~tough ordinary legislation,
In most jm-isdicdons there is noflfing to distinguish prhnaty from secondat3, legal tights.
D. Bentley, ’The Corrmiissioner’s Powers: Democracy Fraying at the Edges?’ (1994) 4 Revenue kamJa~trttal,
85, 101.
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This has meant that less attention has been paid to protecting the fundamental rights of
taxpayers than has perhaps been warranted. In many jufisdictions the tiglit to impose tax
,and the requirement tha} it should be imposed by law are given constitutional protection.
However, the power of administration of the tax system is generally set out as part of the
ordinary tax legislation. The framexvork for exercise of discretion in tax administration is
less likely to be stated explicitly. Yet, all three exercises of power form part of file larger
prover to tax.
Tbis is explored further in Chapter 6. Hoxvever, it will be seen that without
constitutional or supranational restrictions, few of the pfimarily legal fights are available to
taxpayers in many jurisdictions. They are well recogt~ised and many flow directly from the
pt~lciples set out in Chapter 3. However, just as legal systems do not necessarily protect
fl~e hmnan fights that they recognise as pKmciples that should underpin a legal system,
neiflmr do they specifically protect pfimat3, legal rights that flow from tax principles
recognised as features of a good tax system,n9
The advantage of classification is to identify cleasdy wl~ich are the pfimarT legal fights
and xvhere the}, are protected, if at all. Policy makers and legislators can then specifically
decide whether the5, need additional protection in the tax law. At least then their exclusion
is intentional rather than by oversight. As discussed in Chapter 3, it does not make sense to
make much of the basic principles underly’mg tax policy truly to ignore them when it comes
to translating file policy into legislation. The problem for policy-makers is that pfimatT legal
rights recogifise that taxpayers do have fights. The human fights debate in many countries
shows how difficult it is for any legislature to accept that existing protection is insuffident.
It Often takes a catalyst, such as major reform, the intervention of an external agency such
119
~i]lis paradox is discussed in J. Doyle and B. Wells, ’How Fat Can The Common Law Go Towards
Protecting Human Rights?’ in P. ~Mston, above n. 71, pp. 17, 27.
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as file IMF, or political outcry of file kind seen in file US xvhen the Taxpayer Bills of Rights
were introduced, for primary legal rights to be considered.
B El~forceab/e Ta.vpayers’ Rights: Secondary Legal Rights
Most jurisdictions have secondary legal rights that provide protection for taxpayers in the
context of the operation of the law. Such rights are commoN)’ found in the legislation that
governs the administration of the revenue assessment, collection, and enforcement
processes. They are therefore fairly easily identifiable and distinguishable from primal3,
legal rights.
Two main issues arise. First, file breadth of legal protection very much depends upon
the legal system and the way it operates. Man)’ countries rely on administrative rules to
hnplement procedures, and any statutory protection is limited. The secondatT legal rights
do not therefore foma a complete framework for protection, which xvould be found in
combination with pttimat3, adrt~fist~adve rights. Often they are interchangeable in form,
although they are different in substance. Second, even where there is fairly broad stamtur3’
protection, it is usually embodied within the legislation in the context of a specific
procedure or rule: there is usually no systematic and comprehensive O:eatment of taxpayers’
rights. Nonetheless, the existence of secondat3’ legal rights is often used as an argmnent
against providing greater statutory’ protection to taxpayers \vhen an adininistradve charter
or bill of rights is introduced,t2°
Pardclflarly in the common law colmtdes, adin[instrafive regulations, proclamations,
orders, and n~ings have become conunonplace, particularly in the area of taxation.
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Statatur3, protection is designed to ensure that decisions and procedures are fair and
equitable. For example, in Australia, the Adn~inisttative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act
1977 (COx) was introduced ’to simplify and clarify the grounds for judicial reviexv, thereby
facilitating access to the courts and enab]hxg the individual to challenge admhfistrafive
action wtfich adversely affected his interests’,t21
Admhfistrative decision-making has certain features that can prejudice the interests
of the individual. Sir Anthony Mason identified five in particular: it lacks independence and
is susceptible to political, mhfisterial and bureaucratic influence; decisions ate not usually
made in public; the administrator usually does not have to give reasons for a decision; the
a&ninistrator does not always observe the standards of natural justice or procedural
fairness; and the claims of justice of the individual are often subordinated to the more
general demands of public policy..22
It is for these reasons that many jt~zisdictions allow legal rights of review of
administrative decisions. In most jurisdictions they extend to a review of decisions made by
revenue authorities. Australia introduced an Adirfinistrative Appeals Tribunal to review
administrative decisions, and a large part ofirs case load is concerned with taxation matters.
Similar rights of review are available in most OECD jurisdictions.~ These rights of review
ate a par ticulady hnportant example of a secondary legal right.
In its 1990 surwey of taxpayers’ rights and obligations, the OECD identified six basic
principles wlfich apply to the protection of taxpayers and these have been retained in the
~0 As in Japan. See K Ishimura, ’The State of Taxpayers’ Rights in japan’ in D. Bentley, above n. 46. This
was also tim position taken by the Australian Goverm’nent when it decided to introduce an a&nh’dstradve
charter of taxpayer rights.
1~,~Sit A. Mason, ’Administrative Rexdew: The Experience of flqe First Twelve Years’ (1988-1989) 18 Florida
Law Review, 122,123.
~z~ Ibid., p. 30.
1~30ECD, above n. 60, p. 12.
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2003 guideline on Taxpayer Rights and Obligations.124 The fights to pay no more than the
correct amount of tax and to certainty are primary legal fights. So, too, is the right to
publication of the tax rules, but it is phrased as the lower level primary administrative fight
to be infomxed, assisted and heard, which is a subset of the ptinaary legal right3~ The
remaitfing three are secondary legal fights: the fight of appeal; the right to privacy; and the
right to confidential~t3, and secrecy.126
Secondary legal fights of dfis kind cannot normally be implemented using
administrative measures. They involve the structure of the legal system and legal
enforcement mechanisms. However, conmaon law countries often favour adi~ainistrative
measures where these are possible and pfimary admint~tradve fights fotan the larger part of
taxpayers’ tights.
In contrast, some civil law countries have developed a more complete system of
secondary legal rights with detailed statutory regulation of the revenue administration
process. This imposes limits on the acdons of revenue administrators, and affords a greater
degree of certaint3, to taxpayers.
For example, the German Fiscal Code (Abgabenordnung) provides extensive fights
to taxpayers who are subject to field audits32~ Some of these fights are not cormxaonly
found in statutes, and include: a taxpayer is entitled to be informed dttting an audit of an),
facts that are discovered and their tax consequences; an audit mnst take place dttfing
normal office hours; the taxpayer or her or Iris representative is endded to be present
during an audit; the taxpayer has a right to a final audit meeting; dttting a final audit
tneeting the taxpayer is entided to discuss disputed facts, their legal consequences and the
124 Ibid. OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Adrrm~istration, GeneralAdtM*dstregive PtD@les- GAPO02 Tax~q)’er
Rights and Obligatio*ts (Paris, OECD, 2003) (’GAP002’).
l~s See Chapters 8 and 9.
;26 OECD, GAP002, above n. 124, pp. 4-5.
m For a detailed discussion, see C. Daiber, above n. 63.
142
The Context and C/assiflcation of Ta~7~aye~s’ Ra’ghts
result of die audit and its legal consequences; and the taxpayer is entitled to a written audit
report prior to the raising of an assessment based upon the report.
There are often cultural and historical reasons for countries taking one approach
raffler dian another. Japan and Singapore prefer administrative discretion in admhfistering
die t~x system, not sinlply because their tax systems were based on cormnon law models,
but for cultural reasons too.1~8 That could be a reason why Hungary has followed the more
detailed German approach, although the Hungarian Taxation Order Act is not as
comprehensive and systematic. 129
Historically, die US internal Revenue Code sets out a statement of the law, while the
provisions governing its application are detailed in extensive regulations. In 1988 Congress
passed die Taxpayer Bill of Rights.13° Its name suggests that it constitutes a systematic
statutory tteatuxent of taxpayer rights widfin die Internal Revenue Code. Tiffs is far from
dm case, and it has been suggested that riffs and the subsequent Taxpayer BJ~s of Rights 2
(of 1996) and 3 (of 1997) are misnamed. They were merely part of an otrmibus law, and
’provided a variet), of procedtt~al changes to the Internal Revenue Code without any
coherent scheme’.TM
Nonetheless, the US approach is different to die approach taken in most other
jurisdictions, as there has been a considered approach to the quesdon of statutory
protection of taxpayers’ rights. Elsewhere, die statutory protection has developed xvith die
revenue law and, where there has been a systematic review of taxpayers’ rights, it has taken
place at fl~e adi~finisttative level. The US Taxpayer Bills of Rights may have been
See K. Islmnura, above n. 120 and V. Beyer, ’Tax Admmisttalion m Japan’ (1994) 4 Revenue LawJountal,
144.
See 13. Deak, ’Taxpayer Rights and Obligations: "Ilae Hmagatian Expe~ience’ h~ D. Bentley, above n. 46.
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 PL 100-647 Subtitle J.
A. Greenba~wn, above n. 46. For furfl~er discussion of the Taxpayer Bills of Rights, see L.B. Gibbs,
’Taxpayer Bill of Rights’, College of WiJiiam and Mary 35di ,Manual Tax Conference (Williamsburg, 8 9
13ecember 1989); C.R. Meland, ’O~imibus Taxpayers’ Bill of Rights Act: Taxpayers’ Remedy or Polilical
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introduced into the Internal Revenue Code in a piecemeal fashion, but the aim was to
idenfi~, specifically, potential abuses of poxver by the US Internal Revenue Service, and to
provide taxpayers with the necessary legislative protection.
Many of the provisions included in the tktee Taxpayer Bills of Rights are similar to
those found in the German Fiscal Code, which give taxpayers certainty in the process of
tax adn~nistrafion. For example: assessment notices must be accompanied by explanato~3,
information and reasons for the assessment; the process of the conduct of an audit and, in
particular, audit interviexvs is codified; and there are procedural safeguards that fo~cm part
of the general collection process and, specifically, with respect to the fairly draconian
search and seizure rules.
Other aspects of the Bills of Rights go further, and ahn to ameliorate the often harsh
effects of the operation of the US revenue law. A criticism of the process of making
regulations was that there was insufficient consultation to determine the effect that the
introduction of a regulation would have, particularly on small business. Now, any proposed
regulation must be coImnented on for its effect by the Adininistrator of the Small Business
Administration. There was a concern that the remedies available to taxpayers were too
limited xvhere Internal Revenue Service employees were inspecting or browsing taxpayers’
re~xns and information. Crin~aal penalties have been introduced to prevent tmauthorised
inspections of tax returns and civil remedies provided for taxpayers whose information has
been unlawfully disclosed. As in many jurisdictions, taxpayers argued that regulations made
under the Internal Revenue Code were increasingly applied retrospectively. Now this is
unlawful, except in specified ch-cumstances.
The types of taxpayer protection discussed in the last paragraph cannot be proxfided
througb adnfinistrative guidelines. They should be distinguished f~om the procedural rights,
Placebo?’ (1988) 86 Michigan Lan, Ret~ien,, 1787; P. Nodoushani and A.S. Locke, Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2
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sucli as those goveruing the conduct of an audit or the information provided with an
assessment, which can. There are then two main types of secondary legal fight available to
taxpayers: first, those that can equally be provided tl~tough some form of adininistrative
regulation or guideline; and second, those that can only be given in legislative form.
Revenue administrators and govemanents prefer the flexibility and authority of
administrative guidelines. Nonetheless, statutory protection for taxpayers in procedm’at
matters is available, to some degree, in all OECD jtmisdicoons. It is the extent of that
protection in Getanany and Hungary, for example, which contrasts with that given in most
cotranon law countries. Usually, the difference in effect on taxpayers is probably small, but
leNslafive protection, by its nature, offers more certainty. On the other hand, whereas
legislative concessions are often interpreted strictly, adnfi*fistxafive guidelines can expand
readily to meet new situations, as revenue authofities always retain the option of later
narrowing or removing, fairly easily, aW concessions that they give.132 It is likely, given the
trend towards government through delegation, that adnfinistrative rxtle-making will increase
at die expense of legislative rate-making.
A distinct and separate secondai’y legal fight that supports tlfis approach is the fight
to request the intervention of an ombudsman in tax matters. Provided there is adequate
access to the ombudsman, particularly where statutory fights are limited, it is a major step
forward in fights protection. A secondary legal fight instituting an ombudsman or shnilar
office supports tim inaplementation of adininistrative tights. An ombudsman can provide
the authofity to ensure that revenue adirtinistrators give effect to their mvn administrative
guidelines. The office represents the intervention of an independent and inapardal third
patty, where access to the coul:ts is Ihnited.
[1996] Tax’e, 535.
Discussed further in D. Bendey, above n. 17, p. 107.
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Australia has successfully introduced a Special Tax Adviser in the Office of the
Commonwealth Ombudsman.133 The United I~ngdom uses a Revenue Adjudicator.TM The
Swedishjuslitieombudsmannen, which played an important role in monitoring the committees
of locally~elected laypeople that were responsible for assessing Swedish income tax until
1991, issues guidelines wltich are used in administrative practice.~3s The US used a
Taxpayer Ombudsman for some yeats, but in Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 the office was
replaced by a Taxpayer Advocate. The Taxpayer Advocate reports directly to the
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service but must make two reports to the House of
Representatives Ways and Means and the Senate Finance Conm~ittees each year that are
not subject to prior reviexv by any official of the Internal Revenue Set’vice or the
Treasm3,.136 The first report sets out the objectives of the office for the year ahead and the
second report identifies the major problems from the past year, with recommendations for
their resolution)37 In addition, the Taxpayer Advocate has significant powers to assist
taxpayers.1~8 Austria, Denmark, and France have also used an ombudsman successfully.I39
Politically, it is beneficial for governments to appoint an ombudsman responsible for
assisting taxpayers. It is also a secondary legal right that provides significant additional
protection for taxpayers and acts as a balance in the trend towards adininistrative rights.
Publicity and transparency are particularly strong weapons against adnfinistrative
See Cotranomvealfl~ Ombudsman, Annual R_~pot¢ 2005-2006 (Canberra, Commonxvealfl~ of Australia,
2006), p. 61 el seq., <xwvw.comb.gov.au>, 1 November 2006.
Discussed on formation of tim office in D. Oliver, ’The Revenue Adiudicatot: A New B~eed of
O*nbudspezson?’ [1993] Public l~aw, 407. See The Adjudicator’s Office, Annual Repot 2006 (London,
Adjudicator’s Office, 2006), <www.adjudicatorsoffice.gov.uk>, I Novembe~ 2006.
A. Hultqvist, above n. 72.
IRC ~ 7803(c)(2)(B).
Published on <\vx~v.irs.gov/advocate>, 1 Novembe~ 2006.
See National Taxpayer Advocate’s 2007 Objectives Report to Congress, ibid.
OECD, above n. 60, p. 20.
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miusfice.I’1° This is particularly significant now that revenue authorities are focusing on the
importance of taxpayer goodwill m improving compliance.
C Es~rceab/e Taxpayers’ RighEs: P*ima~y Administralive Rights
pt~nary administrative rights are often interchangeable with secondary legal rights, in that
they could be legislated. As discussed above, govermnents prefer administrative rights to
statutory rights for a number of reasons. Adtrdnistrative rights are flexible. A concession
may be given, but it can as easily be taken axvay. For example, in Austrafia, there is a legal
fight to legal professional privilege coveting communications or documents in relation to
litigation, or to legal advice from lawyers to their clients.141 The Commissioner of Taxation
has chosen to extend this right to a wider selection of documents than would be possible at
common law, and to a xvider group of persons, including accomatants. However, in a
number of speeches in the past, the then Commissioner of Taxation expressed concern
tbat tiffs concession was being abused, and indicated the possibility that the ATO may
withdraw it.|42
The example also illustrates the capacity for an admhfistrafive right to be extended
beyond flint available at law. Provided there is a capacity to xvithdraxv a concession in case
of necessity, revenue administrators are often willing to broaden the rights they offer to
taxpayers in order to hnprove their ongoing relafionslfip.
D. Bentley, above n. 46.
Granl v. Dolwlr, (1976) 135 CLR 674 and Bake*" v. Ca*~pbell, (1983) 153 CLR 52. ,at similar concession is
available in the Netherlands, but there, priests, notaries, laxwers, doctors and pharmacists are all given
ptix,ilege, see the General Act on Taxation of 1959, art. 53a. R. Fisher, ’Confidential Tmx Commurdcation:
A Right or a Pfi~llege?’ (2005) Austra/im* Tax Forum, 555, compares the administrative approach taken in
Australia with the statutory extension of the privilege h~ New Zealand.
See, e.g., ’ATO Dixections and Operations’, an address by M. Carmody, the Conm~issinner of Taxation, to
the 1996 Taxation Institute of Australia NSW Convention (Canberra, 21 March 1996).
147
A&ninistrative fights can assist revenue administrators in improving taxpayer
gooth~ill, which has the flow-on effect of increasing compliance. Tiffs has often been at
least part of the reason for the introduction of an adn~tistrative advance rulings system.143
The flexibility of administrative fights is particularly beneficial in tax matters, where
changes are so frequent. Revenue administrators can change fights easily to suit the current
demands of tim substantive law. They can also be inure flexible in applying the fights and
concessions. For example, they may wish to create exceptions when applying a concession,
depending upon the circtmastances of a particular case, perhaps where they fed that the
taxpayer is taking unfair advantage of it, or where it would not be in the best interests of
the collmmnit3, to allow the concession.
Administrative rights can be a precursor to adoption as legal rights. For example,
where advance rulings are given on an administrative basis. Over time they become an
integral part of revenue administration. Ti~e logical progression is that the}, are then given
some form of legislative recognition. Tiffs has bappened in Australia, the Netherlands and
India. In Canada, on the other hand, Revenue Canada considers itself bound by the
advance nflings that it provides, but there is no legal requirement for it to do SO.144
The Netherlands provides an interesting example of adn~inistrative fights that are,
nonetheless, given legal recogtfition. Tiffs occurs through the application by the courts of
the pmmiple of legitmaate expectation. It makes certain information that is given to
taxpayers by the revenue authorit3~ binding on that autborit3T. For example, the revenue
authofit3, provides an explanatory brochure with tax returns. Tbe exptanatorT brochure is
143 In Australia, see fl~e Second Re:idmg Speech to the Taxation Laws Amendment (Self Assessment) Bill
1992.
~ See J. Li, above n. 78, and D. Sandier, ’Canada’, in D. Sandier and E. Fuks (eds.), The Inte~7~alio~¢al Guide !o
A&,attce R,dings (Amsterdam, 1]3FD, 1997-2003).
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binding on the authority if the taxpayer relies on an h~corxect explanation, xvhere it is not
readily apparent that there is a conflict with the existing law.~4s
In Japan, on dae other hand, there are a number of admhfistrative processes that have
little or no smzrce in the law. Ishimttta cites the example of extended audits. He suggests
d~at, although there is no real proxdsion for them in the legislation, they are reported to
have been used even as a form of harassment. This is made easier under the administrative
tales gover~in~g audits, wlfich do not regtdate search and seizure dttring audits. Isbimura
states that ’it is not unlmown for audit officers to go d~xough the handbag or desk drawers
of tile audit subject without obtak~ing consent, even during voluntatT audits’.146 These
examples serve to illustrate the hnportance of administrative protection where the revenue
authorities have sig~fificant powers and independence under the law.
D Principles of Good Pracla’ce: Secondary AgtminislralJve R ’ghts
Secondary admi*tistrative rights are given in the context of detailed processes that could
not be legislated efficiently, and often take the form of guidelines issued by revenue
autlmrities. Many secondary adi~tinistrative rights are found in administrative charters of
taxpayer tights, wbich, although they contain statutory and pr’h’nary admk~istrative rights,
also make statements that taxpayers have *ights that really are not practically enforceable,
except in a general sense.
In Canada, the Declaration: Yovx Rights tells taxpayers that, ’You have the ~ight to
get complete, acct~tate, and clear information about yotuc rights, entitlements, and
Decision of the Supreme Court of 9 March 1988, BNB 1988/!48. Discussed m R. Sommerhalder, above
n. 91.
K. Ishimura, above n. 120.
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obligations’347 Some of this information can be provided through legislation and
explanatm3, memoranda. However, much of it has to be issued via the website, information
brochures, booklets and pamphlets published by Revenue Canada. Taxpayers can place
reasonable reliance on such information in ordering their affairs, but in many situations
they are relying on the infomaation provided by Revenue Canada, with only the promise of
the Declaration of Rights to protect them if they are wrong: the doctrine of legitimate
expectation is not as broad in Canada as it is in the Netherlands.~48 The statements made in
infotanafion brochures that do not flow directly from the law, are usually second,’uT
admitfistrative fights. They could not be legislated, but fotan the framework of minor roles
and procedures for the operation of the system.
Of particular importance to administrative tights is the way that a revenue officer
exercises delegated author’it}, to make a decision. \Yghen the law delegates decision-making
powers, it usually lays doxvn gttidelines as to how the decision is to be made, or relies on
standard principles of achninistrative procedure. Hoxvever, a decision is usually
discretionat3, ha natme and depends upon the particular ckcmnstances of the individual
taxpayer. That is the reason for the delegation of the decision-making power in the first
place.
Normally a revenue authority will publish guidelines as to how it will make decisions
and the factors it x~dll take into account in exercising its discretion. Administrative
guidelines govetafing the decision-making process are primary administrative fights as they
could be legislated. The decisions flowing from these powers are often secondat3’
adnfinistrative rights. T)?ically these are found ha such areas as the application of penalty
prox~isions where there is a late payment of tax. Many jurisdictions have ctdpabilit}’
components that are detm’mined at the discretion of a revenue officer. The revenue
I4"l See <xs~vw.cra-arc.gc.ca/agency/faimess>, 1 November 2006.
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autlmrit3, can have a wide discretion m both procedural and substantive matters. For
example, in respect of the same taxpayer it might have to determine whether to audit the
taxpayer or not, and, if it does, whether to apply an anti-avoidance provision to a scheme
or txansaction, As the discretion and decision-making powers vested in revenue
administrators are broad, so, too, is the inaportance of the administrative guidelines they
publish in relation to the exerdse of those powers. In most cases, the only enforcement
mechanism that exists for a taxpayer in relation to procedttral matters is to take up a breach
of revenue authority guidelines with the authot:ity’s own internal problem resolution
serxfice, where it exists, or xvith the relevant ombudsman.
That said, practice has sho3vn that internal problem resolution units can be
remarkably effective in resolving disputes between line officers of a revenue authority and
taxpayers,m As discussed above, an ombudsman can also resolve disputes, even where the
office has no direct authority to enforce a resolution, simply because of the publicity and
tepotmag capabilities that usually attach to the office.
Some jtnisdictions do not provide this kind of protection to support secondat3,
achnimstrafive rights. For example, in Japan legislative provisions are stated in broad te~ms
and leave considerable discretion to the tax authorities. The tax authorities usually do
provide guidance as to how they will exercise their discretion, but there is little recotttse for
taxpayers if they disagree with that exercise.~s° Islfimura states that, ’it is not possible for
taxpayers or tax specialists to interpret or apply tax laws or to check the validity of specific
treatment by the tax authorities, without consulting tax ckculas. In other words, circttlars
do virtually have the force of law, and do have de facto binding effect on the taxpayer.’~5~
SeeJ. Li, above n. 78.
D. Bentley, above n. 46.
Y,k Ishimu~a, aboxm n. 120.
Ibid.
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A slighdy different form of dfis approach to revenue administration is sometimes
used. Where die law in a jurisdiction is out of date and it would be impossible, ludicrous o~
unfair to apply it in a particular xvay, revenue authorities will issue rulings or extra-statutoU
concessions. These state that they will not apply the law as it stands and that taxpayers
should not follow it. In this way the revenne authority maintains both the goodwill of
taxpayers, and a respect for the law as it is applied.
Secondat3, administrative rights are elusive. Primat3, administxadve rights are
recognisable as they provide the formal administrative roles and procedlttes for the
operation of the tax system and could normally be legislated as secondary legal tights.
Secondat3T administrative rights fm’m that vast body of quasi-rules and processes on wlfich
taxpayers rely on a daily basis for die efficient and effective operation of the system. In a
Model these fights are articulated in the fman of general principles of good tax
adininistration. Their importance is ~ecognised in taxpayers’ charters and the OECD
general administrative principles,is2 The aim is to idendfy clearly that secondag,
administrative fights are important to die proper functioIfing of a model modem tax
adilainis tration.153
E Pffttdples of Good Practice: Adminislralive Goals
Administxative goals are often also included in charters and shnilar adrninistradve
statements of taxpayer rights. They are concerned largely x~dth die atdmdes of ~evenue
authority staff and the mariner of their relationsltip with taxq?ayers. For example, Revenue
Canada’s Fairness and Client Rights docmnent states, inter alia, dlat ’you have die fight to
152 OECD, GAP002, above n. 124.
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be treated with courtesy, respect and consideration’. The Australian Taxpayers’ Charter
states that, ’You can expect us to offer you professional service and assistance to help you
to understand and meet your tax obligations’. New Zealand taxpayers are entitled to
’prompt, courteous and professional’ ser~dce under the Inland Revenue charter.
Admitfistrafive goals are essentially an attempt to set a code of conduct. They should
be seen in the context of dm move by revenue authorities to\yards engendering taxpayer
goodwill. It is not surprising that revenue authorities most interested in hnproving taxpayer
complLance flrcough good reladonslrips with taxpayers provide a&ninisttative goals. They
have flexible content and depend largely upon contextual intet°pretafion of social rules.
Nonetheless, they are important in that they do represent the trend towards a service
oriented approach widfin a revenue admhfistradon that espouses them. As the OECD
sma,ey of taxpayers’ rights in 1990 stated, ’An efficient tax administration also requires that
taxpayers are treated in a cot~treous and efficient manner and that the possibility of
dialogue between the administration and the taxpayer is provided.’154
When charters of fights were first introduced taxpayers were justifiably sceptical of
dae importance of adnfinistrafive goals,tss However, tl,e development of modern
management processes xviflfin tax adn~fistradons has seen a strong emphasis on
statements of service standards accompanied by performance measurement.Is6 A review of
revenue authorities in the 2006 OECD Comparative Information Series Report on tax
With apologies to Gilbert and Sullivan.
OECD, above n. 60, p. 14.
For example, D. kX/illiams, ’The Taxpayers’ Cbarter: A View From The Profession’, paper presented at the
ATAX conference on Current Issues kq Tax Administration (11-12 April 1996); A Carey, ’Taxpayers’
Charter’ (!995-96) 30 Taxaliolt itl Attslm/ia, 543; and Taxation Institute of Australia, ’Current Topic’ (t995-
96) 30 Taxatiott inAmlm]ia, 230.
See, OECD Comminee of Fiscal Affairs Formn on Strategic Mat~agement, Pe~fom~attce MmtagemeM ilt Tax
A&*~ini*lralions (Paris, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, 2001) and as an example, OECD
Committee of Fiscal Affairs Forum on Tax Adrni*fistrafion, SmvD, of TretMs i*~ Ta~,;~a)’er Service DeliveO, Usi~g
New Technologies (Paris, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, 2005). Explored ~n S. James, T.
Svetalekfli and B. ~&ight, ’The Benefits of a More Strategic Approach to Tax Adn~qistradon and the Role
of PerfOrmance Indicators’, paper presented at die 7ill International Tax Administration Conference 2006
(Sydney, Ausnalia).
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administration shows that most annual plans and reports are now both linked to
aclfievement of specific performance standards and guided by formal taxpayers’ rights ha
law or official documents,ls7 The), form part of the OECD Principles of Good Tax
Administration.ts8 It is therefore appropriate to consider administrative goals as an
hnportant part of the broader admhfistrafive framexvork for taxq?ayers’ fights.
Take both Australia and the US as illustrations.~s9 The ATO regularly commissions
external reports on hoxv well it is achieving its administrative goals and pubfished charter
standards. The 2005 review identified that, for example, taxpayers saxv the way ATO staff
treated them as particular strengths of the revenue authority.16° This is a particularly
pleasing result for" the ATO as it has developed a compliance model that asstmaes taxpayers
are honest and has xvorked assiduously to mould its culture to reflect this.~6t The 2007
National Taxpayer Advocate Objectives reflect a similar focus in the IRS. For example, the
Taxpayer Advocate is tmdertaking several research studies that ’should help the IRS craft
an approach to taxpayer service that meets taxpayers’ it~dividual needs’ as part of the IRS
Taxpayer Assistance Blueprint)6~ Where performance is being judged publicly and
transparently on actfievement of achnh~istrafive goals, it makes them valuable instr~ttments
in the development and protection of a broader fi:amework of taxpayers’ fights.
For the Model, as with secondary administrative rights, the classification recognises
that adininistrative goals forna part of the general pfitrciples of good adinhfistrative
OECD, Tax" Admit~islmtion itt OECD attd Selecled Non-OECD Cotottties: Comparative Itfotmatiou Series (2006)
(pads, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, 2006) (’2006 OECD Comparative Sur~,ey’) p. 39 et seq.
OECD Centre for Tax Poficy ,-rod Administration GAPO01 Ptittdples of Good Tax Admittislmtion - Practice
i~rote (Paris, Centre for "lax Policy and Adn~aistration, 2001).
TNS Consultants, Review of the Ta:,7~ayos’ Charter2005 (TNS Social Research, 2006), <wx~av.ato.gov.au>, 1
August 2006. Naliot~al Ta:,7~ao’er Advocale’s 2007 Objectives Repot¢ to Cot~gt~ss, 30 June 2006,
<x~wv.irs.gov/advocate/>, 1 August 2006.
"INS, Ibid., p. 6.
S. James, K. Murphy and M. Remhart, ’The Citizen’s Charter: How Such hfitiafives Might Be More
Effective’ (2005) 20 Public Po/i~ at~d Adminislmtiot~, 1, 13; V. Braiflxwaite and J. Braiflxwaite, ’An Evolving
Compliauce Model for Tax Enforcement’ in N. Shover and J.P. Wright (eds), Crimes of Ptivikge (Oxford,
OUP, 2000), ch. 6; and K. Murphy, ’Moving Towards a More Effective Model of regulator3, Enforcement
h* fl~e Australi,’m T~xation Office’ [2004] BKtt)h Tax Review, 603.
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p~actice. They are not generally witlfin the scope of an ombudsman’s review. Hoxvever,
because they form part of the repor~ag and evaluation process for the revenue authority
there is strong incentive for revenue officers to meet the articulated standards. It is
flaerefore legitimate to suggest that adi~ainistrative goals do form part of the Model as they
can ensure improved taxpayer treatment, 163
CONCLUSION
Chapter 2 explored the reasons xvhy a Model of taxpayers’ rights is timely and benefidal in
the context of developments ha tax administration and the broader legal frame\vork in the
latter part of the 20th and early part of the 21st centuries. However, it is difficult to identify
exactly wbich rights should be included. The traditional principles that underpin tax policy
are well lmown, but Chapter 3 shmved how their content and mearfing was less well
defined. It put forward a shnplified and generally acceptable common meaning for those
principles that are regarded as forming the basis for tax systems. They should also flaerefore
influence taxpayers’ rights.
Although an agreed set of principles is an inaportant starting point for common
agreement, Chapter 3 also outlined the difficulties that flow from the interpretation of any
international model set of rules or guidelk~es. There may be significant differences m
interpretation and therefore application of rules. It will depend on a range of factors, from
variations in the legal system tl~:ough to cultural mores that dictate how a rule or process
should be inaplemented. Chapter 3 stressed that the rights contained in the Modal will
Contain comtnon content, but ti’iust be flexible enough to cope with variations in approach
National Taxpayer Advocate’s 2007 Objectives Report to Congress, above n. 138, p. vii.
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to their implementation. Rules should not be implemented utfless it is witlfin the context of
fl~e legal system, culture, economy and broader environment of a jurisdiction. A Model that
is not expressed broadly enough to facilitate contextual implementation is of little use.
This chapter has explored the different types of right that could be included ha a
model and how best to classify them. The classification takes place in an environment,
where the way government works is changing, in part because of its scope. In the context
of expanding goverrmaent, there is, paradoxically, increasing taxpayer protection and a need
for standards and guidelines to assist in the exercise of power. Where once it may have
been thought that the only substantive protection available to citizens was tlttough
legislation, because administxative protection was fairly limited, fltis is no longer the case. It
is therefore inaportant to classy, taxpayers’ rights in a way that reflects their different
content. The differences are often found in the means of enforcement and these are
explored ftttther in Chapter 5.
Tiffs Chapter has shown how important it is to recognise the differences between
each type of right. Their natnre xdll produce a radically different result. Any jurisdiction
should identify the rights it affords taxpayers across the tax system. It is no longer
sufficient, if policymakers are serious about providing a comprehensive framework
taxation, to leave it to the protection given elsewhere in die law without determining
whether or not it is appropriate. A comprehensive approach requires review of both legal
and admiuistradve r-ights, recoguising the widely different impact depending upon which
method of enforcement is used.
The nuances ha the classification of tights become particularly significant as countt’ies
seek to implement greater taxpayer protection as part of the reform of their tax systems. By
understandhag the different classes of tight they xvilt be able to identify much more easily
t6s s. James, T. Svetalekth and B. Wright, above n. 156.
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the appropriate framexvork of rights for their particular tax achlah~istration. This will cater
to the operation of the ntles in the system, the effect of those l~les, and tile gaps in those
t~les. The t~ales and principles within the classification system are found in Chapters 6 to 8.
Chapte~ 6 focuses on the pzh~aary legal r~les that provide the legislative fl’amework
goverrm~g tile taxation system. Chapter 7 explores the general principles of good tax
ad|~fistration
, 
secondatT legal ~ights and administrative goals - those elements related to
how die tax adnfinistration exercises its powers. Chapter 8 analyses file secondat3’ legal
tights and primal3, administrative rights that form much of the substance of taxpayers’
tights in aW tax system. TILe rights then translate into the Model in Chapter 9.
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CHAPTER 5
ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS
I INTRODUCTION
The aira of a Model of taxpayers’ fights is to provide a guide to best practice in tax
administration. As noted in earlier chapters, the inaplementation depends heavily on the
legal, social, cultural and economic context of the particular jurisdiction. Therefore the
Model cannot itself articulate the precise means of enforcement of the rights it includes. It
can provide a guide to how each of the different t3q3es of rights should be enforced to give
them effect. Tlfis is essential to understand the mearting of the rights set out in Chapters 6
to 8.
Chapter 4 identified file context and classification of taxpayers’ rights. Enforcetnent
relates directly to classification as legal or admitfistrative rights. The issue becomes more
complex for legislative enforcement simply because the subiect of the legislation is rights
protection. At the administrative level, the potential mechauisms available and methods
used to enforce rights are not as distinctive,
The first part of dais chapter exanaines the levels of legal enforcement available and
identifies flaeir advantages and disadvantages using examples from a range of }m-isdictions.
Some primary legal tights dealing with taxation are part of the basis of the legal system. It is
therefore appropriate to begin an analysis with a revie~v of constitutional enforcement.
HOWever, much of flae discussion about enforcement of legal rights focuses on ordinary
legislation and how best to protect rights it contains. Therefore, the main focus of the
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discussion on legal enforcement is on mechanisms such as ’protection of rights through
interpretation provisions and pre-legislative scrutiny.
Tim second part of the chapter focuses on admimstrative mechanisms and
enforcement, particularly in the context of developments in akernative dispute resolution
(ADR) theot3’. Tiffs part uses the example of the ATO dispute resolution model to
illustrate the effective design of a dispute resolution model in the context of tax
administration.
Both parts proxdde recotrmmndations on tile most appropriate forms and processes
for enforcement of taxpayers’ rights. These are included ha the Model in Chapter 9.
II PART 1: LEGISLATIVE ENFORCEMENT
A Level of Et~rcement
The classification of taxpayers’ rights in Chapter 4 identified pritnatT and secondarT legal
rights. Unlike the enforceruent of a specific bill of rights, such as those in Canada, the
United I~dngdom, South Africa and New Zealand, taxpayers’ rights are usually embodied in
a number of different laws. T!ffs is similar to the protection of general rights in countries
such as the United States and Australia, where some rights are given constitutional
protection, but others are included ha a range of different laws.
There are numerous models and different levels of enforcement of *aghts legMatton.
How they are treated depends upon what kind of law embodies the rights in the legal
For a review of the most common models, see P. ~Vlston (ed.), P*~mot¢)g Human Rt~hts th*~¢gh Bills of Rights.
Cbmpa~ulive Pe,ape¢lives (Oxford, OUP, 1999), vAth a genera] comparative overview in M. Darrow and P.
Alston, ’Bills of Rights in Comparatix;e Perspective’ in p. 465, p. 469. See further, G. Griffith, The Prolecliotl
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hierarchy and what powers are allocated to judges or other bodies or groups in respect of
that kind of law.z This Part exanfines in the fol]mving order, those models representative, in
gener,’d terms, of erich level of enforcement and analyses their approptiateness in the
cow, text of taxpayers’ rights:
constitutional enforcement
legislative entrenctmaent
use of an interpretation clause
pre-legislative scmfiny
ordinary legislation
Constitutio*~al Ptvvisions
Most countries now have written constitutions, in addition to setthag out the structure and
operation of govermnent, many constitutions incorporate protection of the rights of
citizens. Some of these r’tglats can impact directly on taxpayers, such as a tight to a fair trial
in the context of a tax offence and the right of appeal from a decision of a tax court.
Constitutional bills of rights have become more cmmnon, with the growing emphasis
worldwide on human tights. However, Bills of Rights are more usually introduced using
Odler statutory methods, discussed further beloxv.
Constitutional protection of htunan rights should provide the strongest assurance to
citzens that their tights vftll indeed be protected. For after all, in the words of De Smith,
the constitution comprises ’the law behind the law -the legal source of legitimate
q HUmat~ Rights: A Rel&lv qf Selecled JtMMictions (Briefing Paper No. 3/2000 NSW ParlJamentat3, Librat3,
Research Sen~ce).
See fuhrer, J.L. Black-Branch, ’Parliamentat3, Supremacy of Pohitical Expediency?: The Constitutional
Position of the Human Rights Act under British Law’ (2002) 23(1) Statute Latt, Ret*ie~l; 59, 60 in tlm
COntext of the constitutional position of human tights.
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authority’.3 Whether riffs is because of an intrinsic role of recognition,4 because of its
pedigree,5 or other theoretical foundation, the constitution is x-iewed as a lfigher furau of
law, ’hierarcltically superior to other laws’.6
As a higher law, the constitution is not norrnally alterable except by special
procedures. These can be flexible, as in many parliamentar’y democracies, where
amendment is simply by special maiofity of file legislature. Tiffs is consistent with Dicey’s
traditional concept of parliament~at3’ sovereignty that ’a sovereign power cannot, xvlfilst
retaitm~g its sovereign character, restrict its own powers by any particular enactment’] The
special procedures can be more rigid, as in Australia, where the Cotrmxonxvealth
Constitution can be amended only by an absolute majority of Parliament, xvith the approval
of a majority of electors both overall and in a maiority of StatesP They can be inwnutable as
in the German Constitution, ’which declares that certain fundamental principles are
immune to constitutional amendment’.9 Manner and fomx legislation is dealt with more
fiflly below
TILe German constitution has been used to protect a number of taxpayers’ rights
over the years. This ranged from the application of the principle of the separation of
powers to disallow the tax authorities from levying admitfistrat:ive penalties other than
those for late payment, to finding that interest taxadon was unconstitutional as the level of
S.A. de Smith, Con¢tittttionaland-Administmtit~e Lan, (3rd edn, Harmondsxvorth, Penguin, 1971), p. 18.
As posited by H.L.A. Hart, in The Concept of Law (2nd edn, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994).
Dworkin’s theot3’ as to the ~ecognition of the source of law. See R. Dworldn, Taking Right.r £etious~,
(London, Duckworth, 1978).
S.A. De Smith, above n. 3, p. 18.
A.V. Dicey, b~ttvdm’tion to [he XB@, of the Law of the Congittttion (10da edn, London, Butterworths, 1960), p~
68, n. 1, discussed in A. Chander, %overeignty, Referenda, and the Entrenclmaetu of a United Kingdom
Bill of Rigbts’ (1991) 10t Yale Lan, Jonrnal, 457, 463 in an analysis of orthodox and new views of
parliamentary sovereignty.
Section 128 of the Constitution.
A. Chander, above n. 7, p. 462, who discusses the concept of immutability and points out that
constitutions, bowever entrenched, are o f cot~rse xmhaerable to revolution.
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enforcement xvas not appropfiate.1° Hoxvever, most constitutions do not provide this level
of protection for taxpayers.
In file context of human fights generally, Darrow and Alston argue that, ’it is
becoming increasingly difficult for a state to demonstxate that it has taken all appropfiate
measures in the absence of some kind of recognition of human fights standards.’tl Tiffs
would normally occur either through the introduci:ion of a bill of fights or by meast~tes that
ensure that international human fights obligations prevail over domestic law)2 Some of die
pfimary taxpayers’ fights may be covered appropfiately by existing constitutional protection
for fights generally. However, the content applicable to taxpayer protection may need more
explicit articulation. Fo~ example, a consfitotional protection of a citizen’s fight to equality
may still allow a restrictive interpretation hi relation to tax. Canada provides an illustration.
Taxpayers have sought to apply to taxation the Section 15 equality fights of the
CanadLan Chatter of Rights and Freedoms (die Canadian Charter), xvlffch fom~s part of the
Canadian Constitution.u The Supreme Court has stated clearly that die Canadian Charter
applies to die Canadian Income Tax Act as much as to other legislation,t4 However, in
Thibadeau v. CamMa, Gonflffer J noted the special nature of die Income Tax Act as a
significant factor to be taken into account in defining die scope of die equality fights and
d~at the essence of the Act is ’to make disthlctions, so as to generate revenue for the
government w!file equitably reconciling a range of necessarily divergent interests’,is Tiffs
approach has been stsongly cfiticised by some cotmnentators. Philipps argues that it is
problematic, as ’it d~reatens to keep lffdden from vie\v dlose assumptions and concepts
A.J. Pddler, ’General Description: Germany’ in H.J. Autt, Comparative Income Ta~,catiom A XlmcturalAna~’sis
(I’he Hague, Kluxver Law Intemalional, 1997), p. 49, pp. 61-62.
M. Darmw and P. Alston, above n. 1, p. 469.
Ibid.
ConslJtudon Act 1982, Part 1, being the Cmiada Act 1982 (UK), Schedule B, c 11.
In bod~ S3,mes v. TheQuee& [1994] 1CTC 40, 94 DTC 6001 (SCC) m~d Thibadeau v. C~*tada, [1995] 2 SCR
627, [1995] 1 CTC 212, 95 DTC 5998 (SCC).
Thibadeau v. Ca,mda, ibid., p. 392 (CTC) and discussed in J. L~, ’Taxpayers’ Rights in Canada’ in D. Bentley
(ed.) Ta~’pa).e~z’ Rights:A~ [,ttematio*aalPerspeclive (Gold Coast, Revenue Law Journal, 1998), p. 89, p. 129 et
seq.
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within the tax system which may reinforce larger patterns of social and econmnic
inequality’,~6 thereby giving rise to toleration of a lesser standard of faix treatment in tax
law.17
Whatever tile mefits of the decision, it illustrates that the application of general fights
to tax law is often interpreted restrictively because of ti~e nature of tax law. Constitutional
protection can fundamentally extend the protection of taxpayers. The Canadian Charter
has resulted in major changes to the audit and investigative powers of Revenue Canada.18
However, the point is that it reqtti~es the introduction of a chaxter or bill of fights into a
constitution for these effects to be felt in the tax law. Constitutional amendment is ahxmst
certainly not going to occur specifically to insert tax, payers’ rights.
Therefore, to rely on the introduction of taxpayers’ rights contained in a Modal into a
constitution, even where the constitution of a countt’y already contains some protection of
general htmaan rights, is both inappropriate to the substance of taxpayers’ fights and the
constitution as a potential vehicle for their protection. Taxpayers’ fights are protected at
best indirectly by constitutions. They are a specific t3Tpe of fight peculiar to one area of the
law, where the executive interacts on a daily basis xvith the individual. It is more appropriate
for protection to apply specifically and not to rely on the indirect protection afforded by a
broad, over-arching instrument that was not designed as a means to protect taxpayers’
fights. Even for primat3, legal fights, appropriate protection for taxpayers relies on specific
legislative attention, or there is a fisk that the association with taxation will cause the
protection to be read down.
L. P~Ftpps~ ‘Tax Law: Equa~ay Pdghts: Thibadeau v. Canada~ (~995) 74 T/~e Ca~adian Bar Re~iew~ 668"
Ibid., p. 675.
j. Li, above n. 15, p. 109.
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2Sinfilar concerns about appropriateness for t~xpayers’ rights apply to the next level of
protection: entrenclunent. Proponents of rights protection of course prefer the maxinaum
protection, not subject to the wlfim, whether advertent or inadvertent, of parliamentary
override. The most secure method of enforcement is through entrencbanent, whereby the
legislature restricts its ability to amend or appeal legislation by ordinat3’ enactment.
In the absence of some form of entrenclm~ent the problem facing the courts, when
an apparent breach of rights comes before them, is that parliament is sovereign in most
democracies. The issue was well set out by Brennan J in the Austt’alian case of Naliomvide
News Ply Ltdv. Wills, o
A court will haterpret laws of the Parliament in the light of a presumption that tl~e
Parfiament does not intend to abrogate human rights and fundamental freedoms but
the court cannot deuy the validity of an exercise of a legislative power expressly
granted merely on the ground that the law abrogates human rights and fundamental
freedoms or trenches upon political rights xvhich, in the courts’ opinion, should be
presetn~ed.
To overcome Otis problem, it is possible to introduce xvhat is sometimes called a
’manner aud form’ provision, designed to entrench the legislation embodying rights that
the parliament wishes to protect. Tttis was the approach taken, for example, to entrench
the Bill of Rights contained ha the South African Constitution.-~°
(1992) 177 CLR 1 43.
C ~apter 2, 1996 Constitution,
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A manner and form provision could theoretically apply to legislation (mbodying
taxpayers’ rights.21 A ’manner’ provision generally sets a mechanism for amendment or
repeal of a piece of legislation, xvlfich goes beyond the usual simple majority requirement.
Examples xvould be the requirement of a greater than simple majorit3’ of one or more
Honses of Parliamentzz and apWoval by a referendum of electors.~ The South African
constitution requites a two-thkds maiofitT vote of the National Assembly and approval of
at least six of the time provincial legislatates to amend it.~4 A ’form’ provision generally
prescribes an express form that an amendment or repeal must take. An example would be a
requirement that legislation inconsistent with a bill of fights, to be effective, mnst expressly
declare that it should operate notwithstanding the bill of rights-zs To be effective, a manner
and form provision would also generally be entrenched or it could itself be repealed by an
ordinary act of padiament.26
The advantage of entrenching taxpayers’ rights using a manner and form provision is
that it overcomes the principle that where a subsequent Act of Parliament conflicts with an
eadier Act, the I~tet Act repeals the earlier.2v It would mean that the taxpayers’ rights could
not be repealed expressly or by implication by a later Act of Parliament unless that Act
complied with the reqtfimments set out in the manner and form provision. In other xvords,
it \vould reqtiite that an5’ change to the legislation embodying the taxpayers’ tights ’be
, "
ion of die at)plicafi°n of manner and form promstons, se,e., e.g., ,For a discuss
~% wv~,~ ’Can the Commonwealdl pa~uament
Black-Branch, above n. z, o ............ ,
Legislation?’ (!980) 11 Fedet’al Lan, Revien; 167; and G. Carney, ’?m Over\few of Manner and Form m
Australia’ (1989) 5QUTLawJourtm!, 69.     " "     Pedtick Ra~tadttAhe, [1965] AC 172.
See e.g., the Austr~lian case, The Btibeo’ C°mmtsst°tter ~"
See e.g., in Australia, s. 128 of the Constitution and the discussion of referenda in tiffs context in A.
Cbander, above n. 7, particularly pp. 475-480, where recent United Kingdom referenda have been used to
provide popular majority support for major constitutional decisions.
Section 74(2).See further, G. Wimerton, above n. 21, p. 17~, who gives dxe Canadian example of The Bill of Rights
1960 (Can) s. 2.
Ibid., p. 172 and G. Carney, above n. 21, p. 70.
G. Carney, ibid., p. 71.
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direcdy considered and intended by the drafters of the later Act rather than be merely an
maintended consequence of an implied inconsistency.’2s
However, entrenclunent places a significant qualification on parlimnentary
sovereignty. In some }nfisdictions there may not be capacity to entrench legislation in this
29
way, particularly where the application of the legislation is to a vet’}, specific aea. In most
iurisdictions where it is possible, entrenchment is restricted to those elements of the law
that have constitutional effect. The option of enCtencbanent is considered in the context of
general bills of fights, not for anything less.3° As with general constitutional protection,
entrenchment is probably only relevant to taxpayers’ rights to the extent that they fall
witlma a general bill of rights. Some of the provisions of a Model could fall witl~’t such a
bill, but it is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore the appropriate means for the
introduction of a general bill of rights.
Partictdarly in the context of those taxpayers’ fights that are capable of legislative
enforcement, xvhat then are the options for ensuring their protection? It xvould be usual
where rights from the Model are legislated, for the legislation to foma part of an act
governing tax a(h~xinistxation. Tax a&~inistrafion may fall vdtbin the general act or acts
governing taxation or be subject to a separate act.3~ The strongest form of protection for
those tights protected by ordinary legislation would be separate identificafion within an act
Ibid., p. 72.
For a discussion of this point in the context of manner and for~n, see O" H°°d Ptfillips, P" Jacks°n and P’
Leopold, O Hood Philh~.r (,~ Jackrom Cb~tslitutio~tal attd Admi~tistrative Lan, (8th edn, London, Sweet &
Max~vell, 2001), p. 4-025 e! .req.
M. Darrow and P. ,Mston, above n. 1, p. 484, explore the debate over entrenched bills of tights,
cam’assmg the advantages and disadvantages.
Discussed in R.K. Gordon, ’Law ofTmx Adnfinistration and Procedure’ in V. Thutowi (ed.), voL 1, Tax
,~" stgtt and D ~fiitg (Washington DC, IMIv, t 996 and 1998), p. 95, p. 110.
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and protection by an interpretation clause. This secdon builds specifically upon the analysis
set out m Chapter 3 on file interpretation of die content of rights.
An interpretation clause is incorporated as part of the enacting legislation and
requires subsequent Acts of Parliament affecthlg tile protected content to be interpreted in
accordance with that content, rather than to override it or negate its effect by in~plicadon.
tt is important to distinguish at this point between an interpretation clause in its ordinary
sense and a clause diat is designed to reconcile parliamentat3’ supremacy with
entrenchment. In iurisdicdons where there is entrenchment, such as Canada, a clause in the
entrenched rights legislation pemlits the legislature to protect other subsequent legislation
from being interpreted as being in breach of the rights legislation by specifically including a
declaratot3~ provision to override the tights being breached. This ensures that Parliament is
not irrevocably bound by tile earlier legislation.3a Tile use of a declaratotT provision might
apply in areas often the subiect of the exercise of marghls of appreciation in international
human rights documents, such as anti-terxorism legislation.
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms uses a ’notwithstanding’ provision to
reconcile constitutional entrenchinent with file doctdne of parliamentat3’ sovereignt3T"
Section 33(1) of the Canadian Charter provides that:
Parliament or die legislature of a province may expressly declare m an Act of
parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that die Act or a provision thereof
shall operate noiwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or secdons 7 to 15 of
tiffs Charter.
32 M. Darrow and P. Alston, above n. 1, p. 498, put forward die argument from democratic d~eory for an
a~ entrenched bill of rights places poxver in die hands of an unelected, unaccountable,
mirepresentative and elite group of people (i.e., judges) who are empowered to overturn Acts of
Parliament, wlfich reflect the values determined by duly elected representatives of tile people, to
the extent that any inconsistency with the bill of rights is identified by the judge.
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Although allowing a ’notwithstandh~g’ provision waters down the extent of the
e~trenclunent, it is still a very significant form of protection and more powerful than a
simple interpretation clause. The sections which may be overridden are lit~tited,33 the period
of the override is limited to a maxitnmn of five yeats (although it may then be re-enacted
for a further maximum five year penod) and the psychological and political ianplications
of invoking the override have tended to act as a barrier to its general use.3s An
interpretation clause offers a less substantial legislative impediment to override of enacted
rights. ~
It is also hnportant to distingttish from an interpretation clause a clause giving courts
the power to declare legislation incompatible with the legislation enacting rights. This is the
position under the United I~angdom Human Rights Act 1998, where section 4 allows the
superior cmrtts to declare that legislation enacted by Parfiament is incompatible with a right
under the European Convention of Human Rights (rights to which the Act aims to give
effect in the United ICAngdom))7 A declaration of incompatibility allows for amendment of
the offending provisions by Onfnisterial order under section 10 or for amendment by
Parliament.
An interpretation clause ts usually included ha most acts promulgating rights. Wliere
it is combined with a ’notwithstanding’ clause or a declaration of incompatibility it is a
Section 33(1) lhnits the override to s. 2 or ss 7 to 15.
Section 33(3) and (4).
For example, see the analysis in J.L. Hiebert, W¢hy must a Bill of Rights be a contest of pofifical and
judicial wills? The Canadian alternative’ (1999) 10 PublicLaw Review, 22, 24.
An interpretation clause is also fomxd ms. 4(1) of dm 1990 Hong Kong Bill of Rights, which states that,
’,~ legislation enacted on or afte~ the cormnencement date shall, to the extent that it admits of such a
COnstruction, be construed so as to be consistent xvith the International Covenant on Ci~l and Political
Rights as applied to Hong Km~g.’ See further, A. Bymes, ’And Some Have Bills of Rights Tim~st Upon
Them: The Experience of Hong Kong’s Bill of Rights’ in M. Darrow and P. Alston, above n. 1, p. 318, p.
356 et seq.
COmpare this to Nexv Zealand, where the co~t was initially of the opinion that it was precluded from
gixfing advisor3, opinions, see P. Cooke, Temese ~. Police, (19921 9 CRNZ 425, 427 and K.D. Ewing, ’TheHuman Rights Act and Parliamentat3’ Democracy’ (19991 Mode~ La~v Review, 79. Tiffs issue was resolved
in Moonen v. Film and k~temlut~ Boa*ff of Review, [2000} 2 NZLR 9 where it was held that the court could
make a judicial declaration of incompatibility where there was a clea* statutot3’ inconsistency that could
not be resolved tl~cough interpretation. Discussed in P. Rishwo~th, G. Huscroft, S. Oplican and R.
Mahoney, The New Zealand Bi!l of Righls (Oxford, OUP, 2003), p. 117 el seq.
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more powerfial protector of fights. A simple interpretation clause is usually the strongest
form of protection that would be used to protect Laxpayets’ rights as they a~e generally not
fiandamental but defivadve rights. However, from the discussion below, it xvill become
apparent dlat an advisor3’ power of incompatibilig, in the hands of the cottrts could be
useful both to a revenue authority and the legislature.
In the UK Htmaan Rights Act 1998, section 3, the interpretation clause, requires that
’so far as it is possible to do so prhnaty and secondat3’ legislation - whether enacted before
or after the 1998 Act - must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with
Convention fights.’~s In the context of rights legislation, tiffs would usually mean a broad
and pm’posive interpretation as described in Chapter 3)9
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act uses a weaker interpretive construction than the
UK Human Rights Act 1998.~’ The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act will not override earlier
inconsistent legislation. Secdon 4 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act states that:at
No Court shall, in reladon to any enacmaent (wbether passed or made before or after
the commencement of this Bill of Rights),
(a) Hold any provision of the enacmient to be impliedly repealed or revoked, or to be
in an}, way invalid or ineffective; or
(b) Decline to apply an), provision of the enactanent - by reason only that the
provision is i~consistent with an), provision of this Bill of Rights
Tltis section must be read in conjunction xxtth sections 5 and 6 of the Nexv Zealand Bill of
Rights Act, Section 5 states that:
O. Ilood Pttillips, P. Jackson aild P. Leopold, above n. 29.
Ibid., p. 479.
See also fl~e Hong Kong Bill of Rights, A. Bymes, above n. 36, p. 348 and J. 2kila~t, ’A Bill of Rights for
Hong Kong’ [I991] PublicLaw, 175, 178.
For a discussion of these sections, see furflier, P. Risbwot~.h et al, above n. 37, ch. 4 and P.~.. Joseph, ’~e
New Zealand Bill of Paghts Expenenc in M. Darrow and P. Alston, above n. 1, p. 283, p. 289 et seq.
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Subject to section 4 of tiffs Bill of Pdghts, the rights and freedoms contained in this
Bill of Rigllts may be subject duly to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can
be demonstxably justified in a free and democratic society.
Section 6 goes on to say:
\’~erever an enacm~ent can be given a meat~ag that is consistent xvifl~ the rights and
freedoms cont,’dned in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any other
meaning.
These sections require Ore courts to interpret Acts of Parliament as drough they are
consistent with fl~e New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. The usual t~tfle of interpretation
applicable to contradictorT legislation and adopted by couunon law couxts was set out by
Lord Blackburn in Gat~e/t v. Bradley:4~
When the nexv enactment is couched in general afftt’mafive language and the previous
law, whether a law of custom or not, can ,,veil stand with it, for the language used is all
in the affmnative, there is nott~ng to say that the previous law shall be repealed, and
therefore file old and the nexv laws may stand together .... But when the new
affirma~ve words ... by theh" necessity.., import a contradicfon, that is to say, where
one can see that it must have been intended that the two should be in conRict, the two
could not stand togeflmr; the second repeals the 17trSt,43
Ga,~tett v. Bradley, (1878) 3 App Cas 944, 966
The pthaciple of lege.¢posletiotesptiotvs coztt~tia* abt~gattt as interpreted by Lord Blackbt~n, is an accepted
~lS:ent of much conmaon la\v jm:ispmdence. See, e.g., in Australia, Butler v. Allot,to,-Genera/(Vie), (1961)CLR 268.
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Secdon 4 seeks to overcome the application of dais raale for laxvs passed prior to the
New ZeaLand Bill of Rights Act where there is a clear contradiction. A subsequent law
clearly contradictor3, to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act would first be subject to
section 6, which emphasises that a consistent meaning is to be prefer-red over any other
meaning. Where a meaning consistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act in its broad
forth is not possible, thensection 5 can be used to assist with die h~terpretadon. As stated
by Hardie Boys J in Ministry ofTmll~port v. Noot~.’4
There must be many a statute xvhich can be read consistently with the Bill’s rights and
freedoms if it is accepted diat the statute has imposed some limit or qnafification upon
them; in other words, diat although the statute cannot be given a meaning consistent
\vith the Bill’s rights and freedoms in their entirety, it can be given a meaning
consistent with them in a limited or abridged form. It is obvinusly consistent with die
spirit and purpose of the Bill of Rights Act dlat such a meaning sbould be adopted
rather than dlat s. 4 should apply so that die rights and freedoms are exclnded
altogether.*s
The sta0atot3, consttxtcdon builds carefully on the pre-existing principles of
interpretation generally accepted in common law jurisdictions. Although the consttxiction is
in the context of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, there is no reason why a similar
approach could not be taken within an indixddual act, such as a tax act. The interpretation
clause would apply to the specific body of tights included in that legislation. It would
reinforce and extend the principles of conmaon law interpretation set out in Chapter 3. It
would proxdde a specific direction to the courts, wtfile gnarding the principle of
4a Mitdsto, of ~).at1~port1,. Nootf, [199213 NZLR 260, 287. Followed by the High C°urt in Het~u~iM v" MiMs!o’ °f
Tmt@orl, (1992) 9 CP~NZ 307, 32l.
45 For an extensive discussion of dfis and other cases which have examined ss 4, 5 and 6 of the Bill of
Rights, see J.B. Elkmd, ’On die Lh’nited Applicability of Sect:ion 4, Bill of Rights Act’ {1993] New ZealaM
Law.!omTml, 111.
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parliamentat3, supremacy. In the context of tax laws it could proxdde clear direction from
d~e legislature as to die margins of appreciation applicable to tax law, much as section 5 of
die New Zealand Bill of Rights Act ’supplies a standard that limits on tights tnust meet,
along with a medlodology for applying that standard’.46
One of the major stmnbling blocks to die introduction of a general intet~pretation
clause is that it reqttires the courts to compare different acts and prefer the interpretation
and application of one over another. Legislatures fear the implications of allowing dleit
enactments to be constrained h~ rids xvay. Man), jurisdictions have legislation that governs
dm inteipretadon of legislation.4v That this has not been considered sufficient in the
context of bills of rights is evidenced hi the analysis above. It may be that file drive for
dghts legislation is often politically motivated and even with entrenchment or
interpretation clauses there is considerable scepticism as to its effectiveness in maW
jntisdictions.4s
Tliat said, interpretation acts and clauses are a feature of modern legislation to ensure
consistency across complex and interrelated areas of law.49 Tax laws are no different and it
would not be inconsistent with modern approaches to legislative drafting to include an
interpretation clause in the legislation govertfing the.administration of tile tax laws.
Tax legislation has always provided an interpretive conundrum. Prebbte has argued
that tax is, in many ways, a gloss on the legal system, or a legal ectopia:s° it creates a legal
fiction in order to apply tax law. For example, whereas company law creates tile company
as a separate legal entity,, tax law often looks through that entity at the ultimate oxvners,
ignoring the operation of tile company law in its application,s~ The range of legal fictions
Pdsbworth et al, above n. 37, p. 120.
For example, it~ Australia the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth); United IgLagdom, Interpretation Act
1978 (1OK); Canada, Interpretation Act (R.S., 1985, c. 1-21).
P. ,Mston, ’A Framewozk for the Comparative .Mlalysis of Bills of Rights’ in P. ~dston, above n. 1, p. 1.
For example, coveting such issues as die meaning of common terms, the tales [or calculating time or
measm:ing distance, and the roles and procedures goveriffng the delegation of attthority.
~ J. Ptebhle, ’x.Xq~y Is Tax Law Incomprehensible?’ (1994) B*ilish Tax Revie~v, 380.sl This often happens in tax loss tales, e.g., the Australian Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), Div. 36.
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created means that there is often overlap and a requirement for the legislation or judges to
identi~, the pfiofit3, of one clause or statute over another. Anti-avoidance rules are the most
cormnon example. The pfiority of roles governing ordinal3’ income and expenses over
capital gains rules can be another. It would therefore not be a significant deviation from d~e
norm to include an interpretation clause into the statute or section of the statute gover*~ag
tax administration to ensttre the priorit3T of those clauses providing taxpayers’ rigbts.
This would be facilitated in most jurisdictions by the existing recognition that tax law
deserves special attention from all branches of government. It is often enacted in its own
statutes; cot~trs and tribunals dealing specifically with tax and tax administration ate
common; and taxation is invariably administered by the executive t!~ough a separate arm
of the civil se~_adce with varying levels of independence.
AdapOng the wording of the Human Rights Act into the law governing tax
admirfistration but limited to the tax2payer’s fights contained ha that Law, would not seem
too great a leap for most governments. To prevent the possibility of compethag or ill-
considered declarations of incompatibility a further caveat should apply to prevent such
declarations at first instance. Any declaration of incompatibility should otlly be issued by
the relevant appeal court or tfibunal in a jurisdiction that normally considers matters of law
and procedure. The clauses could read:
So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation
governing the administration of taxation must be read and given effect in a way
which is compatible xvith the fights contained in dais section.
\~qhere an appeal cotttt is satisfied that a prox~ision of p,~mary or subordinate
legislation is incompatible with a rigiat contained in tiffs section, it may make a
declaration of that incompatibility.
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A report containing all declarations of incompatibility shall be made amaually m the
Minister responsible for revenue and a copy of the report shall be laid before
Parliament.
A declaration of incompatibility would encourage the revenue authority and other relevant
deparunents responsible for tax legislation to consider whether the incompatibility was
intended. If it was not, it xvould provide the basis for amendment of the pfimat2¢ or
suborclinate legislation. The purpose of the annual report is to ensure that both the relevant
nfinister and parliament are apprised of instances of incompatibility. Without any
consequence arising from such a declaration, it could otherwise be ignored, particularly in
the tax arena, where publicity for breaches of taxpayers’ rights may not be considered
newsworthy. It also provides some counter-balance to the argmaaent that the poxver of the
b~reaucracy ’has undemfined the theory that the Westminster model of responsible
Govetmnent effectively guarantees democratic control of Execntive power.’s2
The approach taken does not include a statement to the effect of sections 4 or 5 of
the Nexv Zealand Bill of Rights Act. It recognises flrat a tax act is an ordinar3~ act and does
not claim superiority either as a laxv or in its operation, except to the extent that if there is a
choice, an interpretation should favour upholding, to the extent possible, the meaning that
protects the legislated taxpayers’ rights. To do otherwise would go beyond the scope of an
ordmat3, act containing rights pertaining to one aspect of fl)e law.
However, Rishworth et al identify some significant advantages that ftmv from an
interpretation clause and that are taken seriously by the judicim3’.~ Interestingly, these
advantages are some~nes found in judicial consideration of legislation imposing tax
Si~ Gerard Brennan, ’21m Impact of a Bill of Rights on dm Role of fl~e Judiciary: An Australian
Perspective’ in p. CMston, above n. 1, p. 454, p. 457.
Rishworth et al, above n. 37, p. 119 ~tseq.
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because of the presumption that an exaction of tax should be expressed precisely and make
it clear that a tax is being miposed. However, once it is found that a tax is properly
hnposed, the margin of appreciation given to the revenue authorit3¢ in its manner of
administradot~, collection and enforcement is often broad - hence the need for an
interpretddon clause m protect legislative rights,s4 The points relevant to the approach
suggested here can be sutmnarised as:ss
by including taxpayers’ rights in a statute, parfiament expects an interpretive
approach to accoim-nodate them tmless the}, are exq?ressly or by necessary implication
excluded;
articulation of a fixed set of taxpayer’s rights proxddes precision as m their content;
it augments at least the con-anon law metlmd of interpretation by allowing aud
somethnes reqt~g courts to ascribe a meaning that protects rights xvhere this
xvould not necessatily follow from normal methods of interpretation; and
it requires active judicial consideration of rights claims where this might not
otherwise have occurred.
It can be seen from the conmaon law approach to interpretation discussed in Chapter 3
that an interpretation clause does not go far beyond this position. However, the advantages
set out above can duly flow once there is a conmfitment to an interpretation consistent
with enacted rights. \’~lithout a clause that reqttires such commitment, consistet~t
interpretation is by no means assured,s~
85.
ss Risbworth et al, above n. 37, p. 119 el seq.
Ibid., p. 132. ~klthough, an mterpretalion clause should not be seen as a panacea in the context of d~e
broader human rights experience. See A.W. Braclley, ’The Constitutional Protection of Human Rights in
d~e Commonwealfl~’ [1991] Public Law, 477.
176
4 Pre-/egis/ative Scruti*~y~
E,~*rement of Rights
\~/hether or not there is any form of subsequent protection inherent in the legislation,
through entrenclmaent, interpretation clause or other mechanism, new legislation is not
designed to contradict earlier legislation tmintentionally. Any contradiction should be
intentional. Tbis is particularly so where the earlier legislation provides protection for
tights. An interpretation clause focuses on the role of the judiciary after the legislation has
passed. It is far more efficient to provide safeguards during the legislative process to
remove unintended potential conflict between enacmaents.
The earlier case law of the United Kingdom in the European Court of Human Rights
provides an example of where Otis would have been useful. By 1991, the European Court
of Human Rights had decided against the United Kingdom on 28 occasions. Of these, 22
were direct violations of tights by domestic legislation enacted by Parliament. Instead of
decreasing over ~ne, as would be expected as the meaning of the protected rights became
clear to Pa~ament, statutotT violations increased. Seven cases of statutory ~iolation \vere
decided bet~veen 1975 and 1985 compared with 15 such cases between 1985 and 199t.5s
There were a number of solutions put forward and ultimately the Human Rights Act t998
was passed. However, the various proposals put fo~_~a, ard to increase padiamentatT scrutiny
0f all legislation specifically to avoid statutot3, in "£tingement of human tights might have
been a useful interhn measure,s9 A reconmaendation of the Select Conmaittee on the
’[\ COmprehensive analysis of file arguments for and against pre-legislafive scrutiny has been ~dert~en by
D. ~ey, The Eutv eat~ C~nve~tliott o~ Humatt ~ghls: Comp/ia~tce Mlhout b~cotpomtio~t (~dersi~ot, Dar~oufl~
Pub~s~g Co., 1993).
~e statistics m dfis para~aph a~e taken from D. ~ey, ibid., p. 11 and p. 181.
See b " ...... "
.... ~ey, tb~d; M. Ryle, Pre-le~sla~ve Screwy: A Prophylacnc Approach to Protec~on of H~aan
~gnts’ [1994] PubZi¢" ~tg 192; ~d F. ~ug and J. Wa~am, ’~e "Democratic" En~enchment of a B~ of
~ghts: Libew,s Proposals’ [1993] Publicity, 579.
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Modernisation of the House of Colmaaons to introduce monitoring of legislation has since
been partially itnplemented in tile UK.~°
Canada saw tile potential problems in its legislative process and introduced
procedm’es specifically to sctaatinise legislative proposals to ensure compliance with the
1982 Charter and file 1960 Bill of Rights.6. Bills and their regulations are scmlinised by file
Department of Justice before they are introduced into Parliament to ensure that they are
consistent with tile purposes and provisions of the two statutes.62 Inconsistencies are
reported to the House of Commons, which can still enact the legislation but only with an
explicit statement that the provisiQns will operate despite tile breach of the human rights
laws,63
a The Need for Pte-/egis/ative SomiW at* Australian Case Study
Australia provides an interesting case study as it has no bill of rights, but it does have
express’and hnplied constitutional rights, common law rights64 and is signatot3’ to a range
of hmnan rights instruments including the International Covenant on Cixdl and political
Rights. Pre-legislative scrutiny commenced in earnest in Australia xvith the appointment of
file Standing Committee on Regulations and Ordinances in 1932. In 1978 the Senate
Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs tailed to extend the scrutiny to
primary legislation and reconmaended that:
O. Flood Plfillips, P. Jackson and P. Leopold, above n. 29, p. 242 and p. 247.
D. Kdnley, "Parliamentary Scrutiny of Human Rights: A Duty Neglected?’ in P. Alston, above n. 1, p. 158,
p. 163.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Discussed in J. Doyle and B. Wells, ’How Far can the Cmnmon Law go towards Protecting Htmaan
Rights?’ in P. Alston, above n. 1, p. 17.
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a parliatnentatT committee should be established to maintain a xvatchJng brief on all
bills introduced into Parliament so as to higblight those provisions wtficb have an
impact on persons either by interfering with their rights or subjecting them to the
exercise of undue delegations of prover. A joint committee would enable
consideration of bills as soon as they are introduced into the Parliament, regardless of
the House into wltich they are first introduced, and it would enable members of both
Houses to properly fulfil their obligations in respect of legqslative scrutiny,as
The comtrhttee’s recotranendations were re}ected by the government on the gtotmds that
tlie legislative process migbt be delayed and that ample opportunities for sctx~tiny already
existed.~s This conclusion was questionable and in 1981 the Senate Standing Cormnittee for
tlie Scrutiny of Bills was appointed m review ptima*3~ legislation. Nonetheless, the concern
is that although policy issues may well be debated at length, fl~e teclmical detail of
legislation is seldom afforded sufficient sct’utiny,a~
’Technical details’ here may well involve important questions of civil liberties such as
search rigbts xvithout xvarrants, reversal of the onus of proof and the absence of
appeal tights. The excessive complexity of modem drafting of Commomvealth
legislation adds to the problem.~
Support for Otis contention was found in a study of provisions of bills passed by
padia~nent in 1980 and t981 by the staff of the Regulations and Ordinances Conunittee.
~port o, Xcmlit~ of Bills, PadJamentat3, Paper No. 329 /1978"
A. Missen, ’Senate Cormnittees and the Legislative Process’, in J.R. Nethercote (ed.), Parliamet~t g,~
Btlreatloa9’ (Sydney, Hale & Iremonger, 1982), cb. 8.
The House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, C/eat~r
COmmomvealth La~v: Repo*¢ of the Inquiry i~*to Legislative Drafii~g by the Commomvea/lh (Canberra, A GPS, 1993),
P. I79, stated that, ’tl~e Comnfittee believes that consideration of legislation in staadhag committees may
well help enhance the quality of scmt~y of legislation and thus the standard of legislation’. A. ~fissen,
above n. 66, p. 130. A Scrutiny of Legislation Committee was set up in the State of Queensland in 1995
Under tlie Parliamentary Committees Act 1995 (Qld), follo\~mg the success of the Federal cormnittee.
Ibid.
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The bills were measured against the same principles applied to delegated legislation. A
significant number of provisions were found, which if they had been ’presented as
regulations or ordinances, would have been reported to the Senate and strongly queried’.69
This is hardly surprising and, despite the efforts of the CoIrmrttee for the Scmliny of
Bills, little improvement should be expected for a number of reasons that are prevalent
across jurisdictions using different procedures. The mean time spent in parliamentat3,
SCt’Ufitly of legislation is on a downward trend. In 1993 in Australia, just over five minutes
was the mean lime spent considering each page of primat3’ legislation,vs This figure is
certain to have decreased, as ’the vohtme of prhnat3’ and subordinate legislation considered
by Parliament or its committees has generally increased each year’vt and has shown no sign
of din~tfishing. Furthet~nore, laws affecting the tights of taxpayers are more likely to be
declared to be urgent and guillotined, dealing mainly as the), do, xvith finance matters.
Senate use of a cut-off date, after wlfich Bills received from the House of Representatives
are automatically adjourned to the next sittings, often forces finance bills even more quickly
throngh the House of Representatives, reducing even further the time available to
sct’utinise the legislation]2 Tbis is in part a fi_~nction of parliamentary process, for
governments do not like to allow extended debate on areas in which they might be
xmh~erable to opposition questioning.
Drafting e~ors add to the problem. In Iris submissions to the Inqui~3, into Legislative
Drafting by the Commomvealth, lan Ttmnbttil QC, then First Parliamentat3’ Counsel, made
it clear that the unreafistic deadlines placed upon drafters of legislation mean that they
often do not have the l~ne to review the finished product adequately]~ He went on to say
House of Representatives Standing Comazittee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, above n. 67, p. 170.
Ibid. R. Hazell, in ’Time for a Nexv Convention: Parliamentary Scm~y of Constit~tional Bills 1997-2005’
[2006] Pub/i¢ Law, 247, 250 el seq, provides a comprehensive table of simila~ statistics for I.JK bills of a
constitutional nature. Hazell’s article strongly supports tim validity of the scra~xy process in the context
of limited opportonity for full consideration of bills on the floor of parliament.
House of Representatives Standk~g Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affaks, above n. 67, p. 168.
Ibid., p. !74.
For example, in l~is subtmssion at p $280, ibid., p. 161, lm said ttxat: ~\XThen a law is completely drafted and
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’but I drink our problem is that we do have deadlines that are far too tight and they are
made worse by the fact that policy changes are made at a late stage’.7~
Where a parliamentat3’ inquitT finds that parliamentarT scrotiny of legislation is
l~imal and that. tile demands placed on the drafters of that legislation are too great, both
d~e drafters and die quality controllers are put in the invidious position of relying on each
oflmr’s work to maintain the detailed quart), of the legislation.
b Recommendaliotts
There are obvious problems in setting up effective pre-legislative scrutiny given the
incredible pressure that exists on those involved in drafting, debating and passing
legislation. The parliamentarians, who would in most countries undertake the scruffny, face
enolmous pressures,vs However, such scrutiny provides a necessatT form of quality control
to give effect to rights legislation of any kind. It prevents the need to resort to the courts
unnecessarily to resolve utfintended incompatibility of, or inconsistency with, subsequent
enacmaents and rights contained in existh~g legislation.
It may be considered excessive to have a scrutiny cormnittee ensuring that taxpayers’
tiglits ate not breached by finance bills and other tax legislation. This would have
substantive elements and xvould not shnply be a procedural review. However, given tile
speed with wlfich such bills are passed and the complexity of such legislation, the
establisliment of a predegislative scrutiny connnittee to consider them makes sense. A
conmfittee of tiffs ldnd would work more effectively ha jurisdictions where there are two
houses of parliament, if it were a joint cotrmfittee of both houses. Both houses are required
fl~e drafter is satisfied fl~at it has the correct legal effect, the drafter should then review the whole law m
order to simplify it as much as possible. 22"fis step is usually denied through lack of lime.’
v~ Ibid., p. 163.
~s For a ~4vid description of the position in the UK, see D. Feldman, ’Parfiamental3, Scrathly of Legislation
and Human Rights’ [2002] Public Law, 323, 324 el seq.
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to give attention to the content of such bills and should be equally involved in the scruliny
so that both houses can be equally well informed in the event of incompatibility that is left
unamended.76
Scrutiny of legislation by committee akeady takes place in many iutisdictions]7 The
committees’ presence as part of the legislative process gives them the credibility and
influence necessar3, to be effective. The proposal to extend such scrutiny to protect
legislated taxpayers’ tights ~a~volves little innovation, but gives the specific focus necessat3,
to guard such rights adequately. The vetting should extend to delegated taxation legislation.
The advantages of including such scrutiny in the legislative process go beyond mere
quality control. The successful operation of the existing scrutiny comrmttees ’demonstxates
the potential for the protection of broad principles of tights and liberties tic.tough scrutiny
of legislation by parliamentary committees’]~ As pointed out by Ryle,v9 it would be an
embarrassment to ministers to have theix legislation the subject of a formal report from a
parliamentat3, committee pointing out the ways in wlfich their legislation potentially
breached legislated taxpayers’ tigl~ts. It should be emphasised, that this is the put’pose of a
scrutiny conm~ittee: simply to examine bills, assess xvhether or not those bills appear to
breach the agreed standards and to report to parliament,a° Nonetheless, faced with such
sct~atiny, more care would likely be taken in the preparation.
Associated with pre-legislafive scrutiny there are administrative and process
arrangements that strengthen its operation. In many jurisdictions the Minister is required to
make a statement of the impact of legislation xvhen it is introduced.~ This should extend to
D. Kinley, ’Parliamentar), Scru~xy of Human Rights: A Neglected Duty?’ above n. 61, p. 182.
A selection is mentioned in D. Oliver, "Improving file Scrutiny of Bills The Ca~e for Standards and
Checklists’ [2006] Pt¢bZic Lan,, 219.
7s D. Kinley, above n. 57, p. 103.
7~ M. Ryle, above n. 59, p. 194.
so D. Felchnan, above n. 75, p. 332.
~ See, for example, D. Rodtigo, ’Regulator)~ Impact Analysis in OECD Countries: Challenges for
Developing CounU:ies’ paper presented at Soufl~ Asian~Tt~d High Level Investment Roundtable (June
2005) under Regulator)’ Management and Refoma, <\~vw.oecd.org>, 1 November 2006. R3ie OECD is
encouraging development of Regulator3’ Impact Analysis as a govermnent best practice.
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a reqtfixement to point out \vhen there could be inconsistency betxveen tile proposed
legislation and existing legislated fights. It should also note xvhere administrative
a~angements reslflthag from file proposed legislation would negatively affect published
admmistrafive fights. In most cases, tllere may be no effect on r’ights. However, for the
executive to engage in the fights process, it is important that it is reqnited to exercise its
mind on file impact of legislation on existing fights rather than assmI~ag that there is no
impact and not considering it at all.
The corollary to this is fllat file standing orders or rules for the drafters of legislation,
whether tiffs is in a separate office of the parliamentat3’ draftsman or in file rdevant
department, should make reference to the reports of file scrutiny commitree. If the scrntiny
c0mmitree is regularly asking for reports on similar aspects of legislation, it is important
flaat d~is is taken into account in future drafting. The reports shmtld engender engagement
by policymakers and drafters of legislation in file potential difficulties that can arise and
they should seek to remedy those difficulties in future legislation. The titrust of the
legislation will not necessarily change. However, an awareness of perceived problems in tile
past will enable file drafters to consider shnilat issues in advance and thereby improve the
’rights4tiendliness’ of the legislation.
The committee scrutiny process can provide the opportunity for submissions from
experts and interested patties, xvhich should then be published. This xvould add to file
general understanding of what is meant by the fights and should lead ultimately to better
legislation.8a Without external input, publication and transparency there is a fisk that the
scrutiny committee could simply become a rubber stamp body controlled by the part?, in
power. Tiffs would be a particular danger i~ a jufisdicfion xvhere the government had a
Strong nlajotity both in parliament and on file scruliny commitree. Hoxvever, regular
external submissions may be inlpracfical given file speed with which revenue legislation
8-’M. Ryle, above n. 59, p. 195 and D. Feldinan, above n. 75, p. 333.
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must often be considered. There is no point having a scrutiny conunittee wlfich camiot
report in thne for it to be considered by parliament in its debate on die proposed
legislation. External input is beneficial, with die caveat that it must be possible and not
defeat die propose of the cotrmfittee fl~tough the delays in reporting that it necessitates.
Before reporting and after receix~ag submissions or hearing representations, as
appropriate, the cotm~ittee would seek explanation for potential discrepancies from the
relevant government departments. ~is has worked effectively in Australia to allow
departments to explain much more fully the meaning and intent of detailed techmcal
legislation that would not be possible on the floor of parliament,s3 Critical to die
effectiveness of any scrutiny conmfittee is its powers to gain infor-mafion. It has been a
major contt:ibutoW factor to successful scrutiny conm~itteess4 and is based firmly on the
principle of parliamentatT sovereignty. Without an acceptance by departments fliat
parliament has die right, under the principle of the separation of provers, m seek
clarification and explanation, scrutiny committees are likely m be less effective. This is not
so much a matter for die design of a Model and its processes as the relevant parliamentat3’
committee powers and procedures.
Feldinan identifies five likely responses by a depamrmnt faced by a query. They are
based on his experience with the UK scmfny committees responsible for scrutiny of rights
legislation,ss I adapt Feldinan’s analysis here to the Model and add a sixth,s~
l. The department may disagree that a right is affected by the proposed legislation.
2. In response to a concern raised by the committee about the extent of a discretion,
the department lnay argue that a discretion exercised in a way that breaches a
as See fl~e responses to queries from die Senate Stlmding Conunittee for file Scmtlny of Bills by tim Minister
and Assistant Treasurer on tim retrospectivit3~ of tax legislation, e.g., in Fitx! to 2ix!een!b RepotCs of 2002
(Canberra, Commonxvealfl~ of Australia 2002), p. 421.
~4 See generally, D. Feldman, above n. 75.
ss Ibid., p. 334.
as D. Fel&nan, ibid., does not raise tttis point as it had not occurred in the UK ~ontext at the time of Iris
article.
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legislated fight xvould be in breach of tile law. The committee may dispute the need
for safeguards to file exercise of file discretion on this basis.8v
3. The department may argue that any interference with a right is justifiable.
4. The department may accept that there is a problem, but suggest that it is dealt with
by a guideline, ruling or other fotan of delegated legislation.88
5. The department may accept that there is a problem, but want to defer reined)ring it
until there is a general rexdew of the area.
6. The department naay accept fllat there is a problem and amend the bill.
In addition to departmental responses, committee reports laid before parliament *nay
geuerate debate. The debate may also lead to amendinent or further clarification. The most
important issue is that there is transparenW and understanding about potential
contxadiction, incompatibility and inconsistencies between taxpayers’ rights and new
legislation. Even if it is argued by the executive and accepted by parliament that these
problems do not exist, tile}, should be raised. Often it will not be the bill in question w!fich
is affected. Govermnent has a vested interest in defending its position and may neither
have the inclination nor the need, provided it has a majority in parliament, to change it.
However, it is likely that subsequent bills will be presented with a clear understanding of
concerns that will be raised.. \Yc’here possible, legislation xvill be drafted to avoid such
questions arising again, simply because the government prefers not to engender questions
d~at might give rise to opposition to legislation. That is, unless an inconsistent position is
deliberate, parliamentatT scrutiny conmaittees therefore raise an awareness of
inconsistencies and other problems not just for particular bills but also ha the areas where
such problems are likely to ar’ise more broadly and should be avoided in furore.
:\. Lester QC, qIarliarnentary Scru~y of Legislation m~der the Htmian Rights Act 1998’ [2002] EHRIR
432, 445.
Ibid., p. 439.
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There are disadvantages m such a cotranittee. There is a danger that the committee
chosen to scmtinise legislation woltid have mwnerous other responsibilities and that the
pressu*e of dine xvould diminish their effectiveness in this particular area.s~ Bills involving
taxation matters are often the subject of particular time pressure, which may further reduce
tile conm~ittee’s effective review of file fine detail. One of the major advantages of a
scrutiny con~nittee is to draw attention to offending legislation. If Parliament is urmxoved
by legislative breaches of rights included in revenue legislation, tile scrutiny comnfittee and,
subsequently, tile legislation giwing rights, will lose much of its effect. Tiffs may not be a
far4etched scenario, given tile tendency for tax legislation to escape scrutiny m respect of
individual liberties.9° Nonetheless, legislative enactment together with a scrutiny comrmttee
should provide sufficient weight to balance file expediency argument that use of a scrutiny
committee alone nfight not. Having said fllat, in an adversatiat political enviromnent there
is always tim danger that a scruth~y committee nfight become a tool to harass il~nisters or
focus on political rattler than legishtive negatives.91
To overcome subjective bias and obvious political capture of a scmliny con’mfittee,
Feldman notes file inlpurtance of tile scrutiny taking place against an accepted set of
standards.92 In tiffs instance it would be against file standards incorporated into legislation
from tile Model. Both Hazell and Oliver endorse tile use of statements of scrutiny
92
See D. Feldman, above n. 75, p. 327.
See Miller the discussion in F.D.A.M. Luoga, ’The Viabilig, Of Developing Democratic Legal
Framewotks For Taxation In Developing Countries: Some Lessons From Tanzanian Tax Reform
Experiences’ [2003] L~lv, Sodal Justice & Global Development, <etj.wat~vick.ac.uk/global/issue/2003-
2/luoga.html>, 27 December 2005; and sometimes a~guably even ~n OECD countries: see D. Bentley,
above n. 54; D. kXlilliams, ’Donovatfls Case and the Fut~he~ Abrogation of the Rights of die Indi~ddual’
[1992] Buttet~votlhs Week~, Tax Bu!/etin, 182; and B. McCabe, ’The Investigatory Powers of tim
Conmaissionez Unde~ the Income Tax Assessment Act and Indi~4dual Rights’ (1993) 3 Revetme Law
Journal, 1.
Discussed h~ D. Feldman, above n. 75, p. 328. Evidence can be seen of opposition use of information
derived from scrutiny corm~iittees in A. Lester, above ~. 87, p. 439 el seq. However, it is floe role of
Padiament to obtain information from the executive to justin, its proposals. Accordingly, it is maportant
that the information obtafimd by a scrutiny cormnittee is used m debate, even though die approach taken
by the commattee ha obtaining that information is designed to assess it objectively against prescribed
standards.
D. Feldman, ibkl., p. 329.
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standards and checklists to improve the effectiveness of sct~atiny co*mnittees.°~ The
checklist for scrutiny of legislafion devised by the New Zealand Legislative AdvisorT
Committee is comprehensive.94 Tlfis is appropriate particularly for review of legislation to
ascertain compliance with a formal bill of righta. However, a less comprehensive set of
reqtfi~ements would likely suffice in most jurisdictions to ascertain sin~pty whether new tax
legislation has the potential to interfere with the operation of fights contained in the tax
law.
The caveat on the use of standards and checklists is that they must not be used as a
check-the-box mechanism that obviates the need for the scrutiny committee to exerdse its
mh~d on the matters before it. There is no point having a rubber stamp scrutiny comnfittee.
Feldman makes the point that the better scrutiny cotmnittees are seen as bi-partisan
co,rarfittees, which avoid emotive language, have a relatively cut-and-dried approach and
use objective criteria to make their assessment of proposed legislation.9s
A padiamentary pre-legislative scrutiny committee is no panacea. It is only as
effecm,e as its members and the credibility wtfich it has in the parliamentat3’ process and
with dm govermnent departments involved in legislative drafting. However, it does provide
a useful and relatively objective means of ens~tring that where there is contradiction,
incompatibility or inconsistency between legislated protection of taxpayers and proposed
bills, it is identified. To reiterate, pathaments usually prefer not to override rights and
protection given to citizens unintentionally. Pre-legislative scrutiny helps to ac}fieve this
objective and can usefully be incorporated into a Model for adoption xvitlfin most
ParliamenaU systems.
R. Haze[I, above n. 70 and D. Oliver, above n. 77. They support the proposition for the use of chectdists
made by the Constitution Committee of the House of Lords, in its Report on Par]iame#t at~d the Legislative
P~vces¢, Fourteenth Report (2003 2004 HL 173-I).
Available at <wxwv.jusfice.govt.nz>, 20 November 2006, and discussed in D. Oliver, above n. 77, p. 235
et seq.
D. Feldman, the ,~fiegunyah Public Lecture, ’The Roles of Parliarnents in Protecting Human Rights: A
View from the UK’, Centre for Comparative Constitutional Studies, (l.)diversil3’ of Melbourne, 20 July
2006) p. 10 and p. 17, <cccs.law.udimelb.edu.au>, 11 November 2006.
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5 Ordinary Legislation
Legislative protection of taxpayers’ rights does provide significant protection. The rights
associated with legislation provide support for the legislated rights in a more substantive
legal way than can ever be the case with administrative rights. Pthnat3’ legal rights and some
secondary legal rights require stamtot3, enforcement or else they become simply
aspirational. For example, the rights to certainty under the law and to prospective
legislation are without any force or effect if they are not included within a statute or as part
of a stamtotT inteq)retation clause. It is not xvit!~r the powers of the revenue
commissioner or an), administrative body to enforce a right to certainty in legislation or to
require the legislature to enact laws prospectively.
Many secondary legal rights can be implemented as ptitnatT administrative rights.
\’{~len this is done, the content tends to change and broaden so that the nature of the rights
protected is different. However, where rights are legislated a revenue authority is also likely
to want to avoid the possibility of breach and is likely to go to greater lengths to ensure that
the3, are obsenmd. These efforts may err in favour of the taxpayer and could therefore in
effect extend those rights.
Ordinary legislation of primaU and secondary legal rights in a tax statute can
overcome the uncertahaty that can arise where existing legal rights contained across a range
of different laws are applied to matters concerning taxation. The advantage of specific
provisions in the tax legislation is that the rights are given clarity and, to the extent set out
in the specific provision, offers clearer protection to taxpayers. A reading down of rights is
more the problem of piecemeal legislation that is enacted over a period of rime to protect
taxpayers’ rights.
Elforcement of Rights
However, to prmdde protection, legal rights must also receive the backing of the
courtS. The United States’ Onmibus Taxpayer Bill of Pdghts, enacted in 1988, xvas intended
to make a ’major and substantial change in the fundamental relationship betxveen the
taxpayer and the tax collector’96 and to implement ’a number of measures intended to
better define and lhnit fire [Internal Revenue] Set, rice’s collection and enforcement
powers’.97 The success in aclffex4ng this may have been lhnited by the courts. For exatnple,
it is argued that the courts bare, by using a primarily text-based interpretive approach,
stripped at least one secdon ’of much of its meaning and placed it at odds with the broader
pm]3oses behind the enactment of the Taxpayers’ Bill of Rights’.9s Tiffs may or may not be
a valid analysis. However, jf Posner is right, when he argues that the answers to many legal
questions:99
depend on the policy judgments, political preferences, and ethical values of the judges,
or (what is not clearly distinct) on dominant public ophfion acting fl~rough the judges,
rather than on legal reasoning regarded as someflfing different from policy, or politics,
or values, or public opinion,
then the force of legal rights depends vetT much upon the legislature carrying the courts
with them. m0
Representative Tallon, 134 Cong. Rec. 1-19980 (dally edn, 12 October 1988) cited in D.L. McClain, ’UMled
Stales v. Leach, and Lqtemal Revenue Code Section 7521 (c): Applying a Text-Based Analysis to Provisions
of fl*e Tax Code’ [1991] 77 IowaIa~1v Reviem, 371,372.
D.L. McCla~n, ibid., p. 373.
Ibid., p. 401.
R.A. Posner, ’The Jmispmdence of Skeplicism" [1988] 86 Michigan Law Ret&m, 827, 829. Posner also
makes the point here (at 852) and (more fxflly) in R.A. Posner, ’The Decline of Law as an Autonomous
Discipline: 1962q987’ [19871 100 Ham~td Law Revielv, 761, flint judges i~, tim United States, at least, tend
to .~lisuse interp~elive canons to tim extent t, at ’statutory analysis is fl~e least edi~.ing form of judicial
\~ntmg today’.COncern is that the argtm~ents of Schauer and Posner suggest that judges, in common with most
decision-makers, are inherently conservative hi oudook, so that for secondat3, legal rights to have the
Same effect as pfimai3, admhfistrative *:ights will first require a series of strong precedents to be set by dm
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Where there are stamtot3’ fights and they have express support in the tax law,
taxpayers may ordinarily pursue an action through the courts. The most important reason
for taxpayers decidh!g not to pursue an action through the courts to enforce the protection
is that of cost. As most tax disputes involve relatively small stuns of money, the cost of
pursuing an action in court is a sufficient deterrent to most taxpayers from seeking rebel in
this arena. A further deterrent is the likelihood that if the taxpayer wins a case at first
instance, the revenue autlmrity is likely to have both the reso~rcces and the inclination to
appeal the case to seek clatqficafion of the law at a ltiglier level. A revenue authofity would
not usually invest in litigation where it did not feel that its xtiew of the law was more likely
to be correct than not.
Prhnaty and some secondat3’ legal fights must be legislated to have effect. Other
secondary legal rights ate similar to pfimat3T adnfinistrative rights in that they are based on
the same underl}gng principles. The difference in the content is found in the level of
enforcement afforded. This is explored further in Chapter 8, wlfich analyses tim content of
the rights included ha the Model. The greater the level of enforcement by statute and at
conunon law, then usually the scope of the right protected is more lhnited, although this is
not a necessat3, development. Accordingly, when identifying rights it is vital to emphasise
dais definitional aspect, whether they are legal or admitaistxative rights, or confusion can
result. Policy-makers tnust also decide for the secondatT legal rights that can be enforced as
prhnat3, administrative fights, which medium provides the most appropriate form of
protection in the context of that legal emfironment.
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To sum up, it is preferable that both primat3’ and secondary legal rights are legislated
expressly as part of tire revenue legislation, in conjunction with a scr~atiny con~nittee and
.an haterpretation clause. It may be de~imental to the enforcement of these rights to rely on
e:dsdng statuturT protection, wlfich is likely to be interpreted narrowly by tire courts.
Nonetheless, the Model should not include an article requiring all legislation protecting
taxpayers’ tights to be included in a separate statute as that starts to interfere with the
contextual reqtfirements of each jurisdiction. It is sinaply a recommended approach.
The Model also cannot specify whether a tight should be enforced legislatively or
a&~fisttatively. For example, a problem x~4th any lega[ right is that it may be less accessible
to the taxpayer to enforce than an ada*finisttative fight and may not protect the fights of
taxpayers in relation to tire detail of process in the ordinary operation of Ore tax system. On
the other hand, leaving protection in the hands of powerful adix’finistrators, whose
discretion is effectively beyond political or legal challenge *nay p~event aW protection ~om
being available,m* The choices betxveen tlae types of enforcement at tiffs level depend
heavily on tire context and environment. Prhnat3’ and secondat3, admfifistrative fights and
achmifistrative goals form part of most revenue admirfistrations. The extent to which riley
are enforceable is cfitical to taxpayer protection and Part 2 explores enforcement methods.
y. Ghai, notes that colo*~ial adtrmfist~ators m Kenya xve~e h~ tiffs position and that a sin~ilar position can
exist today h~ patrimonial societies, ’The Kenyan Bill of Rights’ in P..Mston, above n. 1, p. 187 and p. 236
el seq.
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PART 2: ADM1NISTRATp’rE MECHANISMS AND ENFORCEMENT
Chapter 2 outlined how adirti,fistrative enforcement has devdoped in a context of
simplification of tax laws, the intxoducdon of self-assessment systems and die developtnem
of a ’client’ centred approach to taxpayers. Revenue authorities are moxmlg away from a
’command and control’w2 culture to one designed to build trust, support and respect in the
cotrmaunitl,,t°3 Although an emphasis on taxpayers’ rights is part of dos process, it is usually
developed x~dthin the framework of powers akeady delegated to the revenue authority.
Chapter 3 identified that protection of ~dghts should reinforce those principles
underlying the tax system. The nature of the interpretation of rights lends itsdf to boflx
legislative and administrative protection. The fi~st part of Chapter 4 noted that his has
given momenttml to ensure adininisttadve protection of taxpayers is in place. Some of d~is
has taken the fomx of legislated mechai~isms for protection, such as those included in the
US Taxpayer Bills of Rights. Ombudsmen and taxpaye~ advocates have been appointed
either legislatively or actnzimstratively in many jurisdictions. Where mechatfislns are
legislated, the protection itself is still largely by way of adntinistrative process. Chapter 4
also noted that xvhere a right is adnfinisttadve, particularly where it involves the exercise of
discretion, die content can become less certain simply by xqrme of the discretion.
Chapter 4 notes a numbet of administrative mechamsms that contribute explicitly or
hnplicitly to the enforcement of taxpayers’ rights. They are described in Chapter 4 as the
deterw-inant for the classification of file rights as p~hnatT or secondary adi~fitfistxative tights
V. Braithwaite, ’A New Approach to Tax Compliance’ hi V. Braithwaite (ed.), Taxhg Democrao’:
Understa~tdi~g Tax Avoida**¢e arm Evasion (Asbgate, Aldershot, 2003), p. 1.
Ibid.
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or achninist’:ative goals. Primary achuitfisttative tights and to some extent secondary
adi~fistrative rights are supported by some overt mecbauism for enforcement. To have
effect, achlfinistrative goals usually depend upon the existence and application witlfin die
revenue authority of social txtles or qualit3’ assurance mecha,tisms.
Tile mechauisms that can be used are wide-ranging. Primary and secondatT
administrative fights are often protected at least to a lhnited extent by adininistrative law,
adnmiistrative procedures; and independent officers or bodies that provide a fot-m of
investigation or complaints handling. Adn:dnistrative decisions are normally guided by
legislation and od~er txtles governing their exercise. However, die fight of review of die
exercise of delegated administrative discretion is usually limited to facilitate the
administrative decision-making process. That said, where first instance tribunals hear
appeals against decisions of revenue authority decision-makers, they may be placed in the
posidon of the decision-maker so that file}, can revisit the decision where there are strong
grounds for doing so.1°4 There is also a range of independent review mechauisms such as
the United Kingdom Revenue Adjndicator, die US Taxpayer Advocate and file Australian
Special Tax Adviser to die Commomvealth Ombudsman.ms Where these or similar bodies
exist, file}, provide added support for file enforcement of adn~nistrative rights.
Interestingly, die Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and RefurTn Act of 1998~°6
in some cases uses compliance with the Internal Reveuue Mauual as the basis for legal
action,m~ even though it xvas designed only to provide admitfistrative guidance to revenue
For example, in Australia, the Administrative Appeals Tribmml, in re.~dewing a decision, may exercise all
the powers and discretions that are conferred upon the Conm~issioner of Taxation: Admhfistrative
Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s. 43.
The word ’ombudsman’ is a word derived f~:om the S\vedish aa~d does not reflect the gender of the holder
of the office. Although it is aclmowledged that various shortenings are preferred by many authors, no
Single alternative has fotmd broad acceptance and the original term is therefore used m tiffs flxesis to avoid
confusion. U,tired Kingdom Revenue Adjudicator, <www.adjudicatorsoffice.gov.uk>, 1 November 2006;
US Taxpayer Advocate, <w~wv.irs.gov/advocate>, I November 2006; and Australian Commonwealth
Ombudsman, <x~vxv.comb.gov.au>, 1 November 2006. See further, M.E. Komhauser, °~en Bad
Thi%s Happen to Good Taxpayers: A Tale of Two Advocates’ (16 February 19881 TaxNotes I,~ten, atiot*a],
537, who emphasises strongly the m~portance of the independence of an ombudsman.
Pub L No; 105-206.
First Federal Savings ~5~ Loa,~ Assodatiott v. Goldmat~, 644 F Supp 101.102 (WD Pa 1986).
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officers,l°s The Internal Revenue Manual comprises mainly secondat3’ administrative fights.
The attempts by the legislature to use it as a legislatively binding instalment have been
critiqued for introducing effective paralysis of the administrative decision making process
in those areas affected,m9 If there are legislative penalties for improper use of a daily
administrative procedure, the adininistrators will naturally tt3’ not to use it in case they
make a mistake. Tutoring secondary administrative rights that govern the practical daily
tasks of tax administration into enforceable secondat3’ legal t’ights can therefore be counterL
productive. When desig~fing a model it is not so much the type of enforcement that makes
the model effective, but the appropriateness of the enforcement for the right provided.
Tltis was the underlying theme of the analysis in Part 1 and remains so in tiffs Part.
As discussed in Chapter 4, adm_inistrative goals, although they ate shnply goals, are
often enforceable, particularly in strong democracies. Administrative Charters are discussed
at length in Chapter 7. There is often a combination of factors that make adininistrative
goals more effective than they appear. Administrative will is an important element,
particularly given the focus in receut decadeson intproving public set~,ice guidelines and
practice. Recent trends totvatds hnproved governance and risk management provide a
further boost to the intplementation of published promises and gmdelines. So, too, does a
performance-based management approach using objective measures such as key
performance indicators or benclunark measttres to judge performance of the revenue
authofity. Indicators such as response ~:ates, turn-around thnes, and measurement o~
complaint levels can provide more inamediate support for taxpayers ha their quest for
transparent due process tha~x any number of legal avenues for appeal. Where parliametat or
a minister requires a periodic report front a revenue authority on how it is meeting its
adimtaistrative goals, it tends to place internal pressure on the revenue authority to perform.
Discussed in B.T. Camp, ’Tax Adrrmtistralio~ as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Paradigm Shift
the IRS Restmctm:ing and Reform Act o f 1998’ (2004) 56 Flo,ida ~Law Re~&w 1, 105 et seq.
Ibid., p. 107.
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Tins is so particularly in fllose }m’isdictions where government at all levels is relativeb’
t, ansparent. As discussed in Chapter 7, the relative failttte of tax adininistrations in Africa is
due ha part to transparency and governance issues.
Human i:ights legislation, of which legislation of taxpayers’ rights arguably forms
part, is som:ced in higher level principles. Taxpayers are usually oblivious to dlose higher
level human rights principles when dley have a practical problem with die achninistradon of
die tax system. Their interest is not, for example, in whether there has been a breach of die
principle of reasonableness; but rather xvhy a tax officer is exercising discretion to impose a
10% late lodgement penalty even drough the taxpayer’s partner ;vas having complications
wifl~ her pregnancy and die taxpayer had to spend two xveeks going backxvards and
forwards to die hospital instead of completing bis tax return. Taxadon is one of the most
sigrfificant and pervasive ways dlat a govetawnent interacts with its citizens. The daily
interaction is therefore re*T linportant for good goverimaent and to maintain a stable
society.
Many governments recognise the risks of governing badly. They introduce quart),
control mechanisms that have become increasingly powerful. The auditor-general and
oflxer oversight agencies are prevalent in most modern states to provide what is seen as
esseodal oversight and review of die operation of govermnent and its agencies. The power
of government may be based in statute, but its exercise is executive. As discussed in
Chapter 4, fltis power is expanding and dlere are associated dangers. To some extent
sensible governments have ameliorated the dangers in the growth of executive goverm,nent
by providing significant oversight and review to a wide range of bodies that hold its
departments to published sera~ice standards and operational guidelines. Regular published
reports provide a transparency in the operation of govertmaent dlat xvas simply not
contemplated in tire past.
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Oversight and review agencies provide a framework for govertwnent to take a
proacdve approach to dealing with the problems of its citizens. Recourse to the cooxts is
somewhat random and for it to be useful for a larger number of people depends not only
upon a case beh~g brought, but One that is both relevant to a class of citizens and results li~
a change in the way govermnent operates. It does not provide the consistent and
comprehensive remedy to ineffective operation of government that both govet~unent and
its citizens requires.
An ombudsman or sinfilar review body, by contrast, is accessible to the general
public and can take up a much more comprehensive range of issues and problems than can
the cotttts. Cotrtts are severely litrAted in the issues that riley can consider. An ombudsman
can look into almost any administrative decision or problem, often including those of non-
govermxxent bodies that are acting on behalf of govermnent, for example, where there has
been outsotU’cing. An ombudsman or similar rex4ew body has a xvide range of flexible
remedies that can be adapted to the context and the individual. Complaints handling
systems and standards are the halhnark of modern dispute resolution in govermnem
deparm~ents. They focus on the systems and processes in such departments to make sure
that there is compliance with accepted standards of customer set~dce and dispute
resolution. The systematic review, reporting and other forms of qualit3’ assttrance does not
produce a perfect system. It does produce a wide range of accessible and xxddely used
methods and forums for dissipating problems at the administrative and practical level
before they escalate.
\X/here cotxtts catmot follow up on whether their findings and recolmnendations have
been in~plemented, a rexdew mechatxism such as an ombudsman’s office can. Throughout
government, including the tax administration, officers of the ombudsman’s office and
similar review bodies can be involved in inter’hal and public education programs, the media,
and other fotans of awareness building. It is difficuk to identify specific enforcement
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processes that provide a clear remedy for a taxpayer xvith a problem. However, the change
h~ the daily operation, management and culture of government in many cotmtties over the
last two decades has resulted in an enviromnent in xvhich admhffstrafive remedies are
available. The remedies may come in a soft form, but they are often more real and effective
for the individual taxpayer, nonetheless.
Clearly, therefore, performance indicators and benclunarks are an important
component of performance measurement to file extent that they can help to assess the
qualit3T of revenue administration and how file services provided are meeting the promises
made. They ate discussed fuxther in light of recent research in Chapter 7. They are file
means by which taxpayers can hold the revenue authority to account in its provision of
administrative fights and progress tmvards published athninistrative goals. Rather than set
out in the Model a set of benclunarks or performance indicators, it is sufficient to state that
the revenue authotit3r will measure its performance tiu:ough a transparent process of qualit3,
assurance based on published objective meastttes.
These measures provide transparency and quality control. However, tile enforcement
effect is Unplicit. Where file revenue authofit3’ does not meet its published goals it could be
argued ti~at there is no formal sanction. Tiffs is to misunderstand file shift in management
o f goverm,nent that has taken place.
Primary and secondary adinittistrafive tights do offer enforcement mechatffsms. Such
sanction and the other inherent advantages of admhtistxative tights identified in Chapter 4
\~ll ensure that delegated decision-making and regulation witi~l file revenue sphdre will
continue to grow rapidly. It will be deemed better for tile revenue authorities to deliver
taxpayers’ tights xvifl~in a defined administrative ffamexvork. This will maintahi maximmn
flexibi]it3, in the adinhffstration of the tax system \vithout requiting detetanination of tights
by the courts after long and expensive litigation. As ti~e scope of athninisttative discretion
and detet~nination of the content of the la\v increases fl~rougb mechanisms such as
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adiriinistrative regulation, taxation rulings and fottnal circulars, the administrative
protection afforded m taxpayers becomes commensurately more important.
As discussed, the mechanisms for enforcement are wide ranging. However, they are
all concerned xxdth the ability of the taxpayer to enforce a published right at an
administrative level. Cotttt-based mechamsms are largely confined to supporting legal
rights. Administrative problem resolution processes and review bodies support
administrative rights.
One approach to an analysis of these processes and bodies xvould be to compare and
contrast the adininistrative enforcement mechat~isms in use in different }urisdictions. it
would be a somewhat complex way of finding best practice. The alternative approach, used
here, stats xvith alternative dispute resolution (ADR) theory m identi~, the characteristics
of effective adininistrative enforcement. Provided these are present in a system it does not
much matter what the mecha~ism is called or the form it takes. Administrative
enforcement mechanisms vary according to jurisdiction, legal system and a range of factOrS
specific to that country. To try to designate what a mechanism should took like is a
pointless exercise \vhen it is the practical protection that it affords taxpayers that is
ilnpor rant.
The remainder of this Part identifies the characteristics of effective administrative
enforcement, illustrating these characteristics tl~tough a case study application to the
processes provided for in the Australian Taxpayers’ Charter. It is in~portant to note that tlae
reference to ADR theou is necessarily introductot3’ given the limited scope of the thesis.
There is scope for a substantial analytical work on this area alone. However, even at an
introducto~T level it provides a framework to assess the mechanisms used and to suggest
minhnum standards of dispute resolution procedure to protect adininistrative tights. These
mecha~’dsms are essentially based in variations and ~nixes of negotiatiOt~,
conciliation/mediation and arbitration and are in wide use in tax adininistrafion all over the
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~vorld.~m Tire focus of these mechanisms on a problem-solving approach to dispute
resolution is consistent with the current emphasis by revenue authorities on building and
mdnt,-tining strong compliance retationslfips with taxpayers.
The ADR principles ate not jurisdiction specific, although reference in tiffs thesis is
mainly to US and Australian ADR theory, which is at the forefront of research, particularly
lit tire legal context. ADR principles can be applied in the design of an}, dispute system, but
it shottld be so that they make sense in the broader context of the pre-existing social,
culund, legal, economic and adininistrative frameworks. For a dispute resolntion system to
work as part of the administration of a tax system, Chapter 7 demonstrates the hnportance
of mnbedding it rather than imposing it. In some jurisdictions it simply will not work to
protect taxpayers’ fights wlfile the administration and judiciaty remain plagued by
corruption. However, in jufisdictions where there are appropriate and effective frameworks
for conflict resolution, the protection of taxpayers’ ath~inistrative rights follows.
From a fights perspective, it is important to note that once revenue authorities
acknowledge that taxpayers have interests that need to be considered and taken into
account, there is an inmaediate and substantial increase in taxpayer protection floxving
directly from tiffs engagement. Informal dispute resolution processes developed xvitifin tax
administrations are likely to provide the most significant practical increase in taxpayer
protection. A revenue authotit3, itself has much to gain from processes that identi~, and
resolve potential disputes earl}, on to prevent escalation, maintain good relationships with
taxpayers, and encourage compliance. Loxver level conflict resolution processes that are
part of a revenue authofity’s general engagement with taxpayers also ensure that they can
An introduction to the theory may be found m W.L. Ury, J.M, Bren a~d S,B. Goldberg, Geilitg Di~)utes
Rema,~d: Designing Systems to Cttt the Cosl of Cottflfi’l (Cambridge, MA, Progxam on Negotiation Books, 1993).
Dispute resolution in tax a&*fidistradon is particularly well advanced h~ die US, see, e.g., T. Carte;
Louthan mad S.C. Wrappe, "Buildhag a Better Resolution: Adapting IRS Procedures to Fit the Dispute’
(1996) 13 "Fax" Notes Intet~talio~ta/, 1473 and A.P. Mostovi, ’Tax Mediation: Is it Just a Test?’ (1996) 13 Tax
Notes Intet7mtio,ml, !871. For a critique of the advetsarial approach to dispute resolution, see B.T. Camp,
ibid. For a useful fundamental analysis of the design of a dispute system, see W.L. Uty, ’Conflict
Resolution among the Buslunen: Lesso~as in Dispute Systems Design’ (199.5) 11 Negotialio~tJotoTta], 379.
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be accessed by a much wider group of taxpayers. Traditionally, mechanisms to resolve
conflict were restricted to specific areas, such as audit resolution, or to those taxpayers who
had already escalated a conflict to the level of a formal dispute in a tribunal or court.
The layers of dispute resolution fotmd wit!fin tax systems are a relatively recent
phenomenon. Much work has been done on the design of dispute sysmms of Otis kind.
ADR provides flow-on improvements in taxpayer compliance by making it easier to
resolve disputes with the revenue authorities or even to allay concerns. It also improves the
effectiveness and efficiency of tax administration, as ADR focuses on avoiding 6me-
consuming and expensive litigation before the courts,m The Chapter concludes with
reconunendadons that flow from the analysis on the framework for enforcement of
administrative rights.
B Deflnilions
To understand the suggested mechatfisms, it is inaportant to differentiate beva,een types of
conflict resolution. Needless to say the defufitions used vat% but there is sufficient
consensus among ADR theorists to draw for clarity basic definitions of negotiation,
conciliation/mediation and arbitration. There will be disagreement on the bomxdaries and
nuances and the reality is that the mecha,~isms used are often a variation or mix.~z
See, e.g., L. Boulle, Mediation: Pti~@ks, P*~ress, Ptw~lire (2nd edn, Sychmy, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2005) p.
139; H. Astor and C.M. Clfinkin, Diypute Resoh¢tio*z in Amt~a/ia (2nd ecLn, Sy&my, LexisNexis Buttetworths,
2002); and P. Condliffe, Co~il’t Ma*~agement: A Pcaclica/Guide (CoRingwood, Victoria, T:YFE Publications,
1991).For a detailed analysis of current definitions, see National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisor3"
2001),
Council (’NADRAC) A F~ame~vork for ADR Standa~rls (Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia,
AppendL,: A.
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Negotiation in its simplest form involves disputants contacting eacli other and seekh~g
a mutually acceptable outcome fltrough discussion, witimut the assistance of other
persons .... Negotiation takes place m a clhnate of roles, both social and legal, and
against a background of other possible processes for resolving the dispute, which may
include litigation.~13
Negotiation is die traditional approach to informal dispute resolution between taxpayers
and d~e revenue authorit),, but in tim context of the formal transactional relationships
created by legislation, such as debt collection processes. It is still the fundamental dispute
resolution mechanism used, but in a much more flexible and less rigid way, as is shown in
dm case study below.
Independent problem resolution units or case officers charged with negotiathag
solutions to disputes with taxpayers now exist witlfin man), tax achninistrafions. The aim is
to address problems raised by taxpayers that tltteaten to escalate into a forrnal dispute
before they do so. The structure differs, but in a t)~pical negotiation context, the role of the
relevant revenue officer charged with problem resolution is to act as a negotiator for the
revenue authority to resolve a dispute with a taxpayer where the case officer directly
responsible has been unable to negotiate an outeome. Officers will usually be trained for
tl~e role and may report direcdy to a serfior officer \vitl~h~ the revenue autborit),. Through
negotiation they use a problem solving approach that attempts to deal with the underl}dng
interests of the revenue officers and the taxpayers, in a way that is seldom possible in a
tuore fortnal tribunal or court setfng. Transaction costs of disputes (both direct costs such
as advisers’ fees and opporturfit3, costs such as lost productivit3’) reduce as a result.
Astor and C.M. Ctthfldn, above n. 111, p. 82.
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An example of negotiation as part of the ordinary tax collection process is found in
tax audits and the power of the revenue authority to enter into setdements and
compromises in some jtttisdicfions. In most countries, particularly where the introduction
of self-assessment has replaced adixainistradve assessment (in which some form of physical
or automated examination of returns take place), the tax audit has become a vitally
hnportant tool of tax enfo~zcement.TM The aim of the tax audit process is to identify wbere
taxpayers have failed to comply with the tax law resulting in tax deficiencies. Because of the
inherent tmcettainty in the interpretation and application of much of the tax law, audits
often conclude xvith a negotiated settlement, particularly for large taxpayers,m The
negotiation process~ is broad enough to cover the level of penalty applicable where there is
a tax shortfall,n°
Most negotiation of this type is now indirect negotiation where the pardes to the
dispute use representatives, usually lawyers, accotmtants or tax agents (where these ate
recogtfised as competent to represent a taxpayer) to negotiate an outcome.1~
2 Conci/iatio~
Conciliation is a process h~ which d~e pardes to a dispute, wid~ dm assistance of a
neutral third part}, (the conciliator), identify dm disputed issues, develop options,
consider alternatives and endeavou~ to reach an agreement. The couciliator may have
OECD, £lretglhe~dng "Fax" Audit Capabilities: Ge*teral PritMples and Approaches (Paris, Centre for Tmx PofiCy
and A&,~is~afion, 2006); OECD, £l~ngtbening Tax Audit Capabilities: Auditor Wor~*~ k4anagemenl -
StayO, Finditgs and Obset~alions ~at]s, Cen~e for Tmx Poficy and A~is~afion, 2006); and OECD, Tax
Adminisltution & OE~ and Selecled NowOE~ CounOies: Co*t~atulive [~t**mlion Series (2000 (Pads, Centre
for Tax Po~cy and Ad~s~afion, 2006).
Fac~tated by Oae ~cfional approach to t~ a~n~st*afion, wifl~ special o~gafisafiond focus on large
tmxpayer operations, ibid., p. 12. See ~nher, inter-¢~mrican Center of "Fm~ Adn~s~atots, Ex.at~d, alion
Handbook - Slt~,gthenitg the E.x-aminaaon Fum’tion in the 7~.x.Admim)tralions ~*lin ~*~erica a~td the Caribbean
~Vast~gton DC, ~, 2003); L.J. Pfies0ey QC, ’Co~tfissionet’s Powers of 8e~ement and
Compron~se’ (2002) 12 ~vemte ~*t, Jour,~a{ 40; and, moze gener~y, dae ~sputes resolution process m
New Ze~d cont~ed ~ 0xe Tax Adn~s~afion Act 1994, subject to si~ficant amendment k~ 2004.
L.J. Pfiesdey QC, above n. 115.
NAD~C, above n. 112, p. 117.
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an advis°t3’ role on the content of the dispute or the outcome of its resolution, but
not a determhaative role. The conciliator may advise on or determine the process of
conciliation xvhereby resolution is attempted, and may make suggestions for terms of
setdement, give expert advice on likely settlement terms, and may actively encourage
the participants to reach agceement,n~
Conciliation under a statute or govetau’nent service charter folloxvs Otis process. It can be
distinguished from naediation in that a conciliator may have an advisotT role on the content
of the dispute and give expert advice on likely settlement terms in the light of both content
and process)t9 A mediator assists die patdes in the decision-making process and attempts
to hnprove it so that the patdes can reach an outcome to which each of them can assent,tz°
A mediator axguably only advises therefore on process. The term conciliation is probably
mote appropriate in doe tax context, whatever the difficulties in distinguishing it from
mediation, simply because it suggests that the process is tmdettaken in the context of a
formal legislative or administrative framework)z* For dais reason the term conciliation is
used, although it may be indistinguishable in places from mediation.
Conciliation is the intetmediat3’ step ha the dispute resolution process often
introduced into the tax a&ninistration, collection and enforcement process m help improve
taxpayer compliance. Although normally a problem resolution unit or a trained revenue
officer negotiates on behalf of the revenue audmrit3’, the process can be set up to act as a
Ibid.. p. 116.
Ibid. ~Mthough L. Boulle, above n. 111, p. !11 explores the distinction and argues that flfs definition is
appficable to evaluative mediation such that it is ’difficult to sustain a distinction in terms of the
intetamnet’s level of interventionism’ (p. 112).
L. Boulle’s definition in the 1st edition of iris book, above n. 111. In his 2nd edition, ch. 1, he notes the
difficulties in defitfing mediation and skoJlar concerns can be raised in respect of the ~MT)R defatitions set
out in this chapter. The ADR movement has developed significantly and bmadiy in zecent years, which
makes it difficult to provide a single detrmition that will satisfy the different schools of thought.
Accordingly, the use of the NADRAC defitritions in the context of an analysis of a different area of the
law provides both meamng and somettfing of a shield against criticism of that meaning. See further, J.
Wade, ’Mediation - "Ik~e Terminological Debate’ (1994) 5 Australian Dispute Resoht/iottJournal, 204.
In other words, as L. Bmtile, ibid., p. 115, points out, parties have to reach agreements that comply tvi~b
the norms embothed in that framework, whereas in private mediations the parties ’can make decisions m
terms of their own norms provided they are not acting tmlawfidly.’
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conciliation betxveen the revenue officer m charge of the case and the taxpayer. The
conciliator may act as an advocate for the taxpayer witl~in file revenue authotit3,, presenting
file taxpayers concerns. If so, file conciliator will usually present file revenue authority
position in response and try to reach agreement. If it is to be a tree conciliation, the
conciliator xvill not take the part of file revenue authority, which is diffictdt to achieve
unless the conciliator is independent)z~
To overcome the difficulty of independence, many jl~tisdictions have introduced a
separate office of ombudsman or adjudicator)~ If the otrtbudsman/adjudicator finds that
there is sufficient basis for a ta.xpayer’s cotnplaint, he or she may take up the issue with the
revenue authority and conciliate a resolution of tile problem between the revenue authority
and file taxpayer. It could be argued that a fl~teshold requirement before an
ombudsmata/adjudicator will consider a complaint makes it a conciliation/arbitration
rather than a straight conciliation. However, once the complaint is accepted, the process is
usually one of conciliation.
A process that is often called mediation or conferencing is often a successful case
management component of taxation tribunals used for tile first stage of tax hearing in tlie
judicial process. The process may be provided for in file legislation, as in Australia, and a
triblmal member, registrar or other judicial or quasi-judicial officer xxdll hold a preliminat3’
meeting in an attempt to resolve disputes before a formal heating.TM Often the meeting is
short and facilitative where tim parties are represented. \Vhere file parties are m~cepresented
the process can involve significant intervention that can be strongly advisor}’ o*
Tile IRS uses specially trained appeals officers, who act as a neutral party in fl~e dispute. Customer
satialZaction with the process has seen a significmat broadelamg of tile fast-track settlement processes. See,
e.g., IRS, Fasl Track k4ediatiot*: A P~cess for Pro~pt Resohttio~t qf Tax- Issues, Publicatio~ 3605 (Rev 09 2002),
<wx~av.its.gov>, 11 November 2006.
See tl~e examples, above n. 105.
For example, the pmces~ followed m llm Ausnalian Administrative Appeals Tribunal (’the AAT’) and
Small Tax Claims Ttibua~al.
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evaluative,i2s Conferencing is particularly useful in providing taxpayers with a flfird party
,~ddsory view that an appeal to d~e tribunal has no substance. A taxpayer in dispute is
much more likely to accept that he or she has no case from a member of file tribunal than
from the revenue authority.
Mediation is increasingly common in the court system as an integral part of file case
management program, which could therefore also apply to tax matters.~26 Systemic
me0dation of this kind can vary between court appointed mediation and mediation
according to its understood dentition, where file parties appoint file mediator. The court
will usually in tiffs case have an approved panel of mediators chosen on the basis of their
qualifications and experience.
3 Arbilt’ation
Arbitration is a process in wlfich the parties to a dispute present arguments and
evidence to a neutral flfird party (the arbitrator) who makes a determination,la
As noted above, in file tax context arbitration is unlikely to be private, it is a more folanal
arbitration set up wittfitl file framework of file dispute resolution system. This flows from
fl~e legislative imposition of taxation. Arguably, a revenue authority would breach its
delegated decision-making poxvers if it were to transfer decision-making authority to a
See P. Gerber, ’Mediating Tax Appeals in d~e ~M~,T’ (1992) Taxation Institute of Australia, 31st Victorian
Taxalion Convention Papers 31 and R. Fayle and S. Chapple, "I~e Impact of the Recent ARC Report on
Income Taxation Dispute Resolution in the ~Ma.’I", a paper presented at the ATAX conference on
’Current Issues in Tmx Administration’, (Sydney, Australia, 11 and 12 Apr,[ 1996). The process is analysed
in L. Boutle, above n. 111, p. 127. He notes flaat the purpose of conferencing is often focused on process
rati*er than dispute resolution, see the Australian case of Nodttara PO, Lid v. DepttO, Commissioner qfTa~,-atiott,(1992) 38 ATI~ 527.
The Supreme Cotttt Amendment Act 1995 (Qld) is an example. It provides for mandatory mediation mad
case appraisal in civil matters in all courts ~q Queensland, wben ordered by the court. See generally, L.
BouJle, above n. 1 ! 1, p. 130 mad p. 374, and H. Astor and C.M. Clfinkin, above n. 111, p. 237.
NADRAC, above n. 112, p. 119.
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private flaird patty. The same could be said for an ombudsman/adjudicator, However, as
identified above, arbitration can flow from dae negotiation or conciliation as part of the
dispute resolution process: for example, where a revenue officer in a problem resolution
unit must make a decision following a negotiation on behalf of d~e revenue authority or
conciliation between a ease officer and a taxpayer. The same can occur when an
ombudsman/adjudicator considers a complaint. Beyond arbitration dae tax process often
uses an intermediate tribunal or low level tax court where the process is not subject to full
litigation in a formal setting, but provides a determinative and enforceable framework at an
informal level d~at has many of dm characteristics of arbitration.
C Applicalion: DevelopiJg the Australian Ta~oayers’ Chmger to enhance d@ute
resolulion and voluntaO, compliance
Why use the Australian Taxpayers’ Charter (the Chatter) as a case study in dispute
resolution? It was introduced ha 1997 and has been updated after reviews?~s It is a faMy
standard chatter of taxpayers’ rights that articulates existing secondary legal tights and a
nfix of .pmnaaT and secondatT administxative rights. Its internal mechanisms for
enforcement are achninistrative, but it contains detail of how to seek enforcetnent of legal
fights, such as the tight to appeat,ta9 Nonetheless, its focus is on dealing with taxpaye~
concerns adininistrativety and to provide a professional and responsive Tax Office daat is
fair, open and accountable m helping members of the communit3, comply with their tax
obligations cheaply and conveniently,ut~ This reflects the approach of many charters of
taxpayers’ tights. It is not necessarily the most far reaching (the US Bills of Rights and
Australian Taxation Office, The Taxpaye;.:r’ Chat’let; <www.ato.gov.au>, 1 August 2006.
Ibid., p. 12.
Ibid., p. 4.
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st~pporting administrative documents provide a range of substantial rights for taxpayers)
but it is the subject of regular review and has been recognised for its effecfivenessJ3t
lmportandy, there is also sufficient infmanation available to make an analysis of the
tranSfmanafion of dispute resolution between the ATO and taxpayers, it therefore prmddes
,a credible model demonstrating the effect of change in tax administration.
Examining how the Charter provides avenues for taxpayers to exercise thek
adi~i~fistrative fights is a useful starting point for the application of basic ADR theory.
Enforcement activity flows from conflict between the taxpayer and the revenue authority.
Historically, the ATO model of dispute resolution was not designed to reduce conflict
escalation and the Charter model represented the hnplementadon of a cbange in culttu:e
,and approach that had developed over a number of years. It involves negotiation,
conciliation, arbitration and a mL,:ture of these processes. Understanding Chatter processes
can be done more easily within the context of a model of social conflict. This
understanding is important to determine wlfich processes are most appropriate to support
taxpayers’ administrative rights.
I The Social Cow,filet Model
One of the leading models of conflict is that put forward by Pruitt and I~m in Social
Co~ict: Escalation, Stalemate and Settlemen#32 (the Social Conflict model). This can be applied
to contrast the framework for the ATO/taxpayer relationship which existed before and
after the introduction of the Charter. The regulation of conflict under the Charter increases
t~’ For example, S. James, K. Murphy, and M. Reh~hart, "Die Taxpayers’ Charter’ (2004) 7 Jotnmd of Anstralian
Ta.\’alion, 336; M. McLetman, ’The Principles and Concepts in d*e Development of the Taxpayers’
Charier’ (2003) 32 Australian Tax Review 22, 44; and M. D’Ascenzo in Iris ’Commissioner’s online updates’,
28July 2006, <wxwv.ato.gov.au>, 1 August 2006.                                            -
~2 D.G. Pruil~ and S.H. Kim, Soda] Cot~flict: E*calation, Stalemate attd Settlement (3rd edn, New York, McGra\v
Hill, 2004).
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file oppurtoniU to resolve conflict before it escalates. In contrast, an examination of tile
position prior to tile Charter shows how there was a lfigh risk of some escalation. The
model offers duly one perspective, but it does provide a means to review the mechanisms
to regulate conflict available under the Charter and their effectiveness.
The Social Conflict model defines conflict as a ’perceived diue*gence of interest, a belief
that the parties’ current aspirations are incompatible’.~ The Social Conflict model suggests
fl~at pa~ties pursue one of four main strategies to settle conflict. They contend and try to
inapose their preferred solution on the other party; flmy yield and setrle for less than they
would have liked; fliey problem solve and try to find a solution that satisfies tile interests of
both sides; or they avoid and do not engage in the conflict either fl~tough inaction or
withdrawal.~3~ Taxpayers and their advisers recognise all four strategies from their dealings
with the ATO. The strateg3’ chosen often depends upon the ATO personnel involved.
2 CollJZicl Esca/alion befo~ the Cha~ler
Before file introduction of the Chatter, assume that a taxpayer company believes that its
rights have been breached. The ATO has given a ruling that dae taxpayer believes is
inconsistent with a ruling given to another company in file same industry on similat facts.
Asstmxe that the ntiing relates to tile exercise of the Commissioner’s discretion and fliat,
prima facie, them is no question of improper exercise of the discretion. Following an
adverse decision by the Cotmnissioner on an initial objection to the ruling, there is litde
point pursuing the matter in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal or the courts, as die
mlhig relating to file taxpayer is a reasonable exercise of the Commissioner’s discretion in
tiffs instance. When tile ATO position is first contested by tile company, tile initial strategy
133 Ibid., p, 7.
~3~ Ibid,, p. 5 elseq,
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0n both sides is probably to ’contend’, and to attempt to impose thek preferred solution on
d~e odaer side. The company is usually represented by a tax adviser acting for and on behalf
of the company. ’Contending’ takes place tl~rough letters with supporting documentation,
with references to the law and cases. There is also generally contact bet~veen the taxpayer’s
adviser and the ATO, by telephone and, sometimes, at meetings.
Escalationm of the conflict follows. There is the overriding threat in the hands of file
ATO that, if the taxpayer does not comply with the mlkag, it will suffer interest and
penalties on any tax unpaid. TILe issues discussed in the negotiation profiferate so that any
even slightly relevant argument is brought ha to assist or refute the taxpayer’s case. The
parties become increasingly involved in the negotiation over the ruling and commit
additional resources to reinforce their views. For example, a barrister’s opinion may be
sought by both sides in support of their arguments. The outlook of each party is
individualistic: the taxpayer xvants to apply the law in a particukar xvay to the relevant
transaction, while the ATO wants to apply the ruling it has given and protect the revenue
base. If tile issue is significant enough, the taxpayer may try and enjoin fire support of other
parties, such as taxpayer representative groups.
Undetl)dng the conflict is the different focus by the parties on their interests, tights
and power.~ ’Interests’ ’refer to file rmderlying raeeds and concerus of parties in dispute’J3v
’Rights’ refer to norms, such as statutes, court decisions and ATO rulings. Rights are
’°biective standards which can be imposed on parties in dispute in a neutral and even-
handed way’J3s In a tax dispute tile individual interests tend to be subsumed in the
argument over legal fights. It is usually o~fly when the parties enter into a form of problem
sOMng in an effort to resolve the conflict that interests are taken into account. Problem-
m The discussion is based on the model of escalation and its development ha D.G. Pmit~ and S.H. Kim,
above n. 132, chs 5 a~d 6.I~ A USef~ discussion of these issues, from which many of the points made here are drawn, can be found in
~;t.L. Ury, J.M. Brett and S.B. Goldberg, above n. 110, cl~. 1.
L. Boulle, ’Rigbts and Interests - Refuting the Justice Debate’ [1996] 3 Dispute Resoluliott Bulletin, 35.
m Ibid.
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solving is discussed bdow. However, even though tax disputes are overfly focused on the
rights of each part},, an important factor in an}, dispute with the ATO is the cost of taking
the matter further. Where the costs are too high the ATO becomes the effective arbiter of
both parties’ rights as the taxpayer has to withdraw.139 hrm~ediately, the ATO’s power to
impose tax, interest and penalties on the taxpayer, or the d~teat to do so, becomes a further
factor that influences the outcome of the dispute,l~s A counter-weight to the ATO’s power
is where the matter is of public interest and taxpayer representative groups assist the
taxpayer to obtain an adjudication of the tights in the cottrts34.
3 Selt/ement and the Pmb/em o~Escalation
The ATO and taxpayers conduct their disputes xviflfin a relatively fomaal ffamexvork, wlfich
Limits the extent of escalation..4~ Conflicts are usually settled. However, resolving a conflict
D.G. Pmitt and S.H. Kim, above n. 132, p. 6.
W.L. Ury, J.M. Brett and S.B. Goldberg, above n. 110, p. 7. See further, die discussion m L. Boulle, above
n. 11 I; H. Astor and C.M. Cl~nkin, above n. 1ll; and P. Condliffe, above n. 111.
On fltis aspect of ADR, see H.T. Edwards, ’Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or ¢~aafliema?’
(1986) 99 Han~aMkaw Ret,ieu; 668.
Contrast tiffs wifli commercial and p~ivate conflict where escalation has become a significant p~oblem,
leading to extensive research on litigation ~isk management. Alfliough not directly relevant to conflict
escalation in die tax context, dearly die em~ormaent ha wbicli die resolotion of conflicts over tax matters
takes place is influenced by die broader communig, expectations about how conflict should be dealt with.
Where conflicts are not dealt wifli ha accurdance wifli those expec~alions die community response is likely
to be hacreasingly less forgiving and lead to escalation. What we are seeing is the development of social
nomas governing conflict management that wR! inevitably impact on adix~dst~a!ion of government,
including taxation. For recent thi,tking on conflict management in a range of loosely analogous areas see,
e.g.: in media la\v, K. Podlass, "Broadcast Litigiousness: Syndi Court’s Construction of Legal
Consc’ousness 23 Cardozo At# & Enlertainmenl I-an, Jottrttal (2005) 465; in labour law, M.Z. Green,
’Tackling Employment Discrimination wifli ADR: Does Mediation Offer a $1tield for tim Haves or Real
Opportunity for the Have-Nots?’ 26 (2005) Bedeeley Jounlal of Employment and Lahore" Law, 323; ,~d kq
con’wnercial law, L.B. Bingham, ’Control Over Dispute-System Design and Mandatot3’ Conunercid
Arbitration’ 67 (2004) Law & Conle**~pot~O’ Problems, 221. J. Lande, in ’Using Dispute System Design
Methods to Promote Good-Faifli Participation in Cottrt-Connected Mediation Programs’ 50 (2002 2003)
UnivetaiO, of Califot?da Las Atw/e* Law Revien,, 69 explores die development of rules and norms in formal
mediation programs, illustrating the sophistication of some communities in taking advantage of formd
conflict resolution mecba~tisms. The point is fliat for a revenue aufliurits" simply to offer a conflict
resolution mechanism to taxpayers will soon turn to expectation nol o*fly fliat there is such a mechanism
but fliat it will operate ha ways influenced by oflmr conflict resolution mechanisms with wlfich taxpayers
are familiar. It tnay amount to opening rite floodgates but in doing so it will bttild a stronger relatio~s!fiP
bee, veen taxpa.vers and revenue auflio~ifies that \~dJl, based on die exfidence presented ha Cbapter 2,
improve compliance.
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does not necessa~ly overcome the problem of escalation. Conflict affects the total
relationship between the parties. Even if a particular problem ’is resolved, the underlying
conflicts are not, so the cycle of confrontation ... confnues’,m
This might happen in the above example of the cotnpany in a number of ways. The
ATO may send a final communication restating its opinion. The compaW xvould not be
happy with d~is outcome but, in the absence of any basis for appeal, it would have to
accept that it had been overwhelmed by the ATO acdon. The company itself might no
longer wish to pursue the particular conflict and may yield to the txtling by the ATO. The
ATO may yield to the arguments of die company and alter its ruling to reflect the
favm~rable ruling given to file other company. Sometimes, the escalation will reach a
stalemate and die two pardes will tt3, and teach agreement d~rough the use of various
tacdcs. Stalemates involving a powerful orgauisation such as the ATO seldom occur, unless
dxe NFO permits it. This is discussed further below.
In the example, the company does not appeal to the courts, preferring to negotiate
\~dda the ATO. The transaction costs of escalation to die level of court action become
unacceptable to die taxpayer. The free, energy and effort involved in conflict can diseapt
ordinary xvorking practices, to the extent that it becomes counterproductive. The monetatT
costs can also quickly outweigh the benefits of continuing the conflict.TM
4 The Effect of ConVict Escalatio~ on Ta.\payers
The above scenario is cotmnon to dispute resolution involving revenue authorities.
Conflict resolution that is rights-based (where die outcome is detemfined accordh~g to
rights such as legal standards) and poxver-based (where the outcome is determined
’,~ W.L. Ut3,,j.M" Brett and S.B. Ooldberg, above n. 110, p. ~.
See further, e.g., O.E. \~rflliamson, ’Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations’ (1979) 22 Jotovtal of Law attd Ecotlomies, 233.
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according to who is more powerful), favours the revenue authority. Such situations usually
constitute a ’bad’ experience for the taxpayer. As in most jurisdictions, itt Australia
taxpayers are in constant contact with the ATO. Companies and other entities, in
pat-t:icular, can have several different tax returns to self assess, as well as numerous other
contacts with the ATO durhag the tax year. A conflict in one area can spill over into the
other areas in the way returns are completed and contacts are made. The conflict can lnove
from an individual desire to achieve an end in one area to a desire to beat the ATO at its
own game in all areas of tax compliance,m
A taxpayer that sees the ATO as the aggressor uses defensive tacdcs. In response, the
ATO is likely to perceive the taxpayer as a high compliance risk and take further acdon.l~6
The conflict spiral develops, each seeing the other’s behaviotuc as illegitimate. Personal
antipathy can occur even in dealings with the ATO as an organisafion. The taxpayer’s file
will reflect die detrimental labelling of the taxpayer by all those officers who have had
contact with the taxpayer and Otis view xvill be adopted by awone widfin the ATO picking
up the ftle.14v The resolution of individual disputes may otfly exacerbate conflict over the
whole gamut of the taxpayer’s relations with the ATO.
Conflict escalation can be seen both on the individual level and on a group level,
between taxpayers as a whole and the ATO. It has led to significant tax avoidance in
Australia. Particularly during the 1970s and 1980s and often xxdth the encouragement of the
courts, taxpayers tried to expand the boundaries of legithnate tax avoidance.~s
Governments responded with increasingly all-encompassing legislation to minimise the
145 D.G. Pmitt and S.H. Kim, above n. 132, chs 5 and 6.
la6 The ATO compliance strategies focus on risk assessment, see, e.g., ATO Compliance Program 200607,
<x~v.ato.gov.au>, 1 November 2006.
1~7 Social identity theot3, supports tlfis attribution ofindi~4dual hostility (h~dividual officers) to the group (the
ATO) on the basis that tim self-respect of the members of the group is based on believing that their
group is better than the other group (the taxpayer). See D.G. Ptui~ and S.H. tqkn, above n. 132, p. 133.
us For a discussion of tiffs point, see J. Clear),, ’The Evolution of Tax Avoidance’ (1995) 5 Reve*me Law
Jom’*~al, 219.
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oppOrtunity for any unintended revenue leakage and to support ATO admimstration,
c011ecdon and enforcement.
Specifically, conflict esc,’flafion occucred as the ATO began an aggressive audit
p~ogram to enforce taxpayer compliance. If a taxpayer was found to liave erred in self
assessing, penalties and interest xvere applied. In retaliation, taxpayers began to litigate and
adopt a more aggressive approach towards the ATO.t49 Tliere xvere structural changes on
bofl~ sides that contributed to increases in the cost of compliance.~s° Shnultaneously,
associated psychological changes reinforced file conflict spkal.~s~
Negative perceptions and attitudes formed. Differences between the ATO and
taxpayers were emphasised by the ATO, taxpayer groups and the press. The ATO xvas
often represented as aggressive and hostile; tax, payers as trying to beat the system. A lack of
trust and a tendenW to feel threatened by the other patty assisted the escahtion. Yet in
broad terms, taxpayers simply wanted to be able to succeed in work or business, and the
ATO wanted to collect the right anaount of revenue. Decreased respect and poor
cotranunications tended to lead to confrontation rather than problem-solving, exacerbated
by de-humanising the other side.~s~ The result was: group polatisation; a tendency to prefer
conflict in audit and other areas of dissent to problem solving; group cohesiveness on both
sides; each side amaing to aclfieve its goals regardless of the effect on tile other part),; and
the emergence of militant leaders and subgroups.~sa Taxpayer representative groups became
more cohesive, focused and aggressive under strong leaderslfip, in response to sinfilar
developments in the ATO.
See the classic escalation pattern described in FCTv. Ciliba~tk, (1989) 20 FCR 403.
Described in j. Pope, ’Compliance Costs of Taxation: Policy Implications’ (1994) 11 Australian Tax. Forum,
85.
Tiffs section is based on tim model in D.G. Pruitt and S.H. Kim, above n. 132, ch. 6.
This tendency could be seen in parts of tim ATO after tim introduction of tim Charter. R]te Taxation
Ombudsman |figblighted examples in the debt collection area in his 1996 report. See D. Evans, ’Hard
Cases’ (1995q996) 30 Ta:,’alion ittAuslralia, 236. See ftmher, D.G. Pmitt a~*d $.H. Kma, above n. I32, ch.
2.
See further, W.L. Ury, J.M. Brett and S.B. Goldberg, above n. 110, p. xi.
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5 Achieving TaxyoayerCompliance: Redudng Co*tJZict Escalalion
The ATO goal was clear: it xvanted to improve taxpayer compliance.~s4 It became involved
in extensive research to identify the best methods of achieving its goadss It accepted the
incentives to introduce taxpayers’ rigbts outlined in Chapter 2 and sought co-operative
engagement with taxpayers to improve compliance. A radical change in approach emerged.
The papers at the first ATO Compliance Research Conference, held in Canberra in 1993,
are telling. They include tides such as:~s* ’Helping tax agents help taxpayers’, ’Changing
taxpayer compliance: the impact of business auditors as setx*ice providers’ and ’Taxpayers
are people’. The papers reflected an attempt to increase the legitimacy of die ATO in the
eyes of taxpayers and to reduce significantly taxpayers’ bad experiences with the tax system
(and therefore conflict escalation),lsv
Tiffs type of harsh experience is called relative deprivation. It alerts the deprived
part), to tlie existence of incompatible interests and at the same time provides the energy to
combat that threat. Contentious action by die taxpayer is more likely where there is a
growing distrust of die ATO.lss The Dual Concern Model of Conflict Theory states that
conflict st),le is deternfined by the strength of each patt),’s interest in two independent
variables: their concern about their own outcomes and their concern about die othe~
Seen hi tim Commissioner’s ammal reports, e.g., Commissioner of Tmxafion, 1994-95 Amlual Report (1995
AGPS). See Mso, J. Wickerson, ~fbe Chang Role of T~payer Aunt Pro~m~s: Some Recent
Developments m tim Aus~a~atl T~ Office’ (1994) 4 ~ve*Itte ~mJout~lal, 125, and A. Wk~, ’Chang
Taxpayer Comp~m~ce: The Impact of Bus~ess Auditors as Sea,ice Prm4ders’ (1994) 11 Auslt~lia~ Ta.v
Fono~, 63.
~id.
Presen{ed by S. B~d, A. Wk~ and R. ~derson, respectively, ~ of tim ATO.
FoRox~g tim mlemafional ~esearch ~scussed ~ Chapter 2. In parfic~ar, on I~ aunts, see K.A. Kmsey,
E~cts ~ Et~n’emet*e Al~ Attar,sis ~Sut~O’ Dala ~asl~on DC, American Bar Fo~dafion, 1990) ~d
L. Stflans, ’Ta~*g about T~ Aunt Experiences: "D~e Proced~N Content of Soci~safion’, paper
presented at fl~e Internal Revenue Sea, ice Researcb Conference, Wasl~gmn DC, 12-13 November 1992,
quoted m J. Wickerson, ’Meas~g T~payer Comp~ance: Issues m*d Ch~enges Fac~g T~
A~Ms~afions’ (1994) 11 Ausltztliao Tax- Fot~¢m, 1. Evidence for StMm~s’ conclusions can be seen in fl*e
a~mde of Confess m fl*e U*fited States inmm~ Revenue Sen6ce, when pass~g tim T~payers B~s of
~gbts 1 ~d 2. See A. Greenbat~, ~Nted Stares T~payer BNs of ~gbts 1, 2 ~d 3: A Pa~ to tbe
Fu~e or Old k~e m New Bo~es?’ ~ D. Bentley, above n. 15, cb. 15.
D.G. P~ and S.H. ~m, abram n. 132, p. 19.
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pat3,,s outcomes. Where there is high concern about both outcomes, problem solving is
more likely’’s9 The ATO’s research led it to realise the importance of having a lfigh concern
for t~xpayer interests so that it could achieve its own goals of increased taxpayer
compliance and reduced conflict escalation. This dependence emphasises the instrumental
natu*e of the ATO’s concern: satisfaction of taxpayers is instrumental in the ATO
increasing taxpayer compliance,t~°
D The Chapcerframework
The Charter xvas introduced as a direct result of this change in ATO approach to
compliance.*~ Its framework for conflict resolution provides a different approach, has
developed over dme and bttilds on positive past experience. Ut3~, Brett and Goldberg state
that ’disputes are inevitable when people with different interests deal with each other
regularly. Those different interests xvill come into conflict from time to time, generating
disputes.’~62 Importantly, the Charter does provide a framexvork to regulate and resolve the
conflict between the ATO and taxpayers, focusing on early negotiation and concRiation
raffler than moving too quickly to arbitration.
~ae Charter arfict~tes the possibility of conflict over rights and the validity of
taxpayer concerns. It provides conflict regularing mechanisms.~6x For example, if a taxpayer
company has not received a proper explanation for an ATO decision, the Charter
recogmses that an explanation should be given and provides the taxpayer with a fmrnal
Ibid., oh. 3.
Ibid., p. 45 elseq.
Flowing from the implementation of Recommendation 131 of tim Report of the loint Committee of
Public Accounts Repot 326, Art Assessmettt of Tax (i 993), it was effecthm from 1 July 1 ~97.
W.L. Ury, J.M. Bre~t and S.B. Goldberg, above n. 110, p. xii.
Providing rnecha~sms is not sufficient in itself, as ~vill be discussed below. Per W.L. Ury, J.M. Bret* and
S.B. Goldberg, ibid., ’the challenge is to develop procedures that the parties will use ... to ~esolve disputes
more satisfactorily and at lower cost’.
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avenue for complaint. Where previously taxpayers relied on indMduaI approaches to the
ATO, there ate now fomlal mechanisms to inldate a complaint resolution process)64
However, before exploring those mechanisms, it is hnportant to note that the
Charter is limited to specific areas. It is not all embracing. For example, file histot3, of
conflict in file area of taxpayer rights extends to fights not included in the Charter, such as
the fight to certainty. That does not mean that there is no conflict over file right. In other
words tile Social Conflict model developed in the Charter is only as effective as its scope.
The Chatter does articulate the rights of taxpayers, thereby providing a focus for
resolution of conflicts in the area. However, file corollary is that file Charter will also tend
to incorporate elements of conflicts that go beyond its scope. Where file Chatter is lhnited
in its scope, a conflict, say on a tax audit, may cover a much broader range of issues.
Conflicts tend to shape themselves to fit widfin the process available. This leads to greater
satisfaction where the conflicts are resolved, but there is a danger that those aspects of file
conflict that cotdd not fit wifllin the available mechanisms will leave unresolved grievances
to fuel fittther conflicts,t6s
For example, on a tax audit, if taxpayers tt3, to restrict the resolution of iss~ms to the
Charter’s dispute resolution process, they will necessarily be disappointed. The rights
protected in tile Charter ~e limited to process and catmot deal effectively with matters of
substance relating to the operation of file law. ’Process’ means procedural issues, such as
the gMng of reasons for a decision, xvhereas, ’substance’ means matters of law, such as
whether expenditure is deductible. The temptation is to tt3, and force issues of substance
into the Charter process, because it is so much cheaper and more accessible than the cotrct
system.
These are clearly articulated in fl~e ATO, Tao\Joa.yers’ Chatler E:,7)/analo9, Booklet 08: If you’re Not Satired
(ATO, 2003), <www.ato.gov.au>, 1 August 2006.
These concepts are considered in R.E. Miller and A. Sarat, ’Grievances, Clainas and Disputes: Assessing
tim Adversat3, Culture’ (1980-1981) 15 Law &SodeO, Retliealq 525.
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Even with these caveats, the Charter resolution process provides a useful
framework.~66 To understand it better, it is useftd to prmcide some analysis of its design. To
do that it is first important to explore recent histo~3, of ATO dispute system design as that
fot~ns the foundation for that used for the Charter.
I A Pmblem-solvil~g App*vach to contai~ Esca/alion
When dae ATO decided that to help improve compliance it should improve its relationslfip
\vifla taxpayers, the ATO used typical conflict de-escalation tactics.~tv This took place at txvo
levels. At the cotmnunity level, it increased fmanalised interaction and cormnunication
through a range of consultative commaittees, at all levels of the ATO, to ttT and facilitate
c0tranunity and stakeholder participation in the tax adininistration process,ass The ATO
also tried to institute a cultural change to make it seem more human and began to call
taxpayers ’clients’ and tax admiuistration ’set’vice’.~69 At the individual taxpayer level,
Problem Resolution Units (PRUs) were set up to deal with common complaints wiflfin
each office.
The ATO felt that the results showed the effectiveness of tiffs problem solving
approach. There appeared to be a significant increase in compliance and a marked change
Taxpayers mad oflaer stakeholders report a high level of satisfaction with most aspects of the operation of
the Cha~ter. See, TNS Consttlt~mts, Review of the Taxpa~’ers’ Char~er 2005 (]~S Social Research, 2006),
<w~vXv.ato.guv.au>, 1 August 2006. Similar sur~,eys are conducted in man), revenue authurities. See, e.g.,
Nalional Ta~a,)’er Advocate’s 2007 Objectives Report lo Cottgres*: Appettdices, 30 June 2006,
<wxvw.its.gov/advocate/>, 1 August 2006.
D.G. Pruitt and S.H. Khn, above n. 132, ch. 9.
"l]~is has increased substantially over time and some idea of the breadth of stakeholder input today can be
gamed from the ATO homepage unde~ ’Stakeholder consultation’, <www.ato.gov.au>, 1 August 2006.
I~ais is not tmique to Austrafia. Similar measures have been taken in Canada by Revenue Canada. See J.
above n. 15. However, this approach is a featttre of |tighly developed tax systems. See OECD, above n.
114. COmpare tttis with the system in Hm*gary, which is an example o£ a tax administration making the
transition from a closed Communist system. It has moved to self-assessment, but as yet has no form of
independent review, nor any independent documents outlining taxpayer rights. For a discussion of the
HUngarian tax administration system, see D. Deak, ’Taxpayer Rights and Obligations: The Hungarian
Experience, in D. Bentley, abov~ n. 15, ch. 8.
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in attitude by the community towards tile ATO.~7° It culminated in a ’team approach’,
invohfing taxpayer groups and the ATO, trialled in the Tax Law Improvement Project,
wlfich was a project undertaken in the 1990s aimed at simplif3’ing the tax legislation.
Taxpayers were encouraged to participate at all levels of the process and on occasion were
tire staunchest defenders of the flifished elements of the product.TM The project was not
completed, but the inclusion of taxpayers in rxflings panels and other projects has
continued)v2 By this means, the ATO has in some areas effectively used common group
membersl:dp to break down group-centric approaches and de-escalate conflict.m
At the individual level, PRUs were introduced as an altet~nafive to the more formal
framework previously used, allowing for more negotiation and conciliation earl}, on in file
conflict. Conflict lhrfiting institutions are ’forxUnS and flfird party sen, ices for helping their
members trso/ve conflict peacefttlly. Such institutions contribute to stability’ in tim
community.~w As described in the initial example, the formality that existed in the ATO
reladonslfip with the taxpayer could limit the particular conflict but it did not necessarily
resolve it. If there was escalation, the AAT and the courts act as conflict lhniting
institutions in that they ’resolve’ conflict. However, the adversatial nature of the co~t
system means that tile patties are polatised into contending rather than problem sohfing,
unless conciliation/arbitration at the AAT level is accepted and is successful.
The ATO has recogn~ised that the adversarial approach does not help to mamtam a
relationship of trust and mutual benefit with file taxpayer that wiJl in mrn encourage
Above n. 154.
As seen in the address by the private sector representatives on dm Tax Law Improvement Project to the
1996 Australasian Tax Teachers’ Conference, in relation to the reformulation of the loss proxustons.
The ATO undertakes extensive liaison and consultation with taxpayer representative groups: ATO, above
n. 166. In response to systemic concerns with the tax systera, the Inspector-General of Taxation was
established in 2003 under the Inspector-General of Tmiafion Act 2003 (Cth) as an independent start tory
officer to improve tax adnmaistrafion, provide independent adxdce to government on die administration
of tax laws and to idendf3’ systemic tax issues. The ATO has established its own internal Integrit)’
Adx~isor, to monitor how the ATO is xqewed in the con~anu~it3’ and to ensure that ATO staff adhere to
Charter pmxciples: see, e.g., ’12q8, above n. !66, p. 47.
D.G. Pmin and S.H. K~n, above n. 132, p. 134 elseq.
Ibid., p. 138¯
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compliance. F~thmanore, it is aware that the rights ha the Charter relate mainly to process
aad are therefore seen as falling sqnarely w~thha the jt~tisdiction of the ATO)7s It knows
that fi-om a taxpayer perspective the ATO is seen as being in a position of power that
should allow it to resolve any process issues. Taxpayers are unlikely to accept that it is the
law itself wlfich prevents the ATO from looking after taxpayers’ interests.~76
Both taxpayers and the _A_TO want to reduce the overall cost of disputes,m Costs
include the actual compliance costs, such as advisers’ fees and dkect wages, and also
indirect costs, such as lost wages, opporttutity costs of those involved ha the compliance
process and physical and emotional stress.~8
Experience of the PRU model provided a basis for the complaint handling process
under the Charter as ATO Complaints)79 Importantly, the model has ATO Complaints
officers as review officers within the ATO to case manage a complaint to resolution. They
use a problem solving approach in workhag with the business a~ea of the ATO to achieve
resolution¯ This allows a focus on the underlying interests of the parties concerraed, in a
way that is seldom possible in a more formal tribunal or cou~t arbitration. It is an issue that
ATO Complaints officers are ATO employees and are not always seen as neutr~d and
Evidenced by tim consistent review of Charter effectiveness across all areas of its operation. See, e.g.,
TNS, above n. 166.
Discussed when the Charter was introduced by the then Commissioner of Taxation, M. Ca~mody,
’Taxpayers’ Charter: ATO Perspective’, paper presented at the ,~.TAX Conference on Current Issues in
Tax Administration (!1-12 April 1996), p. 7. Rehafo~ced by the cttrrent Commissioner, M. D’Ascenzo in
his ’Cormnissioner’s online updates’, above n. 131: ’When we ask someone about their experience with
the Tax Office, a few of the wo~ds I’d like to hear are: professional, honest, courteous, reasonable,
trustworthy, transparent, open and accountable.’
Ibid. See also, W.L. Ury, J.M. Brett and S.B. Goldberg, above n. 110, p. :d.
"i2qe Ifidden costa of unresolved conflict are now well documented and have encouraged tim establishment
of alternative dispute resolution systems in a wide range of o~gatfisations and institutions. See, e.g., H.
Astor and C.M. Ctfinkha, above n. 111, p. 55 elseq; L. Boulle, above n. 111, p. 70 etseq;, and M.P. Rowe,
¯
, " ’ (1987) 3 Nego/iatio~Jom~tal, 127. It is the classic’The Corporate Ombudsman: A~ Over~aew and Anal)s*s
transaction cost argument. For a detailed discussion, see R. Coase, ’The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960)
Joto~tal of Law attd l~cottom£’~, 1, and R.A. Post*er, The Economi¢s of Justice (Cambridge ixLA, Harvard
University Press, i983).
The author is most grateful to Carol Pimentel, Manager, ATO Complaints Support, fo; providing a
c°mptehensive response to a request fo~ current ATO practice, which forms the factaal basis for tiffs
section. The interpretation and an), errors are tim author’s.
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hnpartial.Is° Hoxvever, while complete neutrality and impartiality may not be possible,
particularly if acknmvledged, they are not a bar to effective third party conciliation.*8*
Escalation beyond ATO Complaints introduces conciliation/arbitration with a
complaint to the Special Tax Adviser to the Commonwealth Ombudsman (file Taxation
Ombudsman). The Taxation Ombudsman is integral to the ATO complaints handling
procedures and acts as a final avenue of conciliation/arbitration xvhere the internal
procedures fail. The process is discussed in detail below. A similar approach is taken by the
Privacy Commissioner, to whom taxpayers *nay complain if they believe that the ATO has
breached file Privacy Act in dealing with their personal information. The use of file
Taxation Ombudsman and Privacy Commissioner gives people an informal and face-saving
way to resolve thek disputes. Research suggests that the mere presence of a flfird party is
likely to change the interactions between the parties and can be vet3’ beneficial in producing
a settlement of the conflict,tsz
In the event that a taxpayer wishes to move directly to a determinative process
involving fot~mal adjudication!litigation, the standard avenues of appeal against a decision
of the ATO are available. These include a review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal
(AAT), wlfich also hears small tax claims in its Small Tax Clahns Tribunal (STCT),fs3 and
file Federal Court of Australia. Tribunals sit as though they were the original decision
NADIL~kC, above n. 112, p. 98 and p. 114, notes that neutrality relates to questions of interest and
hnparfiafiB, to behavioux:         .Neutrality is a relative quality that reflects the demands of the context, suggests certain conduct on the part of
the practitioner ~md c~eates expectations of impartial behaviour. NADRAC ac’knowledges that absolute
neutrality is inapossible, since any practitioner has a degree of haterest in the outcome of the dispute.
D.G. Pmitt and S.H. Kkn, above n. 132, ch. 11. Altbough, it is interesting to note that the United States’
Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 (FIR 2337), enacted on 30 July 1996, introduced an independent position of
Taxpayer Advocate, witl~ the Internal Revenue Service ORS), to replace tbe existing Office of Taxpayer
Ombudsman (also witl~n the IRS), whose independence was felt to be inadequate. Section 10l
estabfished the position in order to: assist taxpayers in resoh~qg problems with the ILLS; identify areas
where taxpayers bave problems in dealings with the IRS; propose changes in tbe adnmtistrative practices
of the IRS that xvill mitigate those problems; and identify potential legislative changes that may mitigate
those problems. "Hae Taxpayer Advocate repm~s directly to Congress txvice a year, by~passing all mher
offices that were thought potentially to have compromised the independence and effectiveness of the
Taxpayer Ombudsman.
D.G. Pntit* and S.H. Kim, above n. 132, c ~. 11.
Adminis~xative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), Part IIIAA.
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maker with all the relevant po\vers?84 When reviexving decisions they therefore reviexv the
merits of the decision. The Federal Cotter hears appeals directly against objection decisions
made by the Commissioner and also on appeal from the AAT. The Court can make any
order on the objection decision including confitn~qg or vatting dm decision, or remitting
dm decision back to the decision maker.18s The importance of a right of appeal and revie\v
is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8. Suffice to say that there is, within the Charter
dispute resolution process, scope for moving some decisions outside alternative dispute
resolution to a more furanal process of reviexv involving litigation.
2 Desig*t oflhe Chat#r Dispute Resolulion System
In general temrs, ADR theorists begin the design of dispute resolution systems by analysing
the existing systems, identifying any problems that need co~ecdon and detemfining why
dmse problems exist so that they are not repeated in an), replacement system.t~8 They
attempt to incorporate problem-solving principles into the design of the system and to
limit escalation,ls7 This approach is common to revenue authorities and tax design
consultants and prmddes a basis for analysing enforcement mechanisms used in tax
administration.~Ss
Adnfinistrafive Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s. 43.
For example, Taxation Admiaistration Act 1953 (Cth), s. 14ZZP.
Identified by S. James, K. Murphy and M. Reinhart, above n. 131, p. 15 as critical to tim success of the
Charter. See generally, B. Wolski, The Laws ofAuslt~lia: D@ule Re~obtlion (Sydney, Law Book Company
Ltd, 1997), ch. 3; W.L. U~3,, J.M. B~ett and S.B. Goldberg, above, n. 110, ch. 2; and C.A. Costantino and
C. Sickles Merchant, Designitg Co,triM Management Systems (San Francisco, CA, Jossey-Bass, 1996), p. 69 el
seq.
The design of a dispute system within the tax framework focuses on collaboration and resort to a tfigher
authority. The options of avoidance and unilateral power play, identified as alternative options by K.A.
$1aikeu and R.H. Hasson, Contro//hg the Costs of Co*~flicl: How to Design a S),stem fo~" Your Orga~dzation (San
Francisco, CA, Jossey-Bass, t998), ch. 2, a~e less relevant in tax disputes.
For example, see C.E. McLttre Jr and S. Pardo R, ’ImprovLqg the Admmistzafio~ of the Colombian
Income Tax 1986-88’ in R.M. Bird and M. Casenegra de Jantscher (eds), bt~pmvi~tg Tax Adminislralion in
Developing Counhles (Wasl~ington DC, IMF, 1992), p. 124.
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As a design principle consistent with the issues identified in the Social Conflict
model, ADR theorists tend to focus on interest-based systems and look to deal with fl~e
tmderlying interests of the parties concerned in the resolution of disputes. They try to
create ’a dispute resolution system ... designed to reduce the costs of handling disputes and
to produce more satisfying and durable resolntions’.~s~ This is also consistent with file
compliance model discussed in Chapter 2.
One of the most influential models of dispute system design is that of Ury, Brett and
Goldberg.~0 It prmddes a useful starting point to analyse appropriate measures to protect
adi~finistrative rights. UrT, Brett and Goldberg put forward six principles, which can be
paraphrased as folloxvs:~9~
Prevent unnecessary conflict d~rough notification, consultation and feedback.
A party taking action likely to affect others should notify and consult fl~em
first. Points of difference can be identified and dealt with early, to prevent
potential conflict.
Withhx the lhnits of confidendalit3T requirements, the system should allow for
analysis and feedback after disputes, by an ombudsman, mgdiator or tile
parties, to overcome systemic problems.
Create ways of reconciling the interests of those in dispute.
Put clear procedures in place that are easy to follow and allow the quick
resolution of differences.
ts~ W.L. Ut3’,J.M. Brett and S.B. Goldberg, above n. 110, p. 43.
190 Ibid.
19~ Ibid., ch. 3. Prhmiple 1 was principle 4 in dieir earlier xvo~k. This model is widely used in dispute systems
design. It is analysed in C.A. Costantino and C. Sickles Merd~ant, above n. 186, p. 46. A sinfilar approach
is found in K.A. Slaikeu and R.H. Hasson, above n. 187, p. 29, ’The Collaboration Option’ and see ch. 5,
The Preferred Path for Cost Control.
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Use multiple steps in the negotiating process, so that die progression to a full-
blown dispute is slowed.
Motivate people to use the system by making multiple enttT points, preventing
retaliation and ensuring that there is active encouragement to use the system.
Ensure that there ~e people the disputants can ttml to for help, such as a
mediator, and make certain that these people are adequately trained in file
appropriate skills.
Buildin ’loop-backs’ to negotiation.
Where interest-based procedures do not ~esolve the dispute and it becomes a
rights-based or power-based dispute, loop backs allow file disputants ’time-out’
to re-assess dleir position before it becomes too entrenched. Loop-backs
encourage a return to negotiation.
Provide It\v-cost alternatives where negotiation fails.
If interest-based negotiation breaks down then there shotfld be low-cost
alternatives to a full court hearhlg.
Create sequential procedures mm4ng from low-cost to high-cost.
Provide clear alternatives to lfigh-cost litigation early on in a dispute. This
involves arranging the procedures outlined in points 1 to 4 in low-to-lfigh cost
sequence. For example, negotiation would be followed by conciliation and
conciliation by arbitration.
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6. Provide the necessat3’ motivation, sldlls and resources to allow the system to xvork.
Specific motivation and training programs must be put in place and adequately
sustained to maintain a properly xvurking system.
The Chat#r model
The Charter model was developed to ensure consistency xvith the ATO Best Practice for
Continuous Improvement and the Australian Standard on complaints handling.~9~ It is a
*nix between a complaint handling system and a dispute resolution system. From the
perspective of a complaints handling system, it also meets, to the extent it is relevant, the
principles of ISO 10002:2004, the International Organization for Standardization Q~taliO,
management - Customer satisfaction* - Guiddines for complaints handling in o~ganizations, wlfich
identifies guidin~ principles that include:~93
visibility - publication of xvhere and hoxv to complain;
accessibilit3~ - ease of use of the system implemented;
responsiveness - complaints dealt xvith quickly and effectively, keeping the
complainant informed of progress and the outcome;
fak’~ess and objectivity - the system should be equitable, objective and unbkased;
complaints can be made free of charge;
confidentiality;
Standards Australia Committee on Cotnplah~ts Handling, Australian Standard: Complainls haMIhg
(Australian Standard 4269-1995) (Standards Australia, 1995). Tttis was the fixst national standard to set
agreed benchmarks and has since been followed by international Standard ISO 1002:2004. In 1997 the
.
¯
" charters in all Commonwealih
Commonwealtl~ Government announced that It would introduce servtce
Govermnent agencies providing direct set,,ices to the public. See iq±LDtL’kC, above n. 112, p. 51. Tttis has
ensttted consistent standards across administrative charters.                       .
Available at <\~-,*.-,v.iso.org>, 1 August 2006. For a useful smnrnat3’ and a comparison with AS 4269, see
tim p~:esentafion by T. Sourdin, Complahtls - Cot~p~’it~g ~vilh lhe International Standard, <’,w, vw.fics-asn’an>’ 1
August 2006.
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customer-focused includh~g opportunity for feedback and a
resolving complaints;
accountability - cleat reporting framework and t~anspatency; and
co~mnitment to
continuous improvement
The review of the Charter in 2005 focused primarily on timse p~nciples and there is a clear
commitment to them by file ATO.t94 Tile Chatter’s rationale goes beyond this, however, to
encompass dispute resolution under self assessment to encourage voluntary compliance. It
was articulated by the then Conm~issioner of Taxation:l~s
For our part, xve see the Charter as a natural progression along the path the ATO has
been heading for several yeaxs now. Tiffs has involved an increased focus on clients
whereby xve look to better understand and address the issues impacling on compliance
and compliance costs, an emphasis on voluntatT compliance under a self-assessment
system, being more open and accessible, and an emphasis in xvorking with the
cotrmmnity to get its support for the vetT important role we perfotan.
The Chatter dispute resolution process is set out in an Explanatory Booklet m the Charter,
IJ)’ou’~ lit! sali~ed.~9~ This and tile other booklets supporting the Chatter provide a clear
and comprehensive explanation of the complaints processes. The Charter is referred to in
most ATO literature and on its xvebsite. The internet has ensured that the ability of the
ATO to interact with taxpayers has expanded significantly. In cotmnon ~vith most
jurisdictions, electro~.ic £t~ing of returns and information is beconmag tile normal means of
TNS, above n. 166. See also M. D’Ascenzo, above n. 131.
M. Carmody, above n. 176, p. 7.
Above n. 164. However, much of the detail in this section goes beyond tim Booklet descriptions and is
laken dkectly from email discussion with Carol Pimentel, Manager, ATO Complaints Support, above n.
179 (on file with the author). Widiout Ms Pimentel’s contribution, this section cotfld not have been
w~itten. An}, conclusions drawn or descriptive errors are the responsibility of the author.
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cormnunicadon. Complaints can still be made by telephone, letter and facsimile, but are
increasingly made by email and via the website.
The aim of the ATO complaints process is for taxpayers to raise an}, complaint in die
first instance with the relevant ATO contact officer. Where there is no specific contact
officer, genetic emails and telephone complaints to the dedicated complaints call centre
team are recorded onto a single office-wide ATO database. These are then directed
electronically to die relevant business line for resolution.
The ATO is organised into lines, wlfich focus on a type of taxpayer, a type of tax, or
an aspect of internal support)9v l~ach of the lines deals with taxpayers in its area on a day-
to-day basis. It is a philosophy of the ATO complaints process that it is die area dealing
with die taxpayer that should take responsibility for complaints. They should be
encot~taged to address die complaint and take any remedial acdon. Where a complaint is
made, the relevant contact officer shottld deal with it in the first instance. The ATO has
also established a network of ’complaint resolvers’ within each of its lines. Where a
complaint is not made direcdy to the relevant ATO contact officer the ’complaint resolver’
will inidate contact with die taxpayer. The se~dce standard requires that complainants will
be contacted witifin du:ee working days of die ATO receixdng the complaint,tgs
If die ATO contact officer fails to resolve die complaint, it is referred to the contact
officer’s manager. If they cannot resolve it, it can be escalated to ATO Complaints. Where
Otis occurs a case manager is appointed to take file matter to resolution to die extent that
tiffs is possible. The Complaints officer acts as an independent reviewer ~xfidlin the ATO
and takes a problem based approach to resolving the dispute.
Assume that Ms Jones, the financial controller of a taxpayer company, wishes to
complain under the Charter about treatment that officers of die company received during a
See the organisalional structure of the ATO, <www.ato.gov.au>, 1 August 2006.
ATO, Ta~,~a)’ers’ Cha~#r Explanato*y Booklel 03: Our se,x&e sla~Mards (ATO, 2003), <xmvav.ato.gov.au>, 1
August 2006.
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tax andit. She has akeady raised the matter with the ATO officer in cbarge of the audit
x~dtbout success.
Ms Jones may contact the ATO officer’s manager, who will attempt to resolve her
complaint.
If Ms Jones is dissatisfied with the outcome, she may contact a member of ATO
Complaints and advise that she wishes to complain.
ATO Complaints will allocate a case manager to work with the relevant business line
to resolve the matter.
The case manager may provide initial advice to Ms Jones, for example, to protect the
rights of the company with the lodgement of an objection or appeal.
If Ms Jones decides to proceed xvith her complaint, then the case manager records
full detaJ]s of the complaint and enter~ the information on to a central database.
The case manager outlines to Ms Jones the process for dealing with her .comphint.~
The case manager works with Ms Jones’ contact officer and her or his manager to
investigate the problem and to try to reach a resolution. Tttis may involve further
interaction xvith Ms Jones.
The case manager or ATO contact officer advises Ms Jones of the outcome of the
investigation into her complaint and, as appropriate, advises her ofaW further action
she can take, such as ta!dng the complaint to the Taxation Ombudsman.
It is otfly if Ms Jones is still dissatisfied after the case manager has taken all possible
action to resolve the dispute that it is expected that the Taxation Ombudsman wonld
become involved. Given the nature of the complaint, the ’mistcealxnent’ of company
NADR&c, above n. 112, p. 98, informed participation is an important component of the recommended
code of practice.
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personnel during an audit, it is uulikely that t!ffs could give rise to a decision
reviewable by a tribunal or cotttt.
Whatever, the outcome the case manager enters details of the complaint process and
outcome onto the central database and this is the first step in a comprehensive
process of reporting and analysis.
Monthly reports are made by ATO Complaints to the ATO Executive.~® They
include: complaint volumes; performance against identified key performance
indicators such as set~6ce standards and other quality assttrance measures; and alerts
about issues that have led to or are likely to lead to complaints, including systemic
issues.
Every quarter, a random sample of complaints is selected across all business lines and
complaint types and reviexved by a panel drawn from across business lines. A general
report on the reviexv is ckculated and the results are included in the monthly reports
by ATO Complaints. IndMdual results are provided to the ’complaint resolvers’ in
the business lhaes. The outcomes of the review also inform the staff training and
skills development strategies.
Each business line has a national complaints coordinator responsible for the
complaints netxvork in d~eir line. It is her or his responsibility to influence the culture
such that the Charter becomes a living document for ATO staff. He or she is
responsible for motfitoring and reporting on trends and issues and for developing the
skills in her or Iris network to deal appropriately with complaints. EverT eight weeks
the nadonal coordinators meet to discuss issues of complaint management at line
level and witlfin the ATO generally.
The ATO Executive constitutes the se~fior management of flxe ATO. See flxe Organisational structure and
repo~th~g arrmqgements on <xw, vw.ato.gov.au>, 1 August 2006.
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Each business line has a semor executive officer responsible for the complaints
portfolio, known as a complaint sponsor. The complaint sponsor’s responsibJfity is
to provide support for the complaints function and to act as an escalation point for
strategic and systemic issues, particularly when the complaint sponsors meet, some
three times per annum.
Any process or meeting that identifies a systemic problem likely to generate
complaints on an ongoing basis is referred mitialiy to ATO Complaints for
resolution. There are processes to ensure that all systemic issues that are identified
are recorded on a central database, and then managed and reported. ATO
Complaints prioritises the issues in its monthly complaints report and works with
business lines to develop solutions.
Conl~ual staff development and traitmag focuses on both trahfing in the system and
more specific complaint handling skills. Training is designed to reinforce the Charter
culture. An ATO C6mplaints Support team provides ongoing support to complaint
handling networks and the complaints call centre and focuses on issues that can
hnp~ove complaints handling.
F Analysis
Tiffs description of the process proxtides sufficient inforanafion to identify broadly how the
ATO complaints model measures up to the Ur3,, Brett and Goldberg model. It is more
easily done because of the 2005 independent survey of Charter perceptions commissioned
by the ATO.2m
above n. 166. See also M. D’Ascenzo, above n. !31.
229
Chapter 5
1 P*avent mmecessaty Co*~ict thmtgh Notification, Consu/talion and Feedback
The first principle is ahned at avoiding conflict before it starts and preventing future
conflict. Taxpayers are made axvare of the comphints process in ahnost all conmmnicafion
with the ATO. Letters, fo*~ns, the website and notices of assessment, for example, all
contain details of how to complain. The process is set out in detail both generally as part of
file Charter documentation and specifically when a taxpayer initiates a complaint.
Articulation of file process reinforces its confidentiafit3q xvhich is also separately identified
with its own complaint process to file Privacy Cormnissioner. This ensures informed
participation, access and fairness in procedure in accordance with file NADRAC code of
Consultation is bLfilt into file ATO model to ensure that there is the opportunity to
identif3’ a conflict, to clarify tile issue and focus on the interests of both parties.=°3 Most
ATO interaction with taxpayers involves exchanges of views and, often, informal meeth~gs.
Taxpayers are usually represented at these meeth*gs by a tax adviser, xvho provides a
counter to file position of power that file ATO almost always holds. If disputes arise at fl~is
level, the process builds in consLfltation bet~veen the taxpayer and file ATO officer’s
super~fsor. The next level of complaint to ATO Complaints may involve consultation. The
connimed involvement of the original ATO officers invoh,ed in the dispute ensures a
problem solving approach that may help prevent the taxpayer perceiving that a solution is
being imposed by tlfird parties. ~flfis could avoid subsequent escalation on oilier issues,
following the Dud Concern Model of Conflict. Where there is no resolution of the
problem it is hnportant that there is explanation of the monitoring process by the ATO to
ensure fliat taxpayers feel that although their concerns have not been resolved, there are
~0~ NADRAC, above n. 112, p. 99. K.A. Slaikeu and R.H. Hasson, above n. 187, p. 54, emphasise the
importance of h~temal mechanisms xvitlm* the system to help parties to select a**d use available convict
~03 C.A. Costantino and C. Sickles Merchant, above n. 186, p. 59.
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measures in place to ensure that systemic issues are addressed. The ’living the Charter’
training and focus of ATO Complaints and the business lines, if in~plemented snccessfully,
should resttlt in an even stronger sense that taxpayers are receiving a fair heating when they
complain.
The TNS sur~,ey shows strong support for the xvork that the ATO has done in this
area.-~’’4 The comparison between the 2005 and 2001 reviews of tile Charter showed ’some
substantial and consistent inaprovements since the 2001 Reviexv, albeit in a different
,’operating environment’’’.=°s Wlfile it did not specifically address the complaints process,
the specific strengths of the ATO were seen by taxpayers and tax agents as:=°~
treating people fairly and reasonably;
treating people as individuals, xvith an opportmfitT to oudine their situation;
manner and helpfulness of staff;
clear verbal conlmunication;
preparedness to pass on queries if unable to assist; and
acknowledgement and resolution of errors.
The weaknesses that were identified were more concerned with the technical advice given,
but could flow througb to the complaint resolutton process. They x~ e~:e,
a perceived lack of accountability by ATO staff;
a negative rating on the clarity, tone and language of xvritten comanunication; and
a negative rating on file ATO response to complex queries.
TNs, above n. 166.
Ibid., p. 5.
Ibid., p. 6.
ibid., p, 7.
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The ATO model is designed to ensure that there are procedures in place for analysis and
feedback. However, this is through the comprehensive ATO Complaints monitoring and
reporting system. The Taxation Ombuds~nan also provides a kind of feedback m atmual
reports made to Parliament. There does not appear to be a formal procedure for obtaining
specific feedback from the taxpayer. Feedback of this kind would provide information on
the success of the dispute handling process and outcomes from file taxpayer perspective. It
is important to provide a means to evaluate the system itself on an ongoing basis from the
viexx~oint of all stakeholders2°s
Costantino and Sickles Merchant suggest that there should be evaluation of both file
impact and effectiveness of the problem resolution system and its admiuistration and
operation.2°~ Applying it to file tax context, in, pact and effectiveness covers the efficiency
of the dispute system in terms of lowering costs and reducing dispute time. It evaluates its
effectiveness in terms of improved outcomes, durabilit3~ of dispute resolution and its
positive effect in the community. Finally, it examines satisfaction of taxpayers with the
resolution process, their relationship with the revenue authurity and file outcome of the
process.=m
Measurement of tile administration and operation of the dispute resolution system
involves a complex assessment. First, there is a review of the functional orga,~isation of tile
system including issues such as the structure and procedures, guidelines and standards in
place, the lines of responsibility, the sufficiency of resources and the relationship between
tile different components of the dispute resolution system. Second, there is evaluation of
ease of access to the system, appropriateness of the procedures in use and the criteria fo~
cases to come into tile system. Finally, there is a review of program quality, including
Ibid., p. 60 and B. Wolski, above n. 186.
C.A. Costan~ino and C. Sickles Merchant, above n. 186, ch. 10.
Ibid., 171.
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tra~oing and education and the competence and qualifications of those charged with
resolving or conciliating disputes at~
Given die size of the dispute system in tax matters, it would make sense to design a
representative evaluation along the lines suggested by Costantino and Sickles Merchant.
Tl~s could be shnilar to file longitudinal reviews of the effectiveness of die Charter, wltich
provide a useful starting point for other reviews of d~is kind.212 Regular evaluation and
assessment of measurable objectives can ensure that file system f~fils its potential. Unless
meaSttrement takes place, significant funds and resources are invested based on educated
guesswork.
2 Ctaate WgB,s ofmoncilitg the lntemts of those in Dispute
The ATO model meets file broad requirements of the second principle. It is vital that the
system does so, as die focus on interests is the underlying theme of die Ut3,
, 
Brett and
Goldberg model. The ATO model provides clear ways to reconcile file interests of the
taxpayer and the ATO. TILe processes t~ be followed, including die roles of all participants
have been set out and should be easy to follow.213 The information that the ATO provides
for taxpayers is almost always clear and helpful: a major strength of file ATO is its public
relations face. The point that there should be no retaliation over complaints is also one tllat
the ATO has had to deal with, for many ye~s, in die face of close public sct, atitly. This
aspect should not be a problem in Australia, but may be in some jm~sdictions.
Tile hierarchical process of the ATO model provides specifically for a multi-step
process. It allows the management of disputes to prevent ummcessary escalation at an early
Stage. The ATO model does provide for limited multiple en~t3, points to the process at the
-’tl Ibid., 175.
~i.~ TNS, above n. 166.
"~t NA1DILAc, above n. 112, p. 98, as a component of tim recommended code of practice.
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first level. Although the process is essentially hierarcliical, taxpayers can at an}, time
approach the ATO officer respongible for their file, the ATO officer’s manager or ATO
Complaints. The taxpayer can also go directly to the Taxation Ombudsman. By doing so,
however, the taxpayer takes the dispute to the highest level in the informal process.
Although the ATO approach is bierarchicat, an advantage of the problem resolution
process is that it cuts through the multiple layers of bureaucracy by assigning an ATO
Complaints officer to the problem if the case officer ca*mot resolve the dispute. This
overcomes a problem con-re)only found in revenue authorities, which tend to be ’highly
stratified, vertically organized institutions that take pride in the~ review and approval
processes’.214
Assisted negotiation is particularly hnportant for taxpayers, as disputes often involve
issues of a liighly complex and techificat nature. Tax advisers are alloxved to assist and
represent taxpayers at ever3’ stage of the ATO model. This provides taxpayers witli a
trusted and relatively objective viewpoint from someone who may understand aspects of
their interests better than they do. For example, a professional adviser would usually be in a
better position to understand the penalty provisions in order to be able to negotiate a
favourable outcome for the taxpayer. On the ATO side, the use of specially trained ATO
Complaints officers to xvork for resolution of the problem, can help to produce a
negotiated outcome.
Once the dispute moves to the Taxpayer Ombudsman, it moves to conciliation or
evalnative mediation. Although evaluative mediation does not have the strengths of
facilitative mediation in providing the parties \vith a strongly interest-based proceSS
controlled by the parties, it does provide an alternative to the judicial process that can
significantly benefit the parties. Where the alternative is to negotiate with the revenue
authorit3, or to pursue expensive litigation, it is an attractive process that can fit into the
-~1~ C.A. Costantino and C. Sickles Merchant, above n. 186, p. 130.
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a&rAnistradve framework su~rotmding most tax systems. Where the content of die dispute
means that the judicial process is not available it provides a valuable additional dispute
~esotution mechanism.
The Taxpayer Ombudsman model of dispute resolution provides a nomaative or
adidsot3, approach based on die range of possible outcomes wid~in the legislative or
administrative frame\vork. It is often a review of die Commissioner’s process of exercise of
l~is discretion and die dispute is defined within those parameters.2Is The nature of the
ombudsman’s role generally means that d~e mediator/conciliator is tr~ed as such and is
not necessarily a tax expert. However, as Boulle notes in his definition of evaluative
mediation, die role of the Taxation Ombudsman is to ’provide infot~nadon, advise and
persuade parties, bring professional expertise to bear on [the] content of negotiations, [and]
predict outcomes away from mediation, such as m couxt’,al~ It resnlts [t~ a high level of
intervention and a quasi-arbitral st3,1e, with little control by die taxpayer over die
outcome.2tv However, there is an outcome and a sense for the tax, payer that her ot !fis
concerns have been heard and considered by an independent thkd part3~.
3 BmTd m 7~oop-backs’to Negotialion
The ATO model provides effective ’loop-backs’ to negotiation at each stage of the process.
Even at the lfighest level, the Taxation Ombudsman negotiates with the ATO on behalf of
the taxpayer. The reason for this emphasis on a negotiated outcome is that, for most
disputes involving process, there is no recotttse to the courts.218 ’Loop-backs’ provide the
,\ustraban Commonwealth Ombudsman, above n. 105.
L. B0ulle, above n. 111, p. 44.
Ibid.
DiScussed in D. Bentley, ’The Taxpayers’ Charter: Mote X]~an a iX.fission Statement’ (199506), 4 Taxatiott
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opportuuity to revert to earlier interest-based methods. These can include prevention,
further fact finding or negotiation, all of wtfich axe relevant to a tax dispute.219
A useful aspect of die ATO model is that there can be a ’loop-forward’ from
informal to more formal procedures. Wolski supports dfis, where interest based negotiation
between the pardes to the dispute is pointless because of the nature of the complaint or the
issues involved.=° In such a situation it would be possible, raider the ATO model, to
proceed straight to die Taxation Ombudsman, or, if they have jurisdiction, di~ecdy to the
AAT or the Federal Court. A ’loop-forward’ stops stalemates, which could reinforce a
negative perception of the problem resolution process. The puqpose of die system is to
hnprove die taxpayer experience and dierefore voluntary compliance.
4 Provide Low-cos! Alternatives whe~a Negotiation fails
It is inaportant to recognise that negotiation betxveen the parties may not result in a
resolution of the dispute. Costantino and Sickles Merchant point out, however, that the
existence of a back-up mechanism in die event of failure often allows die patties to explore
a greater range of interests.2~1 In a tax dispute, this n’fight apply to taxpayers, particularly
since it gives them a greater sense of control,z22 The potential leverage encoiu:aging the
ATO to resolve the matter xvould be its unwillingness to have it referred to the Taxation
Ombudsman. The low-cost alternative and Last resort for taxpayers in most procedural
matters under the ATO model is to appeal to the Taxadon Ombudsman. This involves
negotiation by the Taxadon Ombudsman, on behalf of the tax’payer, with die ATO.
C.A. Costantino and C. Sickles M.ercbant, above n. 186, p. 59.
B. Wolski, above n. 186. Tiffs also meets the N2dDRAC code of pracdce reqttirement for information on
ho\v and when the ADR process may or should be termfiaated, above n. 112, p. 98. See also, K.A. Slaikeu
and R.H. Hasson, above n. 187, p. 46, where the option to ’loop forward’ to a ttigher authority while
preseta,ing the collaborative framework fits die preferred path for cost control.
C.A. Costantino and C. Sickles Merchant, above n. 186, p. 60.
Ibid., p. 61.
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It is only for substantive issues, and vdt3, few procedural issues,m that there are
relatively low cost alternatives in the STCT and the AAT, which use conciliation as part of
d~eir procedures.=~ Although there are limited low-cost alternatives to negotiation for most
procedural matters, the existence of the Taxation Ombudsman is important,z~’
A further support to idendfy systemic problems is the role of the continuous
monitoring of complaints by ATO Complaints, the Taxadon Ombudsman, the Inspector-
General of Taxation and the Board of Taxation. There are few revenue authorities in the
world x~dth such a comprehensive range of oversight bodies as in Australia. This is not
pertinent to the problem resolution process except that a comprehensive and systematic
review of systemic problems will ensure that the number of complaints reduces.
5 C~eate SequentialProcedmes movitgfivm Low-cost to High cost
A potential problem with the ATO model is that the procedures are apparently low-cost
but can involve sigt~ficant unexpected and hidden costs to the taxpayer. The ATO dispute
resolution process often does involve the cost of a long-tet’m involvement by professional
advisers. It also requires substantial input by the taxpayer, in time spent preparing for, and
patticipa~ag in, negotiations. In the context of tax matters there may not be an easy
answer, given that advisers are often essential to the carriage of the issue. The costs would
not differ greatly on the entt3, point at the first ATO level or the second, Taxation
Ombudsman level. The costs would increase in direct proportion to the length of time that
the negotiations take because most of the costs are related to the lkne and effort put in by
the taxpayer and any adviser. There is a significant step-up in costs if the dispute is taken to
b. Bentley, above n. 218.
See p. Gerber, above n. 125.
W.L U ry, J.M. Brett and S.B. Goldberg, above n. ! 10, p. 56. K.A. Sla~keu mad R.H. Hasson, above n. 187,
p. 28 and p. 37 analyse the ~i~ks of introducing power plays and avoidance into flie resolution process.
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the AAT or the Federal Court (where that is an option). If a taxpayer enters a dispute at the
ATO level, the potential increase it cost in taking it to the Taxati6n Ombudsman level is
not significant as access to the Taxation Ombudsman is free. Ury, Brett and Goldberg
argue diat there should be a noticeable increase in transaction costs at each level, to
increase the pressure for a negotiated outcome at an early stage,at Tiffs is achieved as soon
as there is escalation to a tribunal or coart. It is inappropriate to have a significant increase
in cost in moving the dispute from a negotiation witli the ATO to a rex4ew by the Taxation
Ombudsman. To d~ so, would give taxpayers restricted access to independent review,
wlffch is one of the vkmes of the process.
6 Provide the necessary Molivation, Skills and Resources to allow lhe System to work
The TNS survey suggests that the ATO has managed very skilfully the appropriate training,
skilling, resourcing and motivation of its staff revolved in problem resolution to aclfieve
strongly favourable responses from taxpayers and stakeholders.=~ The comprehensive
monitoritrg and review of both mdi~idual and systenffc complaints prm4des a solid basis
for the ongoing integrity and effectiveness of the model. As ADR in Australia develops, it
will be important for its officers to meet the bencbanark standards reqttired of ADR
practitioners,ms The ATO acknowledges that the internal cultxt~e of the ATO is vital to tlie
success of effective problem resolution.=9 ATO management’s systematic and continued
support of the problem resolution framework is an linportant and powerful motivatorff~°
kX~.L. Ury, J.M. Brett and S.B. Goldberg, ibid., p. 63.
TNS, above n. 166.
N~M3R¢\C, above n. 112, p. 55, states that. ’These standards include requirements m reladon to education,
training, assessment, selection, super~4sion, professional development and discipline’.
M. D’Ascenzo, above n. 131. It is a common issue across tax jurisdictions. The culture and organisafion
of tax admimstradon is discussed f~rther in Chapter 7 and includes the problem not ooly of integ~ty i~*
the system as a whole, but the difficult3, in ensuring a consistent culture across the revenue authority. The7US Nalion01 Taxpayer Advocate refers to this problem explicitly m her Nal¢otta/Ta.\~a3’e~ Advocate s 200
Objectioes Repotl to Congress, 30 June 2006, <\wwv.irs.gov/advocate/>, 1 October 2006, in which she makes
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On the other side the ATO must maintain its education program to ensure fllat
taxpayers are both aware of die options for dispute resolution and are comfortable using
them. The existence of this program orients taxpayers to a vahm system that supports early
tesolutiotx of disputes and recognises die rights and responsibilities of all parties.~ The
next stage in the process for the ATO is to ensure that taxpayers see die ATO as
accountable. This was die weakest area in the TNS sut~my and is relevant to any dispute
tes01udon process,z~x TNS say that the implications for the ATO are that:~3
daere needs to be a strong focus on demonstrating accountability;
dfis needs to be inctflcated into staff trali~ing and staff management strategies; and
die way ’accountability’ is described in die Charter shoifld be defined from die
taxpayer’s perspective of ’taking ownersbip of an issue’ and ’seeing it through to
closure/resolution’.
Given that the survey xvas not directed specifically at problem resolution, some of fllese
issues may have been addressed in that process. Nonetheless, a strengthening of
perceptions of ATO accountability generally will also strengthen taxpayers’ perceptions of
the problem resolnfion process.
the illuminating statement: ’ha ttm IRS today, enforcement employees work on enforcement initiatives,
and taxpayer set~ice employees work on taxpayer ser~fce initiatives, and never the twain shall meet’, (iv).
.-5. Costan~,o and C. Sickles Merchanq above n. 186, p. 61.
I-LA. Slaikeu and R.H. Hasson, above n. 187, p. 122.
~T~. S, above n. 166, p. 7.
*bid.
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7 AdditionalPdndpks
Costantino and Sickles Merchant raise the concern daat the designer of organisadonal
systems is often cast in the role of ’expert’ to the exclusion of the participants,z34 This is a
distinct danger for a dispute resolution framework within a tax system. The framework is
usually designed by legislators or revenue authorities v;dth some consultation.23s It is called
an ’authorit3,-reacfive’ system wlfich dictates hoxv disputes will be handled and inaposes
decisions on disputants,z~6 There is not a significant difference in approach from a court
based system.
There was extensive consultation with the community and taxpayer representative
groups in Australia prior to the introduction of the Charter in 1997, followed up by a
reviexv with fttrther consultation prior to the hnplementafion of a rexdsed Charter in
2003.~v Hoxvever, tiffs process did not focus on the detail of the dispute resolution
mechanisms and process. Internal ATO experts designed a system that fliey felt wottld best
stilt the existing ATO structme and meet the needs of the stakeholders. It is therefore an
’expert-imposed’ system that manages or a~commodates conflict to produce the best
possible outcome in the particttlar situation.23s However, substantial changes have occtrrred
over time to the systems and processes to make them more effective. The danger m using
an ’expert-hnposed’ system xvid~in a complex tax bureaucracy is where change cannot or
does not occur to meet the concerns of the taxpayers. It is likely to become irrelevant and
ossified.~9
23~ C.A. Costantino and C. Sickles Merchant, above n. 186, p. 47.
z~s See the criticism of the US approach in A. Greenbaum, above ft. 157, p. 347.
~3~, C.A. Costanthm and C. Sickles Merchant, above n. 186, p. 55.
~37 For a detailed analysis of this process, see S. James et al, above n. 186, p. 336.
~ C.A. Costantino and C. Sickles Merchant, above n. 186, p. 55.
~39 The TNS stm~ey, above n. 166, suggests tl~at the success of the Australian Charter is significantly
dependent on the cotm~itment of die ATO to ensure that staff’live tile Charte~’.
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The most difficult form of dispute system design for a govetannent bureaucracy is
the most effective form: ’stakeholder-derived~ systems designed as an ongoing process,z4°
These systems accept conflict and provide a participative, open and flexible dispute
,esolution process. They may be feasible in the future, but tie degree of stakeholder
participation required means that a consultative ’expert-imposed’ system is likely to be the
preferred model for tax system dispute resolution. However, as the ATO system has
shown, to succeed it has to be reflective and open to conthmal hnprovement.
Another concern with the UtT, Brett and Goldberg model is fliat it does not address
the larger picture of systerrdc conflict or problems with individual or organisational
responses to conflict.241 James et al demonstrate that the comprehensive review and
ongoing development of the Charter framework in Australia provides a model that does
deal with these big picture issues,z4a The Charter in Australia is not disconnected from tax
administration as a whole. Further haput into its future development will flow from the
reports of the Inspector-General of Taxation, a position designed to identify for correction
systemic issues in the adi~fistradon of the tax system.243
When a dispute resolution process is introduced, its effectiveness will be determined
in large part by hoxv seriously officers in tie revenue authority vie\v the dispute resolution
process2- A top-down implementation is insufficient in itself. Tbis will also determine its
take-up. Taxpayers need to see the system working if they are to conl~lue using it to any
significant degree.-m
At the organisadonal level, a dispute resolution process must be supported by a
quality framework.~4~ NADRAC suggests fliat Otis should include a quality review or audit,
Ibid.
Ibid., 47.
S. James et al, above n. 186.
Above n. 172.
For example, internal dispute resolution mechanisms in the Debt Management ;~rea of dxe ATO were
Severely cfiticised by tim Commonweald~ Ombudsman. See D. Evans, above n. 152.
B. WolsM, above n. 186.        d 99
NAD~C, aboven. 112, ch. 3~ p. ¯
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reporting and accountability.247 Most revenue authorities would have an organisational
quality framework in place, but if not, there should be a regular quality re,dew inaplemented
as pat of any dispute resolution process. This should include service standards for
measm’able objectives.24s
The final principle in the U*3,, Brett and Goldberg modd includes the requirement
dlat personnel are appropriately qualified to manage the dispute resolution process.249
There should be a formal process of assessment to detem~ne qualifications.2s° It is
insufficient simply to transfer a revenue officer from a different area and expect that officer
to be able to resolve disputes. An assessment needs to be made as to the suitability of the
qualifications and experience of an officer, before he or she become a member of a dispute
resolution team. Appointments based on seniority or political influence rather dlan merit
251
will undermine the process and seriously nnpalr its effecttveness. The assedsor must have
the experience and qualifications to make the assessment and die authority to implement
the assessment decision.
Before a person is appointed, he or she may need either fortnal or on die job
training. Revenue authorities increasingly contract out training to external prmdders and
this can be a useful mechanism to ensure its qualit3,, wl~e also often prmdding die officers
concerned with an accredited qualification.~s2 As accreditation of ADR practitioners
~7 Ibid., p. 65.
24~, ATO, above n. 198. See furfl~er above n. 105. See, e.g., S. James, T. Svetalekth and B. Wright, ’The
Benefits of a More Strategic Approad~ to Tax Adilfinistradon and the Role of Performance Indicators’,
paper presented at the 7th International Tax Administration Conference (Sydmey, Australia, 2006); M.
Klun, ’Performance Measurement for Tax Admitlistrafions: The Case of Slovenia’ (2004) 70(3)
I~temaliona! Review of Adminiylralive Sde~tce~ 567; and P. Seera, "Performance Measurement in Tax
Admitfistration: Cttile as a Case Study’ (2005) 25 Pub]icAdmiMstmtion attd Developmenl, 115.
249 A. $chlemenson discusses the difficulties in acltiex~mg dris in developing tax adi,~itfist*ations in
’Organizational Stt~acture and Human Resources in ’Pax Administration’, in R.M. Bird and M. Casenegra
de Jantscher, above n. t88, ch. 10. NADRAC, above n. 112, oh. 5 contains an extensi,~e description of the
knowledge, s -kills and ediical requirements of ADR practitioners.
~0 N~X£DRAC, ibid., p. 81.
2sl A. Scblemenson, above n. 249, p. 360, where he makes the point that where developing countries have m
place a performance review process it should ’support employee promotions and career development and
ensure consistency’.
~ The ATO has formed an alliance with the Utfiversity of New South Wales to prm4de tailor made
programs d~ougb the AT~’LX trait in the Faculty of Law.
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becomes more comtllon, it xvould be useful to have as a quality measure that all smtior
officers revolved in problem ~cesolt~fion have an accredited qualification. The diversity of
accreditation, given the range of ADR may reqtfire die revenue authority to require
particular types of qualification suited to its processes.
Another measurable standard would be a reqtfirement for all revenue officers
involi,ed m dispute resolution to complete a certain number of hours per atmtlm of
continuing professional development.~s~ This would be in the context of the overall
~equkement for continuing professional development and may need to be developed ha
conjunction with the relevant industrial or employment agreements or contracts.
The ATO Model relies heavily on the ATO Complaints officer and bushaess fine
’complaints resolver’ to manage ATO obligations after the problem resolution process is
concluded. NADRAC emphasises this final step ha the ADR process as an important
component of its code of ADR practice,as4 Effective closure is essenlLal to ensure that the
overall experience for the taxpayer is favourable, even if the substantive outcome is not
what was sought. From a compliance perspective, the experience is importantass and
ensuring effective closure may requite a specific emphasis in officer traliting.
G Conclusion
Enforcement of adininistrative rights and goals is increashagly effective because of the wide
range of mechanisms for enforcement that are now available in most ju*isdicdons. The
focus o~ governance and risk management ensur’es that greater attention is paid to the
implementation of published promises and guidelines. So, too, does a performance-based
C.A. Costantino and C. Sickles Merchant, above n. 186, cb. 8 and K.A. Slaikeu and R.H. Hasson, above n.
187, cb. 13.
NAIZI1L~C, above n 112, p 98
As discussed in Chapter 2.
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management approach using objective measures such as key performance indicators or
benclunark measures to judge performance of the revenue authority. In conjunction wit~
this move towards t~ansparent and accountable government, oversight and review agencies
provide a framework for govertm~ent to take a proactive approach to dealing widi the
problems of its citizens.
At the review level, relatively infotanal mechanisms and bodies are designed to
facilitate interest based problem resolution at an early stage in any conflict. Dispute
resolution is increasingly facilitated by both the revenue authority and independent
agencies. For example, an office of ombudsman or shnilar review body is accessible to the
general public and can take up a much more comprehensive range of issues and problems
than can the cotU:ts.
This Part used ADR theory to identify die characteristics of effective admhfistradve
enforcement, since the mechanism itself or its form is’ secondary to the characteristics of
the process. Mechanisms will vary according to jurisdiction, legal system and a range of
factors specific to that country. The principles underl3dng die processes remain die same.
From the Social Conflict modal the optimal approach is to problem solve and tt3, to
fred a soludon that satisfies die interests of both sides.2~ It is important to move away from
d~e conflict resolution that is rights-based (where die outcome is detetvained according to
rights such as legal standards) and power-based (where the outcome is detemained
according to who is more powerful), as these constitt~te a bad experience for the
taxpayer.2sv Tltis approach can also allow the conflict to escalate and spill over into odier
areas of interaction.~
The ATO case study identified the successful application by a revenue autho~dty of
an alternative model of dispute resolution. Importandy it is based on domesdc and
D.G. Pruitt and S.H. Kim, above n. 132, p. 5 elseq.
Ibid.
Ibid., chs 5 and 6.
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h~ternationa] complaints handling standards and this should be the starting point for any
dispute resolution system witlfin a revenue authority, The principles are broad, clear and
necessary to implemeut a successful complaints handling mechanism. The Model should
support tim application of the ptindples of ISO 10002:2004, the Intemafonal Organization
f0~ Standardization QuaLi~y management- Customer sa@faction - Guidelines for comp/aints
itt oganizati°ns’2s9
Based on tim successful application by the ATO of the pmlciples put forward by
Ut3,
, 
Brett and Goldberg26° in its Charter dispute resolution process, the Model should
include all six, xvith two additional principles as follows:
1. Prevent unnecessary conflict fl~rough notification, consultation and feedback.
2, Create xvays of reconciling the interests of those in dispute.
3. Build in ’loop-backs’ to negotiation.
4, Provide low-cost alternatives where negotiation fails.
5, Create sequent~l procedures moving from low-cost to liigh-cost.
6. Prmdde the necessary motivation, skills and resources to allow the system to xvork.
7. Provide effective mechanisms for measuring qualitative success.
8. Provide mechanisms for monitoring, review and continuous improvement both at
individual and systemic levels.
~!lm combination of the approaches set out in tiffs Chapter will ensure effective
enforcement of the whole range of taxpayers’ tights and are included in the Model in
Chapter 9.
ISO, above n. 192.
W.L. Ut3,
’ 
J.M. Brett and S.B. Goldberg, above n. 110, ch. 3. Prkqciple 1 was principle 4 in their earlier
work. This model is widely used m dispute systems design. It is analysed m C.A. Costan~xo and C. Sickles
Merchant, above n. 186, p. 46. A similar approach is found in K.A. Slaikeu and R.H. FIasson, above n.
187, p. 29, the Collaboration Option and see ch. 5, ’The Preferred Path for Cost Control’.
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]~ CONCLUSION
Cbapter 5 has developed an analysis of enforcement for both legislative and
administrative rights. In the first part it identified tile inlportance of providing effective
legislative mechatfisms to support the h~nplementation of taxpayers’ rights. These were
reinforced by additional mechanisms such as an interpretation clause and scmliny
committees. The approach reconm~ended and included m the Model in Chapter 9 as best
practice, can be hnplemented in most jhtisdicfions.
Tlie same general applicability was the basis for the recommendations
administrative dispute resolution in the second part of Chapter 5. The ATO model of
dispute resolution provides a useful example of the detailed implementation of effective
adirtinistrative enforcement of taxpayers’ procedural rights. Examirfing the ATO model in
tim context of dispute design theo*3’ allowed the development of recon~nendations for
inclusion in the Model. They also represent best practice.
Now that the rationale, basis, context and enforcement of tights have been analysed
to provide a basis and f~ame\vork for a Model, it is time to examdne the tights that it should
include. Chapters 6-8 analyse the different tTpes of rights and establish the standards that
should be included in the Model as a guide to best practice in tax adininistration.
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CHAPTER 6
ANALYSIS OF PRIMARY LEGAL RIGHTSt
I INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2 acknowledged that although there are arguments that fights are relative and their
content may be based in a particular culture, there is sufficient content that is xvidely
accepted to construct a model of tights as a guide to best practice in tax adininistradon.
The rights wifl~l the model can then be applied wiflain the particular context of the legal
and tax system of each jvxisdiction.
in formulating a model it is impossible to take account of the legal, cultural and
social context in which a model may be applied. To that extent, it is a sterile process. Laws
should never be taken from one jurisdiction and enacted as they stand in another, as many
As indicated in Chapter 1, the fiteramre devoted to a general conception of taxpayers’ rights is lhnited.
However, in recent years a number of leading ti~ttkers in tax have provided depfli and insight that go
significantly beyond die author’s early work in the field. Tlfis chapter draws together much of that
drinking. It also explores some of the literature that has analysed individual rights. Ttfis exploration is
limited by space: concepts sucli as tlae meanhag and appficadon of legal professional privilege are
themsdves the subject of multiple volumes. The primat3, \vorks that provide the foundation for
Chapter are: M. Buqulcchio de Boer, ’Tax matters and the European Convention on Human Rights’ in
Ta:,’ation attd Haman Rigb& A Survey of Case-Jam (International Fiscal Association, 1987), p. 59; OECD,
Taxpayeta.’ Rt~bls arm Obligatio**s: A Smvey of the Legal Situation i*t OECD Countries (1990, OECD); OECD
Centre for Tax Policy and Aditaiuistration, Tax Guidance Series, GemmlAdmiMstmtive Pdtt@le*- GAPO02
Ta&ayer Rights and Obligations (OECD, 2001); D. Bentley, ’Formulating a Taxpayers’ Charter of Rights:
Set~dng file Ground Rules’ (1996) 25 Australia*t Tax- l~view, 97; D. Bendey (ed.), Ta~,;ba.)’et:r’ Ri’gbts: An
lttlentational Pet~eclive (Gold Coast, Revenue Law Jmtrnal, 1998); D. ~Llbregtse and H.P.A.M. van
Atendonk, (eds), Taa,7~o,er Protection ht the European Udon (I’he Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1998); A.
Saxwer, ’A Comparison of New Zealand Taxpayers’ Rights with Selected Civil and Common Law
Countries _ Have New Zealand Taxpayers Been "Short-Changed"?’ (1999) 32 I/a,Merbilt Jom~tal of
Tmtmmtio**al Law, 1345; and P. Baker and A-M. Groeulmgen, The Protection of TaxptD’ers RigMs - An
~nteroational Codification (London, Etttopean FhIancial Foram, 200I). Other valuable \vorks dealing with
individual rights or individual jurisdictions are footnoted. L. Murphy and T. Nagel, The Myth of O*vnet:rbip:
Taxes a~td Justice (New York, OUP, 2002); S. Peers and A. Ward (eds), The Emvpean UMo*t Charier of
Fm~damental Ra~hts (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004); M. Lang (ed.), Direct Taxatiom Recettl ECJ Developme*tts
(~ae Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2003); S. van Thiel, EU Case Law on Inrome Tax (Amsterdam,
IBFD Pubficatlons, 2001); and J. Tile},, Studie* h* the HistoO, of Tax Law (Oxford, Hart Pubfisl~ing, 2004).
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developing countries have discovered to their cost. A model’s value is where it can be used
as a guide to the development of new systems and processes that can be tailored
specifically to fit widfin those that already exist in a jttrisdiction. The development can take
account of the structure and content of the legal system, nuances in the use of language
and important cultural and other differences identified in Chapter 3. It can also be adopted
on an incremental basis in jurisdictions where the abilit3, to change is constrained and must
take place over time.2
Chapters 6 to 8 identify the rights that should be included ha a model with a brief
analysis of each. Chapter 9 proxfides a two-tiered model of rights based upon the analysis.
The justification for a two-tiered modd was given in Chapter 2.
Tide rights included are based in the principles analysed ha Chapter 3. As noted in
Chapter 3, there will be differences in interpretation of the rights. The history of the
OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital shows that there x~dll be debate
¯ over content, but Otis comes back to the’ requirement to contextualise and integrate the
rights into the legal system and culture of each jurisdiction. Tide need for precise definition
even xvhere there is broadly cotmnon content is not as great in a modal designed for
integration into a domestic legal system. It only becomes an issue where two systems
intersect. Tlfis will occur more often with the increase in infot~nation exchange, but it will
be up to the double tax agreements or specific information exchange agreements to deal
with fire cross-jarfisdictional issues.
The content will depend on the method of enforcement and in Chapters 6 to 8 rite
analysis tfigl~ghts the differences ha content depending on the classification of tide right as
administrative or legal. The analysis distinguishes where relevant between primary and
’Apparendy no compellhag case can be made for assuming that social objectives should be very different
ha develophag countries, thongh die political constrahats on feasible changes may be more perva.,dve and
harder to analyze, as they t)qpically affect the admidistration of the tax system in addidon to shaph~g its
desiga’. See D. Newbet3, and N. Stem (eds), The Theoo, of Taxation it~ Deve/opitg Co*retries (Ne~v York, OUP
for the World Bank, 1987), p. 202.
248
Ana~sis of Pffma~y Legal Rights
secondary figbts’and also, where there is administrative enforcement, between fights and
goals. However, because d~ere are significant variations in file forms of enforcement, it is
0~dy certain of file pfirnary legal fights wbich are considered separately and fttst in Chapter
6~ These must almost all be legislated and focus on the fundamental principles that underlie
the tax system. Thereafter, in Chapters 7 and 8, the rights are analysed following a
functional analysis. Chapter 7 covers the general powers of administration good
governance and administrative goals. Chapter 8 analyses general principles of
a~hnimstration, information gathering,, audit and investigation, assessment, sanctions and
enforced collection, and objection and appeaL3 The fundamental procedtttal rights (t~les 12
to 15 below) are also considered within these criteria. Although there is usually separate
legislation providing for these rights and it is often contained in the broadest sense in the
constitution, in file tax context these rigbts are most usefully considered in the context of
the significant subsidiary rights that support them.
The statthag point in determining file fights for inclusion in a modal is a sophisticated
tax system in an OECD country, but usually a system that has seen significant
development.4 The OECD has long emphasised ftmdamental fights in file legal process,
including tax regulation. Countries such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, file Utfited
States and Germany have legislated or codified much of the regnlation governing their tax
systems. They have also provided taxpayers with significant rights not available in man),
iutisdicfions. A review of file tax systems in competes such as these provides a broad
framework of rights. The rights are sotttced in fomaal law, administrative regulation and
statements of intent. Examples of file latter are the statements of taxpayer rights that are
published in countries sucl! as the United I(.kagdom, Canada, New Zealand and Australia.
Tins was the apl~roach taken m tim compaxattve analysis of taxpayers nglits m D. Benfle), Ta~7~a)ets
Rights: A~t l,tlet~t~a’liona! Perspective, above n. 1. It is also broadly tim format suggested in P. Baker and A-M.
Gtoenhagen, above n. 1, p. 37.
~[q~e last decades have seen significant reform of OECD tax systems at,d \vith it tlie expansion of
taxpayers’ rights, particularly primal3, and secondat3’ achninistrative rights. For an analysis of tax reform
See K.C. Messere, Tax PollO, & OECD Coutthies: Choices at*d Co~icls (Amsterdam, 1BFD Publications BV,
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The statements thetnselves have no force of law, but are indicative of the tights that are
seen as important.
The analysis in this chapter provides examples to support the tights included. It is
beyond the scope of tiffs thesis to provide examples from ever3, fantily of tax system,s The
examples chosen ate therefore illustrative only,
The basis for including a tight is one or more of: general ac£eptance of that tight in a
munber of jm:isdictions, xvhether legislative, administrative or judicial; inclusion in t~eaties
or other international documents; support from other sources such as academic and other
commentators; and general compliance with one or more of the principles set out in
Chapter 3, where this is appropriate. Although it may seem arbitxatO’, there is fairly broad
consensus on the protection that taxpayers should be afforded. The form and enforcement
of the tights identified is a matter for debate. Chapters 6 to 8 aim to provide a model wid~
analysis that xvill take fot~,atd the debate from a general acceptance and scattered
inaplementation of taxpayers’ tights to a ~rtore systematic recognition and implementation.
The chapters provide a tool to analyse the effectiveness of different tax systems in
providing taxpayers’ tights and to help identify gaps in the rights provided within those
systems.
II PPaMARY LEGAL RIGHTS
pmnat3, legal tights ate fimdamental to the operation of ti~e tax system and can be
identified separately from those witigm the tax system. For that reason, it is more difficult
to say that they are specific to taxation than it is for other taxpayers’ tights. PfimatT legal
1993).
For a description of fl~e different tax fan, lies, see V. Thuxonyi, Cb~tpa~tfi~e Tax Law (The Hague, Kluwel
Law International, 2003), ch. 2. See generally R. Da~id ~a~d J.E.C. Briedey, Major Legal Systems *n lhe I! odd
Today: A~ InOvductio~t to the Comparative Study of Law (3rd edn., London, Stevens & Sons, 1985).
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rights are usually found in constitutions, legislation protected by interpretation clauses, or
fatemational agreements. By nature they are concerned with lfigher order questions, such
as what makes a valid tax law.
For the pro-pose of tiffs thesis the emphasis is not on when a law is valid. The
asstunption is that the starting point is with a system wlffch has mechamsms to create valid
rules (legal or adn~inistrative) wlffch are enforceable. Wetlinan analyses the position set out
dins far in tiffs thesis:6
There ate three parties or classes of patties m any right. A first patty is anyone who
possesses tim tight. A second paty is anyone against wbom tim right holds. A tki~d
patty is anyone in a position to intervene in flxe presupposed cmxfrontation betxveen a
right-holder and a second party and side xviti~ one principal adversatT against the
other. The essential purpose or function of any legal right is to confer upon its
possessor a spedfic sort of donation over one or more potential adversaries. The
right aclfieves its purpose only if tim legal norms that define and confer it are
respected by timse subject to flae la\~ .....
Given the existence of valid tx~les, the next quesdon is what makes a good rule. Tiffs is a
moral question that has perplexed jurists for centtu:ies. An approach that asks what is a
good t~e is described by Cridcal Legal Studies scholar, Duncan Kennedy, as die ’natm’al
law approach,~ to detem~ine whether the rationale for the law makes sense. If it does not,
lie argues that this methodology requkes us ’to for~’nulate an alternative rationale that
satisfies us of dae radonalit3, and justice of the outcome’.8 It can be dis~aguished, for
example, from tile ctidcal approach that seeks to discover and deconstmct the underlying
modve belfind die original taw and die instrumental or interest analysis that analyses die
C. Welknan, A Theo0, of Righls: Petso~ts Ut~der Lows, Ittslitutio*ls attd Motels (Totowa, Rown’tan & ~Vllanheld,1985), p. 102.
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interests belfind the original laxv.9 The advantage of the approach taken here is that it
begins from a widely accepted position and Seeks to improve upon that position. It is not
the p~pose of this thesis to analyse whether the accepted position is a flawed staling
The jurisprudence of Lon Fuller provides useful guidance on the characteristics of a
good law once it is accepted as valid.1° Fuller helps to identi~, what a good rule looks like.
His discussion can be adapted to the context of tax laxv to determine the txlles that should
govern the formulation and interpretation of ’good’ tax law. Lon Fuller’s list of ’Eight
Ways to Fail to Make Law’ is a starting point,n Jurists may argue over whether the legal
system has failed if any of these rules is absent, but for titis thesis it is sufficient that fl~ey
raise some important issues in the context of taxpayers’ rights and what makes a ’good’ tax
law. Winston points out that Fuller’s critics disagree that these canons are part of the nature
of law or that they identify a necessat3r connection between law and moralit3’32 However,
they do not quibble with the proposition that the rtfles may be necessary or at least
beneficial for a legal system to succeed,t3 With tiffs caveat, it is acceptable to apply F~fller’s
argument that for a ruler who will fail to make ’good law’:14
D. Kermedy, ’The Smmmre of Blackstone’s Conm~entaries’ (1979) 28 Bt~ffalo Law Revietv, 209, 219.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Fulier’s approaclx was ctiticised by jurists such as FIa~t and Raz on the basis that Fuller failed in his
analysis of the special features of legal systems, i.e., in determining ’what is law?’. However, the criticisms
did not extend to the legitimacy of iris question, ’what are some of the criteria for iudg~ng xvhen a lawis a
good law?’.
L.L. Fu~er~ The M~ra/i~’ ~f ~m (L~nd~n~ Yale U~iversity Press~1964)~ P. 3 3. Whi~e n~t necessa~y agree~%
with Ftdlet, jurists have often used bis criteria as a starting point for thei* argttment. For example,
Fhufis, in Natura! L~1v and Natto~l Righls (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 270, begins there in
analysis of what is a legal system that exemplifies the role of law.
K.I. Winston, ’Innoduction’ in K.I. ~rmston (ed.), The PtitMples ~f 5"oral Order (Durham, NC, Duke
University Press, 1981), p. 11, p. 35. Raz draws on and expands Fuller’s rules in J. Raz, The AulhodO’
Law: Essays o~ I~w and Moralily (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979), 195 el .~eq. They are discussed extens veh"
by C. Sampford, Rettvsp~cliviO, atld the Parle of Law (OUP, Oxford, 2006), cb. 2 in the context of a broader
discussion on ’The Rule of Laxv’, xvhicb stmunar’ses many of the major theorists on the topic.
Ibid.
L.L. Fuller, above n. 11.
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There are in tiffs enterprise, if you will, eight distinct routes m disaster. The first and
most obvious lies ha a fifilure to achieve rules at all, so that ever}, issue must be
decided on an ad hoc basis. The other routes are: (2) a failure to publicise, or at least
to make available to the affected party, the rules he is expected to observe; (3) the
abuse of retroactive legislation, which not only cannot itself guide action, but
undercuts the integrity of rules prospective in effect, since it puts them under the
tt~reat of retxospective change; (4) a failure to make txtles understandable; (5°) the
enactment of contradictory rules or (6) rules that reqttire conduct beyond the powers
of the affected party; (7) introducing such frequent changes in the rules that the
subject cannot orient his action by them; and, finally, (8) a failure of congruence
between the rules as announced and their actual administration.
Each of tilese failitres provides a basis for a primar}, legal rule in a Model of Taxpayers’
Rights. Each role also reflects the basic principles that should underlie a tax system,
discussed in Chapter 3. They can be rephrased with the references to the basic principles in
brackets.
1. Tax must be imposed by law (tax roles should not be arbitrary).
2. Tax law must be published (tax rules should be transparent).
3. Tax law must not be inaposed retroactivdy (taxpayers should be able to anticipate in
advance the consequences of a transaction).
4. Tax law must be understandable (tax rules should be certain: clear and simple to
understand).
5. Tax law must not be contradictor}, (tax rules should be certain).
6. Taxpayers must be able to obey the law (tax tales should be effective and certain).
7. Frequent change must not undermine the tax law (tax rules should be certain).
8. Tax law must be applied (tax rules should be certain, fair, transparent and effective).
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In the context of tax laxv, txtles 4 to 8 focus on different aspects of the requirement for
certainty and the}, will be dealt with on this basis. Rules 1, 2 and 4 to 8 reflect the European
Court of Human Rights’ threefold test for detenv2Mng whether an interference with an
ECHR right is in accordance wit~ law3s It must have a basis in law, the law must be
accessible and the law must allow the consequences of an action to be foreseeable or
certain,t6
The following additional legal roles derive from the basic principles. They ate
consistently found in sot~tces of primary legal rules such as charters, of fights and
constitulions. They can be distingttished from secondary legal and administrative rules that
often give a different substance to a right expressed in similar terms.17
9. Taxpayers need pay no more than the correct amount of tax (tax rules should be
effective and certain).
10. Tax law should not impose double taxation (tax rules should be fair and effective).
11. Tax rules should not discrin~inate and there should be equality before the law (tax
roles should be fair and equitable).
12. Tax rules should safis~, the pfinciple ofproportionaliU (tax roles should be effective,
fair and equitable).
13. Taxpayers should have the fight to privacy (tax roles should be fair),
14. Taxqpayers should have the tight to confidentiality and secrecy (tax rules should be
fair).
15. Taxpayers should have the fight of access to information (tax roles should be fair).
C. Ovey and R.C.A. \Xqaite, Ja~bs & While European Conve*ttion on Human ~hts (3rd e~, Oxford, OUP,
2002), p. 201.
~6 Ibid.
17 FOr ex~nple tim fight of access to file co~ts is a ~ndament~ fight ~lat should have lfigher order
protec~on ~rough a constitution o*’ s~ar ~s~ment. ~e content of dmt ~ght of access ~ tax cases is
usury a secondaU, legal ~e concerned x~th fl~e ad~fistrafion of the tax system in flae context of d~e
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Taxpayers should have tl~e r{ght of access to the cotttts (tax roles shottld be fair),
which should demonstxate the following charactenistics:t8
(a) an independent and impartial tribunal;
(b) a fair and public heating;
(c) a fair t~;
(d) the right to remain silent;
(e) the right to representation; and
(D public judgment witlRn a reasonable time.
Primary legal rules provide the ffamexvotk for all other rules. Some of file 16 listed rules
may be collapsed more convei~ienfly into a rule that covers more than one concept. \~aere
tiffs occttrs in tim analysis it is clearly articulated. Each primarT legal rule provides file basis
for a number of subsidiary rules, xvhich are analysed in Chapter 8. Rules 13 to 16 are
considered togefller with their subsidiary rules also in Chapter 8.
A Tax must be imposed by Law
As noted in Chapter 2, the right to tax is founded in recognition of individual property
tights. The corollary is that infringements on property rights by tile state, whatever their
pMosophical basis, must be sanctioned by law39 The primary requkement for the
operation of a tax system is therefore that there is a legal basis for file exaction of tax. Tiffs
\\ddet court process.
The European Conventon, Art. 6 for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (t950)
(ECHR). Raz explores the importa**ce of the role of the courts to the Me of law, above n. 12, p. 198. It is
assumed for tttis analyals that courts exist and operate in accordance \~4th the basic tenets of the rule of
law. If they do not, it is not specifically an issue for the framework of rules governh*g taxation, but a more
general question as to whether there is an operational legal system at all.
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is seen as such a ftmdamental tenet of the legal system that the power to tax is usually given
constitutional sanction with a zeqt~ement that tax is imposed by law.
A history of the defence of the requirement to tax under the laxv reveals some of the
most significant developments that have led to modern democracy. The English Civil War
was driven in part by the move to end tire sovereign’s prerogative to tax.2° In 1789, Article
13 of the French Declaration of Hmnan Riglrts spedfically provided for taxation as the
means by wltich governments can maintain public order and cover their administrative
expenses.2t The beginnhags of the American Revolution were attributable ha part to the
imposition of taxes by the British Government without reference to the elected American
legislatures. Even xvhere a tax is legislated, the response of the people can reverse it, as
occurred xviti~ the ’Poll Tax’ in the United Igingdom, wltich arguably spurred movement
towards decentralisation of political power22
This emphasis on the principle of legality for taxation is found in tnany
constitutions.23 In tmitatT systems the constitutional provisions focus on legality. In federal
systems the constitutional underpintting of the principle of legality in tax matters is
reinforced by the rules governh~g jurisdiction to impose tax.
19 For example, ECIq2R Art. 1 of the First Protocol (as amended), xvlrch proxddes for the entitlement to
peaceful enjoyment of possessions, specifically excepts the right of a state to secttre the payment of taxes
or other contributions or penalties, but it only does so if there is a legal basis for its action. There are also
requirements that the measttres taken am in the general interest of the state a~d are proportionate, when
balancing the individual arid general interests. See M. Buquiccltio-de Boer, above n. l, p. 59.
.,0 As noted in F. Vanistendael, ’Legal Framewozk for Taxation’ in V. Tburon)d (ed.), vol. 1, Tax Law Desigt~
attd Dtz~i~g (Washington DC, LMF, 1996 and 1998), p. 15, p. 16, starting with the 1628 Petition of Rights
and end[tag with the acknowledgement in 1689 of the BR1 of Rights. For an excellent analysis of later
developments, see M. Datmton, Tt~¢slittg Leviatba*t: The Polities of Taxation itt Btitaitt, !799-1914 (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2001), and Just Taxes: The Polilics of’Fax-atiott i# B*itai#, 1914-1979 (Cambridge,
Cambridge Utfiversity Press, 2002).
Orgatrsation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Ta~,Tba.)’et:¢’ Rights attd Ob[igations
(Paris, OECD, 1990), p. 10.
~a For an account of the rise and fall of the poll tax (more properly, the cotmnunit3, charge) see D. Williams,
Taxatiom A guide lo theoO, a~td pmctice m lhe Uttited K_ittgdom (London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1992), cb. 1.
z~ For example, in the constimrons of Australia (s. 51), Belgium (art. 170), Canada (at*. 91(3), France (art
34), Itall, (art. 23), Mexico (art. 31), and Spain (art. 133). I-I. A~butina, ’Taxation i~, Croatia: Developments
in the Field of Taxpayers’ Rights and Obligations’, in D. Bentley, Taa,;~ao’etx Rights: An httenmtionat
Pe,~Oective, above n. 1, p. 138, p. 151, identifies the legality principle in countries in transition as
important basic criterion for the admkfistxafion and assessment of tax.
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The German constitation for example gives exclusive legislative power to the Federal
Govetamaent over custotns duties and financial monopolies and taxes can only be inaposed
by law’24 The Federal Goverrmaent also has priority in legislathlg where both it and the
L~flder have jurisdiction.25 Tiffs means that the Federal Govermnent may legislate where it
is entided m at least some of the revenue from taxes or if file subject matter affects the
equality of life or lega! or economic unity of file com~try.26 The Lfinder have exclusive
jtu:isdicdon over local excise and similar non-essential taxes.27 Riidler notes that die
Bundesrat, or Council of States, can and does block taxation laws proposed by the
Bundestag (Federal Parliament)28
The most inaportant issue, once the principle of legality is established, is its
interpretation. Thuronyi identifies five areas that have given rise to dispute:~9
1. Where taxes are imposed by administxafive regulation.
2. Where revenue authorities enter into individual agreements xvith taxpayers and it is
argued that file tax is then not imposed by the role of law.
3. Where revenue authorities are given unlimited admhfistrafive discretion to decide
whether to grant a tax privilege.
4. Where it is argued that judges are required to interpret tax law strictly to avoid
effectively making tax law themselves.
5. Where tax laws must be renewed annually.
~ Grundgesetzatt. 105(1), and Btmdes-Verfasstmgsgesetz Art. 18.
z~ Grundgesetz art. 74.
~6 GtundgesetzAtficles 105(2) and 72(2).
a See f~ther, C. Daiber, ’Protection of Taxpayers’ Rights in Germany’ in D. Bentley, Taxpayers" Rt~hls: An
hl&~mtionalPetapective, above n. 1, p. 152, p. 153 and A.J. R~dler, ’General Desc~ption: Germany’ in H.J.
’mlt, Corn     ~                              na sts m Ha e Kluwer Law Internauonal 1997    49ib     ’pamli~ e Income Taxaliot~: A S/tr~ctttm/ A ~ " (T]    gu ,                   ’    ,    ), p. ¯
z~ V. Thuronyi, above n. 5, 4.3.2.
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The last point, as Thuxonyi points out, relates to the budget process and is not a general
principle.3° W]aat it does do is reqcfire the legislature to make a conscious decision to ratiO,
the continued application of the tax laws in place as well as any new budget and other
provisions. ~qaile this nfight be a useful discipline, it is not essential to d~e protection of the
principle of legality.
The first d~ree points go to the nab of the content of a rule reqttiring legality. They
are concerned with the scope that the revenue authorities have to make decisions that
require the exercise of a broad discretion. More specifically, they raise the question as to
bow much discretion a revenue authority can be given before it is usmping the principle of
legality.
The Get:than requixement3t that tliere should be a legal basis for an}, adn~nisttadve
act, including tax assessment and collection is mirrored in many countries, particularly cMl
law countries. In France and the Netherlands, for example, the tax departments of the
Ministry of Finance explain and interpret statutes and decrees, but cannot set new rotes)~
The Swedish constitution appears to be even more stringent in the limitations it in,poses
on delegated authority.33
In common laxv jurisdictions, subject to the operation of Bills of Rights, there tends
to be significantly more scope for delegation and discretion. In Canada,34 Australia3s and
Nexv Zealand,36 for example, the revenue authorities are charged with the management of
the tax system and have substantial discretion. However, the discretion does not extend to
Ibid. ~i3ie principle is found in art. 171 of the Belgian Constitution.
Grmxdgesetz Art. 20(3), and see F. Vanistendael, above n. 20, p. 17.
G. Gest, ’General Description: France’ in H.J. ANt,. above n. 27, p. 39, p. 45 and A. van Rijn, ’A
Comparative Stud}, of Taxpayer Protection in Five Member Countries of the Ettropean Union’ ha 1).
Albregtse and H.P.A.M. van ±~:endonk, above n. 1, p. 45, p. 46.
P. Melz, ’General Description: Sweden’ in H.J. Atilt, above n. 27, p. 97, p. 103 and see A. Httitq~dSt,
’Taxpayers’ Rights in Sxveden’ in D. Bendey, Tax7~a3,oa’Rights:A*~ Internatio**alPmpective, above n. 1, p. 299
B.J. ,M-nold, ’General Description: Canada’ in I-LJ. Atilt, above n. 27, p. 25, p. 33.
For example, Income "Fax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), s. 8; Taxation Administxadon Act 1953 (Cd~), s
3A, and Fringe Benefits Tax Assessment Act 1986 (Cth), s. 3.
Tax Administration Act 1994, s. 6A
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t~le-maki£g, which is often a point of some contention between taxpayers and revenue
The UK seems to give still greater latitude to the Inland Revenue Commissioners to
exercise discretion, including extra-statutory concessions)8 Walton J questioned the legality
of dlese powers in Vestey v. IRC,39 but McNeill J in R v. IRC, ex paste Fulford-Dobsot?°
suggested diat they fali wiflfin the exercise of the Commissioners’ managerial discretion.41
williams suggests that a broader exercise of discretion has been encouxaged by the lack of
constitutional protection and may change over time with the application of the Human
Rights Act 1998 to tax matters.4~
Thuronyi’s second and third points are similar. Whether a revenue authority has the
power to enter into an agreement with an indixddual taxpayer or can grant a general
privilege such as a tax anmesty to a group or class of taxpayers raises the question of the
proper extent of delegation.43 For taxpayers there is a problem where they can be
disadvantaged by such delegation. Usually, negotiation of an agreement or the grant of a
privilege, such as an arm~esty, results m the reduction of tax payable and is thus more likely
to disadvantage other taxpayers rather than those receiving the benefit.
This may be unfair to other taxpayers and result in inequity, such that taxpayers in
exactly d~e same fiscal position are treated unequally. For example, through profligacy a
taxpayer may not have sufficient funds to pay tax owiaag and as part of an audit the revenue
auflmrity may reduce die amount payable under a scheme of arrangement. Argnably, a
general privilege is prefet~red as it ensures consistency between taxpayers in the same
~ B.J. Arnold, above n. 34. In Austrafia, the introduction of a legal basis for the rulings made by flie ATO in
1992 i~ conjunction with dm introduction of self-assessment was largely in ~:esponse to a need for legal
certainty.3s Discussed more fury in A. van Rijn, above n. 32.
~ [1978] Simon’s Tax Cases, 575, saying that be was ’totally uamble to understand on what basis tim hfland
Revenue Commissinners are entitled to make extta-stata~toiy concessions’.
Ibid., p. 344.
ibid..p. 351.
p~ \’(rtlliams, ’United Kingdom Tax Collection: Rights of and Against Taxpayers’ in D. Bentley, Ta:,Tbayets’
’gbts: An Intet~mtionalPet~e~tive, above n. 1, p. 331, p. 332, p. 345.
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situation. However, it is also inconsistent vis ~ vis the majority of taxpayers that have not
put themselves in a position that );eqrfires a pfixdlege to be given. Exercise of delegated
adi~aistrative prover m this way may be designated as arbitrat3’ in that it goes beyond the
interpretation and implementation of the law.
The difficulty lies in balancing the demands of a complex modern administxation,
where it is impossible fox the legislature to determine how and where each rule is to apply,
with the need for certainty and fairness for taxpayers. Both benefit from some flexibilit3, in
the exercise of delegated authority, particularly to ameliorate the utaintended effects of
legislation and to assist in voluntat’y compliance. Neither benefits in the long run from the
exercise of delegated authority that stretches the intent of the law. It may be practically
simpler, but it is unsustainable to argue d~at die basic pmxciple of effectiveness should
override the principles of eqttity, fairness and certainty, particularly where to do so
undermines the operation of tile rule of law.~4
The 1990 OECD sut~my xvas cognisant of dais concern and identified which of die
smx,eyed countries’ revenue authorities had: discretion to waive or reduce a taxpayer’s tax
liability or alloxv grace periods for payment; and the power to negotiate the level of tax
penalty applicable to the taxpayer.45 Waiver poxvets were fimited in almost all cotmmes,
except by statute but there were vat3fimg levels of latitude in all countries to allow some
grace period in die payment of tax in cases of hardship.4~ There was significant divergence
in the ability to negotiate die level of tax penalty and, where it was permissible, in the
grounds for doing so.
A right to be included in a model ca~mot take an extreme position unless it is
accepted that the extreme is both beneficial and likely to become a common standard.
F. Vamstendael, above n. 20, p. 18.
See tim discussion suppozting Otis approach in Fiscal Affairs Department, Mattltal on Fiscal 7¥w~spatrtI!l
(Wasl~t~gton DC, 1Mt~, 20011, p. !9. Also available at <wxxav.imf.org/extemal/work-htm>, 20 Octobe~
2006. (IblF Code).
OECD, above n. l, p. 57.
?although even the period of waiver is set down by statute in some countries, such as Ireland, ibid., p. 58
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Given the range of approaches to the prhaciple of legality and the delegation of prover to
.~&~m-listrators to make rules, it is helpful to consider the issues m the context of Article 6
EcPlR and subsequent consideration of the nature of a criminal charge in the Netherlands
and French nadonat courts.
Ardcle 6 ECHR provides the tight to ~ fair trial with associated rights to everyone
charged with a criminal offence. The assttmpdon is that criminal offences are hnposed by
law, that is, the legality principle. The question in point here is what constitutes a criminal
charge that is subject to Article 6? Ovey and White note that the concept of a ’criminal
cha~ge’ is given an autonomous meaning by the European Court of Human Rights so that
states cannot avoid ’Convention controls by classifying offences as disciplinary,
a&rdnist~ative or civil matters’.47 A modal of taxpayers’ rights, although a standard and not
an enforceable treat3,, also needs to give autonomous meatling to the concept of
permissible delegation to a revenue authorit3,.
In Etgel and others v. Nether/a~lda4s the Court examined disciplinary action taken against
metnbers of die ataned forces in the Netherlands to deterTnine xvhether they constituted
criminal charges under Ardcle 6 or an admhtistrative offence. The Court took into account
the nature of die offence, the severit3, of die sanction and the size of die group targeted. In
Bende~toutt v. France49 the Court examined the French system of tax surcharges to determine
whether it fell within the ambit of an Ardcle 6 criminal charge. The Court found that the
surcharges were: imposed under a general rule both to deter and punish; vet’}, substantial
and could lead to inlprisonment; and utliversat, covering all taxpayers. The Court had
already held that a criminal charge need not lead to imprisomnent,s°
I~ C. Over and R.C.A. White, above n. 15, p. 140.
~ Judgm{nt of 8 June 1976, Series A, No. 22; (1979-80) l EHRR 647. See furflmr, C. Ovey and R.C.A.
R~te, ibid.
~ J~dgment of 24 February 1994, Series A, No. 284; (1994) 18 EHRR 54.
~ Ozliirk ~. Germa~, Judgment of 21 February 1984, Series A, No. 73; (1984) 6 EHRR 409 and La~¢k0 v.
SlO!,akia (App 26138/95), Judgment of 2 September 1998.
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The Supreme Court m the Netherlands found in 1985 that where a tax inspector
increases an assessment in the foY-m of a major fine it is a ctinfinal charge, applying the
Oztiirk decision.5a The French Co,tseil d’~ta! made a similar finding in the M&ic case.s~- Once
a tax penalty hnposed by a tax inspector is recognised as a criminal charge it is then subject
to a wide range of safeguards imposed both domestically and under the ECHR.s3
In the ct~ainal context, a charge moves from adininistxafive to legal based on the
nature of the offence, the severity of the penalty and the breadth of application. By analogy
it is arguable that the framework for the operation of an administrative discretion should be
spelt out in law where the content and matter of the discretion is significant, the bh~ding
quality or effect is substantial and the potential application is broad. To take an example,
where a tax inspector has broad discretion to determine a xvide range of tax penalties:
The matter of the discretion is significant both for taxpayers and for the effectiveness
of the revenue authority’s compliance program.
The effect of the discretion can be substantial for the individual taxpayer, the
standard of voluntatT compliance, and the amount of revenue collected.
It potentially applies to all taxpayers.
The legality principle does not limit the use of adininistxative discretion. It does provide a
legal basis for the application of a general legal rttle to particular cases and gttidance as to
how that application should occur,s4 In co*rmaon law jurisdictions, legislation has
traditionally been distinguished from executive action on the basis that:ss
E. Pechler, Fiscal Administrative Sanctions’ in D. Albregtse and H.P.A.M. van Arendonk, above n. 1, p
75.
Co~seld Etat, 31 March 1995, Dmit Fiscal 1995. No. 18 18, comm. 106 (Mhic), cited ibid.
C. Ovey and R.C.A. Wlfite, above n. 15, p. 142. ~Mthough mud~ of the jurisprudence of both fl~e
E*tropean Court of Human Rights and the domesdc courts is concerned with limiting die extent of
criminal charges to encourage decriminalization, the question of legality remains.
A. Huhqvist, LegalilelgptitMpe1, vid ittkomslbegkalltlittgett (Stockholm, Jmistf6rlaget,1995)’ p" 393 n°tes that ~¢i
Sweden it is beyond the poxver of the National Tax Board (revenue auflmfit3’) to give an interpretatiola
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Legislative activit3, involves flxe process of formulating general rules of conduct
~viflaout reference to particular cases (and usually operating prospectively), wlfile
executive action involves tile process of performing particttiar acts, issuing particular
orders or matting decisions fllat apply general rules to particular cases.
How can executive or administrative action be distinguished more specifically from that
requiring legislation? The Australian Administrative Review Council suggested a fl~*ee-
pronged test based on file content of the matter to be ruled on, file binding quality of the
instrument and fire generality of its application,56 This supports the approach taken in the
European Court of Human Rights and in the domestic courts of its signatories.
Thuscon}d’s fourth point that disputes have arisen over a judge’s capacity to make tax
law using a broad interpretation of the law titrough the cases returns to the differences
between legal famtiies. Even within the common law family, tire difference in approach
between the US Supreme Court and the House of Lords or tim High Cmttt of Australia is
substantial and courts witi~ ti~e same jurisdiction can often have different styles,s~
The legislature and the judiciat3, ate two arms of govet’~maent. They act as a check on
tile executive.S8 From a tax-payer’s perspective, if fire judiciar3, takes a strong purposive
approach to interpretation that leads to a different interpretation of flae tax Law from the
conmmn expectation, it can undermine certainty. However, titis goes to tire hub of fire
(even where it has discretion) that is either less or more favourable than that set out by law.
_ interpretation outside the nottnal area of meaning is beyond its authority.
~ The Donoughmore Conmdttee on Mi~tisters’ Powers of the United Kingdom Parliament (Report, 1932,
Cmd 4060), cited in D. Pearce and S. Argument, Ddegated Legislation i~t Amtmlia (2nd edn., Sydney,
Buttetxvorths, 1999), p. 1.
P~de makittg by Commomvealth Age~tde* (Parliamentar), Paper No. 93 of 92) 20, cited in D. Pearce and S.
¯ ~gument, ibid., p. 2.
~ It is the subject of popular and political debate. Tiffs is particularly e~ident where an appointment to the
highest court can have sigttificant L’npact on the shape of legislation. See, e.g., ’Statistical modeLing: The
Wisdom of Hercules’, The EconotMst, 27 August 2005, p. 69, wlfich describes research hito maps of legal
precedent to determine the effect of precedent on the US Supreme Com’t in line with R. Dwo~kin’s
seatrdess web of the law: R. Dwotldn La s Empire (London, Fonta ia Press, 1986), oh. 7.
st See IMF Code, above n. 44, 1.1.2 and the explanation, p. 10-i1.
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constitutional structure of the state. Taxpayers’ tigbts are realistically going to have tittle
impact on this aspect of the debatd. It is far more inaportant that an}, model of taxpayers’
rights focuses on the need for checks on the executive to uphold the legality principle. The
form of those checks, whether through the legislature or judiciat3, xvill depend upon the
constitutional structure and approach of the particular jurisdiction.
In sma~maty, it is possible to identify the key constituents of the legality p~inciple:
1. A tax ha its broadest sense must be imposed by law.s9 It hdps to have tiffs principle
embodied in the constitution, but otherwise it shoafld be stated expressly in the main
taxing act, or ha indixddual taxing acts xvhere they are separate and independent.
2. The structure of a tax system requ.ires rules governing tax administration, collection
and enforcement, xvhich grant to the revenue authority administrative discretion in a
wide range of different contexts.
3. The n~es should provide limits on the exercise of all discretion6° and a precise
framework for the exercise of any discretion where:
(a) the content and matter of the discretion is significant;
(b) the binding quality or effect is substantial; and
(c) the potential application is broad.
It could be a*gued that dais protection is embodied in administrative law. However, it goes
beyond an analysis of administrative discretion and the relevant adi~inistrative law
safeguards. It is fundamental to the principle of legality. The operation of Article 6 ]gCHR
shows that how discretion is exercised can determine xvhether or not a taxpayer is taxed
Ibid., 1.2.2.
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a~d how much. It is therefore essential to provide a legal basis for xvhat is effectively
aOninistrative regulation, as well as for legislative regulation.
The UK may have sun4ved without a written constitution for centtuies. However, it
has had tile benefit of those centuries to work out the delicate balance between tile
executive and taxpayers. For countries that are still developing their systems and finding
fl~at balance, file operation of the rule of law and file consistent application of file legality
principle is a precursor to the existence of genuine taxpayers’ tiglits. The benefit to those
countries is flint on a political levd it enhances ’file legithnacy of the political group in
power’.61 Arbutina argues that it has file added advantage of transforming ’taxpayers from
tim objects of the exercise of state power to subjects participating, fl~rough file formulation
of lliei* rights and obligations, in the shaping of their situation’.62
B Publicalion of Rules
It is self-evident that it is particularly important to taxpayers that all t~les governing file tax
system are compiled and publicised.6~ Tax systems usually suffer from an overabundance
of roles and if there is no dug, to publish them, the obvious result is that it is difficult for
taxpayers to comply. Taxpayers should be given cun~ent infoianation ’on file operation of
fl~e tax system and the way in wlfich their tax is assessed’.64 They should also be informed
about flleir appeal rights.
Ibid.
G.P. Jenki,~s, ’Modernization of Tax Administrations: Revenue Boards and P~ivatizalion as Insmmxents
for Change’ (1994) 48 IBFD Bul/eti~I, 75.
H. ~bulina, above n. 23, p. 151.
It is emphasised by most cormnentamrs on tax administration, particularJy flmse concerned xvith its
development in non-OECD countries. See, e.b, R.K. Gordon, ’Laxv of Tax Administration and
Procedure’ Ln V. Thuronyi, above n. 20, p. 95, p. 100 and R.A. LeBaube and C.L. Vehom, ’Assisthxg
Taxpayers ~n Meeting "I]~ei* Obligations Under the Law’ in R.M. Bird and M. Casenegza de Jantscher
(eds), lmflmvi, tg Tax-Admf*dstra!iot~ in Developi*tg Com~tties (X~"astlington DC, D, IF, 1992), p. 310, p. 314. See
also IMF Code, above n. 44, 1.2.2 and the explm*ation, pp. 18-19.
OEcD, above n. l, p. 12.
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The point is not as obxdous ha practice as it first seems. It is only relatively recently, in
some jm’isdictions, that many of the internal rules applied by the tax authorities ha
adn~fistering the tax system have become available to taxpayers. South Africa is an
example.6s In jurisdictions such as Japan, much of the detail as to how the tax authorities
operate is arguably still unknown.66
In many OECD jurisdictions, the volume of information available is overwheliuing.
The Internet has assisted siguificanfly in developing transparency and the publication of
vast amounts of information that may or may not be relevant to individual taxpayers. It is
therefore important that there is some guidance to the information published. In less
sophisticated tax jurisdictions it is vital that the information made available to taxpayers is
targeted and specific to their particular knowledge requirements. Othetxvise taxpayers may
not have the skills to identify what the roles are even though they are freely available. Tlie
result is then the same as if publication had not occurred.67
The problem becomes more acute where there are low literacy levels among
taxpayers. There is a tendency to concentrate on indirect taxation in developing countries,
usually a consumption tax, as the means of raising revenue from less educated, low-income
taxpayers.68 The education process during the period of in~plementafion is critical and can
focus on radio, telm~ision and other accessible media. Thereafter, little ongoing education is
requited for the average taxpaying consumer. An alternative to direct collection from flmse
See B. Croome, ’Constitutional Law and Taxpayers’ Rights ha South Africa - An Ovetnqexv’ [2002] Acta
JtMdica 1 ,’rod R.C. \Klilliams, ’Taxpayers’ Rights ha South Africa’ ha D. Bentley, Ta~7~ayet:t’ Rt~hts: A*I
Inlen~alionalPe~apective, above n. 1, oh. 11.
See K. Istrimura, "The State of Taxpayers’ RJghts ha Japan’ ha D" BenfleY, Tax;sayetz’ Rt~hts: A*t ltttet~ali°t*al
PeraTbeclive
, 
above n. 1, ch. 9 and for an alternative view, M. Nakazato and M. Ramseyer, ’General
Descnpttun: Japan H.J. Ault, above n. 27, p. 7t, p. 77.
This is an old technique ha litigation where discover3’ of documents can produce literally mmkloads of
information, in which the relevant documents are carefully tfidden ha obscttre places to escape easy
detection. Sir Humphrey Appleby parodied the teclmique when concealing important papers for signatate
anmng flmse of less consequence ha fl~e Prime Mknister’s ’Red Boxes’ ha the 1980s television show ’Yes
Prime M~ster’.
See generally, A. Tait, Vab¢e Added Tax; I*goT~atio~tal Ptuclice a**d Problems (Wastthagton D~, IMP, ! 988). For
the hacreasing trend towards the ha~plementafion of a VAT, see I13FD, A*mua/Repo~l, wluch publishes each
},ear a worldwide sun’ey of developmet~ts and trends ha international t~xafion. See also, e.g., ’IMF
Conmmnds VAT Introduction in Cameroon’ (1999) 18 Tax" Nole* l~len,alional, 1770 and ’IMF Welcomes
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whose education, background and fiteracy makes it most difficult to explain the compliance
requirements that exist in a complex modem tax system is to use third pardes such as
employers and financial institutions to collect tax on the taxpayer’s behalf.69
However, as aid and state economic development programs target small business and
dte development of an entrepreneurial sector, there is a commensurate increase in tile
number of taxpayers required to comply x~dth more complex tax rules.T° In countries where
die literacy rate is low and participation in education is predominandy limited to the
pr~tnatT level, it becomes a serious challenge for governments and revenue authorities to
make the t’ules available to taxpayers in a comprehensible form.71
Ahnost as hnportant as the publication of roles is the mariner of publication. Usually
govenunents publish legislation and delegated legislation together with explanatot3,
tuaterial. However, it is seldom easily accessible. It is left to the revenue authorities and
comnlercial printers to distribute tile z’tiles and infomaation explaining them. In most
OECD countries the growth in the complexity of tax legislation has spawned a burgeotfing
tax industry comprising the revenue authorities, taxpayers, adxdsors, publishers, trainers,
acadetlfic institndons, media specialists and more. The Internet has exacerbated the
reformation flow, but has been a boon to revenue authorities. As taxpayers and their
advisors gain read), access to the Internet, the revenue autho~city website becomes a focal
point to obtain authoritative information.
Tanzania’s VAT’ (1999) 18 Tcrx’Noleslntemationa], 1675.
Variants on a Pay As You Earn System are standard for employees in most jurisdictions. Other forms of
third part3, collection have been widely accepted for many years, although not without difficulty in many
developkag countries that do not have tim administrative and physical infrastructure and resources to
support its in~plementadon. See, e.g., L. Fernando Ramlrez Acitfia, °P~ivadzation of Tax Administration’ in
R.M. Bird and M. Casenegra de Jantscher, above n. 63, p. 377.
~’~ For example, M. McKercbar, L.R. Ingraham and S. Karlinsky, "Tax Complexity and Small Business: A
Comparison of dm Perceptions of Tax Agents in tim United States and Austrafia’ (2005) Journal of
Australian Taxation, 289; T.J. Bardk, ’Small Business Start-Ups in the United States: Estimates of the
Effects of Characteristics of States’ (1989) 55 Southern EcottomicJottma], 1004; and J.L. Guyton, A. Kindlon
and J.A. Zbou, ’Recent Research on Small Business Compliance Burden’ in Nadonal Tax Association,
~
Proreedit~g,: Nineo, Sevenlh Ammal Co*tfemwe 2004 (kX~aslfington DC, Nadonal Tax Association, 2005), p. 395.
See, e.g., K. Yuldnobu and T.IC Sarker, ~Ieclmical Ass’stance in F’scat Pofic) and Tax A~hninistration in
Developing Com~tdes: The State of Nature in Bangladesh’ (2002) 8 Asia-Padflc Tax- Btdktin, 278.
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This highlights an important caveat on the publication of rules, Information and
explanation of the rules must be published in an impartial and unbiased manner. In
Australia in 2005, for example, the Inspector-General of Taxadon constituted an inqu~,into bias in ATO rulings,v2 If there is bias in the publication by tbe revenue authotit3,
’
taxpayers are made aware not of the rules with *vbich they must comply, but the revenue
authority’s interpretation of those txdes. This can lead to a completely different outcome
for the taxpayer and effectively undermines the constitutional separation of powers.
The growing complexity of tax rules reqttires that the infotTnation is also available to
those charged with administering the tax system so that they can proxdde accurate,
consistent and comprehensive service to taxpayers.73 Revenue authorities invest
considerable amounts in training and equipping staff with an accurate understanding of the
law and their role in implementing it, although in developing countries it is but one of a
number of areas making demands on lhnited resources.74 Internal publication to the large
group of revenue authority persormel responsible for implementing the law and exercising
discretion under the law is cridcal to the effective application of the ,xdes. Taxpayers must
have reassurance that there is a high qualit3~ publication of the rules internally to revenue
authority staff as xvell exterually.
If rules ate not published accurately or completely it can also impact on the capacity
of those charged with adjudicating fl~em. An adjudicator must bare access to a complete
set of rules or it undermines the process of adjudication and the office of the adjudicator.
’Re~dexv of the Potential Revenue Bias ha Private Binding Rulings Lnvolving Large Complex Matters’.
<Wxvw.igt.gov.au>, 1 November 2006.
See R.A. LiBaube and C.L. Vehom, above n. 63.
See R.M. Bird and M. Casenegra de Jantscher, ’Reform of Tax Administration’ and A. Sclflemenson,
’Organizational Structure and Hmnan Resources ha Tmx Admitfistration’ in R.M. Bird ar*d M. Casenegra
de Jantscher, above n. 63, oh. 1 and cb. 1t. In the same volume, E. T~raloch-Reid, ’Comments’, p. 111
describes development itfitiafives for tin,: auditors in ]amaica; and C.E. McLure Jr and S. Pardo P~
’Improving the Adnfiaistration of Colombian Income ;Fax, 1986-88’, p. 124 describes the creation of a
National Tax School ha Colombia to provide tax law training for bofl~ the public and prtvate sectors. Tins
mirrors developments ha OECD countries, where tmiversities and professional bodies provide training
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Non-relroac~ive Rules
A p~oblem fundamental to taxadon is retroactive or retrospective legislation. The terms are
used differendy in different jurisdictions, but Sampford, in his comprehensive study, finds
0t~ analysis that there is no effective differetlce in trleaning between the ten-ns.7s He defines
retroactive or retrospective laws as ’laws which alter lheflttm~ legal cottseque**ces ofpasl acliot~s
aM eventa~.v6 One of the tenets of most legal systems is that certain legislation should not
have retroactive effect. This flows from die prohibition on retroactive cdminal laws in
international instruments such as Article 15 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and Ardcle 7 ECHR. The courts have interpreted these provisions as an extension
of tlie principle of legalit3~: an), provision audlotizing interference with an individual tight
should be sufficiendy precise to render die interference ’in accordance with die law’.77
However, Ovey & White note that for Atdcle 7 ECHR, ’the Strasbourg case law shows
that a cringe has to be very loosely defined indeed before the Court will find a violation of
tits pmvisinn.’v8
As Article i of Protocol 1 (as amended) ECHR requires only that diere be laws
sec~ing die payment of taxes, their retroactivity or otherwise is not specifically taken into
account trader the Convention.79 In Naliotml & Pmvindal Bui/di~g Soc_ie(y attd othets v. Ut*ited
Kitgdom,~° the European Court of Human Rights upheld retroactive tax legislation. It found
that retroactive legislation introduced in 1991 and 1992 served to carry out the intention of
the 1986 UK Parliament by filling in gaps left by the o~iginal legislation. Parliament did not
and qualifications for both sectors, e.g., The Chartered Institute of Taxation in the UK and ATAX h~
Australia.
C. Sampford, above n. 12, ch. 1, qDefirdng Retrospectivity’.
Ibid., p. 22.
C. Ovey and R.C.A. Wlfite, above n. 15, p. 191.
Ibid.
See D.J. Harris, M. O’Boyle and C. Watbfick, Lain of the Ettt~pea~t Co*~ventio*t o~1 Human* Righls (1995,
London, Buttet~vorths), p. 537.
(1998) 25 EH[RR. 127.
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act m~teasonably as the legislation serced a legitimate propose. The legislation was also
proportionate in that it struck a fair balance between the taxpayer and the state.81
Most international instrxm~ents protecting hmnan fights take a similar approach,
reset~dng the tight to tax within the law to the member states.s2 This is reflected in
domestic law. Vanistendael notes that, ’in most countries, the principle of non*etroactivit],
is obsetaTed not as a legally binding principle ... but as a principle of tax policy that the
legislature follows as it considers appropriate.’s3 The 1990 OECD sun, ey, however, states
that as a matter of principle, tax laws should normally not be retroactive as taxpayers
should know what the consequences of an action will be before taking it.84
The nature of tax law is such that it is difficult to legislate against rettoactivit3’. Tax
law is not restricted to a single transaction or event. It is generally applied over thne and a
change in the laxv will almost alxvays have some past as xvell as future econonfic effect.8s
For example, it is fairly common for a goverm-nent to announce in its annual budget that
tax rates x*~ change from a pa~ticulax date. The legislative process can be slow xvhere a
government cannot easily command a majority in the legislature to pass its legislation and
sometimes the legislation authofising third pa~ties, such as employers, to make deductions
of tax at the new rates has not come into force by the dtue those deductions should be
made.86 Legally, deductions cannot be made, but if the law has retroactive effect, penalties
may subsequendy apply for failure to deduct. The UK ext~a-statutot3’ concessions or other
adngmisttative arrangements that Badge the law are the simplest response.8~ However, it is
an inappropriate mechatfism and undermines the principle of legal}t3’-
81 Discussed in P. Baker, ’Taxation and the Em~opean Convention on Human Rights’ [2000] British Tax
Ret&lv, 211,225. .
. ..
~ ....
am Camb*id~’e Lalt louma157(2) 273.
~2 J. Tile},, ’l-Iuman Rtgbts aim ¯ axpa~ ers k~ vvo~ ~s
83 F. Vanistendael, above n. 20, p. 24. The exceptions include Bdgimn and F~:ance, wifich may pmx4de
specifically for re~oacti~dty in the tax code.
84 OECD, para. 2.2I.
Discussed fttrthet hi F. Vanistendad, above, n. 20.
Australia has faced tliis issue on a munber ° f °ccasi°ns in recent years xx4th different taxes"
ATO, Admhtislmlive TreatmeM o.[ Retrospective Legislation (Canberra, ATO, 1994), available m~der
Professionals’, <w~v.ato.gov.an>, 20 October 2006.
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Some retroactivity is beneficial to taxpayers, xvhere it makes teclmical corrections to
lawS passed in error, clarifies the law or overturns a judickal decision that goes against past
practice.88 More commonly, tax laxv is passed retroactively to counter tax avoidance or to
p~event taxpayers having a windoxv of opportunity to take advantage of tax schemes
between the armouncement of legislation cotmte~ng them and the inaplementation of the
law.
In Australia, there is a history of aggressive tax avoidance to exploit loopholes in the
law, encouraged for some years by the courts, which used a fur:realistic approach to
statutory interpretation.~9 The Govet’mnent has overcome tiffs problem through its wide-
ravaging general anti-avoidance role.9° However, the previous culture remains of using a
statutory response to any issue that may represent a risk to the revenue.91 There is no
constitutional or legal impediment ~0 retroactive legislation of tax laxvs. Faced with tax
arrangements that fal] within the law, but which represent a risk to the revenue, the
Government legislates to fill the gap ia~ the law. This is usually given effect by
announcement that legislation will be introduced in an area to achieve a particular effect. In
principle, this appears to be an appropriate use of retroactive legislation.92 Other~vise
taxpayers would rearrange their affairs to take full advantage of the loophole before the
legislation came into effect.
However, there is a difficnlty where the legislation is produced some th~ae later, is
debated and amended, and the law can be passed even years after the ammuncement is first
made.9~ The additional problem for taxpayers is that the legislative process can introduce
laws ti~at are significantly xvider than or different from the original announcement but
V. ~Ilmtowi, above n. 5, p. 76.
J. Cleat),, ’1Ira Evolution of Tax Avoidance’ (1995) 5 Reve~*ue LawJom~lal, 219 and C. Sampford, above n.
12, p. 147 elseq.
I*~come Tax Assessment Act 1936, Part P,rA.
R. Varm, ’General Description: Australia’ in H.J. Ault, above n. 27, p. 5, p. !0.
For a discussion of the diffictflties with retrospecfi~,e legislation in ~.\ust~alia, see tim Reports of tim
Scrutiny of Bills Committee, <xx~wv.al~h.gov.au/Senate/conwnii~ee/scrutiny>, 20 October 2006.
C. Sampford, above n. 12, p. 156 on ’~eg]slation by press release’.
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xvlfich have effect from the date of the original announcement.94 From the Govet~mtent
perspective, there is generally broad debate in the tax profession as the law develops, so
where there will be significant amendments to the original atmouncement, they are usually
publicised at least to the tax profession even if not to the public. Nonetheless, it
undermines the principle of legality, as taxpayers are forced to manage their affaks on the
basis of legislation that has neither been passed and of whose precise content they ate
unaware.9s In response, the Senate (Australia’s upper house in a bicameral system) has
adopted procedtucal taxies to pass legislation prospectively if legislation is not introduced
into Parliament within six months of its original announcement.%
In France, there have been a mm~ber of cases which highlight the problem of
retroactive legislation against tax avoidance.97 Where legislation has been upheld in the
courts and Parliament then passes retroactive legislation to overturn the original law, it
raises concerns. Cytille argues that there should be strict limits on Parliament’s ability to
introduce retroactive legislation to overtm~ earlier legislation that the judiciary has upheld
as valid, particularly where the risk to revenue is minimat.98
In German},, the constitution prohibits legislation where the legal consequences
based on past facts are retroactive, effectively backdating a cbange in the Lqw.99 However,
where the legislation applies prospectively but to facts or events that have already occtztted,
there may be limited exceptions,t°° Thuronyi provides a useful summary of the exceptions
that ~ght justify retroactivit3,:ml
9~ Ibid.,p. 158.
95 q~ae case of Gtt5, v. FC!" (1989) 20 A’I~ 649, illustrates the application of a capital gains provision that was
significantly different in its effect from the original announcement. To their dett:hnent, the taxpayers
entered L~to t~ansactions on the basis of the announcement before the detail of the la~v became available.
Senate Resolution of 8 November 1988, reproduced in Senate 8tandi~g Conm~ittee for the Scrafiny of
Bills, Eleventh Report of 19.o8, <~wv.apb.gov.au/ senate/comn~ttee/scn~tiny /bills/1998/b l l.btm> , 20
October 2006.
D. Cy~ille, "Taxpayer Protection and Tax Fines in France’ in D. zVlbregtse and I-t.P.A.M. vast Arend0nk,
above n. 1, p. 99, p. 101.
98 ibid.
99 C. Daiber, above n. 24, p. 159.
100 Ibid.
101 V. q!q~uronyi, above m 5, p. 80.
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die retroactive consequences could be considered de minimi~,
the law was unclear or contradictory before enactment of the legislation;
retroactive application was required in order to correct a constitutionally
defective legal Pale (for example, a Pale that violated the principle of equality);
retroactive application was required because of: ’urgetlt requirements of the
public interest’.
Sweden takes a similar strong line against rettoacfivity102 and tiffs is mirrored in a munber
of other jurisdictions.1°3
Others take a completely different viexv. Croatia has a histot3, of retroactive
regulation,1°4 as do Australiams and the United States. In .United States v. Car/Ion the Supreme
Court found that the retroactive legislation in question was acceptable as it fulfilled a
legitimate legislative purpose, was reasonable, the means xvere rational and the amendment
was neither illegitimate nor arbitxary,m~ It xvas found to be reasonable for Congress to
prevent loss to the revenue by imposing a tax on taxpayers entering into purely tax-
motivated transactions that took advantage of an uncorrected laxv.l°v
Given the divergence ha approach by sophisticated tax regimes, a model must take a
consensual approach to gain acceptance. The best outcome for taxpayers wotfld be for
jurisdictions to adopt the German or Swedish constitutional models. Hmvever, a less
stringent approach is acceptable provided it includes safeguards. Tiffs is die point where
Countries that do allow retroactive legislation have sometimes allowed pragmatism to
10~ A. Hultqxdst, above n. 33, p. 300 and R. Persson-Osterman, ’Human Rights ha the Field of Ti~xafion: a
~4ew from Sweden’ (1999) 2 The Cambridge Yearbook ofEuropea# LegaloCludies.:0~ V. Thuronyi, above n. 5, p. 81 notes that specific constitutional protection exists ha Brazil, Greece,
Mexico, Mozambique, Paraguay, Peru, Romania, Russia, Slovenia and Venezuela.
~I, H. ,~cbuthaa, above n. 23, p. !39.
~s ,Uthough retroactive statutes are permissible, flxe courts will generally resist their retrospective application
Unless the statute dearly hatends it, see MacComdck v. FCT (1984) 15 ATR 437.it~ Discussed ha V. Thuronyi, above n. 5, p. 78.
~7 Ibid., p. 79. See, however, Public Law 1-4-168-July 30, 1996 (H.R.2337), Tide XI - Relief from
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overcome the basic principles that underpin the role of law. The urgenW to pass legislation
has tended to supersede good legisl~itive practice.
A compromise may be found in the review of legislation by a parliamentary scmdny
corrm~ittee of a kind discussed in Chapter 5. It is interesting to note that one of the pfitnary
focuses of the Australian Senate Standing Committee for the Sctxltiny of Bills in relation to
tax legislation has been on die dangers of the potendat tetrospecdvity of such legislation.
Where amendments are technical and have no financial effect, they are accepted. However,
where there is potential for the retrospective inaposidon of fiabilities, the Committee draws
it to the attention of the relevant minister and seeks a&dce either that tl~s is not the effect
of the law or that it is indeed the intention of the law.1°8 It requires a response from the
mitlister and enstttes that retrospective legislation is not introduced utlintendonally or
without vet3, good reason (the sancdon in Anstt’alia being that it would othetavise be raised
in the Senate debate on the bill).
Sampford endorses the approach to retrospective legislation taken by the
Queensland Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld),1°9 wl~ich ~equkes a scrutiny commattee
to ensure that:11°
The purposes of legislation are defined.
The means identified are def’med.
The proportionalit3’ of the means to that end are considered.
Drawbacks are identified.
Mternathms to legisladot~ are considered.
The supporthxg measures are considered.
Retroactive ?.pplicadon of Treasut3’ Department Regulation, s. 1101.
108 For example, see Senate Stat~ding Corrmaittee for d~e Scpalkxy of Bills, Fitut 1o Fifteenth Repot# of 2003
(Commonwealfli of Australia 2003), p. 220.
109 <wwxv.austlii.edu.au>, 20 October 2006.
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Delegated legislation and administrative discretion should be subject to shnilar rules
g0veriahlg retroacdvity. In most cases the governhlg legislation would prevent retroactive
application of delegated legislation or administrative discretion prior to the date of effect of
d~e governing legislation. However, die detailed interpretation of dm governing law may
~equize the itnplementation of rules by the authorised delegate from time to time that could
take effect rettoacdvely.l t 1
Adnfitffstrative discretion *nay also change over dine. In the context of tax avoidance
in particular, discretion may be exercised to change die inteipretation of die taw by the
revenue authority. Tiffs may include changes in accepted interpretations of court decisions,
where the revenue authority believes that taxpayersare exploifng the existing
iuteipretafion for tax avoidance purposes,n2 Althoughthere are often no expficit
safeguards for taxpayers against retxoactive applicationf delegated legislation and
a&ninistrative discretion, adopt:hag similar safeguards to those applicable to the governing
legishtion is unlikely to be contentious.
D Certain~y
The issue of certainty covers a nmnber of considerations across legislation, application and
adjudication. Often, the rules or practices that try to smooth the teclmical difficulties that
arise in the law from time to time are not articulated clearly enough. Tlffs can create more
problems than it solves. It is therefore important to identi~, and articidate in the tax
C. Sampford, above n. 12, p. 281.
Internal Revenue Code ~7805.
For example, in Australia, the tong-accepted rules governing professional sen~ice trusts have been changed
by the ATO to counter what they judge to be substantial exploitation 6f those rules to avoid tax. See
~ther, G.S. Cooper, ’Sen,ice Entities’ (2006) 40 Tax-atiott & Australia, 592 and Taxation Ruling TR
2006/2, <www.ato.gov.au>, 1 November 2006.
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context, the operational rules that allow tile law to work effectively and provide taxpayers
with the required certainty,n~ Qttite often these will be roles of interpretation.
The European Court of Htwnan Right’s consideration of the requixements for a valid
limitation on rights under the ECHR is relevant. The imposition of tax is a similar class of
law to a restriction on a protected right. In the St#May Times case,114 it was held that a norm
must be formulated:l~s
with sofficient precision to enable the cidzen to regulate his conduct: he must be able
- if need be with appropriate adxdce - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the
circumstances, flae consequences which a given action may entail.
The Court has not required a level of specificity that precludes the need for
interpretation,na However, the law must be reasonably certain. The requkement of
reasonableness underpins much of the analysis below and reflects the OECD
expectation.liT
An associated difficult3~ that can undermine certainty is d,at of complexity. As stated
in Chapter 3, tax rules should be as clear and simple to understand as the complexity of the
subject of taxation allows. Prebble argues that tax law is necessarily complex because of the
nature of modern transactions and their legal treatment and can verge on tli~
incomprehensible)is The problem can be made worse, as some jurisdictions persist m
ushag archaic txdes of drafting that ser~,e to make even shnple laxvs seem
ll~ IMF Code, above n. 44, 1.2.2 and the explanation, pp. 18 20.
114 StoMa), Time~ v. United Kbgdom, Judgment of 26 Apdl 1979, Series A, No. 30; (1979-80) 2 EHRR 245.
us Ibid., para. 49.
tl~ C. Ovey and R.C.A. Wkite, above n. 15, p. 201.
i1~ OECD, above n. 1, para. 2.21.
lls See J. P~ebble, ’\’(qay Is Tax Law Incomprehensible?’ (1994) Btilish Tax Revieu,, 380. The dmme is Mso
explored in G.S. Cooper, ’Themes and Issues in "Fax Simplification’ (1993) 10 Au*tmliatt Tax Forum, 417
and W.G. Gale mid J. Holtzblatt, ’The Role of Admhaistrative Factors Jn Tax Reform: Simplicity,
Compliance and Enforcement’ (Social Science Research Nem,ork, 11 Febmat3, 2000), sSRN,
<ssm.com/abstract=208289>, 6 September 2006, or DOI: 10.2139/ssm.208289.
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incomprehensible.119 The difficulties hi making tax law shnple is discussed in Chapter 3.
Hopefully, best practice in drafting xvill flmv from the other rights. It is difficult to legislate.
E Undersfandable Ibdes
A right diat should exist in all jurisdictions, but that regrettably does not, is the requirement
that tax laws should make sense. It is assumed that they do, often incorrectly. It is
important that taxpayers should be able to understand the tax law, albeit with professional
assistance.120
One of the particular problems ~vith the common law system is that there is a
presumption that laws have meaning. There are roles of statutory interpretation that require
judges to interpret the law to find the least absaucd meaning where the ordinat3, meaulng of
the law does not make sense. In tax legislation this leads to the anomalous situation that
taxpayers are supposed to second-guess what meaning judges will read into a provision,
where its ordinat3, meading is not clear. The problem is more acute, in that it is ofteo
broad, catch-all provisions that attempt to act as a stop-gap in tax legislation that are poorly
drafted.
An Australian example concerned the notorious ’Terrible Twins’ of the capital gain
and loss provisions..2~ Where no other provision applied, the language of these two
subsections sought to deem a transaction to have occu~ed that would then be subject to
tl~e capital gains provisions. The legal concepts that had to be dealt with to achieve this in a
couple of paragraphs proved too much. No-one knew exactly what they meant. When a
Case considering their application finally reached the full High Court~2z of seven judges
119 Discussed at lengfl~ in V. Thuron}d, ’Drafting "Fax Legislation’ in V, ’I]aaronyi, above n. 20, ch. 3.
~-"J OECD, ibid., para. 2.21 and Iik,Lg Code, above n, 113.
~-~1 lncome Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), subss 160M(6) and (7),
tza Australia’s highest court.
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they gave a nmnber of different judgments which differed in turn from those given by the
loxver courts. The Cl~ief Justice noted the judges’ inability to teach a con~non
understanding and said of tire subsections:.23
They must be obscure, if not bexvildering, both to the taxpayer who seeks to
determine iris or her liability to capital gains tax by reference to them and to the
lawyer who is called upon’to haterpret them.
Where there is a prox~ision which is obscure, bewildering or abstrrd, and judges interpret it,
they thereby provide it with meaning. That meaning then becomes its meaning from when
it xvas first introduced. Taxpayers xvho have arranged their affairs on the basis of an
alternative interpretation (which may have been put fotavard by the revenue authorit3’ prior
to the judgment) could experience significant commercial losses. It is an extension of the
¯ problem of retroactive legislation. Instead, if a provision is absurd or does not make sense,
judges should interpret it in favour of the taxpayer, or order that it does not apply for lack
of meaning, and the responsibility should rest with the legislature to amend the provision.
The ordinary meatfing of the tax rules should be clear and comprehensible. Where
the courts fred that it is not, the legislature or its delegate has the responsibility to amend
the relevant provision. Taxpayers should not suffer the application of an interpretation that
leaves them worse off than an equally plausible interpretation of the rule. In the same way,
where the revenue authority finds that the interpretation of the laxv is uncertain in its
application, it should have discretion to take test cases to the courts. Tiffs would normally
otfly be feasible as a standard approach in a sophisticated tax system, it is therefore a
recommended ~ght.
Sir ,.kntt~ony Mason CJ in Hepples v. FCF (1991) CLR 492, 497.
Analysis ~fPdma~y Legal Rights
Litigation of test cases promotes certainty in grey axeas of the law, paxdcularly in
yeas of concern to a large number of taxpayers, or to a particular sector.124 A revenue
authority should identif3, the criteria for choosing test cases. In a recent review of the ATO
litigation program, the Australian Inspecto>General of Taxation made recotmnendations
d~at are apt in any jurisdiction,t~s Accordingly, drawing on these recormnendadons in
relation to litigation generally and test case litigation in particular, as part of the
recommended right: the revenue authority should set out its litigation philosophy,
approach and policy; there should oversight by a senior officer of the revenue authority to
ensure consistency in management of the program; risk management teclmiques should
apply to tax litigation issues; there should be independent input into the litigation program;
dm revenue authority should fiand taxpayers’ expenses in defending all cases where the
revenue authority has been unsuccessful at any stage of the litigation; and the revenue
audmrity should cormnunicate the application of fmalised court and tribunal decisions in a
standard form. The right is most effective where taxpayers have input into the cases chosen
through some form of adviso*3, process.
Where a rule is absurd, ambiguous, contradictory, or does not make sense, it places
dxe revenue authority in a difficult position ff it is to apply the laxv. Providing that where
there is such a provision, the revenue authority as well as adjudicator), bodies may apply it
to tim tax-payer’s benefit prevents anomalous results. It also reduces the need for extra-
statutory concessions of the kind that axe used in the UK.12~
The ATO has a budget line dedicated to funding a test case litigation program where taxpayer costs are
fimded. It focuses oll litigation, where the outcome is likely to resolve taxation issues that are important to
the general adininistrafion of the tax system through file creation of legal precedent, ’Test Case i[ddgation
Program’, <www.ato.gov.au>, 1 November 2006. Fundh~g is Ikaited and cases chosen tend to have wide
application.
l~spector-Generd of Taxation, Redew of Tax Q~ce Mattageme#l qf Pl I VC l~Tigaliot~ (Canberra, Inspector-GenerM ofA. ~an Riin’ above n. 32. Tkis rule overcomes the concern over rules that are not obeyed m their
applicalion.
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F Contradictory Ruks
A right that is more often found in tax systems, is that rules should not be contradictory.
Two rules that appear to contradict one another leave the t~xpayer in a position of
uncertainty. In most jt~tisdicdons there are procedures that allow an interpretation to be
given by the cottrts that avoids uncertainty. Hoxvever, if a taxpayer can shoxv that the
application of the laxv is to the taxpayer’s disadvantage, then k should be interpreted in the
taxpayer’s favotm It may be unfak that an interpretation chosen by a court to avoid
contradiction between rifles is different f~om an equally plausible interpretation of file law
retied on by file taxpayer.
Statutes tend to overcome tiffs difficulty by including interpretation provisions.~27
OflLerwise, a later act normally prevails over an earlier act. Usually, a jtmsdicfion xvill have a
separate act governing flae interpretation of statutes3as
G FOtks that cannot be obeyed
A similar problem arises where rules cannot be obeyed: they reqttire conduct that is beyond
the powers of tile affected patty. For example, legislation may require a taxpayer to provide
infom~ation about a company in wlfich the taxpayer has invested on the basis of deemed
contxol.129 Tl~is creates a problem where tile company is in another country and the
taxpayer cannot gain access to that infomaafion under the laws of that other countty. In
other situations, legislation may require the taxpayer to pay tax on income which the
1~7 See Chapter 5 on enforcement of legislation.
i~_s In Australia, Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth); United Kingdom, Interpretation Act 1978 (UK); C~mada,
Inteoretation Act (R.$., 1985, c. 1-21).
~z’~ For example, reader Controlled Foreign Corporation or Foreign Investment Fund provisions.
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taxpayer is deemed to have received, but to xv!fich the taxpayer is demed access by taw.13° It
is unfa~ in such cases to penalise th~ taxpayer for non payment or extended payment and
tlie law should allow relief. In most cases, it xvould be administrative relief, but the revenue
authority may require additional legal authority to provide it. In such cases, it is reasonable
that the onus should rest with taxpayers to prove that they cannot obey a law.
Care should be taken in introducing such a rule where it is likely to lead to abuse.
There should be clear and narroxv limits on the exercise of such discretion. It should be
sabject to the approval of the most senior officers of the revenue authority and to an
annual reporting and external audit process.
H The Right to pay no more than the Correct Amount of Tax
A tax system should operate on the basis that taxpayers need only pay the amount of tax
required by law. Taxpayers that overpay tax should be entitled to a ftdl refund and, ideally,
interest should be paid on the overpayment. The tax authority shotRd be under an
obligation to inform taxpayers if it finds that they are entitled to tax relief, deductions or
;efunds that the taxpayers have not claimed.TM
Although tiffs is an issue of assessment, it is fundamental to the principle of certainty and
requites particular protection to ensure that tax roles are not arbitratT. Revenue authorities
are tim means by xvhich governments exact tax from their citizens. They are in a better
position than the taxpayer to understand the rules of the tax system. If taxpayers make
In Australia, one interpretation that the cotttts have given to the rules taxing trusts can lead to a
beneficiary, who is a life tenoa~t, paying tax on income that is corpus of the m, st, when that income will
never come to the beneficiary and will ultimately be distributed to a remaindetmma. A*~ analogous posidon
can a~ise where a taxpayer has assets that have been frozen in a foreign jurisdiction and the taxpayer has
to pay tax on the income from the frozen assets that are taxable in the taxpayer’s cout~tt3, of residence,
even though the taxpayer cannot access the income to pay the tax.
Tiffs would not be the case if the relief, deductions or refm*d were optional and the taxpayer had chosen
not to exercise that option. In other words, it is not the responsibility of the tax authority to act as a tax
plam~er for the taxpayer. See furtt,e[, OECD, above n. 7, para. 2.20.
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errors m the government’s favour, it is the dug, of a revenue authofit3, to correct those
errors.132
The Rc ht not to be Taxed Twice
Generally, tax systems should be designed to avoid double taxation and, in most cases, they
are. Taxpayers should not be taxed twice on the same income. Where unforeseen
anomalies occur in legislation, so that double taxation occurs, taxpayers should be able to
obtain relief from the cotu:ts without needing to wait for amending ~egislation. It is more
difficult to protect taxpayers from double taxation at the internalional level. Double tax
agreements attempt to do so, but it is unrealistic to expect taxpayers to be able to claim
genetat relief in domestic courts from international double taxation.
J Non-disoiminalion
One of the most important fights in auy tax system is the right to equal t~eamaent or non-
discrimination. Based on the principle of equit3, and fah’ness outlined in Chapter 3, it is also
very difficult to apply ha the tax context in its broad sense. Article 26 ICCPR states that ’All
persons are equal before the law and are entided without any discrimination to the equal
pt:otecdon of the laxv.’ Although considered primarily in the context of the rights
specifically provided for in the Covenant, die non-discrimination ardde provides in itself
an autonomous fight.133
Discussed m the EU context byJ. Malherbe, ’Does it work and how does it work? A Belgian xfe\v’ m D.
A!bregtse and H.P.A.AL van Arendortk, above n. I, p. 27, p. 29.
S. Joseph, J. Schultz and M. Castan, The International Covena~g on Civi/ and Political Pa~hls: Cases, Materials aid
Commeutao,
, 
(Oxford, OUP, 2000), p. 524.
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From Chapter 3, a basic principle of tax law design is that it should treat people in
similar circumstances in file same way (horizontal equity) and ensure that tax is allocated
fairly between people in different cir~rtmstm~ces (vertical equity). To what extent can the
fight to equal treatment or non-discrimination apply to this principle? It has been found
fl~at a system of progressive taxation does not violate Article 26.~u It has also been held
fl~at there is an objective distinction to be made betxveen lfigher and loxver income and file
aim to achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth is both reasonable and compatible
wifl~ the ahns of the Covenant.13s Tlfis allows fairness or vertical equity into the principle of
n0u-discriminafion.
The jurisprudence on Ardde 26 ICCPR has focused heavily on horizontal equity
issues in non-tax matrers.~6 The test is whether the discrimination is based on reasonable
and objective criteria3~7 An additional consideration is that distinctions that were
reasonable and objective at the thne of enactment of legislation, remain so in a changing
s0ciet3,.t3s Negadve effects on an individual or group of individuals are not necessarily
discrilniuatoty.~39
Both points are important in file tax context. Obsct~te tax rules can remain in place
despite the fact that the economic or social reasons for their hnplementation have long
disappeared. Sometimes political lobbying will ensttre that they are at tile forefront of
cttttent axvareness and are retained. At other times there is no reason or support for their
retention. In such cases legislation should provide taxpayers suffering discrimination
standing to question the rxtles’ contimting validity. The second point is a necessatT
distinction in tile context of tax roles, xvhere tire introduction of a rule often produces
negative effects or less beneficial effects to at least some taxpayers.
S. Joseph et al, above n. 133, p. 526
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 519.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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Article 14 ECHR provides a more detailed jurisprudence on non-discrimination in
response to the breadth of its jm-isdiction. Unlike Article 26 ICCPR it does not have
autonomous effect and therefore has little effect on tax matters.~4° However Protocol 12,
although phrased in terms of a prohibition on discrimination, effectively provides a right to
equality. It is likely to have a wider impact on tax matters in that it focuses specifically on
discfiroinafion by a public authority in the exercise of disctefionat3’ power and by any act or
omission34~ The methodology used by file European Court of Human Rights in exanfining
non-discrhninal:ion issues under Article 26 is useful.
Once it has reviexved xvhether the complaint falls widfin a protected tight and there is
violation of a substantive provision, file Court examines whether there is different
treatment342 The Chassagnou case highlighted that file applicant must show there has been
different treatment and, once this has been done, the respondent Government must show
that different treatment is justifi-ed.143 In idenfif3fing difference, the groups must be
comparable)44 For indirect disctimination, file groups must show that although the same
reqtfirement applies, ’a significant number of one group is unable to comply with fl~e
requirement’,m
It is generally straightforward to identify different treatment between taxpayers. Tax
policy focuses extensively on the difficnlfies in balancing competing objectives.~46 That is
why there is such a wide margin of appreciation given to Contracting States of the ECHR
and other human tights instttmaents in tax policy.~4v The critical factors in any
Abdulaxff~6 Cabale* attd Balkat~dali v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 28 May 1985, Series A, No. 94; (1985) 7
E~ 47t, para. 71.
C. Ovey ~d R.C.A. k~te, above n. 15, p. 358. It came h~to force on 1 Ap~ 2005.
For a comprehensive analysis of d*e Co~gs meflmdology, see C. Ovey and R.C.A. ~fite, ibid., p. 352.
Chassagnou attd olhers v. Ftw~w, Jud~ent of 29 April 1999; (2000) 29 E~ 615, paras 91 m*d 92.
C. Ovey and R.C.A. ~qfite, above n. 15, p. 355 and Ftaditt v. Swede& Jud~aent of 18 Febmat3, 1991; (1991)
13 E~ 784.
C. Ovey ~d R.C,A. ~X~fite, ibid.
See, e,g., K.C. Messere, above n. 4,
See, e.g., Nalio~al ~ Provi~Mal Buildi*g SoreO’ a~d o[~et~ v. Untied ~l~dol~l, Jud~ent of 23 October 1997;
(1998) 25 E~ 127, para. 88.
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determination of discrimination or inequality is whether fl, e different treatment pursues a
legimnate aim and whether the means employed are proportionate to the legitimate aim.148
policy determines whether compames are taxed differently to parmerslfips, trusts or
sole traders although they are cart3’ing on sin~ilar businesses. Social policy detem~nes file
levels of relief available to taxpayers for dependents of different kinds. Yet, to t~eat
taxpayers in the same position differently would undem~ne file ~ffectiveness of the tax
system. Germany has taken the concept one step further. It was found to be
unconstitutional to impose a different tax burden on real estate as compared to other forms
of property, as it breached the principle of equality before tile law.149 Tile same decision
held that a total tax burden imposed on a taxpayer which exceeds approximately 50 per
cent of the total return typically derived from the taxpayer’s property is a violation of the
constitutional right of f~ee disposition of property. These concepts open intereshng new
areas for consideration and may be an indication of how dfis right will expand in
}udsdicfions other than Germany.
Thurowi prox4des a xvide-ranging analysis of tile application of the prindple of
equality, or non-discrimination in courts in a number of jurisdictions.~5° The German
Conslkufional Court clearly takes an active interventionist approach to violations of the
principle of equality, and has struck down a number of taxes for breach of this rule.~sl In
contrast, the US Supreme Court allows a significant degree of latitude in tax matters352 In
France, an important area of intet’vention has been to ensure equal access to procedural
In all d~ee courts, it is likely that tile methodology of the ~uropean Court of Human
lhglits would have achieved shrila~ results. The analysis as to whether discrhnination is
C. Ovey and R.C.A. White, above n. 15, p. 352.
Decision of the Constitutional Court of 22 June 1995, 2 Bvl 37/91 published in Official Tax Gazette II
95,655 elseq, discussed in C. Daibe% above n. 27, p. 156.
V. Thu~onyi, above n. 5, p. 82.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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pem~issible requites an assessment of the legitimacy of tile aim and the proportionality of
the means. ~I~m courts in each jm’isdiction are influenced infer alia by their own legal,
political, social and economic circumstances in reac!fing that decision. That is how it
should be and is consistent with the arguments for some recognition of cultural relativit},
identified in Chapter 2.154 This approach does not necessarily undermine the concept of
non-disctin~nation. Rather, it acknowledges that in an area fraught with policy and oilier
arguments, the detailed content of tim tight will differ betxveen jurisdictions. It also leaves it
open for jtttisdictions with different interpretations to include a fight to non-discrimination.
Propor ona/i y
Tile principle of proportionalit3~ has its origins in dvil laxv jurisdictions and has a much
shorter history in the conunon law. In the cixdl la\v tradition, file executive gives effect to
the purposes of the state and the adilfinistrafive law regulates file exercise of state power.Iss
Administxators exercise their powers, but file), are constrained by the values and principles
in the laxv that seek to control and supervise state activities and die state’s reladonslfip wid~
private indix~iduals,ts~ The effectiveness of the state is therefore assttred, but not at fl~e
expense of the interests of the private citizen.
Tile principle of proportionalit3’ requires broad[), fllat the state should use
appropriate means to ac|fieve its policy objectives. This is relevant both to taxation txtles
and the acdons of the revenue authorities in administering tile tax system. In Germany, tile
principle requites that file means used to achieve a revenue objective should be approp*{ate
and necessatT, impose die lightest possible burden, provide the best alternative to achieve
F. Vanistendaet, aboye n. 20, p. 20.
See ftttther R. Piotrowicz and S. Kaye, Humatt Rights m 1tt!oTtatiottM attd At¢*ttuliatt Law (Sydney,
Butterworfl~s, 2000), p. 79.
R. Thomas, Legitimate E:,?)ectatio*ts and Ptvpotliot~aliO, in Admit,islt~tlive Law (Oxford and Portland, Ha~l
Publisbhag, 2000), p. 12.
Ibid.
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the desired objective and an), resullklg disadvantage must not be disproportionate to the
aim.~S7 It is a construction that has been adopted by file European Court of Justice as
applicable to the European Union and was articulated in a simil~ tl~tee-part test requiring
Are appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the objectives legitimately pursued
by the legislation in question; when there is a choice between several appropriate
measures recourse must be had to tlie least onerous, and doe disadvantages caused
must not be disproportionate to tlie aims pursued.
Use of the proportionality principle is not designed to interfere with a chosen policy
goal, but to ensure that the means used to achieve it were the most appropriate.~S9 In this
sense it provides a most effective redress for the taxpayer when a revenue authority over-
reaches its powers. It goes beyond file relatively restrictive review on the grounds of
reasonableness found in common laxv jurisdictions,~0 to require a review of the
appropriateness of the exercise of administrative power. The narrow common law reading
of grounds for judicial revimv means that it is appropriate to include the p*inciple of
proportionality as a primary legal tight, which should be legislated, even if it is only
applicable to tax administration. Although common law jurisdictions are slowly adop~g
tlie principle as part of administrative law, it is by no means tmiversal.~6~
The European Court’s formulation is in respect of legislation. However, it should
extend, as it does in Europe generally, to the exercise of adit~inistrative discretion. The
~7 C. Daiber, above n. 27, p. 159.
*s~F~ v. M&istO, of Agticul.tut~, Fisheries attd Food, expa*# Fedega, Case C-331/88 [I 990] ECR 1-4023, para. 13.
1~9F. Jacobs, ’Recent Developments in the Prhlciple of Propordonafity in European Community Law’, in E.
I~s Ellis (ed.), The Ptin@/e ofPmflotCionalt~y t)* the Laws of Emvpe (Oxford, Hart Publislmag, 1999), p. 65.
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advantage of the proportionality principle is that it is broad enougb to cover a xvidet range
of the more egregious abuses of poxver xvithout requiting special grom~ds for review ot
satisfaction of particularly difficult burdens of proof often required in the common law.
The Australian Federal Court, for example, xvould not have needed to find abuse of power
in Uddslelt v. ll<ilco.x962 in which the Commissioner exercised Iris discretion to require almost
100 per cent of a doctor’s income to be used to pay a tax debt, whicb was also under
appeal. The measures used xvere neither appropriate nor proportionate to achieve the
legithnate ahn. The civil law fot~mulation of the principle was to protect the legitimacy of
the exercise of legislative and adininistrafive power.16~ As discussed in earlier chapters, there
is often no greater need in respect of tax law and administration.
III CONCLUSION
Tiffs chapter begins by emphasising that primary legal rights go to the heart of the legal
system. Using Fuller’s eight criteria for valid law as a starting point, it expands on fl~e
criteria for valid law with a focus on tax law. Simply because tax is critical to the operation
of govermnent dtes not mean that it is beyond the laxv. Caveats on Ore notarial operation
of fire law used to support the operation of the tax system undetanine the legal system
itself. It is not appropriate to have requirements for valid law applicable only to certain
aspects of the law. just as derogations from htmaan rigbts instnmaents are frowned upon
except in the most extreme circumstances, so derogations from Ore normal operation of
the legal system should not be accepted shnply because tax is involved.
Once it is accepted that the tax law is not a special species of laxv that allows arbitraU
rxde-making, it is necessatT to consider what the basic reqtfirements are for the leg,ql
(1988) 83 :LLR 99; 15 ALD 546.
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framework governhag taxation.They are not much different to that required in other areas,
but there are special emphases pertinent to tax. As discussed in Chapter 2, taxation is not
generally seen as a fundamental good. It is designed to deprive citizens of their property,
~vtfich is a fundamental good. However, as its pmlmse is widely recognised as legithnate
,and necessary for the continuation of society, it is hnportant to ensure that a tax system is
effective without breaclKng basic fights of the citizens being taxed. The pfimar3T legal rights
articulated in tt~is chapter are designed to ensure that balance is kept.
Tax laws should be imposed by law, be subject to the operation of the Me of law,
and comply with principles of legality. This provides t~mm xvith legitimacy. Taxpayers must
know what the rules are. This requires substantial interplay between the legal and
administrative fights, as publication needs to be at all levels, from the pubfication of rtiles
legislated t!~cough to detailed explanation of their operation in the daily arha~inistration of
the tax system. There must be careful morfitofing of retrospective legislation. In some
cases, it is necessaW to make announcements of impending legislalion to protect the fisc,
particularly in cases of schemes for the avoidance of tax. Ho\vever, the use of retrospective
legislation should be used only to the ’extent available for other legislation and in
compliance with the prhadples set out by Tl~uronyi, discussed above.
There should be careful management of tax legislation to allow its effective operation
in accordance with tim principles underl)6ng the system discussed in Chapter 3. A tax
system simply will not work effectively if its ta.fles are uncertain, cannot be understood, are
conttadictot-y or cannot be obeyed. In most jurisdictions where such problems arise, it is
not intentional. Hoxvever, where the system is not constantly and consistently monitored,
breaches of these rules can occnr and there should be safeguards in place to protect
taxpayers from those breaches.
Thomas, above n. 155, p. 14.
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The principles of fairness and equity are undermined if taxpayers are double-taxed,
discriminated against or required t6 pay mo#e than the tax due. \Yghere t!~is happens it is
often symptomatic of a corrupt system. It can also happen where tim internal safeguards
are not in place to allow taxpayers redress. Wi~ere there is no redress, breaches of basic
taxpayers’ rights can be glossed over and ignored within fire sigifificant bureaucracy of the
tax a&afinistration. The principle of proportionality tries to balance the rights of the state
and the individual taxpayer. Although legal systems and tax administrations can get away
xvith not applying these principles, it is not best practice. The Model therefore provides the
rules that ensure a level of best practice to protect taxpayers, but also to ensure a tax
system that operates more effectively.
Where prhaaat3, legal tn.des do not exist to protect taxpayers they will be the most
difficult to introduce, simply because they require legislation. There will always be strong
defensive arguments justif~Rng why the roles are umaecessat3T. Nonetheless, best practice
¯ suggests that they should be legislated.
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CHAPTER 7
TAX ADMINISTRATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHARTERS
I INTRODUCTION
The regttkation govertfing tax administration usually determines the structure of the tax
system and sets up a tax authority. The fights outlined in Chapters 7 and 8 are often
expressed as limitations on its powers. "Ilm regulation setting up the tax authority normally
also provides it with general powers of administration of the tax system. An understanding
of the scope and extent of these general powers will often dictate the way a taxpayer
complies with the tax laws. There is a substantial body of literature analysing the inter-
relationship between: the revenue authofity’s exercise of its powers; the civil law, criminal
law and purely adinhaistrative sanctions available to enforce those powers; and taxpayer
compliance.
The relationslaip between the exercise of administrative powers and voluntary
compliance was discussed in Chapter 2. It is outside tim scope of dais thesis to examine the
lh~ks between taxpayer compliance and civil and criminal sanctions) It is the exercise of the
powers of administration and the procedures to effect compliance and impose sanctions
that ate the focus of dais chapter and the next.
Discussed in R.K. Gordon, ’Law of Tax Admimstxafion and Procedure" in V. Thuronyi, (ed.), Co,t~parative
Tax" Latv (I]m Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2003), p. 95, p. 117. Gordon’s chapter provides a
detailed discussion of dais hnportant issue widi extensive reference to die relevant literature.
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The legal framework for tax admitfistration will necessatSly depend upon the broader
legal framexvork and the adininisttative structure of that jurisdiction.2 As with all
comparative legal analysis it is qttickly evident that there are many sinfilafifies across
jurisdictions. However, these catmot be taken at face value, as local nuances may change
the nature and meaning of xvhat on the surface seem alike. The difficulties of cross-
jurisdictional interpretation were discussed in Chapter 3. However, a general framework is
appropriate and arguably the best form is one organised along functional lines. Tiffs is the
approach taken in Chapters 7 and 8.3 As discussed in Chapter 4, the functional approach
also determines the t32ae and enforcement of tax20ayers’ rights.
The more power and discretion left in the hands of the revenue authorities, generally
the greater the proportion of administrative rights. Tiffs is prevalent in common law
jurisdictions. Many civil taw jurisdictions provide a more detailed legislative content to the
adininistralion of the tax system and therefore to taxpayers’ rights; the corol.lary being a
reduction in the discretion of the revenue authority. As illus0:ated in Chapter 5, the nature
of rights changes depending on hmv they are enforced. The analysis in the next two
chapters therefore does not favour a particular style of enforcement, but provides an
indication of the differences M content that can occur between secondat3, legal rights and
pfitna~3, and secondary adnlinistradve rights and principles of good practice.
It is itnportant to note that ’content’ does not necessarily mean tl~at rules are spelt
out in detail. Tiaat is a product of the conmmn law, where principles, such as those set out
in Chapter 6, have largely come late to the tax systetn. Grbich4 argues forcefully that the
civil taw concept of providing in legislation the ’core principles and vetT basic conceptual
F. Vattistendael, ’Legal Framework for Taxation’ in V. Thuronfi, ibid., p. 15 provides an analysis of tlie
distribution of tax law maliing power between die legislative and executive branches of government and
be~veen central and local governments.
3 Discussed (xtensively and strongly recotranended in R.K. Gordon, above n. 1, p. 97, whicb should be
given pardcu]ax weight as it is based on significant experience ha designing tax legislation ha a range of
jttdsdicdons.
Y. Grbich, ’New IX{odalities ha Tax Decision-iX.iakhag: Appl)dng European experience to Australia’ [2004}
eJTR 7; (2004) 2 eJottmalofTax Research, 125, <wx, av.austlii.edu.au/au/jouxnals/eJTR/2004/index.hm~l>,
or by free subscription, <wxmv.atax.tmsw.edu.au/ejtr!>, 3 November 2006.
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tax fxamew°rk’S gives a degree of legal certainty that reduces significandy the scope of
adtnirdsttative discretion. It does so without necessarily demanding the comprehensive and
detailed teclmical rotes coveting every eventuality that are so often fotmd in conunon law
jurisdiCtions.~ However, the thrust of Grbich’s argument, which is made in the context of
hat~uonisation of European tax law, unde~es the difficulties in applying the content of
one jutisdiction’s rules to another. The analysis of tights in the next two chapters is
therefore broadly framed to capture the general principles applicable across jurisdictions.
The nature of the tax system determines where taxpayers’ rights are found. Primary
and secondary legal tights are usually found in a range of legislation. Some tights are given
constitutional protection of a kind discussed in Chapter 6. Others, such as appeal tights
and the jurisdiction of courts can be found in admhaistrative law. Some are found in special
Legislation governing particular subject matter, such as freedom of information legislation.
Most are included iff those codes, rules or statutes dealh~g specifically with taxation,
whefl~er they fom~ part of public adinhtistrative or procedtttal law (often in civil laxv
jurisdictions) or sit rather uncomfortably as a branch of public law (usually the case in
common law jurisdictions).~
The nature of tax law means that there is overlap in any jurisdiction and some
aspects of tax administxation are governed by a completely different set of rules. The most
obvious example is where criminal offences apply to acts in connection with taxation and
the ctin~ml law and procedure take precedence over adirtinistrative Law or the ordinary tax
law. The seriousness of crlininal charges can introduce generic elements of protection that
ate not available under general admh-tistt’ative, procedural or tax-specific provisions. Tliey
Ibid., p. 142.
See, e.g., J. Prebble, ’~Xq~y is Tax Law Incomprehensible?’ [1994] British Tax Review, 380; G.S. Cooper,
’Themes and Issues in Tax Shnplificadon’ (1993) 10 Auslmlian Tax Forum, 417; and D. Bentley, ’Ten
Yea~s of the Revemce LatvJo~¢mal: A Diary of Tax Reform’ (1999) 11 Bo*M Law R~t,iew, 192.
For country examples see D. Bentley (ed.), Taxpayers’ Rights: An I*ttemaliona/Perspeclive (Gold Coast,
Revenue Law ]oumal, 1998) and H.J. Ault, Comparative h~come Taxation: A Slmcluml Ana~),sis (London,
Kluwer Law I~temational, 1997). A discussion of tim approach taken in different legal systems can be
found in V. ~*~onyi, V. Thuronyi (ed.), above n. 1, clx. 4 and see also para. 6.3 on the organization of
tax administration law.
293
form important elements of file analysis beloxv, but file focus is limited as far as possible to
file effect of these provisions on taxpltyers.
Gordon suggests that althougli it is best not to provide special rules only for tax
matters where the general laws are applicable and effective, it can be beneficial ’to modi~,
existing law to fit file unique problems inherent in tax administration’.8 Taxpayers’ rights
often do fall into this categoi3T and are specific to the tax law. Where they have general
application to all areas of tax law and administration, Gordon argues that there are
important benefits to collecting them in one place wiflfin the t~x code or prhlaat3, tax
statute.9 The benefits include ease of access, that they need not be repeated in each section
where the), apply, and inlproved uniformity in design and application,m The same principles
apply to collection of administrative rights in one place and support file use of
administrative ’charters’ or ’bills’ of taxpayers’ rights,u
GENERAL POWERS OF ADMINISTRATION
A Autonomy of the Reve,me Authori.ly
Fundamental to the operado*l of the tax system and its administration is that there should
be an adminis~adve body charged with the administration of the tax system independent
from external interference,m The head of the revenue authority, should therefore be in d~e
R.K. Gordon, above n. 1, p. 99.
Ibid. See also V. Thuronyi, above n. 7, para. 6.3.
R.K. Gordon, ibid.
Often morn realistically termed ’sea,ice standazds’.
Fiscal Affairs Department, Mattual o~i Fig~.al Traltapat~t~y ~Xtaslfmgton DC, IM~, 2001) 1.!, identifies as a
fmldamental principal, the clarity of roles and respo~sibilities in government. Tiffs point is discussed
furdier below. ~e Manual is also available at <wxwv.in~£org/extemal/work.hm~>, 1 November 2006,
(IMIv Code).
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position of sole responsibility for tax assessment, collection and enforcement, thereby
assuring her or his independence.
Concomitant with this level of independence for the head of tile revenue authority
come lfigh levels of accountability, xvhich are dealt with in the following sections,t~ A basic
guarantee of independence can be found in a fixed term of appointment. Bersten notes that
tiffs applies to the Australian Commissioner of Taxation, who is appointed for a term of
seven years)4 The appointment is by tile Governor-General on file advice of the Prinle
hlinister. But as file term of appoint:ment exceeds that of file Federal Governmmlt, it
precludes file potiticisation of tile role: a change in government does not bring with it file
tight to change file Conmoissioner)s The US Commissioner of Internal Revenue shl~ilarly is
appointed by the President by and with the consent and adxdce of file Senate for a five-year
teml under ~7803 I~te,~mlRemnue Code.
This principle that tile head of the revenue authority has security of tenu~ce, adds to
her or his independence. It is important that file scope for removal is lhnited. Australia
restricts renloval to instances of proven ~Ifisbehaviottt, mental or physical incapadt3,,
bankruptcy, unapproved paid employment outside tile duties as Commissioner, or absence
without leave,t6 The US allows renloval, however, at file will of tile President)7
Interestingly, Canada has not seen the need to establish details of file position of
Cotmnissioner by legislation. The Income Tax Act (RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp)) simply states
at Section 220:
u For arl exceller~t analysis o f the pmlciples underl3dng the independence and acc°untability °f the head °f
a revenue authority, see M. Bersten, "Independence and Accountability of the Commissioner of
Taxation’ (2002) 12 Revem¢e k~wJoto~tal, 5 in dm context of the Australian Commissioner of Taxadom
Ibid.,p. 15,
Ibid. The Senate term is six yeats and the House of Representatives only three years in Australia.
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), s. 6C.
~7803(a)(1)(C)I~tte~a/Reve~ueCode.
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(1) The Minister shall administer and enforce this Act and file Conmaissioner of
Customs and Revenue may exercise all the poxvers and perforwn the duties of
the i~inister under this Act.
(2) Such officers, clerks and employees as are necessary to administer and enforce
this Act shall be appointed or employed in the manner authorqzed by law.
(2.01) The M~nister may authorize an officer or a class of officers to exercise powers
or perfomr duties of the Minister under this Act.
Given the experience in developing countries discussed below, Otis is an instance xvhere the
iulmrent stability and democratic traditions of some democracies plays against them. They
do not offer explicit protection of tire independence of the position of the head of tim
revem~e authofit3’. Tennre is not assured. Removal can in theory be at the whim of the
executive arm of govermnent. Best practice suggests that protection should be put in place.
Without protection, there is a danger, however remote, that the tax administration could be
adininistered by an appointee beholden to the political wil! of the executive.
The reporting relationship of the revenne authorit3T within the executive branch of
gover~m~ent is also critical to its independence. Tire reporting relafionslfip can influence tire
revenue authofity’s focus and its method of operation)s To counter this, some
jurisdictions, such as Montenegro, have placed the tax adininistration outside the control of
a particular ministt3’, repotting direct]), to the Executive..9 This follows the example of
countries such as Australia and Canada, where the ATO and Canada Revenue Agency
(CRA) report directly to a Minister. However, in com~tries such as the United Kdngdom,
where Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) falls within the broader responsibilib’
of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the Utfited States, where the IRS is a bureau of d~e
See, e.g., K. Isbamura, qlae State of Taxpayers Rights m Japan’ m D. Bentley, above n. 7, p. 227.
p. Goranovic, Taxpayers ILights and Tax Administration m Montenegro, p.
<unpanl.un.org/mtradocigroups/public/d°cmnentsiiftspacee/unpan004534’pdf>’ 2 November 2006.
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Department of the Treasury, there is little practical difference in the independence of the
te~,enue auflloEi[~t.
The extent of a revenue authofity’s autonomy and the powers given to it generally
,~eflect underlying differences in the political structures and systems of public sector
achxmtistration in countries, as welt as longstanding historical practice’.2° In the OECD, for
example, it was found in 2006 fl~at just over half of its members had established ratified
authorities with some degree of autonomy.=1 However, those authorities that comprise
single or multiple directorates in the relevant ]~ais~T of Finance do not necessarily thereby
lose d~eir independence. The discussion below will demonstrate that it is the substance of
independence that is important rather than an organisational frown. Tile 2006 OECD
comparative survey does note that autonomy includes some or all of: the power to
interpret tax laxvs; the authority to impose penalties and interest; responsibility for file
internal organisafion and management of tax operations, including budgetary discretion;
~esponsibJ~ty for information teclmolog3, associated with tax administration; the discretion
to establish performance standards; and responsibility for personnel.= It is beyond file
scope of this thesis, but it would be useful to explore fl~:ough detailed case study which
powers and responsibilities should be given to a revenue authority as a matter of priority to
best establish its independence. So maW revenue authorities have now undergone
substantial reform either unilaterally or with external assistance, that there would be
sufficient material for analysis.
Not all jurisdictions have clear delineation of roles and it is xvorth identi~,ing how
independence should be achieved where a revenue authotqty either falls wiflfin a Ministry or
OECD Conmlittee on Fiscal Affairs, Tax Adminislmlion i~* OECD Coungt~es and Sek¢led NomOECD
Comtttie,: Compat~live I~lfot~t~atio,t .Fetie* (2006) (Paris, Centre for Tax Policy and ~.dministration, 2006), p. 9.
Ibid., and Table 1, p. 31.
Ibid., pp 11q2.
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has its o\vn minister. It was clearly articulated in Austrafia by the then Minister for Revenue
and Assistant Treasurer:z~
Of course, the Cormnissinner of Taxation has absolute autonomy in the actual
administration of the tax laws.
Perceptions of a non-partisan administration of the taxation laws are as
fundamental to successful tax systems (and hence successful government) as are non-
pardsan judicial systems to the rule of law and sustaining a democratic society.
For dais and other reasons, the Conm~issioner of Taxation has - and will
continue to have - absolute discretion in the day to day adininistration of the tax laws.
At the same time, democratic government is held accountable by society for the
taxation system that it imposes and so must be able to deliver a system that accords
with democratically expressed preferences.
This is the part of tax athninistration that is wiflain the Government’s domain -
tax administration policy - and dais is my challenge as Minister for Revenue.
The Government’s roles in tax admitaistration include:
putting in place a robust tax design framework that generates tax laxvs that are
unambiguous, responsive to the legitimate concerns of taxpayers, and
conducive to effective adnfitaistration;
adequately resourcing the tax adininistration function; and
ensutng that appropriate accountability and review mechanisms are in place to
identi~, and remedy any problems ha tax administration.
Senator the Hon. H. Coonan, Speech to the Challis Tax Discussion Group (Sydney, 26 July 2002), p. 1,
<assistant.treasurer.gov.au/atr/content/speeches/2002/O10.asp>, 4 January 2006.
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The distinction of roles between the executive and the revenue authority becomes
more important in countries where-the tale df law is not as well established. Any form of
separation of authority becomes a useful means to increase transparency simply by virtue
of the requirement to share information among a xvider group. Even dfs is predicated on
die assumption that the tax system is not simply an instrument of executive authority,
~vlfich entrenches the systemic opportunity to act arbitrarily. At the point where application
of dre rule of la\v and obser~ance of the constitution become uncertain, no structural
measures will have much effect in protecting taxpayers’ rights,a4 However, wid~ increasing
recognition of the t’ule of law, any incremental measures to protect the autonomy of the tax
system and its administration are also likely to enhance taxpayer protection.2s Tiffs is
patdct~larly so, given the recog~fidon in those jurisdictions where the revenue base is under
d~reat, fl~at revenue collection xvill only increase if it is perceived as fair by the taxpayers. It
was and remains a notable component of the strategy of the Pakistan Central Board of
Revenue.26 The Tanzarfia Revenue Authority, as part of its effort to tertian its tax system
has identified its mission, ’To be an effective and efficient tax administration wlfch
promotes voluntatT¢ tax compliance by providing lfgh quality customer services with
fairness and integrity throngh competent and motivated staftT.27
Even in a country such as Zhnbabxve, suffering from democratic and economic
collapse, dm Zhnbabxve Revenue Authority has maintained as its banner headline on its
See die insightful discussion of the move in Tanzania from fl*e exercise of arbinaty executive authority
!o programmes designed to restore internal and external respectability to the operation of the tax system
m F.D.A.;M. Luoga, "The Viability of Developing Democratic Legal Frameworks for Taxation in
Developing Countries: Some Lessons from Tanzadian Tax Reform Experiences’, Law, SodalJustice ~
Global Development, <elj.watwick.ac.uk/global/issue/2OO3-2/luoga.html>, 5 November 2006, and L.
Ralmer and S. Gloppen, ’Accountability through tax refomas? Reflections from sub-Saharan Africa’, in
M. Moore and L. Rakner (eds), ’The New Polidcs of Taxation and Accountability’, IDS Bulletin, 33 (3)
July 2002.
Underlined by the explanations in die IMF Code, above n. 12, and particularly 18-2L
’Reform of the CBR November 2001 - June 2004’, a paper following a xvorkshop of the Central Board
of Revenue (26-28 October 2001), <unpanl.un.org/intradoc/>, 2 November 2006, and see die Pakistan
Central Board of Revenue website, <www.cbr.gov.pk/>, 2 November 2006.
Tanzania Revenue Authorii3,
, 
<www.tra.go.tz/index.btm>, 2 November 2006.
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xvebsite, ’Transparency, Integrity, Fairness: We are here to serve’.~8 It underscores tile fact
that revenue authofities are generally aware Of how important tr’ansparency, integ~ty and
fairness are to effective tax administration, compliance and enforcement. Their
independence from any autocratic or corrupt exercise of power by govetvmlent is a critical
first step in establishing their authority to implement those piinciples.~9 Tiffs highlights an
important issue. There are layers in the application of the rule of law and the general
principles that should underlie a tax system identified in Chapter 3.
Certain aspects of a countt’y’s legal system ruay be subjugated to the autocratic will of
file ~_~lh~g elite. However, other aspects will often remain in place w!file some or many of
tile social and econonffc structttres of society remain operative. As has been seen in
countries from’Nazi Germany to Zhnbabwe, contract and family law may be observed
even during incidences of genocide.3° In the same way a revenue authorit3, could operate
effectively, observing taxpayers’ fights, even where there was blatant abuse of human
rights. More often, it is likely that the corruption will seep down, at least to some extent,
into the bl~reaucracy.3~ Alternatively, file bureaucracy may be more heavily infected widi
con, aption than the tfigher level political and judicial organs. The ahn of the Model here
should be to bolster file position of those fighting against corruption and seelcing to
implement and enforce taxpayers’ rights.
ZLmbabxve Revenue Authodiy, <w~vxv.zin~a.co.zxv/>, 2 November 2006-
Fo~ ~m excellent history of the development of independent revenue collection as a central pillar of
modern democracy, see N. Ferguson, The Cash ~ex-tts: Mon9, and Pomer in the Modern llTo~td, 1700-2000(London, Allen L~ne/Penguin Press, 2001).
3o For fi~rther information on the Zhababxvean genocide, see Legal Resot~rces Foundation
and the Cafl~olic Commision for Jusdce and Peace, Bt~akdt~g the Si/ence, Buildit~ Trite Peace: A t~pot¢ on lhe
dislttt~am~ in Malabele/attd and lhe
k~id/ands 1980-1989,
<x~av.b~fonmazhn.com/members_~eports/matrep/mattepsumm.htm>, 4 January 2006.
For a deeper analysis of tltis aspect of corruption see D. Kaufman~L M. Go*~zales de Asis and P. Dini~io
(eds), l~++proving Govet~lance and Conttvllit~g Cot~ption: Ton,m~ts a PatlidpatoO’ and Action-Oriented Approach
Gmtmded       in      Et~pitical      Rigom"      (World       Bank       Institute,       2001),
<www.worldbm~k.org/wbi/governance/pubs/improving.bmil>, 31 October 2006. This volume
represents much of the material used by the World Bank Institute in its core course on figbl~ng
corruption.
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Few countries claim to be tmdemocratic. The opposite is die case and most
undemocratic countries make a point of publicising their democratic credentials.3a If the
~Ddel is widely accepted and espouses basic principles of achninistradon fl~at reinforce
tsxpayers’ rights, there is likely to be a similar clahn by revenue authorities that they
0bseta~e those principles. As noted above, die mission statements of revenue authorities,
ranging from the United States to Zhnbabwe, akeady incorporate a strong setwice focus.
The pressure to provide se~,ice and integrity in the tax system is further driven by the
demand for foreign direct invesmmnt. Tltis is illustrated by a paper issued in 2003 by the
American and European Union Chambers of Commerce on die need for reform of the
Armenian tax system if foreign direct investment was to be sustained, let alone increased.3~
It couctuue :
Moreover, in the vie\v of ahnost [all] respondents, the tax administration and the
hnplementafion of the tax system in Armenia on the part of the tax authorities is
inefficient, inequitable and unprofessional, xvith xvidespread corruption and
harassment of foreign investors and corporations that try to abide by the laws.
The key results of these weaknesses according to the paticipants of our survey
ate that:
Tax cotleclion is not as higb as it could or should be;
Foreign Direct Investment (FD1) into At~nenia is significantly discouraged,
xvith a vetT serious negative effect on the economy.
There are numerous agencies charting democratic development. For a listing of many of the better
tecognised, see tim Democracy Research Guide, The National Endowment for Democracy,
<www.ned.org>, 1 November 2006.
The American and European Union Chambers of Commerce in ~M-menia, A Joint White Paper, Refomt of
the A~mtiatt Tax" S3,slem: The Foreigt~ Im,esto~s’ Per~ective (August 2003), p. 3,
<wWW.amcham.ge/res!ics!Tax\XnnitePaper.pdf>, 6 November 2006.
Ibid., p. 3.
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Over time it is possible that the pressare for reform to atU:act foreign direct investment will
succeed. Alternatively, other internal and external factors identified in Chapter 4 are likely,
again over dine, to ensure that the tax system exlffbits the principles necessatT for it to
operate more effectively. It is interesting to note de Jantscher and Bird’s cormnents on
Lath~ America that,3s
The 1980s - in so maW ways a lost decade for a Latin America burdened xvith
external indebtedness and characterized by macmeconomic instability - turned out to
be a decade of aclfievement for the reform of tax adnfinisn’ation.
Noned~eless, the experience of sub-Saharan Africa is particularly instructive in this context.
As aid decreased there was an increased need to raise revenue,a6 To coiInter inefficient,
incompetent and corrupt tax collection and with the encouragement of the international
donor cormmmity Rakner and Gloppen note that a mtmber of African countries
introduced semi-autonomous revenue authorities.37 The ainx was to make better paid,
resottrced and trained indixdduals responsible for revenue collection and to limit dkect
political intervention in collection operations.3s Tiffs is consistent with the need for
independence from political interference, transparency and accountability. Inidal
improvements in Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia showed increased levels of efficiency in
35 M. Casanegra de Jantscher and R.M. Bird, "l~e Reform of Tax Adn~Lnisttation’ m R.M. Bird and M.
Casanegra de Jantscher (eds), I*@ml,i*g Tax-Adminislmtio~ i*~ Del,e/opi~g C’om~Oie~ (Washington D.C., IMF,
1992), pp. 1, 2.
~a L. Rakner and S. Gloppen, ’Tax Refotm and Democratic Accountability in Sub Saharan Africa’, pape~
presented    at    an    IDS    Taxation    Seminar,    (28-29    October    2002),    p.    6,
<www.ids.ac.ukigdr/cfs/aclixfties!Taxafion-Seminar.html>, 29 October 2006.
}* Ibid., p. 8. The countries identified are Gbana (1985), Uganda (1991), Zambia (1994), Kenya (1995),
Soutlf Africa (1996), Tanzania (1996), Rwanda (2000) and Malawi (2000). For a comprehensive analysis
of semi-autonomous revenue authorities and their advantages and disadvantages, see A.J. Mann, Are
Semi-Autonomous Revenue Aulhotilies the Answer to Tax Administration Pmbkms itt Developing Comttties? A
Pt~lical    Gtdde,     ~l~e     US     Agency     fo~     International     Development,     2004),
<www.fiscalrefom,.net/researcb/research.bm*>, 6 November 2006.
3s Ibid., p. 9. See gxrther, R.M. Bird, ’Admiinstrative Dimensions of Tax Refomx’, (2004) 10(3) Ada-Pa4ftc
TaxBullelit~, 134, 145 and IMF Code, above n. 12, 3.3.4.
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re~,enue collection from existh~g taxpayers. Hoxvever, Rakner and Gtoppen conclude that
d~ere remained a failure in these countries to increase revenue collection or to apply the laxv
uniformly, wlfich derived from a lack of polidcat will both to cease interfering and to allow
tratlsparency and accountability widfin the tax administration.4° Furthermore, even among
those taxpayers paying tax there remained a lack of trust manifested in low levels of
voluntary compliance.41 Bkd argues that:42
A tentative conclusion might be that, to put it in extreme terms, counties that have
the will, strategy, and resources to refoem tax administration probably do not need
independent revenue authorities and those in wlfich these critical ingredients are
lac -ldng are unlikely m be successful even if they create such an authorit3,.
One of the issues identified by Bird is the revenue authority’s reso~ces. A solntion
to the problems faced by revenue authorities in countries with vet3, linfited resources is to
outsource a number of functions that are particularly cosily to hnplement. Computerisation
and the sigtfificant possibilities from developments in technology provide a major incentive
to use them as much as possible in the tax administration process. However, the capital
cost of inves~g in the infrastructure, together with the personnel, training, operational and
maintenance costs are beyond the capacity of many com~tdes. Ramirez Acufia and
Mattmez-Vazquez have identified the advantages and disadvantages of outsourcing
elements of the tax adnfinistration process to the private sector.43 Both argue that the
s9 L. Ralmer and S. Gloppen, above n. 36.40 Ibid., pp. 9-18.41 Ibid., p. 15.42 R.M. Bh’d, above n. 38.
~ L.F. Ranfirez Acu~a, "Pfivatization of Tax Adm~strafior~’ and J. Marlinez-Vazquez, ’Comments’ m M.
Casanegra de Jantscher and ILM. Bird, above n. 35, p. 377 and p. 396. See also, G.P. Jenkins,
’Modernization of Tax Administrations: Revenue Boards and Privatization as Instrnments for Change’
(1994) 48 IBFD Btdletin, 75 and C.Y. Mansfield, ’Tax Reform m Developing Countries: "I~ne
Administrative Dhnension’ (1990) 44 IBFD Bu//elin, 137.
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decision-making role of a revenue autl~ority cannot be outsourced.~ However, the
informafion components, in certain circumstances, can be outsourced effectively and
efficiently, subject to stringent safeguards, without tmdermining either the integrity or the
perceived integrity of the tax system.4s As outsourcing becomes increasingly common,
taxpayers need the assurance that there is no nnderaxthfing of the autonomy of the revenue
authority. There is a long history of tax farming in Europe.46 It is clear from the discussion
above flaat it is no more conducive to creating a fair tax system today than it was in 1794,
when 28 tax farmers were guillotined during the French Revolution.47
Patronage is equally insidious in undemfining the integrit7 of the tax system. Raknet
and Gloppen note that it has seriously inhibited tax collection from cot-potations in
Zambia.aa It would extend to similar pattinaonial systems.49 Ovesccoming the problem of
patronage such that members of parfiament and others in executive audmrity do not have
sufficient influence over tax administration is necessarily a hard fought issue. However, it is
a requirement to ensure basic protection of taxpayers’ rights. Democratic countries operate
under fl~e general principle that a member of partLament caunot also hold office as a civil
sergeant (excluding positions as a govermnent minister or a member of the atoned forces),s°
This should also be reflected in the Model.
Although democratic goverurnent contribntes strongly to the in~plementafion of a
fair and equitable, certain and sinaple, efficient and effective tax system, it is not a
prerequisite. If the Model is implemented, even in form only, it is likely that incrementally it
will become more substantive. One of the first steps along that road is the recognitio*x that
taxation has been shoxw~ to be less effective when hnposed and implemented by fiat of a
Ibid.
Ibid., particularly pp. 378-392 and p. 397.
N. Ferguson, above n: 29.
Ibid., p. 95.
L. Rakner and S. Gtoppen, above n. 36, p. 12.
a9 F.D.A.M. Luoga, above n. 24.
50 G.. Carney, Member~ of pa~¢.;ame~h Law m~d E~hir~ (Sydney, Prospect, 2000), P. 57 et seq¯ f°~ a tfist°ry °f d~c
Westmfinster system. See also, UK, House of Conmlo~ls Disqualification Act 1975 and Commonwealth
of Ausn-alia Constitution Act 1900, s. 44(iv) and (v).
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0arrOw txiling elite. The relative aumnotny of the revenue authority to adm~fister the tax
syste*n independent from external interference is therefore a pattictflarly important initial
requirement, but it must be combined with the will, strategy and resources to be effective.
The Model can only provide the framework for an effective tax system: it does not provide
the political xx611 to implement it. Independence alone, however, is insufficient. It is also
necessatT to make the revenue authority accountable.
B Oversight and Accoun*abili  of the Reve,me Authoti y
Admirfistration of tax law necessa~_’ily involves the exercise of direct statutory powers and
fire exercise of admhlistrative discretion. The provers and discretion are usually
conveniently vested in the head or heads of the revenue authority, with the power to
delegate that authority.5~ In common law jurisdictions the general delegation of power can
include lawmaking, provided the delegation is exercised in accordance with the delegated
auflamit3~,s= In civil law jurisdictions delegated authority is far more highly regulated.
Vanistendael writes that in the ]European continental tradition:ss
This poxver of fl~e executive branch of government to execute or implement fl~e tax
laws is based on a general or specific delegation of power in flxe constitution. Tax
~egulations issued under such delegation of poxver are limited to tlie imptmnentation
of tlie law itself and are valid only wiflfin the limits of flmse laxvs. What can be
determined by executive decree are matters of detail, procedure, and a&~hfistration. A
For example, Australia, Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), s. 8; Canada, BJ. Arnold, ’General
Description: Canada’ m H.J. Ault, above n. 27, p. 25, p. 33; and New Zealand, Tax Admhfistrafion Act
1994, s. 6A.
For example, m the UK flmre is an increasing tendency to legislate broad prLnciples to p~ovide a ’skeletal’
framework \viflfin whinh gLinisters enact secondary legislation. H. Femvick and G. Phillipson, Te.\’t, Ca*es
3~ a’latetial* ou Public Law a*¢d Humatt Ra’ghls (2nd edn, Cavendish Publishing Ltd, 2003), p. 291 argue fl~at
this may also be seen as a slk~uficant erosion of parliamentatT sovereignty.
F. Vartistendael, above n. 2,~. 57. See also, Y. Grbich, above n. 4.
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regulation that extended the scope of the tax taxv, changed its conditions, or altered
the meatfing of the law xvould have to be declared illegal and inappficable by the
In the analysis that follows it xvill soon become clear that these differences are seen most
clearly in that taxpayers’ rights in common law jurisdictions tend to be administrative
rights. In civil law jurisdictions the}, tend to be secondary legal rights. Each right is
important, but its precise nature and content must adapt to the type of j/trisdiction in which
it is found. That said, it will be seen that there are several areas where there can be gaps in
taxpayer protection because of it. Tiffs reinforces the IMF view, based on its experience in
developing countries that, in addition to the principle that all tax must be hnposed by law,
’the administxadve application of tax laws should be sub}ect to procedural safeguards’,s~
The existence of procedural safeguards is cridcal to the integtit3’ of the tax system,ss
Thuronyi, based on Iris experience in super’vising tax reform projects as Senior Counsel in
the IMF, identifies six areas in tax admirtistradon that can seriously undermine its effective
operation:s6
1. Corruption among tax officials, which he describes as ’rampant in a nmnber of
developing and transition countries, with other cour~trJes occupying intermediate
positions’;
2. A lack of knowledge and competence of tax officials in m~derstanding and applying
the tax law;sv
3. Low investment in the pubhc service prmdding salary and conditions that camaOt
attract or retain competent staff;
IMF Code, above*~. 12, p. 2.
Ibid., 1.2.
Above n. 4, p. 207.
Discussed Barther in Publication o f R~des in Cbapte~ 6.
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Where tax officials are subject to physical danger because of theix role, particularly in
tax collection;
5. Where tax audits are over-fotmalistic in their design and admhfistration xvithout any
probing of the legal and economic issues in a taxpayer’s tax retma~; and
6. If tax refunds are not automatically given or are difficult to extract from the
govemment.
As discussed in Chapter 4 taxpayers’ rights can only. flourish in environments where the
rule of taw is observed. Luoga suggests that this is partictflarly so ’in the context of
patdmot~ial systems that are prevalent in developing countries’,sa Ghais9 notes the concerns
of foreign direct investors over unaccountable and undemocratic govertmaent, which leads
to poor pollW and inefficient administration.
This returns to the point that a form of taxpayers’ rights is ineffective if it is not
obset~ed in the application of the tax law and its administration. However, if there are at
least foranal safeguards in place there is something for either or both of the tax
a&ninistration and taxpayers to work towards in making the safeguards effective.
It is not within the scope of this discussion to identify the best structure for effective
tax administration.~° However, Thuxonyi has raised issues particularly in relation to
developing countries and countries in transition, which tie in with the discussion in the
previous section. Authors such as Islfimura~t have concerns in relation to de>eloped
F.D.A.M. Luoga, ’Taxation in the Advent of Democratisation and Transition to Free Market Economy
in Tanzania and Concerns on the Rule of Law and Human Rights’, Law, Yodal Juslice & Global
Devdopmeot, 31, <elj.watwick.ac.uk/global/issue/2002 1/luoga.html>, 6 November 2006.
Y. Ghai, ’Constitutions and Governance in Africa: A Prolegomenon’ in S. Adelman and A. Paliwala
(eds), Law and Cffsis in lbe Third World (London, Hans Zell, 1993), p. 51, p. 75.
For some discussion, see A.J. Mama, above n. 37; J. Martinez-Vazquez and A. Timofeev, ’Choosing
betxveen Centralized and Decentralized Models of Tax Administration’, ISP Working Paper Number 05
02, International Studies Program, (Georgia State University, January 2005), <isp-
aysps.gsu.edu/papers/ispxvp0502.html>, 6 November 2006; R.R. Taiietcio Jra:, ’Administrative Reform
as Credible Cotxm~itment: The Impact of Autonomy on Revenue Authority Performance in Latin
Ametica’ (2004) 32 (2) Wo~]d Development, 213; and C. Vehom and J. Brondolo, ’Organizational Options
for Tax Adn~istration’ (1999) 53 IBFD Bulleti~*, 499.
Above n. 9.
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countries. In the previous section xve noted that it is inaportant that the revenue authority is
autonomous from political interference. Thi* may be through the clear separation of role,
function and responsibRity xvithin a govetaunent deparmaent, or tkrough die sernL
autonomous revenue authority model.
Flowing directly ’from die arguments supporting non-interference, it is equally
essential that there is some form of external oversight as a check or balance on the role of
the revenue authol~ity.62 The nature of dais oversight ~411 depend on die stmctt~te of
govermnent, In some democracies, the oversight has been linlited until recently to
reporting annually to parliament or a responsible minister in the govenxment. In AusttalL%
for example, die ATO provides a comprehensive annual report to the Minister for
Revenue, who has Federal Cabinet responsibility for the deparmaent and the report must
be laid before both houses of Parliament.6~ In many democracies, die parliament can
regularly make enquii~es into die tax system through its cormnittees, which may or may not
arise out of the annual reporting process. In die US, for example, this falls under die Ways
and Means Committee in die House of Representatives and the Finance Comnaittee in die
Senate.64 In South Africa, the Portfolio Comnaittee on Finance of die Nadonal Assembly
reviews the activities of the South African Revenue Service under Section 55(2) of the
Constitution.6s Tlais is a common approach.
Bersten raises the question as to whether this form of accountability leaves die
goverrmxent xvith enough poxver over the adn~fist~ation of the tax laxvs.66 The minister
responsible has no power of dkection over an autonomous revenue authority.6~ "Hie
revemm authority is usually forbidden by c~ninal penalties from disclosing any confidential
IMF Code, above n. 12, is co ~cerned largely wifla die independent ctmcks and balances that enstu:e the
integtit3, of government finances, including taxation.
IncomeTax Assessment Act 1936 (Cfll), s. 14.
J.M. Dodge, J.C. Fleming, Jr and D.A. Geier, Federal lncome Tax." Docttine, 2lmctto~, aM Po/i9’ (3rd e&~,
Charlottesville, LexisNexis, 2004), p. 30.
See e.g., the repotts of flm Parfiamentat3’ Monitofing Group, <www’pmg’°rg"za/>’ 6 Januzry 2006"
M. Bersten, above n. !3, p. 21.
Ibid.
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information about taxpayers to the nfinister.~s However, Bersten points out fllat die nature
of the parmerslfip between nfinister and re’i, enue authority ensures that there is sufficient
leverage for each party to achieve its own requirements from the relationship.~ On the
goverrm~ent side:v°
die revenue authority budget is allocated fl~rough die parliamenta*3, process;
it is able m amend tax laws;
it is able to allocate and remove adnfinistrative responsibilities from tie revenue
authurity;
it can influence the revenue authority through the many other gnvemment
departments that interact operationally with the revenue authority; and
it has the ultimate power of appointment of the head and sometimes oilier senior
members of the revenue authority.
"File revenue autho~city’s major strength is its independence. Given the dependence of most
governments on tax revenues, the revenue authority is in a powerful position of influence
sfinply because it collects t, he budgeted revenue and implements both revenue legislation
passed by parliament and subordinate revenue legislation introduced by file executive]~ Its
input hlto revenue policy and the design of new laws can be critical in making them
effective. Where the system works well, there shotdd be a balance between the goverm~aent
and the revenue authority wlfich ensures both independence and accountability.
In some jurisdictions, the demand for accountability requires more than the higher
level oversight provided by a responsible minister or an oversight co*r~nittee of pa~ament.
Ibid., p. 22. Tiffs is discussed further h~ Chapter 8. It is vital that t,mxpayers have complete confidence that
their confidential tax kiformafion cannot be revealed to parliament or to any other ttm:d par~,.69 Ibid.
~0 Ibid.
~ Ibid.
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It focuses on more detailed governance issues including the strategic funcdon and
operation of the tax system. Appointing independent members of a body specifically
responsible for oversight of the tax system is most common. For example, in response to
tiffs reqtfirement, Canada consfitoted a Board of Management with 15 members, 11
nominated by the provinces and tet:dtories. External appointees bring a broad range of
backgrounds and expertise to the strategic and organisational management of the CRA. A
similar external expertise is brought to the Board of HMRC in the United I#,ingdom by the
non-executive directors. In 1998, following continuing public concerns about the operation
of its IRS, the U~fited States introduced an IRS Oversight Board as part of the popularly
known Taxpayer Bill of Rights 3]2 This approach has been followed in those jurisdictions
seeking to cope with major reform of their systems in response to fiscal crises. For
example, Pakistan’s 2001 reforan strategy included increased autonomy for the Central
Board of Revenue subject to oversight by a Supervisor3’ Council comprising a range of
government officials and the possibilit3’ of co-opted private sector representatives,v3
Where the goverrmaent does not want to appoint independent members to a
govetamag body there are other options. In response to criticism of tile tax system, in 2000
the Australian Government introduced the Board of Taxation, xvith no reporting
relationship to the Commissioner of Taxation, but whose advisorT function to tim
¯ 74Treasurer mchlded:
fl~e qua[it), and effectiveness of tax legislation and the processes ~br its
development, including tim processes of communit), consultation and otber
aspects of tax design;
72 A. Greenbaum, ’United States Taxpayer BL~s of Pdghts 1, 2 and 3: A Pad~ to the Future or Old W[ime m
New Botdes?’ in D. Bendey, above n. 7, p. 347, An Act to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 ~o
restructure and reform dxe Internal Revenue Service and for od~er purposes PL 105-206. See generally,
OECD, above n.20, pp. 12-14.
~ Cennal Board of Revenue, above n. 26.
v~ The Charter of the Board o f Taxation, <www.taxboard.gov-au/content/charter’asp>, 6 N°vember 2006
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hnprovements to the general integtity and fimctioifing of the taxation system;
research and other studies commissioned by the Board on topics approved or
referred by the Treasurer; and
other taxation matters referred to the Board by the Treasurer.
The Board of Taxation reco,rmaended the establislmaent of the office of Inspector-General
of Taxation as a further independent observer of the tax system, to advise the govermnent
on tax matters and, in particular, to identify systemic problems in tax adnfinisttation]s The
~.li~fister for Revenue agreed to the establislwnent of the office as an independent taxpayer
advocate and adviser to the Govet’mrrent, stating that her key priorities were to improve the
responsiveness of the tax system to the genuine concerns of taxpayers and to ensure that
the tax system is fair.v6 The position was established in 2003 as an independent position
appointed by the Govemo>General with an annual reporting requirement to Parliament to
e~tsure transparency]~
Some argue that oversight boards or sitxfilar bodies can themselves be designed to
constrain the operations of the revenue authority in favour of taxpayers. Greenbaum
argued that the IRS Oversight Board xvas ’a legislative in~qtation to second guess and thus
restrict the Cormnissioner in the petfomaance of her or Iris job of running the IRS’]s If tiffs
were the case, the Board would not be applying approp~ate governance pmaciples.
Oversight must go hand in hand xvith appropriate use of oversight powers and
responsibilities and any external oversight body shottld not be open to capture by special
Board of Taxation, Iuspeclor-Geuet~l of Ta:,’atiom A Repot to the Minister for l~veuu~ aud Assi*tant Treasurer
(2002), <www.taxboard.gov.au/content/>, 6 November 2006.
Press Release by the tlmn Minister for Revenue and tim Assistant Treasttrer, Senator the Hon. H.
COonan, 16 September 2002, <assistant.treasttrer.gov.au/atr/content/pressreleases/2002/O98.asp>, 6
November 2006.
Tim Press Release, ibid., outlhms the rationale for the appointment and its scope.
A. Greenbamn, above n. 72, p. 367.
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interest groups intent on pursuing a particular agenda. As Highfield and Baer noted in the
context of Russian tax adininistration in 2000:79
A balance should exist bet~veen the rights of the taxpayer, whose rights are ensured by
due process and fair treatment, and the tax administration, xvbich should have powers
sufficient to administer and enforce the tax law in an efficient and even-handed
It is not sufficient simply to establish external oversight of tire revenue authority. It is
essential that the oversight is exercised in accordance with principles of good governance.
Creating a balance betxveen independence and accountabilit3’ is difficnlt, but is the key to an
effective revenue authority. Majone urges a note of caution ha designing an autonomous yet
accountable system. He argues that regulators and agencies are often ctiticised for
shortcomings in this regard, ’which in many cases are due less to their actions or omissions
than to the xvay the enabling statutes have been written.’s° The effectiveness of the
oversight of the revenue authotit3’ is therefore predicated on its design. Tiffs ha turn is
highly dependent on the jurisdictional context and existing govetammnt smactures and
accountabJlities. Oversight of the revenue authority cannot be held hostage to a system
where the existing structures would make it meaningless. But it is equally pointless
introducing independence and accountability measures that bear tat relationship to tim
system in \vhich they are supposed to ope~cate.~
presented at Fiscal Affaks Departmeat,R. Higlifield aud K. Baer, Tax Adirmusnauon for Russ a, paper
IM]a Conference on Post-Election Stxategy, (Moscow, 5-7 Ap~ 2000) p. 2.
so G. Majone, ’Agency Independence and Accountabilit3 , m OECD Working Party on Regulato0’
Management 7a~d Reform, Desigtti~tg I~depet~dettl a~td Accotmlable Regtdatot), Authofflies for High QualiO’
Re~lllaliott, Proceedings of ai* Expert Meeting (London, UK, 10 11 Januat3’ 2005) pp. 52-53,
<ww~v.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/28/35028836.pdt~, 6 November 2006.
Fo~ a more extensive discussion on structures for accoumabilit3’, see G. Majone, ’S~xategy and Stmctttre:
the Political Economy of Agency, Independence and Accountability’ in OECD Working party o*~
Regulator3, Managemear amd Reform, ibid., p. 126.
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C PEndples of Good Governance
Good governance is essential to die effective administration of a tax system. The oversight
body, whatever form it takes, should apply good governance principles if that is thek role,
or cormnent on hoxv well good governance principles are being applied if their funcdon
does not involve governance. The revenue authorit3"s senior management and board, if
there is one, should also be acutely conscious of and seek to implement good governance
principles.
In their discussion of existhlg taxpayer protection, Baker & Groenhagen note the
paucity of meastttes taken to set international governance standards for taxarion.8z This can
be explained in the context of the extensive worldwide focus on the development of
governance principles generally, and the numerous guidelines applicable to government
institutions specifically. The broader focus on governance has inapacted on tax
admimstradon through a variety of associated documents that are applicable to revenue
aufllorides. There is considerable overlap between governance and setadce standards. The
former are concerned with the governance of the tax administration and its organisadon.
The latter focus on die standards of service provided by the adiulnistration to taxpayers,
but in a number of areas, such as compliance, as discussed in Chapter 2, this inapacts
directly on risk management and therefore governance. Hoxvever, it is hnportant to
distinguish between the two and dais section deals with prqnciples of governance and die
next section deals with public sen, ice standards as principles of good practice.
Altho~lgh ’there is a high co~relafion between governance quality and per capita
income’,83 attempts to improve governance in the public service is not restricted to OECD
P. Baker and A M. Groenhagen, The Protection q[Taxpayers Rights - An Inle~ati~tal Cod~cation ~ondon,
Eutopem FMandal Fo~, 2001), ch. 2.
J. Huther ~d A. Shah, App~q~g a Sitnp/e Measu~ ~ Good Got,et~ta~ce to/he Debate ~ Fiscal Dew~*tmliwlion
(1998 World B~ Po~cy Research Wot~g Paper 1894), <x~mv.worldba~.org/wbi/govem~ce/x~-
ov -
.
I , 06g et,,~cehm~l>, 6 Nmembet 20 .
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countries. For example, countries such as India, througli the Department of Administtalive
Reforms and Public Grievances84 and Malaysia, through an extensive public service quality
program,8s have developed highly sophisticated governance principles and public service
standards fox application in non-OECD enviromnents. One of the most useful
benchmarks was that issued by the Independent Commission for Good Governance in
Public Services in the UK, The Good Govet~lance Standard for Pub& Sovices (Good Governance
Standard),86 It sets out six malor ptanop es:
1. Good governance means focusing on the organisations’s purpose and on
outcomes for citizens and set~,ice users.
2. Good governance means performing effectively iu clearly deNxed functions and
rotes.
3. Good governance means promoting values for the whole orgatfisation and
demonstrating the values of good governance through behaviour.
4. Good governance means taking infom~ed, transparent decisions and managing
risk.
5. Good governance means developing die capacity and capability of the
governing body to be effective.
6. Good governance means engaging stakeholders and making accountability real.
The detailed content of each principle is reinforced by sub-principles and explanationsff
They are all applicable to some extent ~o the govemauce of a revenue authority. Where
there is no specific governing body, the fifth principle wotdd apply to those that act in that
See dm comprehensive website of Citizens’ Charters in Government °f India <www’g°icharters’nic’ia>’
6 November 2006.
See, e.g., Malaysian Administrative Modemisation and Management Plam~ing Utfit ~L~.,IPD), The Civil
Service    of )~,Ia/m,sia    -    Movitg    into    the    New    Mtllenmum    (2000    ~’~ )’
<~vw ma~ u ov ~,/mam u/bm/Pubficafions/Book/N~e~mi~/M~n.hm~>, 6 Novembe~ 2006.p.g ¯ ~ P
(2004 OPM & CIPFA), <xm~v.opm.co.~/ICGGPS/dowtfioad_upload/Standa~d.pdf>, 6 November
2006.
Ibid., p. 5.
Ibid., pp. 5-26.
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capacity for the revenue authorit3, as the external oversight body. It is important for
p~liamentary committees or other such bodies responsible for external oversight to realise
the responsibility they have in assessing and challenging the standards of governance
exercised by the revemle authority. The Good Governance Standard includes as an
kppendix sample questions to aid in this task.s9
In assessing the need for revenue authority oversight it was noted that Tlluronyi
~dsed sL’~ areas where tax adinitlistration could be seriously undermined. By properly
applying the Good Governance Standard to a revem~e authority exhibiting those
characteristics it is likely that most, if not all, would be addressed. A combination of strong
etl~ical organisational values, effective ~isk management, good quality in£ormation, an
emphasis on accotmtability and the provision of an environment in which high quality
’staff can perform well and deliver effective services’v° would act to redr~ce corruption
sigt~ificantly. Lack of knowledge and competence of tax officials wonld be overcome by the
principle that good governance means engaging the staff as stakeholders and making
accountability to them as employees real. The principle gives a responsibility to ensure that
staff recmittnent, ttaitling and motivation are maintained at a high level to meet the
objectives of the revenue authority. The same principle would require the oversight body to
~ght against low invesmaent in staff with the provision of poor wages and conditions. The
combination of achieving the revenue authority’s objectives, the engagement of taxpayers
as stakeholders and accountability to taxpayers, would overconae procedural failures
identified by Thuronyi. What could not be overcome simply by good governance is where
tax officials are subject to physical danger because of their ~’ole. However, the engagement
of taxpayers as stakeholders and striving to achieve a perception that the tax system is fair,
should go some xvay to reducing taxpayer aggression towards the system.9~
Ibid., AppendLx B, p. 31.
Ibid., p. 24.
Implicit in the analysis by L. Rakt~er and S. Gloppen, above n. 36, pp. 12~17.
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Where public setaTice standards have become ingrained into the culture of the
revenue authority, it is more likely that taxpayers’ fights will be upheld. This x, dll Usually
only be possible \vhere the governance principles support the integfit3, and effective
operation of the tax system. In that sense, as in the areas of substantive taw, the
introduction of the Model is but one aspect of the legal and administrative envirormaent
that is necessatT to support a genuine recognition and application of taxpayers’ fights. As
identified above, the more entrenched the nile of law, the mote likely that there is an
em~tonment in which governance principles can be observed.9z xX/hether they will be
observed depends in addidon on the accountability and transparency of government?3
However, as noted in Chapter 2, hnproved governance and increased engagement do not
necessarily flow from socio-economic development. Kaufmann argues that:94
tbe process of economic development does not in itself automatically ensure
improved governance, civil fiberties and control of corruption. Tbe cansalit3, direction
is from hnproved governance (including civil and political liberties) to economic
development, and not vice versa.
His research shoxvs that it requires specific intet~,ention by the state and the formulation
and hnplementafion of policies on governance to establish the climate both for hnman
fights to be obseta, ed and economic development m occur.9s
Moxdng from the general governance principles of The Good Gommance Standmrtfor
Public Se*Tdces, a specifically relevant and inter-nationally acceptable96 set of principles, man}’
of xvhich are directly applicable to the governance of a revenue authofity, is tim 2001 IMF
See D. Kanfmam~ et al, above n. 31 and F.D.A.M. Luoga, above n. 24, p. 8.
See generally, OECD Working Party on Regulator}, Management and Reform, above n. 80.
D. Kaufmann, ’Human Rights and Governance: The Empirical Challenge’ in P. )dston and M. Robinson
(eds), Htctttat* R~hts aM Development: Towards Mu/ualReittfotreme~tl (Oxford, OUP, 2005), p. 352, s. 5.
9s Ibid., see the conclusions in s. 5, sttmmatising die earlier analysis, particularly in ss 2 and 3.
96 This does not mean that fliey are likely to be observed in mosl countries.
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Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Tran~at~ng?7 (IMF Code). q~ae IMF Code is largely concerned
vfith lfigher level issues, but elements relate directly to the Model.
1    The IMF Code
The IMF Code is in four sections. Section i focuses on the ’Clarity of Roles and
Responsibilities’. It applies to gover~mlent generally. Applying it specifically to the
a&ni~istration of the tax system, it supports a number of the arguments ali’eady made m
this Chapter:98
1.1 The government sector should be distinguished from the rest of the public
sector and from the rest of the economy, and policy and management roles
wittfin the public sector should be clear and publicly disclosed.
1.1.1 The stt’uctm’e and functions of government should be clearly spedfied.
1.i.2 Tlie responsibilities of different levels of govermneut, and of the executive
branch, the legislative branch, and the judiciary, should be well defined.
1.1.3 Clea" mechanisms for dm coordination and management of budgetary and
extrabudgetary activities should be established.
There are further points reqtfiting a clear deIineatio,~ of the roles of government,
nongovernmental public sector agencies and the private sector. The first points set out
above support the clear separation of responsibilities between the tl~:ee arms of
government. As discussed earlier, tl~is requires that the rote of the revenue authority as an
arm of the executive be clearly specified. It in,pacts directly on a number of the tights
considered below (and a number of those set out in Chapter 6), which are designed to
Ii~[F Code, above n. 12.
Ibid., p.
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prevent the revenue authofity f~om usutping the role of either the legislature or the
judicialT.
The requirement that the policy and management roles xvithin the public sector be
clear and publicly disclosed protects the revenue authofity from interference by Other
government deparmaents. In regimes where corruption is fife, we have seen that it was a
sigrfificant reason for the introduction of semi-autonomous revenue authofities. From that
discussion, it was also clear that part of the failure of semi-autonomous revenue authorities
to make a longer-lasting impact in countries such as Uganda, Zambia and Tanzania was
because there were no clear mechattisms for the coordination and management of
budgetat3, activities.99 It ties in with the next sub-section of the IMF Code:1°°
1.2 There should be a clear legal and administrative frarnexvork for fiscal
1.2.1 Any committnent or expenditure of public funds should be governed by
comprehensive budget laws and openly available administrative rules.
1.2.2 Taxes, duties, fees, and charges should have an explicit legal basis. ’Fax laws and
regulations should be easily accessible and understandable, and clear criteria
should guide an}, adtninis~ative discretion in their application.
1.2.3 Ethical standards of behaviouac for public servants should be clear and well
public~ed.
A clear legal and adiuinistradve ftamexvork for the tax system is fundamental both to
principles of good governance and taxpayers’ fights. In particular, the necessity for
explicit legal basis for all taxes was discussed in Chapte~ 6 and is set out in At~cle 4 of d~e
Model. Article 4 also incoq~orates the requirement that any administrative discrelSon
99 L. Rakner and S. Gloppen, above n. 36, p. 11.
100 IMF Code, above n. 12, p. vii.
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should be governed by clear cfiteria. The requirement that tax laws and regulations should
be easily accessible and tmderstandable ties back to the principles of certainty and simplicity
3iscussed in Chapter 3. It is important to note that the explanations of 1.2.2 in the IMF
Code also extend to cover ’Taxpayer l~dghts and Opetmess of Admhfistrative Decisions to
Independent Reviexv’.~°~ The list of rights mentioned provides further support for the
Model and the reference in the IMF Code is noted etsexvhere in figs thesis m the context of
the discussion of individual fights.
One of the most significant principles included in the IMF Code is the requirement
for cleat and xvell publicized ettfical standards for public servants.~°2 This shot~ld include all
employees of the revenue authority, even where the revenue authofity is autonomous and
its employees are not public servants. Etlfics cannot be legislated. However, the substantive
tax law includes a range of penalties for breach of major etlfical requirements, such as the
requirement of revenue officers to maintain the confidentialit3~ of taxpayers’ records and
infom~afion. Nonetheless, it is a principle of good governance to maintain an environment
in wlfich revenue authofity employees are acutely aware of the ethical responsibilities wlfich
they bear. These should also be articulated for the benefit of taxpayers in an3, document
settng out their administrative rights and obligations. Tlfis is discussed further in the next
section and as a general principle of admhfistrafion in Chapter 8.
There is linfited direct applicability of the remainder of the IMF Code to the revenue
authority in the context of taxpayers’ fights. Hoxvever, the basic principles surrounding the
effective fiscal operation of a government ate directly applicable to the revenue authofit3, as
it contributes towatds and participates in that operation. They are basic governance
Ibid., p. 20.
The IMF Code identifies the U~tiled Nations’ International Code of Cbt~duct fir Public O~dals,
<w~mv.tm.org/ga/docun~ents/garesSl/garSi-59.htm>, 6 November 2006, as the basis for etttical
Standards and the OECD-PUIkL,\ p~,nciples for managing ethics ha the public sector as best practice, see
<\m.m.v.oecd.org/puma/gvmance!ethics/>, 10 Januat3, 2006.
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principles and taxpayers have the fight to expect that they will be implemented in. order to
protect the fabric, structure and operation of the tax system.
Those pfinciples that are parucularly relevant to taxpa} ers ~ghts ar .
2.1 The public should be provided with full infom~ation on the past, current, and
projected fiscal acdvity of government.
2.2 A commitment should be made to the thnely publication of fiscal informafion.
3.3 Procedures for the execution and monitoring of approved expenditure and for
collecting revenue shoul~ be clearly specified.
3.3.4 The national tax admhtistradon should be legally protected from political
di*ecdon and should report regularly to the public on its activities.
4.1
4.l.3
Fiscal data should tneet accepted data quality standards.
Specific assurances should be provided as to the quality of fiscal data. In
particular, it should be indicated \vhether data in fiscal reports are internally
consistent and have been reconciled with relevant data from other sources.
4.2
4.2.1
Fiscal information should be subjected to independent scmfny.
A national audit body or equfivalent organization, which is independent of the
executive, should provide thnely reports for the legislature and public on the
4.2.3
financial integrity of government accounts.
A nadonal stafisfics agency should be provided wida the institutional
independence to verify the quality of fiscal data.
There is a focus on the f~ffl provision of reformation to the public and the monitoring of
the qualit}, and integ~it}, of that information. It extends the principle of transparency,
articulated in Chapter 2 in the context of the design and implementation of tax rules, to the
fiscal acdvit3’ of the government. Although not directly xxdthin the mat~agement control of
the revenue authorit},, the principles cover the broader fiscal acdvity in which the revenue
~03 Ibid., p. viii-x.
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aud~ofity plays such a cridcat part.t°4 If Kaufmann is correct, improved governance xvill lead
to economic development,ms
The principles apply to the autonomy of the revenue authority discussed above.
Ho~vever, as was pointed out, autonomy must exist in fact and not just on paper. Bkd
notes that xvithout the political will not to interfere there is little to stop such interference
occUrring in many developing countries.I°6 Articulation of governance principles does at
least increase awareness that they exist. This is reinforced where there is a national audit
aud~ofity that is independent of the executive and which provides regular, comprehensive
arid accurate reports on the fiscal health of the countt’y. As these reports are made to
padiament and ate accessible by die public generally, they begin to entrench the concept of
accountability. Widening die tax net ha countxies where it has been sectoral and where die
base is narrow involves more taxpayers in the tax system and there is an increasing
propensity to give voice to concerns they might have.t°7
However, if the audit, monitoring and reporting activities are to be effective the
quality and integrity of data must be assured. This is ahvays going to be difficult in
developing countries, but it is an area of patdculat focus, for obvious reasons, by donor
countries. The IMF Code notes, for example, that the IMF is systematically devdoping a
data quality assessment framework that ’is designed to be a flexible, compreliensive tool
fl~at can be used in a variety of country situations by experts and non-experts alike’,ms
External accountability is reinforced by the requkement to provide accurate figures for
Except in those instances identified by Moore, particularly dm anti democratic effect of dependence on
aid and other sources of gover*mmnt income sucb as sectoral and illegal lexdes, 101 of which significantly
reduce the importance of central revenue raising and budgeting. Described in M. Moore, "Death Without
Taxes: Democracy, State Capacity and Aid Dependence in the Forth World’ in M. Robinson and G.
Wlfite (eds), The Democratic Deve/opme*ital Xtate: Political and Imtitulional Desigt1 (Oxford, OUP, 1998), p. 84.
See further M. Moore, ’Political Underdevelopment: What Causes "Bad Governance"?’ (2001) 3 Public
Management Review, 3.
D. Kanfmann, above n. 94.
R.M. Bird, above u. 38.
I3. Kaufmatm, above n. 94 and L. Rakner and S. Gloppen, above n. 36 pp. 12-16.
IMF Code, above n. 12, p. 65.
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anything from trade negodarions to ensurhag as high a sovereign credit rating as possible.
Accuracy in one area of government can then flow flarough to other areas.
Although the IMF Code gives little explanation of the procedures that should be
’clearly specified’ for collecting revenue m 3.3, this is a very important point. It identifies
file procedural implementation of the tax laws and regulations imposing tax. The
procedures will be both formal and informal. Many are included in the substantive tax law.
Others are administrative and included in internal manuals and handbooks. In the
explanation of 1.2.2, with the requirement that clear criteria should guide any administrative
discretion, the IMF Code does state that ’the material file tax agency uses in appl}fing tlae
tax laws (e.g., manuals and legal opiafions) should be publicly available’,m9 Appl)4ng this as a
principle of governance fits nearly with the underlying principles of certainty and simplicity
identified in Chapter 3. It also overcomes file concerns in tax systems where there is little
transparency.
For example, Ishimura xvrites of Japan, that ’tax procedures are extremely opaque so
that many decisions are made arbitrarily by file tax authorities’,u° Arbutina, writing from a
Croatian perspective, makes the point that for countries ha transition major tax refman ’is
enough to cause an administrative nightmare’,m wtfich makes transparency difficult during
tile transitional period. However, he also reinforqes the point made by Rakner and
Gloppen,nz that tax refo*:m increases democratic accountability simply by virtue of raising
taxpayer concerns that they are facing or likely to face increased taxation)~3
To comply with the IMF Code, the Model must reflect the requirement for clear
specification of procedures for collecting revenue. It does so by requiring a legal basis for
taxation and administrative discretion, together with criteria for the exercise of tlaat
Ibid., p. 19.
K. Ishimttra, above n. 18, p. 227, p. 230. See also, T. Okamttra, ’The Japanese Tax System: Due Process
and fl~e Taxpayer’ (1993) 11 lt~temationa! Tax- a~d Bminess Lau,, 125.
H. Atbudna, ’Taxation in Croatia: Developments in fl~e Field of Taxpayers’ Rights and Obligations’ in D.
Betidey, above n. 7, p. 138, p. 145.
L. Rakner and S. Gloppen, above n. 36, pp. 12 16.
H. Arbutina, above n. 111, p. 150.
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~iscretion. It also requires that taxpayers should haste access to information affecting any
aspect of the procedures governing tax ad{ninistradon, collection and enforcement. The
Modal must emphasise the importance of goveruance prh~ciples generally and at tltis stage
it is appropriate to require that the revenue authority should ensure compliance m all areas
of its responsibility with the IMF Code. A future development may be to include a model
set of governance principles as an appendLx to the Modal.
D Ptindples of Good Practice
Historically, public service standards have been the instruments used to govern public
service adaaah~istration. The Australian Public Service standards, for example, were
intt-oduced in 1922 and updated in 1999.TM The OECD noted the extent of public service
or Citizen’s Charters in its 1996 review,ns The general detail of public service standards
governing administration of govermnent departments, including the revenue authority,
fo*ans the background to parts of the Model. Public seivice standards are relevant to the
governance, management and operation of the revenue authority. However, the detailed
content is generally applicable to an), govertmaent department (and often also to any public
service body whether public or private). Tt~s Section therefore focuses on identifying those
Standards that are dkectly relevant to the Model.
In doing so, it analyses both general and specific principles of good practice relevant
to tax administration. As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, principles of good practice
generally comprise a&ninistrafive rights and goals that are prima facie unenforceable. These
ate not exactly congruent xvith the inclusions in most revenue authority documents setting
~" Public Set~,ice Regulations 1922 (Cth), updated by the Public Setice Act 1999 (Cth).
iis OECD,     Re~b~lldve     Goven*me**l:     Se*~gce     Qua~i~     l*~ilialives     (OECD,     1996),
<xvxVXVoecdorg/findDocmnent/O,2350,en 2649 34275 i 119699 1 1 37405,00html>, 10 January2006.      "
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out taxpayers’ rights as these often include enforceable rights and also describe, in broad
terms, taxpayers’ obligations. However, as the documents issued by revenue authorities are
the product of extensive research and are widely accepted, they shoLlld fotan the starting
point for the prindples of good practice. Secondary legal and primary administrative tights
that are contained in revenne authority documents are discussed in Chapter 8.
The principles of good practice provide the practical adnfinistrative framework to
support the Model’s hnplementation. As such, the potential and justifiable variation in any
compilation of principles of good practice makes it impossible to provide a model set of
principles. \Xrhat is more useful is to provide an illnstrarion of recognised examples of lfigh
quality principles of good practice:
It is also very important to separate the unenforceable administrative rights and goals
from the enforceable rights in the Model. The separation underlines tile fact that an), tight
included in the Model must be substantially enforceable. If the t~vo were combined in tbe
¯ Model, there would be a strong temptation to issue a generic document from the revenue
authority including both enforceable and unenforceable rights, but without providing for
the enforcement of the enforceable rights. The rarionale would be that if a right is included
in a document issued by the revenue authority the right has therefore been given to
taxpayers and no ftttther action is necessa*3’. The reality is that rights requk’ing legislation or
the exercise of specific admJatistrative discretion do not exist until the relevant legislation is
passed or adiniifistrafive discretion is exercised. It is easy to fudge the implementation of
taxpayers’ rights and the Model must avoid facilitating fudging of Otis kind.
Before exami*~hag the documents issued by individual revenue authotities, it is useftd
to take a step back and examine the xvork done in this area by the OECD. The O1~CD
Centre for Tax Policy and Adi~finistration has produced two relevant docmnents: pd~cip/es
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Good Tax Administration - Praelice Note (GAP001) and Taxpayer R~hts and Obh’galions
(GAP002).u~
1 OECD GAPO01
GAP001 is concerned with the principles of good tax administration. Much of its focus is
on promoting high standards of international cooperation among tax administrations.
There is much less detail on the principles applicable to domestic tax adininistration.
GAP001 is consistent with the principles set out in Chapter 3, including aspects of the
neutxalit3, prJ~ciple. As an O]ECD docmr~ent, it puts .for~vard OECD policy. Much of it is
unconttoversiat and represents accepted best practice. Some points may draw criticism
from a wider audience. For example, revenue authorities are encouraged to support tl~e
at~n’s length principle and tlie OECD gttidelines on transfer pricing. They are also
encottraged to manage issues relating to tax competition and tax havens by identif36ng risks
and elaborating administrative strategies. Hmvever, GAP001 encapsulates most of the
principles that shottld underpin a tax administration intent on protecting taxpayers’ rights.
Indeed, GAP001 is designed to provide tim basis for GAP002, wltich sets out taxpayers’
tights and obligations.
GAP001 begins with an introducto*3, section on the goals and challenges of revenue
authorities,nv Consistent with the principles of good governance discussed above, it
l~ghlights the importance of a revenue authority understanding its pin’pose and goals,
ensuring that its use of resources is the most effective and efficient to achieve them)~ It is
assisted m doing so if it uses a combination of teclmology, benclm~arking and testing to
Available at <wwxv.oecd.org>, i0 January 2006.
GAP001, 3.
Ibid,, para. 2.
325
improve its public hnage and the organisadon of its xvork processes,n9 The language of
’management’ as a discipline ha’s permeated revenue authorities relatively recently.
Traditionally the concept of a strategic plan and a business model for a revenue authority
was not well known. Tlris has changed dramatically and the best run revenue authorities ate
models of good management practice. At the 2004 6th International Conference on Tax
Admhtisttadon in Sydney, it was instructive that the keynote addresses by the Australian
Corrm~issioner of Taxation and the New Zealand Conmaissioner of Inland Revenue both
began by setting out the strategic goals of their respective organisafions)2° The Australian
Commissioner of Taxation went on to describe the ATO Business Model.tzi
Arguably, it should be taken for granted that the management of a revenue authority
will folloxv accepted best practice. That is inaplicit in the Good Governance Standard
discussed in the previous secdon. HoweveL as is apparent from research into developing
countries, the tax admirfistradon is often sta~ed of the capacity and resowcces to acbieve
dfis. Barbone et al note that dttring the 1990s, 37.2% of World Batik projects had as one of
their objectives the strengthening of adininistrative institutions and 16.3% of projects dae
strengthening of adnfinistradve capacit3’.~22 Until a revenue authorit3T achieves at least a
mh~tnal level of good management practice, supported by the resowcces necessat3’ to give
effect to its strategic plan, it is unlikely to be able to observe the basic Model. Arguably, a
revenue authorit3~ in dais position i~ not a fully operational revenue authority and the Model
should not be diluted to cater for dais kind of tax administration. Rather, whether the basic
Model can be properly implemented is a benclmaark for revenue authorities to show that
they bare reached a mi~finmm operational standard to run theh" tax admhfistrafion.
Ibid.
M. Carmody, Commissioner of Taxation, ’The Ar~ of Tm~ Administration: Two years on’ and D. Butler,
Commissioner of Inland Revenue, ’Challenges of Globalising T~,: Systems = Ne~v Zealand’s Journe},
papers presented at the 6th International Conference on T~x A&n~aistration, ARK,: (Sydmey, 15-16 April
2004).
~bid., p. 3.
L. Ba~hone, A. Das-Gupt~, L. De Wulf Prod A. t-I~nsson, ’Refor~mn~ Tm~: Systems: The World B~¢1¢
Record hi fl~e 1990s’, World Bank Policy Research Wo -rkmg Paper 2237, (November 1999),
<wxvw.xvorldbat~k.org/wbi/govemance/wp-governance.hmd>, 6 November 2006.
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A chuse reqtfiring adequate functh~g for die revenne authority as a budget priority is
flmrefore appropriate widen the Model. It may be ignored or paid lip-service. But to have
such a clause in the legislation set~g up a revenue authority ensures that it is at least
recognised as inaportant to effective tax administration.
GAPO01 identifies the primary goals of a revenue authority as promoting voluntary
compliance, developing strategies to deal with non-compliance and addressing the
opportunities and challenges of globalisation.~v° Tiffs is achieved by carefully managing and
promoting good relationslffps with the key stakeholders in the tax system: taxpayers,
employees of the revenue authority and other revenue authorities.~z4 The management of
these relationslffps takes place in a context of ’clear, sinaple and "user-friendly"
administrative systems and procedttres’,l~s an ability to adapt to change in the business and
legislative envirormxent, and careful domestic and global risk management,t~6
Many of the principles set out in GAP001 are dealt with elsewhere in flae Model and
often constitute legislative or administrative txfles within a tax system. Most revenue
auflmrities will incorporate the remaining principles of good tax adinirfistration outlined in
GAP001 into other parts of dmir strategic planning docmnentation and manage~nent
principles and processes.~z7 Without addressing these principles, even if it is at a lower level
in some instances than GAP001, or uses a different approach, it is tmlikely that a revenue
auflmrity can operate effectively in an increasingly interactive global tax enviromnent.
GAP001, above n. 117, pp. 3-4.
Ibid.
Ibid., para. 4.
Ibid., pp. 3-4.
It is supported in much of the discussion in the United Nalions Econonfic and Social Co~mcil
Committee of Experts    on    International    Cooperation    in Tax    Matters.    See
<\~m.v.un.org/esa/cornnfissions.html>, 11 October 2006.
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2 OECD GAPO02 ap*d Ta~,7Oayer’s Charte*s
The rationale for encapsulating adnfinistrative rights and broader tax, payers’ rights in an
administrative charter was set out in Chapter 4. Atdcle 6 of the Model states that, ’Atl rules
applicable in die tax system shall be compiled and published accurately and in a form that
is accessible to all users’. Paragraph 21 of GAP002 reinforces the inlportance of
accessibility, emphasising the importance of sun~marising and explaitfing a taxpayer’s rights
and obligations in plain language so as to make ’such infomlation much more widely
accessible and understandable’.
A charter generally contains rights and obligations. Most are derived from
adn’dnistrative and legislative rules dispersed across the tax system. The advantage of a
charter is to draxv together those that are most important for taxpayers to know when
dealing with their tax affairs. It often also alloxvs the revenue authority to artic~tlate a sense
of its culture and values to tax-payers. As emphasised in Chapter 2, taxpayers’ rights and
equally, taxpayers’ charters, must be shaped to fit die individual context of each
jurisdiction. The point made in Para. 23 of GAP002 is critical: ’In drawing up a taxpayers’
charter a jurisdiction must properly reflect their own policy and leg]sladve emfiromuent and
their own administrative practices and culture’. A jurisdiction without a charter does not
necessarily respect taxpayers’ rights any less than one with a charter. This is self evident if
one examines the charters on die websites of revemie authorities in jurisdictions where
there are documented case studies of corruption or revenue mismanagement.
Even in jurisdictions where taxpayers’ tights are widely accepted, a charter is not
essential. The point made in GAP002 at Para. 23, is dlat it is die underlying practice that is
important. The publication of those practices in accordance with Atdcle 6 of the Model
can take place in different ways. In Iwo ardcles on the subject, James, Murphy and Reinhart
argue that die UK Taxpayer’s Charter was somettfing of a failure as an initiative and has
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been left to atrophy.~28 The articles argue that to be successful the process of fom~ulafing a
Charter should follow the Australian mod~l. A key difference was that the Austrafian
Taxpayers’ Charter was formulated following systematic preparation, a review of previous
experience and xvidespread consulta60n.~a~ The ATO then adopted the Charter values as its
own so that they became inculcated across the organisation, feeding into its Compliance
Model and later reflected in an ’Integrity Framexvo~k’, which sets out the ATO’s underlying
behaviours, values and ethics.~3° Subsequent reviews of the Australian Taxpayers’ Charter
have shown that the ATO has largely succeeded in tiffs approach.~3I
Tiffs analysis suggests, therefore, those jurisdictions that wish to introduce successfnl
Taxpayers’ Charters or sin~ar documents should ensure that they incorporate into the
hnplementation process at least two hnpurtant steps. The fi~st is to enstt~e that there is
wide stakeholder input into the formulation of the Charter and hoxv it is to be
hnplemented. The Australian experience showed that stakeholders did not need to agree
with the process for it to succeed.~3a The second is to ensure that the culture Of the revenue
auflaofity is changed over time so that the Charter reflects the way the revenue authority
operates. The longitudinal surveys of taxpayers’ views of the Taxpayers’ Charter in
Australia clearly show that Charters can become living documents.
Taxpayers’ Charters can be effective but need not exist for taxpayers’ rights to be
protected. They do represent a useful means of compl)&xg with the need to publish the
taxpayers’ rights and obligations contained in the tax rules of a jurisdiction. They also
S. James, K. Murphy and IXL Reinhart, ’The Citizen’s Charte~: Hoxv such Iultiatives might be More
Effective’ (2005) 20 Public PollO, and AdmiMstmtiott, 1, p. 15 and S. James, K. Murphy and M. Rekti*art,
’The Taxpayer’s Charter: A Case Study in Tax Administration’ (2004) 7 Jom~tal of Attstt~lian Taxations, 336,
342.
S. James, et al, ibid., ’The Citizen’s Charter: How Such Initiatives ix.fight Be More Effective’ (2005), 1, p.
10. The process is described in M. McLerman, ’The Principles and Concepts in the Development of the
Taxpayers’ Charter’ (2003) 32Australian Tax- Review, 22.
M. D’Ascenzo, ’IAving our values’, paper presented at the 7tit International Tax Administration
Conference (Sydney, zkustralia, 2006), p. 7.
S. James et al, above n. 128; ’The T~payer’s Charter: A Case Study ha Tax Admhaistration’ (2004) 7
Jotwttal of ~h~stta]ian Taxation, 336; and TNS Consultants, Rvt,ietv of the Taxpa3’o~" Chatler 2005 (Canberra,
TNS Social Research, 2006), <w~wv.ato.gov.au>, 1 August 2006.
S. james et al, above n. 129, p. 9.
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provide an oppormtfity to publish tlaose principles of good pracdce that ate unenforceable
legislative or administrative tx~les. GAP002 represents a comprehensive if not exhaustive
example of a taxpayers’ charter of fights and obligations. Rather than designing a
competitive example, it makes sense for the Model to include GAP002 ha an appendix.
3 identifii*g P~ind, O/es of Good Practice
Principles of good pracdce comprise those principles that are nQt legal or administrative
tights. As noted in Chapter 5, it is their direct or indirect enforceability xvbich prmddes
dram with substance that goes beyond aspiration.
A principle xvhich states that revenue officers will deal cotucteously with taxpayers has
no legal definition or content unless die revenne officer behaves so badly that her or Iris
acdon becomes delictual, tordous or crhninal. It has no real content at all ff when a
taxpayer complains that he or she has been treated discourteously; there is no means of
redress and there are no consequences. However, the principle has real content if when the
taxpayer complains, the complaint is taken seriously, it is investigated, and can lead to
disciplinat3, acdon against the offending revenue officer. It has even more substance if dm
performance of the manager of the relevant unit is also affected by the outcome of dm
complaint investigalion. This xvonld occttr if he or she is judged against a key performance
indicator that measures the incidence of complaints of this kind and adverse or favourable
consequences can result. For example, an annual bonus might depend on meeting tat’gets
across a range of such key performance indicators.
The use of performance inclicators to assess tax administration and indixddual
revenue officers is becoming more conm~on. James, Svetalekth and Wright proxdde a useful
sm-vey of the literature and note the broad correlation between the success of taxpayers’
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charters and the use of performance indicators.133 Part of the success relates to the
development of a response by the revenue authority to taxpayer concerns over real or
perceived breaches of the charter)34
However, not all actions of the revenue authority can be measured dkectly. Where
there is direct measurement, albeit only t/trough a perfomaance indicator, there is
aclmmistrafive enforcement and the right is a secondary administrative right. For example, a
service standard might commit the revenue authority to respond to all emails xvithin 3 days
and to provide an answer to all email requests wit!fin 14 days unless the matter is
complicated and the taxpayer has been notified of the delay and given an alternative
tm~effame for a response. If this standard is not met, a taxpayer may then be able to follow
the complaints procedure tb_tough a number of steps, all the way to the ombudsman. Most
taxpayers would not take complaints of this nature t/trough to the ombudsman. However,
the possibility makes it a secondarT¢ administrative right. Most taxpayers would be satisfied
wifll acknowledgement of the error and an apology. This latter step is a principle of good
practice.
The difference is often blurred. Performance indicators can measure at a less specific
level. For example, measurement of the incidence of complaints is common. However, that
does not prmdde a specific enough measure to ensure that a revenne officer apologises
when it is warranted. It becomes ridiculous and counterproductive to take the measures
down to the level of recording when an apology was required and recording to ensure that
it was given. This is xvhere staff training and the in~portance of the values which imbue the
S. James, T. Svetalekth and B. Wright, ’The Benefits of a More Strategic Approach to Tax
Adnfinistration and the Role of Performance Indicators’ paper presented at the 7th International Tax
Administration Conference (Sydney, Australia, 2000). See, e.g., M. KIma, ’Performance Measurement for
Tax Administrations: The Case of Slovenia’ (2004) 70(3) Itgenmlional Review ofAdminislrative Sde*tces, 567;
P. Seera, ’Performance Measurement in Tax Adnfirfistration: Ctfile as a Case Study’ (2005) 25 Public
Administration and Development, 115; and C. Habammer, ’Performance Comparison of Tax Offices in
Germaw: A Project in the States of Bavaria, Rlfineland-Palatinate, Saxony and Thttdngia’, paper
presented at the CIAT Technical Conference (Paris, 2002).
TNs Consultants, above n. 131.
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operation of the revenue authority come into play.t35 Principles of good practice moderate
die behaviour of revenue officers aS die}, interact with each oilier and with taxpayers. The),
govern how revenue officers go about their daily \vork.
The rauge of principles of good practice is as broad as the different behaviours that
might be used to inaplement an), of die facets of tax adnfinistration. The principles
entunerated here do not include most of those that are incorporated into revenue authority
values statements. Rather they include those that focus specifically on the interaction
between the revenue officer and die taxpayer.
This section sets out those more cotmnonly found in GAP002 supplemented by
those taken from taxpayers’ charters from around the world.136 It does not include an},
rights that are dealt with in Chapter 8 as legal or administrative rights although many of the
principles are derived from or form part of those rights. In some jurisdictions some of the
Chapter 8 rqghts will not have legal or adininistrafive enforcement. For die purposes of the
Model, they should have such enforcement and are the~cefore considered in that context.
The principles of good practice ate self-explanatory and do not include additional
Revenue authorities should:
1. Act professionally in all dealings with taxpayers.
2. Treat taxpayers with courtesy, consideration and sensifixdU.
3. Listen to taxpayers’ concerns.
4. Consult with key stakeholders or their representatives before sig~tificant changes are
introduced.
See M. D’Ascenzo, above n. 130,
Tile Charters of Nexv Zealand <www.ixd.govt,nz>, 1 October 2006; Canada <www.cra arc.gc.ca>,
October 2006; South Africa <www.sars.gov.za>, 1 October 2006; and Australia <www.ato.gov, au>,
October 2006, a~e particularly helpful and provide the basis for most of the principles listed.
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5. Take account of a taxpayer’s particular dtcumstances, especially individual, cultural
and special needs, to die extent allowed by law.
6. Treat taxpayers as being honest in their tax affairs uuless the), act otherwise.
7. Mirmnise the costs of complying with tax obligations.
8. Provide assistance to taxpayers to help them tmderstand and meet their tax
obligations.
9. Make sure publications and oilier communications are clear, accurate, helpful and
easy to understand.
10. Keep looking for new and better ways to give taxpayers advice and infurmation.
/ 1. Conduct general education programs for both existing and potential taxpayers.
12. Provide taxpayers with easy access to and identification of contact details.
13. Be accessible and attend to enquirers, whether by telephone, mail or in person,
within specified times designed to minimise delay.
14. Deal with urgent requests xvithout delay, whether by telephone, mail or in person.
15. Answer telephone calls promptly and without unnecessary transfer.
16. Make an effort to ensure the taxpayer is put in touch with the appropriate person the
first time.
17. Try to get all aspects of interaction with taxpayers tight first thne by making best use
of all of the information available.
18. Follow throngh on xvhat they say they will do.
19. Ensure that their staff ae well ttaii~ed, competent and up-to-date \vith changes in the
law that affect their roles.
20. Strive to provide qnality ser~ice across the orgaulsation.
21. Apologise for errors, fix them quickly and explain xvhat went wrong and why.
22. Make it clear that taxpayers can question the information, advice and service they are
given and infur-m them of options available for resolving disagreements.
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23. Monitor flleix performance in living these principles tl~ough collection of
:information and regular sur~eys, which are made public and used internally for
continual improvement.
III CONCLUSION
Tiffs Chapter and die next adopt a functional analysis of taxpayers’ rights. As. discussed in
earlier chapters, the nature of each tight depends in part on the nature of its enforcement.
However, fl~is Chapter has demonstrated dlat die very existence of any rights is largely
dependent on die proper functioning of die tax system, which in ram, depends upon die
effectiveness of file revenue authority. Tile particular context of each jurisdiction and its
system of law and administration detemaines die powers and discretion given to die
revenue authority. Nonetheless, there are certain critical elements that will govern die
effectiveness of the tax system and a significant gap in any of dlese areas leaves tile system
open to abuse, ineffectiveness or both.
Tlie most fundamental taxpayers’ rights are congruent with die basic rights of die
citizen (or tax resident) to good government. In die tax context, adherence to die IMF
Code provides a broad framework of fiscal integrity necessary for an effective tax system. It
has been shown diat dlere are strong arguments supporting die benefits of improved
governance of fiscal and revenue areas. Inter~enfion in die system and die foimal
implementation of policies on governance should lead both to an increase in foreign direct
investment and economic developnaetlt.
An effective revenue authority is, of com:se, critical to the success of an}’
government. A govermnent’s programs rely on revenue. A govermnent can inaplement
laws to raise die revenue required, but tiffs will duly happen if there is effective assessme~t
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arid collection of tax and enforcement of the tax laws. Tiffs Chapter has identified a
ammber of elements fimdamental to an effective revenue authority and the safeguarding of
taxpayers’ rights.
The structure of the body responsible for the general poxvers of adnRnistrafion of the
tax system, whether autonomous or semLautonomous, is not as important as its
independence from external interference. Tl~e head of the revenue authority should have
secuxity of tenure to ensure he or she does not face removal at the wlfim of the executive.
The position should have the sole responsibifity for revenue adininistration, with a
reporting relationship that is non-partisan and does not allow executive interference.
Accountability is nonetheless vital. Tax admhfistration should be characterised by
transparenw, integrity and the application of the principles of good governance. This
requires oversight by groups that are not captured by special interests, but can ask the hard
questions essential to maintain best practice. Oversight may be by way of such entities as
legislative or executive committees, audit bodies, oversight boards with independent
membership, statutory oversight positions or a combination of these.
However, the analysis also shows that without appropriate investment in revenue
achnhfisttation: autonomy and accountability are somewhat meaningless. Corruption and
incompetence are rife where there is loxv investment in resources and personnel.
Particularly in developing countries, investment has to be intelligent and appropriate to the
em~onment. Tlfis might mean outsourcing aspects of the adrnhfistrafion, such as
information teclmology. But to safeguard taxpayers’ rights and ensure that there is no
c0traption in the process, there must be stringent safeguards.
Equally important is appropriate training and development of revenue personnel.
They need to have the knowledge to move beyond a formalistic interpretation of the rules
to a broader understanding of the aspects of the tax rules that they are implementing. Only
fl~en can they apply them appropriately in accordance with principles of good practice to
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ensure effective compliance. Revenue officers need to understand and adopt a culture
hnbued with die values that wilt encourage taxpayers to comply voluntarily with the tax
roles. For this the officers need training and a commitment to the values espoused by
senior management.
Value dtiven statements of good practice are published by most revenue authorities,
often in the form of Taxpayers’ Charters. They generally include a statement of enforceable
rights protected elsewhere. However, flley also identify the attitude and approach that wilt
be taken by the revenue authority and its officers in the administration of the tax system.
By themselves these charters are worth little. However, if they are accompanied by the
systemic protection designed to ensure independence, accolmtability and good governance,
they are valuable. Not duly do the}, articulate to stakeholders what die}, can expect in their
relations with die revenue authority, but they give benclm~arks against wlffch the revenue
authorit3r can be judged. They are even more effective where they are accompanied by
performance indicators.
Particularly for those rights that are no more than principles of good practice and are
simply incapable of enforcement, performance indicators can provide feedback on how
well intangible values are being given effect. In modem administration, feedback on
perceptions or other indirect measures of perfomaance, such as the nmnber of complaints
received, can play a significant role in guiding improvements. They also encotttage
transparency, articulate a perfoimance co~mlfftment to stakeholders in the system and
communicate flxe values that are so important to the good relationslfips that make the
system work well. Tiffs Chapter lists the most xvidety used principles of good practice flaat
are included in most charters of taxpayers’ rights. They are included in an Appendix to tim
Model, with part of GAP002, wlfich provides an example administrative charter of
taxpayers’ rights prepared by the OECD.
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Chapter 6 set out the primary legal rights essential to the existence of an effective tax
system. Chapter 7 has provided the framework for the tax administration and the principles
d~at should govern its operation both at the smlctural level and in the itnplementation of
its underlying values. Chapter 8 now gives a functional analysis of the legal and
achninistrative fights that ensure the proper administration of the tax system. The whole
prmddes an effective guide to best pracdce in tax adn~tistradon.
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CHAPTER 8
ANALYSIS OF SECONDARY LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
RIGHTS
I INTRODUGTION
Tiffs Chapter concludes the analysis of taxpayers’ rights for inclusion in the Model. It
continues the functional analysis begun in Chapter 7. The tights discussed cover the
nonnat operations of a revenue authority on a daily basis. If a revenue authority provides
taxpayers’ with these tights, it is necessatily largely complyhag with the framework of
principles set out in Chapter 3 and balancing the compethag claims of those principles. The
fights do not attempt to deal with detailed design of the tax system and therefore matters
such as substantive horizontal and xrertical eqttity. They do cover the principles that
underlie the administtalion of the tax system: elements of each of: equity and fairness,
certainty and shnplicity, efficiency, neutrality and effectiveness. They also seek to provide a
balance between the competi~g principles.
The fights set out in Otis Chapter hnplement more specifically the pmnary legal fights
of Chapter 6. They provide the substantive content for the administration of a tax system
supported by the framework identified in Chapter 7 (including the principles of good
governance) and enable the integration of the principles of good practice. The fights are set
out following the functions of the tax system: general administration; infomaation
gathering, audit and investigation; assessment; sanctions and enforced collection; and
Objection and appeal.
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The rights comprise secondary legal rights, and primary and secondar3~ administrative
rights. Secondary legal rights focus on the specific operation of the law, whether at a
general level m prmdding a standard for its operation, or in the context of individual
procedt~tes and specific processes. These rights may also be protected as primat3,
adnfinistrative rights, in which case the content may be broader but less certain. At a lower
level of operation, secondary administrative rights provide a form of protection ha d~e
context of detailed processes and less formal interaction. The distinction is made clear as
appropriate in the analysis that follows. In many cases, the level of enforcement will
depend upon how the right is adopted in a particular jurisdiction.
The tights discussed in tiffs Chapter flow from the essential functions and operation
of tax adininistrarion. The literature on each of these areas is itrmaense both at a general
level and in each jurisdiction. They comprise many controversial areas of the law, such as
legal professional privilege and the role against sdf-incrimination. It is beyond the scope of
this thesis to explore the detailed legal content of each area, the debates and controversies.
It does not pretend to do so.
The aim of Otis thesis is to develop a model of r’tries of best practice. Each
jurisdiction will adapt the Model to its own legal system and wider context.~ It is therefore
legitm~ate to draw from a parficu~r reading of some of the literature those txtles that seem
to reflect best practice and can be so adapted. Any choice is necessarily idiosyncratic.
However, that does not undernm~e the validity of making a choice, provided it follows a
sin~ilar process to the requirements for fl~e exercise of discretion set out below. The
advantage of a Model of best practice is that it is just that. It provides a basis for reasoned
argument, critical analysis and reflective development and improvement.
For a very useful analysis of contextual application of different aspects of tax administration, see R.M
Bird, ’Administrative Dimensions of Tax Reform’ (2004) 10 Asia-Padflc Tax Bttlleti*~, 134.
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Ana[ysk" of Secondmy Legal and AdmMstrative Rights
ADMINISTRATIVE PRINCIPLES
A
1    The Nature
The Exerdse of Diserelion
The principle of legality requfres tile hnposition of tax in accordance with the law. In
Chapter 6 it was argued that under die legality principle there should be clear limits on
discretion and a frammvork for its exercise. Discretion normally relates to process rather
fl~an file hnposidon of tax. However, revenue authorities may in many jurisdictions
legitimately exercise discretion, for example, as to file level of penalty applicable. The
revenue authority may also follow settlement procedures that allow a taxpayer in some
circmnstances to pay less fllan the legally stipulated tax due. The detail of when and how
fills is appropriate is dealt with below. However, die examples illustrate that although
discretion is largely procedural, it can govern matters of substance.
In Chapter 6 it was also noted that the exercise of discretion is more common and
broader in scope in common law jurisdictions than file more formal and legal approach to
adnmlistrative law in many civil law jurisdictions. The body of law in both t3-pes of
jurisdiction is useful in deriving the prhlciples that should apply to file administrative
exercise of discretion. The starting point of common law adiuinistradve law is generally to
define die avenues available to challenge government acdon and to identify the remedies
applicable where file acdon is unlawful.2 In defining taxpayers’ rights, the result may be the
2 H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Fors)nth, ’Adnfimstrative Law’ (8fix edn, Oxford, OUP, 2000), p. 4.
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same, but the starting point is to define appropriate criteria for laxvful and appropriate
decision-making. This is more akin to the civil law approach.
Defining appropriate criteria takes place, essentially, at t~vo levels. On one level there
are specific criteria, wbich may differ depending upon the t3q3e of decision being made and
the nature of the decision-maker. Most of the criteria governing the decision to allow a
settlement of a sigtffficant tax dispute with a major corporation are going to differ from
those governing the decision whether a telephone request from a taxpayer asking a
relatively insignificant question is an oral binding ruling. However, at a higher level, there
are arguably basic principles that should provide a framework for any admhfistrative
decision. Tiffs is the approach adopted under the administrative law of many jurisdictions.
In one of the more extensive studies of tim theory betfind conmmn law discretionary
powers, Galligan supports this view and argues that one such principle ’is that officials to
whom powers have been delegated must account for their actions to the community’)
"Even in undemocratic states, tiffs is particularly true of the tax system. Earlier chapters
have lfigldighted that it is important for voluntary compliance that taxpayers perceive the
tax system as broadly fair. Aspects of tiffs are political, but there is a strong requirement for
legal accountability wherever a decision is delegated and requires the decisionmaaker to
exercise discretion.
The nature of principles is that they are not precise and they overlap.~ Broadly,
Galligan suggests that decisions should be: rational or reasonable; directed towards serxfng
the Dtrpose or end for xvlffch the decision-making power was conferred; and compliant
with general considerations of moratit3,,s Perhaps the most hnportant concept flowing from
the last point is that ’the rights and interests of individuals be treated with understanding
and respect’ and from dais, in ram, flow principles such as fairness and non-
D.J. Galligan, Disnvlio~ia~y Powers:A LegalSluO, oJOfl~da/Diso~lion (Oxford, OUP, 1986), p. 4.
1LM. Dwor "kL% Taki*~g Rights Setiou*~, (London, Gerald Duckwortb & Co, 1977), pp. 31-39, pp. 68 71 and
D.J. Galfig,-m, ibid., p. 5.
D.J. Galfigan, above n. 3, p. 5.
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discrhrtinafion.6 Tiffs can be seen in German administrative law] It places emphasis on
controlling discretionary power both generally and in file tax courts to manage very
carefully file interaction between the revenue authozit3, and the individual along these lines,
wlfile protecting file integrity of state power. Tiffs analysis is consistent with file protection
dlat file administrative law provides to those who are affected by decisions that require file
exercise 9f discretion.8 It also coincides with the principles that underpin decision-making
m tax administration.
It is worth reiterathlg that it is only where a decision-maker may exercise discretion
that flmse principles apply. Most substantive tax decisions and many procedural tax
decisions are matters of law governed by roles. It is not up to the revenue authority to
decide differently from the rule, however, ktational, unfair or lacking in purpose the *ule
may seem.~ The making of tax rules should be governed by file pr’tmar7 legal rights set out
in Chapter 6, which should prevent such problems with rules. If primary legal rifles are not
in place to do so, then political accountability collles into play and must deal wifll file
problem, whether through file formal political process or informally, through rising levels
of non-compliance, as described in Chapter 7.
Ibid.
See generally, J. Schwarze, Emvpean AdtMttislmlive Lain (London, Sweet & Maxavell, 1992) and C. Dalber,
’Protection of Taxpayers’ Rights ha German},’ ha D. Bentley (ed.), Taxpao’ets’ Righ#: An I#tematio~ta/
Perspective (Gold Coast, Revenue Law Journal, 1998), p. 152 at p. 167.
See the comprehensive analysis of Diplock LJ ha Comtdl of Civil Service Uttio~ts v. MiMsler for the Civil Sen,ice
[1985] AC 374 at 408.
As was stated, e.g., by the Canadian Federal Com’t of Appeal in Latimer v. The Qme*1 95 DTC 5311 (FCA)
at 5317. Although see the discussion on UK extta-statuto*3’ concessions in S. Eden, ’Judicial control of
tax negotiation’ and N. Lee, ’Z1ae Effect of the Human Rights Act 1988 on Taxation Policy and
Admirfistradon’, papers presented at the 6th International Conference on Tax Administration, Atax
(Sydimy, 15 16 April 2004).
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2    A Framework for the Exercise of Diso~tion
To enable a revenue authority to be effective and comply with the principles of good
governance outlined in Chapter 7 requires an emphasis on bigb level recruitment, training
and motivation of revenue officers.1° ~iI~e principles of good pracdce discussed in Chapter
7 will only work if there is a culture in place to support them, which is why there is such a
strong emphasis in revenue authority business plans on outcomes, performance and qualit},
set~Tice deliver3,. A strong quality-focused and serdce-oriented culture is equally important
when it comes to the exercise of discretion. CIAT makes this clear, for example, in its
’Mirtimum necessary attributes for a sound and effective tax administration’.~ It places
significant emphasis on strengthening the human resottrces of a revenue authority,
including the environment in which revenue staff xvork.1-~
Where decision-makers have the trai~img and ability to make decisions, there is
nonetheless a requirement to follo\v certain processes in decisinn-n~aking in order to reach
an appropriate decision. The large body of administrative law devoted to the process of
decision-making demonstrates that it is by no means straightforward. The development of
English adininisttative law has seen a number of cases that set out fl~e basic principles
govertimg delegated decision-making. The principles reflect those often found in other
jurisdictions, parfict~lar]y in the conunon law family. Lord Greene MR in Associated provincial
Pictmv Houses Ltd v. Wednesbuo’ Co*poration~3 emphasised that the decision-maker is required
to come to a reasonable decision, taking account of certain matters in reaching a decision
For example, L. Barbone, A. Das Gupta, L. De ~lulf and A. Hansson, ’Refomm~g Tax Systems: The
World Bank Record in the 1990s’, World Bank Policy Research Worldng Paper 2237, November 1999,
<\~vw.worldbank,org/wbi/govemance/wp govemance.html>, 1 October 2006; OECD, Slt~gtheltitg Ta.x"
Audil Capabilities: Goteral Ptindples attdAppmacbes (Paris, Centre for Tax Policy and Ad~ninisttafion, 2006);
OECD, Sltet~gthenitg Tax" Audil Capabilities: Auditor Workfot~e Mattagemotl - Sun~ey Findit~gs a*td Obset~,atiO~S
(Pals, Centre fo~: Tax Policy and Adrtmaistration, 2006).
Approved on 19 Marda 1996 by fl~e CIAT General Assembly, Santo Domingo, Dominican Repubhc,
<www.ciat.org>, 1 October 2006.
Discussed further in the ’Conclusions of the CLOT Executive Council’s Petit Co ~fit{’ at its meeting of 3
December 1999, <wavw.ciat.org>, I October 2006.
[1948] 1 KB 223 at 228-234.
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and not taking account of others. Lord Hailsham LC in Chief Constable of the Notch Waks
po/i~* t~. Et~a115.4 added the requirement that the individual must be given fair treatment by
the decision-maker. The essence is that decisions should be reasonable, based on criteria or
standards, and fair.
Galligan reaches the same conclusion from a theoretical analysis. He argues that the
precepts of decision-making require at a mirfimum:*s
(a) that any exercise of posvers be based on reasons, and that the reasons be applied
consistently, fairly, and impartially; (b) that the reasons be intelligibly related to a
framework of equally intelligible purposes, policies, p~lciples, and rules (in general,
standards) which can be seen fairly to fall widfin and be the basis of delegated
authority; (c) that in matters of procedure and substance there be compliance with
general, critical considerations of morality. Around these foundations more detailed
and specific principles can be created. Their algrfificance is that they go towards
regulating file relafionship between citizeus and flae state by.stipulating file processes
and principles that must be satisfied if dm exerdse of official poxvers is to be
considered justifiable and legitimate. In p~dcular riley eliminate decialon-making by
whinl, capi~ce, chance, or ritual; they provide the basis for identifying and eliminating
arbitrariness, for developing general standards in malting decisions, and for extending
flae requirements of fair procedures; and they open the processes of decision-nlaldng
to external public scrutiny. There is then a focal point from which the decision-maker
can bare a critical viexv of Iris own decisions, and there is a basis for legal and judicial
controls.
Decisions made in this way comply with the basic principles set out in Chapter 3.
Taxpayers would generally perceive decisions made as fair. The process ensttres that
i~ [1982] 3 ~M] ER 141 at 143.is 13.j. Galligan, above n. 3, p. 6.
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decisions are not arbitrat3,, are transparent, and taxpayers can anticipate in advance ilae Way
a decision affecting them will be made, even if the outcome is still dependent on the
exercise of the discretion. A clear process of this kind is efficient and helps to reduce bott~
compliance and adininistration costs. Consistency facilitates business decisions. Tinlely
decision-making is a factor in an assessment of reasonableness, particularly in the tax
context, because it conttibutes to return on die use of Bands. Most important, discretion is
often given to revenue authorities to ensure that the tax system is effective in a dynamic
enviro,mmnt. A proper process ensures that the tights of the taxpayer can be balanced
against the requirement to safeguard the collection of revenue in a way that is botll fair and
seen to be fair..6
Gatligan comes from a cotmnon law backgrotmd. Yet the general theoretical
approach is not dissimilar in this narro\v sphere from the civil law txadifion. The difference
in approach between the Model and common laxv adn~nistrative law is that the Model sets
out the reqttirements for the effective exercise of discretion, whereas administrative law
sets out die requirements for tex4ew of the exercise of discretion. The latter is narrower m
scope, although the reasons for review inform the criteria governing the appropriate
exercise of discretion.
In llis comparison of the coturnon and civil laxv administrative traditions, Thomas’
analysis suggests that the Model is more aligned to die civil law tradition,t7 He states, for
example, tbat French administrative law starts with the notion that d~e adinhlistradon
should be constrained by those limitations ’necessat’y to protect the indi~ddual in light of
the needs of public administration’.~ GetTnan administrative txadition is disdncdy different.
However, die point of departure for Gernlan adinitfistrative law is also the concept of
~Mdmugh G. Tutley, Transition, Taxalion arm lhe Xtate (Aldershot, Asbgate, 2006), p. 113 argues that m
transition countries, it is importam for effectiveness to reduce dae discretionat3, power of tax officials and
inspectors.
17 R. Thomas, La.gitittmle E~Tbeclatio*ts a~td Propotliona/iO’ i*~ AdmiMstrative Lair (Oxford and Pordand, Hart
Publishing, 2000), p. 1 et seq.
18 Ibid., p.
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pr0tec~lg the subjective rights of individuals from tile exercise of state power and
discretion; a protection subsequently reinforced by strong judicial reviexv.19 It is an
approach accepted by file European Conmaunity as it has sought to blend different
achr~nistrative laxv practice.2° As such, it provides justification for file Model to provide
guidance for file exercise of discretionary decision-making powers themselves rather tllan
for bow a couxt might subsequently review such decisions;
~ Ctitetia Govemi*g the Exercise of Discrelion
The broader tegal constraints governing tile exercise of discretion are discussed in Chapter
6 and covered by Article ~ of tile Model. This would cover such issues as tile legality of
decisions, acting beyond the provers of the decision-maker and tile improper legal exercise
of discretion.~* It also covers the principles of non-discrinfination and proportionality.
Using Galligan’s analysis, tile first criterion governing the exercise of discretion is
that any exercise of poxvers should be based on reasons, which are applied consistently,
fairly, and impartially. There is no general requirement to give reasons in administrative
law,~ but increasingly in revenue administration, the requirements of consistency, fairness
and mlpartiality demand it. To ensure the operation of an effective tax administration it is
important to explain tax decisions to provide transparency, certainty and to encourage
taxpayers to see the system as fair. It is clear from file discussion in Chapter 7 flat revenue
I,~ Ibid.
~’:’ Ibid., p. 19. See also the discussion in H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Fors)mh, above n. 2, ch. 7 on the increasing
.~ and signiticam changes foreshadowed by the incorporation of E~tropean Law into the UK comrnon law.
R. Creyke and J. McMillan, Cono~l of Government Aclion (Chatswood, Le~isNexis Butter~vorths, 2005), p.
366 el seq.; R. Douglas, Dot~g/a* at~dJones’s Admh*irlralit~e Law (Sth edn, Sydney, The Fedetalion Press, 2006),
P. 367 et seq. and p. 630 et seq. and J. Jowell, ’The Legal Control of Administralive Discretion’ [1973] Public
z~ La~v, 178.For example, see H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyth, above n. 2, p. 517.
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authorities, themselves, see thei~ conunltment to explain decisions to taxpayers as
fundamental.~
If reasons are to be given, what ate the characteristics that the), should have? Implicit
in the giving of reasons is that they should be rational and logical. It is not always clear to a
decision-makex when a decision is made that it is illogical or i~ational. Howev~x, that the
decision-tnaker must address the additional xequitements of consistency, impartiality and
fairness overcomes obviously illogical and izxafional decision-making. Review mechanisms
pxovide added pxotection. For example, in the common law it falls witl~in the grounds for
judicial review of adi~m~istxative decisions,a4 Howevex, the pxovision of both dispute
mechanisms and xecot~se to a Revenue Ombudsman undex Axticle 11 of the Model
ensures that taxpayexs can raise such issues without having to go fttst to the courts, which
can be too costly fox many taxpayers in time and money.
The requixement that decisions be applied consistently, faixly and impartially accozds
" with the principles set out in Chapter 3, addressing in particular: perceptions of fah~ess,
certainty, the t’tfle against arbitrariness, transparency and efficiency. Many xevenue
authorities provide advance tax rulings, often with extensive explanations, to catex fox this
demand. However, there is a cleat undexstanding among xevenue authorities tt~at the
principles of good pxactice discussed in Chaptex 7 increasingly demand .that any decision
given should reflect these characteristics. Inconsistent application of the law leads to a
bxeakdown in t~ust. Perceptions of unfairness whexe taxpayers in the same position
t~eated differently can lead both to concet’ns as to the integ~itT of the system and to
increased non-compliance,as Partiality xeflects not only bias, but the tt~eats of arbitrariness
7"ax7)a),er l~’gh# and Obligations - Pmclice I~rote (GAP002) (Paris, OECD, 200!), <xwv~v.oecd.otg>, 1
Octobeg 2006.
R. Douglas, above n. 21, p.446.
See, e.g., N. B~ooks, "I~e Challenge of Tax Compliance’ in C. Evans mxd A. Greenbaum (eds), Ta.\
Ad*m)tislralion: Fadng lhe Challetges of the Futm~ (Sydney, P~ospect, 1998), p. 7. In die context of fl~e exercise
of discretion in transfer pricing disputes, see F.M. :’dlegra, ’Section 482: Mapping the Contottrs of the
Abnse of Discretion Standard o f Judicial Revie\v’ (1994) 13 ITitgittia Tax Ret~ien~, 423.
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and cormplion, as discussed in Chapter 7.26 The first criterion is therefore consistent with
good practice in tax adilahaistration.
From a practical standpoint dais raises hnportant questions in relation to resources,
management, structure and organisarion within a revenue authority. The CLAT ’Mirfimum
neceSsary attributes for a sound and effective tax administration’ mentioned above, focus
heaxdly on tile requirements necessat3, to guarantee integrity, impartiality and taxpayer trust.
Many of these relate to training, resources, systems and procedures. It folloxvs on from the
discussion on principles of good tax practice in Chapter 7.
Revenue authoriries recog~aise file hnportance of encouraging these principles. In
2006, South Africa introduced a legally binding ruling system, ’intended to promote clarity,
consistency and certainty’27 and following the exapaple of countries such as Australia and
New Zealand. Hoxvever, with the best intentions, even the most sophisticated OECD
revenue administrations struggle to aclaieve consistency. In Canada, for example, an audit
in 1993 of the relatively new GST riding system found that ’in an unmamred system...the
risk of issuing inconsistent or inaccurate t~lings and interpretations is relatively laigh. The
decentralization of interpretation services...increases the risk of inaccuracies in rulings and
interpretation’.2a
Although insritutionally it is difficult to aclaieve complete consistency and fairness,a9
there are two levels of response: organisational and individual. Organisarionally, for
example, it is important to ensure that systems are in place to enable consistent, fair and
See, e.g., Tttrley’s analysis of corruption in 25 countries in transition in G. Tudey, above n. 16, pp. 97-123
and L. Rakner and S. Gloppen, ’Tax Reform and Democratic Accountability in Sub-Saharan Africa’,
paper presented at an IDS Taxation Seminar (28-29 October 2002), p. 6,
<www.ids.ac.uk/gdr/cfs/activides/Taxation-Seminar.html>, 1 October 2006.
Media Release, 23 Septembet 2006, <www.sa~s.gov.za>, 1 October 2006.
Auditor General of Canada, 1993 Repotl of the Auditor General of Cmmda - Deparmmnt of National
Revenue, oh. 20, <www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf>, 1 October 2006.
See, e.g., in Australia, The Treasuo,, Repot¢ on Aspects of Income Tax- Se[[Assessme*~t (Caaaberra, The Treasm3.
,
2005), <selfassessment.treasury.gov.au>, 1 October 2006.
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impartial decision-making across the revenue anthority.3° Tiffs will require sufficient
resources to allow decisions madein one part of the organisation to be made available to
decision-makers making similar decisions in other pats. It will reqafire adequate training of
both decision-makers and those responsible for colla~ug and disseminating information. It
will require taxpayer education so that the information provided by taxpayers and upon
wlffch decisions are made is sufficient to ensure consistency. Individually, however, it will
require training for decision-makers so that whatever the resources, systems and
information available to them, they make the best possible decision that they can make on
the basis of tile information before them.31
Tiffs leads clkecdy into Galligan’s second criterion, paraphrased as: the reasons given
for a decision should be intelligibly related to a framework of equally intelligible standards
wtffch can be seen fairy to fall within and be the basis of delegated authority. The criterion
sets out how a decision should be made. Any decision-maker is constrained by the extent
of the discretion afforded. Wiflffn the parameters constraining the exercise of discretion,
how should the decision-maker approach her or tffs task? The essential point established by
Galligan here is that .no decision is made ha a vacuum. There are rules, principles, policies,
guidelines, precedents and other factors that inform the context and framework ~idtin
wtffch a decision is made.32 All of these elements can usefully be described as constituting
s{andards, which, using Galligan’s criterion, should form file basis for any decision.
Given the breadth of formal and informal txfles and other influences on any decision,
how does a decision-maker determine a hierarchy of their importance in react~lg a
decision? Modem management and decision-making processes have made dos
30 One of the purposes of the \york carried out by the OECD, see OECD, Sltrltglheld~g Tax Audit
Capabilities: Get~e*~! P~i*Mples m*d Approaches, above n. 10; OECD, Stre,glheni~g Tax Audil Caflabi/itie*: Audilar
Workforce Manageme**t, above n. 10.
~ That this is vital in tile broader context of tax administration can be seen ha G. Turley,
above n. 16, and in a specific coamttT example, J.K. H)-an, ’Mongoha: Reform of the
’Fax Audit System’, (2006) 12Asia-Pacific TaxBu/leti& 341.
3z For an extensive discussion of theories of the model of roles and discretionary authority, see DJ
Galligan, above n. 3, p. 56 etseq.
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detemainafion much easier based on substantial theoretical work on stroctuth~g discretion.33
The extent of the influences on a decision is confined by file context, particularly at loxver
levels of decision-making. Many of the decisions can be confined strictly withh1 certain
parameters and if they fall outside the designated areas within which a decision can be
made, they are escalated to a higher level decision-maker.~4 The decision-making process is
ltighly structured and manuals, check-lists, databases and comprehensive procedural
guidelfi~es are in place across revenue authorities and wiflm~ individual areas to facilitate
high quality decision-making across file organisation. The quality of file process is
maintained through checking mechanisms by both peers and officers at a higher level.
F,~ness is increasingly mflaanced by file transparency in revenue decision-making
processes.~s
Two types of problem can arise from tiffs approach. First, it does not guarantee that
revenue officers will follow it. A number of studies of reforms of tax administration in
developing countries note the difficult3, in malting revenue officers follow the rules where
the culture within file tax administration and the broader environment do not reinforce
adlierence to the roles)6 This is a systemic issue that needs resolution whether or not
discretion is given to revenue officers.
Pioneered by K.C. Davis, Discretiona~ Justice (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State Universil3, Press, 1969) and
discussed extensively in D~J. Galfigan, ibid, p. 167 et seq.
q~aese form part of the opera6oual guidelines xvitl~n almost every revenue authority and are
reflected in the CIAT, ~!inimum Necessaty Attributes for a Sound and Effective Tax
Adnfir~stration’, above n. 11, e.g., p. 6: ’Actious, methodology and performance standards
system hnplemented and iu operatiou for management control’.
CL-kT, ibid. "!’he extent of consultation ha develophag hatemal guidelines is quite remarkable ha some
revenue anthorities. Although it could be argued that some of this is window dressing, the range of
avenues for community input ha jurisdictions such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada ensures that
~aXpayers are veq, satisfied with their revenue authorities: see the detailed discussion trader the heading,
P~nciples of Good Practice’ ha Chapter 7
-" mp~e, F.D.A.M. Luoga, ’Taxation ha the Advent of Democratisation and Transition to Free
Market Economy ha Tanzauia and Concerns on the Rule of Law and Human Rights’ Law, Social Justice &
Global Developmem, p. 31, <elj.war~vick.ac.uk/globai!issue/2002-1/luoga.html>, 1 October 2006; M.
b, lOOre and L. Rakner (eds), "lqae Ne\v Politics of Taxation and Accountability’, 33(3) (July 2002) [D£
Bttl/eli~; G. Turley, above n. 16 and J.K. HD, xm
, 
above n. 31, p. 347.
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Secondl structured decision-malmag can encourage a tectmical or mechanical
application of tl~e relevant standard~.37 It is a problem if appropriate exercise of discretion
is constrained so that it does not take account of the particular factors relevant to a
particular case that distingnish it from other cases of the same kind. This can be overcome
by effective training of personnel, a system of escalation of more complex matters to
revenue officers with more experience and a system of checkh~g and approving decisions at
a lfigher level, before they are sent out. Tiffs step is also important as it ensm’es that, in their
review, higher level revenue officers can take appropriate account of policy, legislative and
other developmenta that might impact on the decisinn.3~
The use of pmcedttres, manuals and checklists to aid in decision-making does not
obviate tl~e exercise of discretion, but it makes it manageable. It also does not prevent a
mix of approaches to decision-making. A decision on an objection against an assessment
may be relatively easily dealt with on the infom~ation proxfided in accordance with a set of
fairly specific standard procedures. A decision on an advance ruling request in a complex
tectmical area nfight require a range of actix4ties by the revenue officer in coming to a
decision. They *night include: discussions and even negotiations xx4th the taxpayer to
understand and refine understanding of the questinn and the relevant facts; research using
a range of libraries, databases and the experience of other officers; and conferencing with
senior officers from different locations and sections. Standard procedures in answering a
complex advance ruling request may be comprehensive, but can still be framed sufficiently
~v This is the case in all institutional decision-making. See tim tension in d~e Ettropean Cmtrt of Human
Rights between objective mid subjective approaches to interpretation, particularly during Sir Gerald
Fitzmautice’s term as a judge; described in C. Ovey and R.C.A. Wlfite, Jacob’s & White: The European
Com,enlion on Human Rights (4th edn, Oxford, OUP, 2006), p. 52 elseq.
~s D.J. Galligan, al)ove n. 3, p. 169 el seq. He notes a,t p. 178 that ’dae risk of arbitrariness is hi0a...wbere
powers are exercised by officials whose expertise and trahfing are lhnited, and whose decisions are
ueaikely to be reviewed or checked in a systematic way by odaer officials.’
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broadly to cater to a multi-step process incorporathag substantial information frotn
39
The essence of this approach is to ensure the best quafity decisions can be made in a
complex and changing world. Structure and constraint in decision-making, when properly
applied, adckesses the common concerns that decision-makers can use their powers for
improper purposes, take account of irrelevant considerations in reaclfing thei:c decisions
and not relate the reasons they give to the standards used.4° To avoid misuse of discretion
m more complex matters, where the standards are less specific, it is inaportant to escalate
the decision to more senior revenue officers. The requirement for reasons and tim
transparency that comes with it, places an obligation on the decision maker flint helps to
focus attention not just on making the right decision, but being able to justify it.
At a higher level of abstraction, there is an overarching requirement of
reasonableness required for intelligible reasons to fit widfin intelligible standards that fairly
fit xvidfin the scope of the discretion. The conwnon law concept of reasonableness, which
can be used to exclude irrationality, discrimination and dispropordonality,4t is extended m
the civil laxv by the principles of proportionality and legithnate expectation.42 Although the
common law does not have the clear theoretical rationale ~or the application of dae
reasonableness principle, the civil law aina of ensuring that there is an optimal balance
betweet~ pubfic adnfiuistration and social interests and the safeguarding of individual
interests is inherent in proper decisionmaaking within an), tax achninistradon.4s
The broader concept of reasonableness relates also to the third Galligan criterion:
that in matters of procedure and substance there be compliance with general, critical
For example flxe Advance Pricing Agreement process, see M. Maddaam, The Ttmtsfer Pffdt~g of Itttmtgibks
(Ihe Hague, Klu\ve[ Law International, 2005), p. 231 etseq.
R. Douglas, above n. 21, p. 399 elseq.
R. Douglas, ibid., p. 461 et seq. and R. Creyke and J. McMR!an, above n. 21, p. 304 el seq.
R. Thomag above n. 17, p. 15.
Ibid., for a discussion of the differences m theoretical app[oach, p. 1 et seq. and for a common law
analysis, see M. Paterson, ’Legitimate Expectations and Fairness: New Dkecdons in Australian Law’
(1992) Monad~ UMversi[y Law Review, 70.
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considerations of morality. This may perhaps be better expressed for our pro’poses: that
discretionary power should be exercised fairly and reasonably in matters of procedure and
substance.44 It returns to file fundatnentat principle of Chapter 3, that it is important that
the public perceives the tax system as fair.4s
What does this mean in practice? Tile common law tends to define reasonableness to
mean what is not unteasonao . Although Lord Hailsham LC underlines the difficulties in
defining reasonableness, as t~vo reasonable people can reasonably come to opposite
positions on the same set of facts,47 the core content of what is fak and reasonable is
generally understood and has changed little over the }Tears. Coke cJ ha 1598 said that the
exercise of discretion in reason and law:4s
is a science or understanding to discern between falsity and math, between wrong and
.tight, between shadows and substance, between equity and colourable glosses and
pretences, and not to do accordhag to their wills and private affections.
This concept is accepted by revenue authorities. It is tile substance tmderlying, for example,
the ATO ’core values of fairness and professionalism; transparency and accountability; and
consultation, collaboration and co-design.’49 It is why the ATO, like other revenue
authorities, seeks affitanation of taxpayer perceptions that it is fair and reasonable in the
exercise of its powers. The ATO is proud that in 2006, of over 1500 businesses su*~myed
Ex~red in depth in D.J~ Ga~gan~ Due Pr~ess and Fair Pr~cedures (Oxf~rd~ ~arend~n Press~1996)~
B. Torgler, ’Tax Mo~:ale and Tmx Compfiance: A Cross Culture Comparison’ , in National Tax
Association, Proceedings: Ninety SL’,:th Annual Conference 2003 (Waslfington DC, National Tax
Assodation, 2004), p. 63, p. 72, notes, e.g., that in a cross-culmxal study invul~4ng empkical data gathered
from botix Costa Pica and Switzerland, diere was a strong positive correlation between taxpayers’ m, st m
the government and legal system and tax morale, lead~g to the conclusion that compfiance is higher m
jurisdictions x~4th a government and legal system that are seen as fair and supportive of their taxpayers.
See, e.g., R. Douglas, above n. 21, p. 461 el seq., R. Creyke and J. McMillan, above n. 21, p. 724 et seq. and
H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyth, above n. 2, p. 353 el seq.
Re W. (An Infant) [1971] AC 682, 700.
(1598) 5 Co. Rep. 99b, quoted with approval in H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Fo~s)~d*, above n. 2, p. 353.
M. D’Ascenzo, speech to the International C.F.O. Forum (Sydi*ey, Australia, 19 October 2006),
<w,,mv.ato.gov.au>, 1 November 2006.
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72 per cent said that the ATO ad~isters the tax system fairy and 88 per cent said that
the ATO treats them in a fair and impartial way.s° Even those revenue authorities m
infisdictions with gover*maents ranking higher on corruption indexes recognise these
values. For example, as noted in Chapter 7, the Zimbabwe Revenue Authotity website has
as its banner headline, ’Integrity, Transparency, Fairness: We are here to serve’sl and the
Kenya Revenue Authority highlights on its website its annual survey to hdp it provide
better quality service to its customers,s~
To be fair and reasonable encompasses such aspects as proportionallt3,:
a&ninistrative measttres must not unnecessarily or disproportionately interfere with
individual tights to achieve their aim.s~ It extends to procedrucal fairness or natural justice,
which has been recog~tised as a ’kind of code of fak administrative proce&u:e’ in the
common law.s4
One of the more important elements of reasonableness not dealt with elsewhere is
the principle of legitimate expectations. It has been accepted in the common lawss and
rdlects a longstanding civil laxv principle that protects those legitimate expecta~ons that
have been raised tl~cough administrative conduct,sa Particularly important in the tax
context, it does not extend to subjective hope or an implied promise, but it can arise as a
result of acht*inistrative inaction,sv It is an element of reasonableness and the couxts will
only entertain expectations that are reasonable in the light of all the circumstances,s~
Whether the legi~nate expectation induced can operate xvhen it falls outside the
power of the revenue authority will depend upon the law of the }utisdiction. In Germany,
Eureka Strateg~ c Research, Busines*Petre’.ptiotts .fut~te9 II’/ave9, <wwxv ato gov.au>, 1 November 2006.
<www.zimra.co.zxv>, 1 October 2006.
<wwxv.kra.go.ke>, 10ctobe~ 2006.
H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Fo~sytb, above n. 2, p. 368 et seq. and R. Thomas, above n. 17, p. 77.
H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsytb, above n. 2, p. 435.
H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsytb, above n. 2, p. 370 and p. 494. See R. "Ilmmas, above n. 17 for a
C0mprebensive analysis of the cot~mmn and civil law positions.
Ibid.
R. Tho has, above n. 17, p. 53.
Ibid., p. 55.
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the expectation can be fulfilled through a principle that alloxvs the balancing of the interests
of legality and legal certainty, v~hile Netherlands courts will allow reliance on the
expectation provided the interests of fl~d pardes are not affected,s9 Tile UK follows tlle
European Corm of Justice and ’balances the protection of the general public interest
against the individual’s legitimate expectations,’6° This has seen a mmaber of extra-statutory
concessions made by the Inland Revenue upheld by the courts for the sake of fairness even
though they are contrary to the law.6t
Fairness extends to matters of legal certainty in the considerations of the European
Court of Justice. In Gebmeders van Es duoane Agenten BI/ v. Inspecteur der Invoet~cl)ten en
Accifi~ze&~z the Commission failed to amend a regulation concertfing tariff nomenclature
when it was required to do so. Tiffs resulted ha macertaint3, on the part of the individuals as
to their legal obligations, and had the consequence that the Court held flaat the regulation
could not thereafter be applied. For fairness, the European Court of Justice also reqttires
adequate notice before administrative and legislative measures can take effect.6~ Although,
exceptionally, a Conmmnity measure may take effect before its publication where the
purpose to be aclfieved and legitimate expectation demands it.s4
The Model should adopt Galligan’s criteria for the exercise of discretion in Artide 6.
From the analysis it should inclnde the reasonableness and fairness requirement. The
meaning extends to cover the p*~inciple of legitimate expectation. Legitimate expectation
also falls x~4thin the concept of certainty in role-malting, covered in Article 9 of the Model.
59 Ibid., p. 56.
60 H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Fors}~, above n. 2, p. 499.
6~ Ibid., p. 408 and S. Eden and N. Lee, above n. 9.
62 [19961 E.C.R. I- 431
63 Case 98/78 [1979] E.C.R. 69, 84.
ca Case 99/78 [1979] E.C.R. 101,111.
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B The Pri)zdpks of Reasonable Time and Reasonable Nolice
Whenever a taxpayer is enfided to a decision or action by the tax authority, it should occur
either wiflffn a specified pet’iod or widen a reasonable time. Likewise, whenever a taxpayer
is required to do someflffng, provide infonnation, or otherwise assist the revenue authofity,
it should be after die taxpayer is given reasonable notice, unless it is clear diat such nodce
would reasonably impact on the success of the relevant administrative action. This Latter
point is dealt with more full), in the context of search and seizure.
Statistics contained in file reports from the Ombudsman office in most jufisdictions
suggest that delays, errors and nffsunderstandings form file greater part of the work of
these offices.6s Tax legislation, by virtue of the requirement of legal certainty, sets out
numerous time limits wifl~hl which taxpayers nmst fulfil their obligations. It is less helpful
in providing t~me limits within which file revenue authofity must act outside formal
procedures. This is appropriate, as much of the point in giving file revenue authorities
powers to administer tile tax system would disappear if administrative procedures were
legislated.
Revenue aufllotifies recognlse the obligation that they have to act fairly, efficiently
and effectively. It is not in the best interests of good administration for administrative
delays to fota’n die bulk of complaints about the tax system. The OECD GAP002 sets out
in its model adiniuistrathm charter a number of fights for which specific turnaround times
should be inserted and a number of others which should be dealt with ’as quickly as
p°ssible’.~6 Tiffs is reflective of most tax adiuinlstrations, which use published key
For example, the annual reports off the Australian Commonwealtll Ombudstnan, <www.comb.gov.au>, !
October 2006; the Irish Office of the Ombudsman, <ombudsman.gov.ie>, 1 October 2006; the UK
Adjudicator’s Office, <www.adjudicatorsoffice.gov.uk>, 1 October 2006; and the US National Taxpayer
Advocate, <www.irs.gmo>, 1 October 2006.
A-hove n, 23, p. 8.
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performance indicators, as discussed in Chapter 7, to measure and improve theft
administration.
The principles of reasonable time and reasonable notice underpin the CIAT,
’Minitnum necessat3, attributes for a sound and effective tax administration’.67 There is
therefore widespread acceptance of their importance to good tax. administration. However,
it is also important that they are articttlated as general principles, rather than simply
specified as a parfictflar requirement for particular actions. As a general principle, they can
cover a range of actions for which a specific time period is inappropriate, especially when
an action depends upon particular facts and circumstances. Ideally, the principles would be
legislated to provide the option of judicLal review. Howexmr, if it is felt strongly in a
jurisdiction that this is inappropriate, they should at least be articttlated clearly and given
adininistrative enforceability through the dispute resolution mechanisms identified in
Article 1 1 of the Model.
C The Ptindple of Fairness in Administralive Aclion
There are certain generally accepted rtdes of fairness governing administrative actton. We
have seen d~at in the conwnon law they are articulated in tetans of review of adn~nistradve
action;69 in the civil law administrative procedure is usually clearly set out in a code]° The
rules of fairness apply to most administrative procedt~res considered in the Model.
Above n. 11, p. 7.
F. Vanistendae~ ~wega~ Frame~v~rk f~r Taxat~n ~ m ~ . Tbur~ny~ (ed~)~ Tax ~n~ Desig~ a~d Dt.af~i*~‘ v~.1
~X~asltington DC, International Monetat3, Fund, 1996), p. 21 and M. McLennan, ’The Principles and
Concepts in the Development of file Taxpayers’ Charter’ (2003) 32 Aurtmlia*~ Tax" Review, 22, 3t.
69 For example, see H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyfla, above n. 2.
~0 C. Daiber, above n. 7, p. 165 mid R. Thomas, above n. 17, p. 13. But see also the ’Order Concer*fing
Implementation Standards and Rules for fl~e Work of the National Tax Agency’ in Japan, in National TLx
Agency, A~* Oul]ine ofJapatme TaxAdtMMstralion, p. 3 el seq, <x~wv.nta.go.jp>, 1 October 2006.
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~dthough each jurisdiction will have its oxvn procedtttes under its achnLrfistrative laxv,v~ the
Model sets out the general minimmn standard expected for administrative procedures
applicable to taxpayers. There will be variations: certain search and seizure actions
u~dertaken by revenue authorities may not ftt/fil all of these requirements. It is important
to establish a standard for administrative actions so that variations from the standard have
to be justified.
A usefttl example of a code wbich melds many of the common and cixdl law
principles is the South African Promotion of Justice Act 2000.72 The Constitutional basis
for the Act is set out in the Preamble and is found in sedfion 33 of tile Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa. It provides ’the right to adn~fistrative action that is lawful,
reasonable and procedurally fair and tile tight to wt’itten reasons for adnfinistrative action’.
Section 3 of the Act sets out the requirements for procedurally fair achninisttative action
and requires:
(a) adequate nodce of dae natttre and purpose of the proposed administrative
action;
(b) a reasonable opportunity to make representations;
(c) a clear statement of the admh~istrative action;
(d) adequate notice of aW right of review or" iutemal appeal, where applicable; and
(e) adequate notice of the right to request reasons.
For example, G. Richardson, ’An ~Maalysis of die Impact of Tax Fairness Perceptions on Tax Compliance
Behavior h~ a Non-Western Jurisdiction: ~lm Case of Hong Kong’ paper presented at the 6th
Irttemational Conference on Tax Administration (Sydney, Austxalia, 15-16 April 2004).
The impfications are explored further in the context of d~e South African Constitution by B. Croome,
’Constitutional Law and The Taxpayer’s Rights in South Africa - ~Ma Overview’ 2002 ActaJutidira, 1.
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This is a straightforward, simple and clear statement of requizements that are generally
accepted. They are contakled in slightly different ways in ahnost ever}, charter or statement
of revenue adnm’ustratton pracnce. T1 formulation is therefore used in the Model.
D The Pr&dp/es of Pub/icalion, Disseminalion and Educalion
Article 6 of the Model requires that all roles applicable in the tax system shall be compiled
and published accm’atel}~ and in a forth that is accessible to all users. It is fundmnental to
the effective operation of tile tax system.74 Unless taxpayers knmv that they are required to
pay tax in a particular situation and know how to go about it, it is difficult for them to
comply. As tax compliance research has developed, it has become increasingly self-evident
that compliance improves with publication and dissemination of informati’on, and with
- taxpayer education]s
There is a strong emphasis on information dissemination generally, but particularly to
assist in any major change process. Change in tax systems is a constant and information
dissen~afion and education is essential if taxpayers are going to perceive the system as fak.
Tile more infotanation that is available, the more certain are taxpayers of their duty to
comply with the obligations that the tax system places upon them. If the h~fotmation is
73
74
See, e.g., A. Kimitchiva, ’Accountability and Fairness m Tax Administrations - A Case Study of the
Thailand Revenue Deparmaent’ (2006) 12Asia-Padflc Tax" Bulletitt, 76.
OECD, Tax~aowx’ Righls at~d Obligaliotts - a Smv~y of the Legal Silualio~t i~t OECD Cotmtties (Pads, OECD,
1990) (’OECD Taxpayers’ Rights and Obligations’), para. 2.16.
Tile general compliance literature and papers at successive conferences on international tax administration
reflect tiffs: e.g., the annual IRS Research Conferences (US) biem~ial ATAX International Tax
Ada~instration Conferences, (Sydney, Australia) and the Tax Research Network Annual Conferences
(UK). It is essential to the proper operation of self-assessment and the successful introduction of reform
See, e.g.,: J. Ahn, B. Jackson and M. McKee, ’Audit Information Dissetnination, Taxpayer
Conm~tmication, and Compliance: An Experfinental Approach’, paper presented at 2004 IlLS Research
Conference (Washington DC); D.R. Vos (Austrafian Inspector-General of Taxation), ’The Importance of
Certainty and Fakness fi~ a Self-assessing Em4ror~ment’ and M. Redmond, ’Ireland - a Case Study in T~v
Adnm~istration Change Management’, papers presented at the 7th International Tax Administratio~l
Conference (Sydney, Australia, 2006); and C. Richardson, ’Admirdstrative Buxdens and Simpfification m
HM[RC’, paper presented at tim Tax Research Network Annual Conference (Southampton, UI<2, 2006).
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simple to understand and designed to reach all types of taxpayer, including those in
~maority groups, with limited education or particular disabilities, it can prmdde greater
certainty and comfort with the system. It also becomes more effective in collecting the tax
due and more efficient in reducing the burden on taxpayers as they go tl~rough the process
of complying with the law.
Most revenue authorities have extensive school and conmmnlty education
programs]~ The intemet has transformed revenue authorities’ ability to provide massive
77
smounts of information relatively cheaply and easily to those who have access.
Publication, dissemination, education and assistance are seen as necessary attributes for a
sound and effective tax adininistradon,w They should be recognlsed as principles
underlying the tax administration.
The consequence of recognising these principles would not be to open a floodgate of
challenges to revenue decisions on the basis d~at proper information was not provided.
This option would only be open, in most cases, where a taxpayer could show dm
adiudicator in the administrative dispute resolution process that there was a genuine lack of
infomaation available. Errors and misunderstandings tbmugh too litde or misinfomaation
are already a significant component of the work of an ombudsman office]9 Rather, it
would prmdde general underlying principles to assist in dae process of acln~listradve
dispute resolution. It would also allmv the revenue authority to support budgetary clahns
for additional resources for an essential component of its administration.
Japan provides an example of a particularly strong commm~ity and school based approach. See National
Tax Agency, above n. 70.
For example, see the discussion m A. Halkyard, ’Treating Taxpayers Right: Tmxpayers’ Rights with Special
Reference to Hong Kong’ (2001) 9 Asia PadflcLatv B2viett,, 133, p. 143.
CL.\T, above n. 11, p. 7. See further, the comprehensive discussion by N. Brooks, ’Key Issues hi Income
Tax: Challenges of Tax Administration and Compliance’, paper presented at die Asian Developrnent
Bank 2001 Tax Conference.
Above, n. 65.
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E The P, indples of Assistance and Providing for Special Needs
The fairness principle reinforces dm wider prohibition in most jtttisdicdons against
discrimination generally,s° There is increasing awareness of the responsibilities daat
gover*maent agencies haste to take action to support non-discfiminadon. This can be seen
in public service legislation, public seta,ice charters and in the business or other plans of
Taxpayers’ chatters usually include some statement that taxpayers have the right to
be informed, assisted and heard.8z Hmvever, a fight to assistance should be ardcuhted as a
basic principle and in connection witi1 those taxpayers requiring special or paticular
assistance. The benefit is as much to the revenue authority as it is to the taxpayer. Ovetdy
making assistance avail,able to those who need it acts both as an education process and
assists to bring xvithin the tax system those marginafised members of the community who
are most likely otherwise to fall within the black economy,s~
Obviously, the breadth and depth of assistance required xxfill direcdy affect a
jufisdicfion’s ability to budget for it. Hmvever, tiffs does not warrant malmag the principle
only a recormnended fight. All jurisdictions should do what they can for those taxpayers
needing special assistance. The level of assistance will sinaply vary depending upon
For example, the International Covenant on Ci~41 and Pofitical Rights, art. 26; and Emzopean Convention
on Human Rigbts, art. 14, discussed in C. Ovey and R.C.A. ~/bite, above n. 37, p. 4t2 el seq.
For example, in Austxalia, which has no national charter of ~igbts and is not subiect to a treat}, such as the
European Convention on Human Rights, the Constitution, various discrimination acts, the Human Rights
and Equal Opportunities Conmdssion and Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) are but a few of the statutes and
bodies that place obligations on tt~e ATO to deliver tmxpayer assistance in a nomdiscriminatoq, manner:
M. McLennan, above n. 68, p. 38. See in the US, N.E. Olsen, ’Taxpayer Rights, Customer Ser~ice and
Compliance: A Three-Legged Stool’ (2003) 51 Kat**as Law Review, 1239.
For example, see OECD Tnxpayers’ ~ights and obligations, above n. 74 and GAP002, above n. 23, p. 3.
K.M. Bloomquist, ’,am Oven, Jew of some Recent IRS Research on Taxpayer Compfiance Bebaviour’,
paper presented at the 7ti~ International Tax Administration Conference (Sydney, Australia, 2006); X.S.
Li, %thnic Diveralt}~, Social Identifies and "lax Compliance - Evidence from the European and World
Values Sur~,eys’, seminar paper presented at the Llniversity of Micl~igan (1 November 2005), <www-
personal.umich.edu-xinl>, 1 October 2006; and R.M. Bird, J. Mardnez-Vazquez and B. Torgler, ’Tax
Performance in Developing Countries: The Role of Demand Factors’ in National Tax AssociatiOn,
Ptvceedi~gs: Nit~eO,-Si~’tb ~/tmttta! Cotfet~t~ce 2004 (Wastfington DC, National Tax Association, 2005), p. 284.
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budgetary and other resource constraints. It is hnportant, hoxvever, that the principle of
assisth*g all taxpayers is expressly a~ticulated as fundamental to any tax ach~ainisttation,s4
F The Ptiilciples of Acling Ethically and Professionally
Underlying much of the discussion in previous chapters has been the implicit
understanding that taxpayers can rely on revenue authorities to act etlfically and
professionally. It is arguable, given the extent of the requirements in the Model to adopt
pnnciptes of good governance and good practice, and to ensure the independence, fairness
and impartiality of the revenue authority, that there is no need to articulate ethics and
professionalism as a separate principle. There are several reasons xvhy it is appropriate.
l:rtrst, the extent and effect of cort~aption in governments and revenue authorities
around the worldss suggests that it is essential for taxpayers to have a general principle that
they can rely on in bringing a complaint through the revenue authority dispute resolution
mechardsm and, ulthnately, a revenue ombudsman. Rarely would a revenue authority refuse
to say that its officers act etlfically and professionally. It is far more likely that a
government would not introduce principles of good governance and comply with the
International Monetary Fund Code of GoodPmc#ces on Fiscal T~’at*~pata~gv. At least a statement
of general principle gives some gmtmd for adininistrative protection.
Second, although there are usually laws, both ctin~aal and administrative, which
require ethical and hnpartial behax~iour, they are normally fairly specific because there are
penalties associated with them.8~ They do not necessarily cover the less obvious areas of
See A. Halk3,ard
’ 
above n. 77, p. 146 on tbe Hong Kong Taxpayers’ Charter.
G. Turley, above n. 16; S.S. Evethart, J. Marfinez&razquez and R.M. McNab, ’Corruption, Investment
and Growth in Developing Countries’ in National Tax Association, above n. 45; and see the discussion in
Chapter 7 on dfis point.
For example, in Australia: the Public Ser~4ce Act 1999 (Cth), the Administrative Decisions (~udicial
Review) Act 1977 (Cflx), the various discrimination acts and the Crimes Act 1922 (Ctli) to name but a few.
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unedtical conduct, where flaere may be a minor conflict of interest, a slightly dubious
decision, or an unprofessional attkude wlfich is affecting the proper determination of a
taxpayer’s liabilities. A general principle would do so.
T~fixd, the nature of a principle of tax administration makes it a useful protection
both for the taxpayer and the reputation of the revenue anthotity.87 Although it could be
used both as a ground for judicial review and a basis for adnfinistrative complah~t, it still
has force even where it is only a basis for administrative complaint. It ensures that there is
ground for complaint using the internal revenue authority dispute resolution mechamsms.
It also allows escalation to the independent office of a revenue ombudsman.
The principles of ethical behaviour and professionalism are encapsulated in some
form in most taxpayer’s chatters. It makes sense to reflect this in Ore Model. For those
jurisdictions where it is not clear that they can be relied on by taxpayers using existing
remedies, they are a useful additional protection. For those jurisdictions that do adhere to
the principles as part of the general requirement of civil servants, stating them clearly as
part of the rules governing the tax adi~finistration gives added weight to their content in a
tax context. Professional behaviour includes the subsidiary concept that revenue officers
will not draw an adverse inference simply because a taxpayer chooses to exercise available
legal or adi,~tistrative rights.
III INFOtlAIATION OATHE1ONG, AUDIT AND INVESTIGATIONs8
~7 M. McLetman, above n. 68, p. 34. Japan strongly emphasises this approach: National Tax Agency, above
n. 70, p. 3 et seq.
88 For a wide range of country specific examples, see D. Bentley, above n. 7. For a general sma~ey of the
application of these obligations, see OECD Taxpayers’ fights and obligations, above n. 74 and oECD,
Tax Admittistratiott lit OECD arm Selected NoIt-OECD Cotolt~es: Comparative It~mtatio*t Sedes (2006) (Paris,
Centre for Tax Policy and Adr~fitlistradon, 2006) (’2006 OECD Comparative Sut-,,-ey’).
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It was noted in Chapter 2 that the Model does not include taxpayer obligations. It provides
guidance on best practice to policy makers; setth~g out the rights that the rules governing
the tax system should include. Hoxvever, those rights are firualy rooted in taxpayer
obligations. Nowhere is this more important to understand than in the context of
i~formation gathering, audit and investigation. Taxpayers’ rights must provide an
appropriate safet3r net for taxpayers without undermining the purpose and effectiveness of
the tax system.
Taxpayers’ rights have been used in the past as a stick with which to beat revenue
authorities. Greenbaum argued that the US Taxpayer Bills of Rights 2 and 3 xvere simply
vehicles used for political purposes to undermine and reduce the provers of the IRS.s9 He
suggested that:~°
There is a serious problem associated with undermining the IRS unnecessarily or
excessively. The concern is that the ERS would no longer be perceived as a credible or
effective tax adn~nistration aud widespread voluntary compliance with the law would
cease.
Particularly in an envirormaent of increasing self-assessment, comprehensive powers are
critical to a revenue authority’s effective operation: most hnportantly to gather information,
audit taxpayers and enforce the payment of taxes that are legally due and payable. Much of
the analysis in this thesis so far has focused on the importance of the relationslfip between
taxpayers and revenue authorities. Tiffs is appropriate as it is the engine room of voluntary
compliance.9~ Hoxvever, there are several themes in modem tax adinimstration that require
A. Greenbaum, ’United States Taxpayer Bills of Rights 1, 2 and 3: A Path to the Futmze or Old kXritine ha
New Bottles’, in D. Ber~tley, above n. 7, p, 347, p, 377.
Ibid, p. 378,
K. Messere, F. de Kam and C. Heady, Tax Polio,: TheoO, and P~lclice itt OECD Comt#ies (Oxford, OUP,
2003) p. 31.
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a relatively powerful steel fist within file velvet glove of improved relationships.
following paragraphs identify some of the more important of these themes.
First, self-assessment has become the prefe~ed form of assessment of taxpayers Over
administrative assessment procedures because it is seen as more effective and more
efficient.92 Where administrative assessment is used, it is largely automated.93 The result is a
focus by revenue authorities on a risk-based and targeted verification process designed to
identi~, the most significant instances of non-compliance.94 These are dealt with usitlg a
range of methods designed to encourage volimtarT compliance, but designed also to
penalise those who abuse the system; in particular those engaged in fraud and evasion.9s It
is critical to maintain the balance between encouragement and deter*ent to make the tax
admhfistration as effective as possible,s6
Second, there is a strong trend in revenue authorities towards performance-oriented
budgeting and perfomaance management as governments and citizens demand value for
"money (efficiency and effectiveness) from their revenue authorit3,.9v OECD revenue
authorities are arguably reasonably welt resourced,s8 Non-OECD countries are usually
not.99 Tile emphasis on outcomes inevitably means that there is a welcome trend towards
ensufiaag that there is efficient use of the resources that are available. This loops back again
to the importance of tax audit activities and verification and related functions,m°
2006 OECD Comparative Survey, above n. 88, p. 57.
Ibid.
Ibid. Most revetme authotil3’ websites publish the annual compliance program, wltich identifies the most
pressing compliance issues.
95 For example, ATO, Col~tpliance Ptogmm 2OOtO7, <wx*av.ato.gov.au> , l November 2006.
96 N. Brooks, above n. 78, and J.G. McCubbin, ’Optimal Tax Enforcement: A Review of file Literatuxe mid
Practical Implications’ in National Tax Association, above n. 45, p. 16.
97 2006 OECD Comparative 8m, ey, above n. 88, p. 36; and see, for an example from file developLqg Pacific
Island Cotmtdes, C. Grandcolas, ’Management of the VAT - Improving file Level of Compliance Using
Petfomaance Indicators (200) 12 Asia-Padfic Tax Bullelk~, 6.
98 2006 OECD Comparative Stm,ey, above n. 88, p. 100 elseq.
99 Ibid; T.A. Khan, "Pakistan: Income Tax Reforms’ (2006) 12 Asia-Padf!c Tax- Bttl/elin, 42; and see G. Tudey,
above n. 16, who examines the problem of revenue erosion in a number of countries in transition.
100 2006 OECD Comparative Sur~,ey, above n. 88, p. 105 and N. Brooks, above n. 25, p. 33.
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Tlfird, the advent of elect*onic commerce has been identified for some dine as a
tl~eat to revenue.1°1 Revenue authorities have responded both individually: d~ough
domesdc measures; and also mtddlaterally: for example, by amending relevant ardcles and
commentary in the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, designed to
flow through to individual double tax agreements. However, electronic commerce
transactions remain as a significant compliance risk requiting strong measures to combat
a~,oidance and evasion.
Fmttd~, globalisadon has a ntm~ber of ramifications for revenue collection. Hat~mful
tax competition and the problems associated with bank secrecy reLating to accounts held by
aon residents of the host jurisdiction have attracted significant revenue activity.~°z The
±\TO Compliance Program 2006-07, wlfich is illustrative of the issues facing most mature
economies, also identifies as problems activities such as: profit shift~ig, international
consmnpdon tax schemes, cross-border financing, and cotnpliance issues associated with
individual mobility,m3 Tanzi has written extensively for many years from an IMF
perspective about these challenges to the revenue authorities; he adds to the list the
taxadun of derivatives and hedge fin~ds and the inabilit3, to tax fmancia! capital,m~ As soon
as taxpayers entering into these activities move beyond acceptable tax planning, these issues
have nodmag to do with lapses in voluntat3, compliance and evet3,dfing to do with
intentional avoidance and evasion of taxes. It is essential that revenue authorities have the
tools to counter serious risks to revenue of tiffs kind.
*0, OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Ekctt~nic Commen’e: A Discussion Paper on Taxation Issues (Pads,
OECD, 1998).i,,~ See, e.g., OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: ~M* Emerging Global Issue (Pads, OECD, 1998) and
subsequent reports, discussed in Chapter 2.io~ Above n. 95. See further, the Final Seoul Declaration, following tbe Third Meeting of the OECD Forum
on Tax Adn~fistration (1~-~.5 September 2006), <\w,wv.oecd.org>, 1 November 2006.
~’~ V. Tanzi, ’Tbe Economic Role of the State in the 21st Centuq,’ (2005) 25(3) CatoJoto~ta/, 617, 633 and
’Globallzation, Technological Developments and rite Work of Fiscal Termites’ (2001) 26(4) Bmok~’t~
Jout~ml of lntert~aliottal Law, 1261.
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Fifth, aggressive tax planning, defined by Braithwaite as ’a scheme or at~cangement
put in place xvith the dominant purpose of avoiding tax’,l°s is widely recognised as a
growing risk to revenue in countries around the world,m6 At its extremes it blurs into
evasion of taxes and fraud. The latter remain significant threats to the revenue, particularly
in the context of cortaapfion, organised ct~ne and money laundering actixqties.I°v
Realistically, revenue authorities are often at a disadvantage in combating systematic
and intentional tax evasion by powerfial taxpayers. This is reflected in works by
international experts with tiOes such as The C~#is in Tax Adminislration)°8 Tillinghutst
notes:1°9
The number of challenges facing the Internal Revenue Set’vice in administering and
enforcing compfiance with the international provisions of the U.S. tax law is indeed
prodigious...Crin~inal t3~pes are not, of course, cooperative, nonreporters are hard to
find, and the multinationals, even when compliant or relatively so, present a daunting
range of issues of both legal and factual complexity.
It is particularly so in non-OECD countries xvhere limited resottrces and a rela0vely
immatt~re infrastructure compounds wealmesses in enforcement programs,u° The aim of
taxpayers’ rights therefore should not be to undermine a revenue authofity’s duty and
abilit!~ to collect the tax that is legally due under the laws of the jurisdiction in wlfich it
10s j. Btaiflxxvaite, Markets ht Vice Marcels i~1 Virtue (Oxford, OUP, 2005), p. 16.
I08 j. Braiflxwaite, ibid, describes the ~ecttrring cycles of aggressive tax planning in rite US and Australia. This
is reflected in the ATO, Contpliam’e Pvgmtn 2006497, above n. 95 wl~ch includes dm topic as one of its
major issues.
m? In some cotmtries these issues fl~reaten dm viability of tim tax system. See, e.g, G. Ttecley, above n. 16.
10s H.J. Aaron and J. Slemrod (eds), The Crisis it1 Ta~,-Admitlist~lion (Washington D.C., Brookings InsfimOofl
Press, 2004). The difficulties of crea~ig effective tax a0aninistrafion in countries in transition is described,
e.g., in G.Turley, above n. 16 and "~. Tanz, Creating Effective Tax Adi,finistradons: "I]m Experience of
Russia and Georgia’ in J. Komai, S. Haggard and R. Kaufinan (eds.), Reforming the State: lV#cal and IITe~fatv
Reform in Poslsodalist Comttties (Cambridge, CUP, 2001).109 D.R. Tillinghast, ’Issues of International Tax Enforcement’, in H.J. Aaron and J. Slemrod, ibid., p. 38. See
generally, J. Braithwaite, above n. 105, and R. Avi Yonab, ’Globa~zafion, Tax Competition and d*e Fiscal
Crisis of the Welfare State’ (2000) 113 Han~at~l Law Rel,t}tv, 1573.
n0 N. Brooks, above n. 25 and n. 68 and G. Turley, above n.16.
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operates. Braithwaite notes that in the 21S~ centurT, the measures required to ensure
compliance will continue to include: responsive regulation, escalating enforcement to
counter increasingly egregious breaches of the law, and adequate and escalating penalties to
act as a serious deterrent)°
Taxpayers’ rights provide a safety net to ensure that a tax system operates according
to accepted roles of procedural fairness and provides adequate opportunity for taxpayers to
seek review. Taxpayers’ rights provide a legal and moral basis for the proper operation of
tim tax system. They rest not simply on the laws of a particttLar jurisdiction, but also on
generally accepted norms of international law and practice. Witl~n these parameters, it is
appropriate to assume that taxpayers should be expected to act honesty and themselves
comply both with the rxfles of the jurisdictions in wlfich they live and those in \vlfich they
choose to operate or simply enter into transactions.
A direct result of fl~is assumption is that in the increasingly difficult environment for
collecting taxes, the revenue authority has the right to complete information that it requires
to assess the tax liabilities of each taxpayer. It is essential that there is appropriate
protection in place to prevent misuse of that information. However, by giving the revenue
authority complete information the taxpayer demonstrates the good faith that then allows
the operation of a xvide range of protective rights in relation to the way that information is
used. The same rights simply cannot be afforded to taxpayers who refuse to provide
complete information.
It comes back full circle to the rote of law. Where a taxpayer submits to the rule of
laxv in a jurisdiction, that taxpayer is given the full protection of die laxv and a xvide range of
non-legal rights associated with voluntal3, compliance. Where a taxpayer intentionally steps
into the gloomier shadoxvs of legal uncertainty, the protective rights afforded to the
taxpayer become more restricted. Where the taxpayer intentionally breaks the laxv, the
ul j. Braid~\vaite, above n. 105, p. 177 elseq.
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rights are limited to legal rules of procedittal fairness in criminal proceedings, The
description of best practice in tax adir’~nistration set out in this section does not therefore
extend taxpayers’ rights beyond what is reasonable in the current compliance environment.
It rather seeks to maintain an appropriate balance between taxpayers’ rights and the legal
obligation of the rm~enue authority to collect taxes due.n2 It mirrors the requirements of
transparency and accountability demanded of the revenue authorities themsehms, which are
fundamental to principles of good governance and good practice.
A General I, tformalion Gatheril~g
Revenue authorities reb, on infotanation to assess a taxpayer’s liability to pay tax under the
laxv and/or to veofy taxpayer self assessment. The ptimat3, legal rights in Chapter 6 govern
the reqtfirements for the imposition of a tax liability. Secondat3, legal aries normally govern
the procedures for the practical administration of the tax system. These will cover sucl~
matters as: who mnst file a remm or other document; who has the authotit3, to demand a
return, an additional return or anodier doctUnent; the information that must be included in
a return or other document; and the tininag for lodgement of a retutal or other document.
Primary legal rights cover matters that might impact on the proper operation of.the rule of
law, such as the general requirement fllat Laws should not operate retroactively and that dae
rules governing file prmdsion of information must be published and available to taxpayers
so diat they can comply with the law.
The general fights to privacy in a jurisdiction cover such isstles as national
identification numbers and their broader use by government. Such argmnents are often
n~, J.G. McCubbir,, above n,96,
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caught up ha the debate over taxpayers’ fights,u3 but taxpayers’ fights are limited to
ensuring the confidentiality of reformation provided for tax purposes. It is the application
of the general fights of citizens that provide limitations on how a jurisdiction may choose
to identi~, or register its citizens. Most revenue authorities nmv use unique taxpayer
identifiers or another high integfit3r number for both personal and business taxation,u4
There are four general areas of inaportance that relate to infomaation gathefing:
!. secrecy or confidentiality provisions governing infmvnation gathered;
2. gathering information from taxpayers;
3. gathering information from third parties; and
4. exchange of information with other revenue authofities.
They are dealt with in order. As noted above, the general assumption is that it is legitimate
for a revenue authofity to reqtfire the provision of infomaafion by its citizens. Tlie fights
considered here are those that are concerned with how the information is obtained and
how it is dealt with once it has been obtained.
Seo~fy ar Co*~denlia/i~ Provisions
The gathering of infma~nation from taxpayers is predicated upon the revenue authofities
treating the information as confidential,us Most jufisdictions have general privacy laws, but
tax taws involve the provision of some of the taxpayer’s most detailed and intimate
information. It is therefore m the public interest that there should be additional specific
This has been a particular issue m Japan. See K. Ishim~tra, "The State of Taxpayers’ Rights ha Japan’ ha D.
Bendey, above n. 7, p. 227, p. 256.
2006 OECD Comparative Sut~,ey, above n. 88, p. 121.
OECD Taxpayers’ tights mid obligations, above n. 74,.para. 2.26 and OECD, GAP002, above n. 23, p. 9.
371
Chafer ~
and stringent safeguards governing information provided for tax purposes,u° The), should
set out precisely how, when and wliere reformation relating to a taxpayer can be used.
The taales should govern the collection, storage, security, access to, correction of, use
and disclosuxe of infomaation provided,u7 They should note, in particular, the importance
of a revenue officer using the information o~aly in the cotucse of her or Iris duties. The rules
should extend to flfird parties working for flae revenue authorit3T and given access as a result
to confidential taxpayer information)18
There should be restrictions on revenue officers malting records of information ot
divulging or commurticating information about anyone’s tax affairs,n9 The restrictions
should continue to apply after d~ey cease employment as a revenue officer. Wiflfin the
revenue authotit3’ these activities should be restricted to the cotvcse of normal duties as they
affect that taxpayer’s tax affaks. That might extend m divulging information about one
taxpayer to another where the basis of assessment of the other taxpayer depends upon that
" information. In common l~w jm-isdicdons this can occttr, for example, with mast
distxibudons where details of the trust distribution notified to the revenue authority by a
trust may be disclosed to the tax’payer to xvhom the distribution was made.
Some~nes infomaation is passed to other govertmmnt departments as revenue
authorities take on roles wider" than tax collection.|=° The same rules should apply to
officers of other deparmaents in respect of confidential tax related infomaafion. Passing
reformation outside the revenue authority or to an approved govenmaent department
should noranalty only occux in connection xvitla tax recover3’ proceedings or to other
~(’ For example, Australia Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s. 16, and Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s. 70.
See further, Aus{xalian Law Reform Cmmnission, Pmtectittg Classified attd SecuKO, Semitive I,~t~mtion:
Digctmio*t Paper 67 (Canberra, Cormnonwealflx of Australia 2004), p. 113 et seq. Canada has extensive
security arrangements in place, particularly to protect electronic data: <\mmv.cra-arc.gc.ca>, 1 November
2006.
uv OECD Taxpa}ers Rigbts and Obligations, above n. 74, para. 2.28.
rig For example, K. kXq~eelwtight, ’Taxpayers’ Rigbts m Australia’ in D. Bendey, above n. 7, p. 57, p. 74 and
M. McLetman, above n. 68, p. 43.
119 CL’\T, ’lM;inimum necessary attributes for a sotmd and effective tax administration’, above n. 1 l, p. 7.
120 2006 OECD Comparative Sma,ey, above n. 88, p. 14 and OECD Taxpayers’ Rights and Obligations,
abram n. 74, para. 2.27¯
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revenue authorities in cormecdon with treaty provisions (discussed below). Secdon 241 of
the Canadian Income Tax Act petwoits disclostire, for example, xvhere there are:121
ctqminat proceedings;
legal proceedings that relate to the enforcement of the tax law;
hmrfinent danger of death or physical injur3, to any individual; and
intra-govemmental or inter-governmental transfer of specified information.
The rules should be particularly clear on levels of authorisation and the reasons requited
before confidential infot’mation is released. Tiffs might extend to disclosure of the names of
taxpayers with significant outstanding tax debts as a form of penalty, as occurs in
Hungat3,.I=
Taxpayers should have reasonable right of access to information held about them by
fl~e revenue authorities, provided it does not unduly lfinder tile administration of the tax
system)23 Tills is normally available in a jurisdiction under freedom of information or
similar provisions. It extends to requests to amend or annotate details about them that are
incorrect. Restrictions on access usually include access to documents with references to
d~d patdes, internal working documents or where such access is against the public
~t~tetest)24
In most revenue authorities there are regular checks to ensure that the confidentiality
provisions are not being breached. Normally, breaches of the prmfisions by a revenue
officer would constitute a breach of her or ltis employment contract and a criminal
Discussed in J. Li, ’Taxpayers’ Rights in Canada’ in D. Bentley, above n. 7, p. 89, p. 96. See tim similar
German provisions in C. Daiber, above n. 7, p. 171.
Discussed in D. De*k, ’Taxpayer Rights and Obligations: The Htmgarian Experience’ in D. Bentley,
above n. 7, p. 200, p. 212.
M. McLennan, above n. 68, p. 44.
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cfl~t) Part IV, and see M. McLetman, ibid.
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offence,tas The sanctions should allow both dismissal from the revenue authority and
criminal penalties ranging from frees to imprisomnent, depending upon die seriousness of
die offence. Criminal sanction is justified in this instance as it is in tlie public interest,l-’~
Where a taxpayer can demonstrate damage or loss as a result of a revenue officer breaclmag
confidenfiafity provisions, compensation should be payable.
In certain circtwnstances taxpayer information that does not direcdy or indirecdy
reveal the idendty of the taxpayer to whom it relates may be released,t27 This cotmnonly
occurs xxdth redacted infomaation contained in ruling requests. It is of particular concern in
reladon to transfer pricing ~trrangements and advance pricing agreements, where taxpayers
prmdde sensitive competitive information to revenue authorities)as It has been the subject
of debate, particularly in count, des such as the US and Australia.tat Care has been taken in
both jurisdictions to protect the confidentiality of information provided using appropriate
legal mechaulsms. Further issues arise in relation to information exchange (discussed
below).
Advances in technology mean that tax authorities need to place particular emphasis
on the protection of confidential information held on databases)~° The protection should
extend to provide strong sanctions to deter tmautho*_{sed third parties from accessing
confidential taxpayer information. No system is completely safe from computer hackers
and there must be protection for taxpayers against unaufl~orised dissemination of
information possibly critical to the commercial stmdval of those taxpayers. Where dfird
part3~ providers are used in data collection, management or storage, d~ey should fall widlin
the confidentiality provisions governing taxpayer information applicable to revenue
1~ OECD Taxpayers’ rights and obligations, above n. 71, para. 2.26.
~26 Australian Law Reform Conmaission, above n. 116, p. 129.
1~7 For example, the Canadian Income Tax Act 0/SC 1985 (Sfla Supp.) c. I), s. 241.
1~ OECD, above n. 74, para. 2.29.
1~9 See M. Marld~am, above n. 39, p. 280 etseq.
130 OECD Taxpayers’ fights and obligations, above n. 74, p. 20. For example, this is governed in part m
Switzerland by, Ord~xance of the FDF on Etectro~ficatly Transmitted Data and Information (30 January
2002), <wxvw.estv.admh~.ch>, 1 November 2006.
374
Analysis of Secondary Legal and Adlainistrative Rights
officerS. It is important that individuals are personally liable for unauthorised release of
taxpayer infornaation. The companies or organlsafions that they work for should also bear"
concurrent liability.
Tax authorities reqttire information to assess a taxpayer’s liability to tax. Tlffs usually
requires the return of information of some kind. The 2006 OECD Comparative Survey
noted that the four main types of personal income tax arrangements for employee
taxpayers include a largely retttrn-free alternative for taxpayers with only one or linffted
sources of income, wl~ich is used in a number of countries)3~ In such cases, employees
provide information on entitlements to their employers, who then calculate the applicable
tax rate so that the cor:tect amount of tax is paid through the withholding system. F’tling a
return is therefore the norm for taxpayers in all but a few jurisdictions. The return and any
subsequent investigation can result in the provision of substantial information to the
revenue authorities covering everT aspect of a person’s or business’s activities.
Due process demands that taxpayers should be aware of the requirement to provide
reformation, tl~at they should have the capacity to provide d~e information, and tl~at there
sboutd be a presumption that they are acting honestly unless they act otherwise. Tiffs is
Coveted under the requirements for certainty, publication and the principles of good
practice discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. Under the basic right to privacy there should be
limits on the scope of the tax authorities’ info,~mation gathering powers. Tiffs is notanally
phrased as a requirement that infor:mafion collected relates to the finaucial affairs of the
taxpayer. Related information extends to information that impacts upon the tax affairs of
2006 OECD Comparative Suave},, above n. 88, p. 59 and the Table on p. 69.
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the taxpayer. For example, prmdsion of a tax rebate may depend upon the detailed personal
circumstances of the taxpayer. Detern~nation of residence for tax purposes can invoh, e a
detailed examination of a taxpayer’s private life.~32 The privaW laws of each iurisdiction
should identify how the laxvs apply to the revenue authorities. These xvill be governed, for
signatories, by Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Collection of tax does not require file provision of unlimited information; in most
cases revenue authorities want only relevant information so that they can operate more
efficiently. What is flae best way to protect a taxpayer against abuse of information
gathering powers xvhere, for example, a taxpayer is targeted by a rogue officer who keeps
on demanding unnecessary information? It is essentially a management issue. Authorisation
for significant informalion demands should be given by a senior officer. Therefore it is best
dealt with through die application of the pfitlciples of good practice combined with an
effective internal dispute resolution process. There is file further option of refet*al to an
ombudsman if the issue is not resolved. As xvith most tights included in this chapter, fllere
is an assumption fllat the basic organs of state are operating more or less effectively.
Tax administration depends increasingly upon reporting and withholdhlg by a wide range
of third parties.~3~ The OECD notes that there are txvo pre-conditions for effective and
efficient use of information reporting and matching: the reporting body must be able to
captttte and send reports electronically; and the reporting body mast use a !figh integrity
taxpayer identifier to enable die revenue authority to match die information)3~ As revenue
R. Robatgi, Bade [ttlet~tatio#al Taxation (The Hague, Kluxver Law International, 2002), p. 132 provides a
range of examples of country practice.
2006 OECD Comparative Survey, above n. 88, p. 59 and the Table on p. 63 el seq.
Ibid, p. 60.
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authorities are able to meet these pre-conditions, this kind of reporthag will increase to
maprove audit efficiency. Meanwhilb, there is still sigrdficant capture of confidential data
from third parties, even if it cannot all be used.
Taxpayer’s rights do not cover the holding of infomaation by third parties. That is
covered by the privacy laws of the relevant jm]sdiction. They do cover the request for
information and the treamaent of the information once it is provided. The latter point is
covered by the confidentiality provisions discussed above.
The requirement to provide information to a revenue authority about a taxpayer
should be governed by legislation. The right to privacy is recognised as a fundamental right
under Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Pdghts. Article t7
prmfides tliat no-one should be subjected to arbitrarT or unlawful interference. This
requirement is nomaally translated into the p~vacy laws of a jurisdiction. The result is that
both the revenue authority and the third party provider are protected where the
requirement to provide information is legislated.
For the standard reporting function there should be no requirement tha~ the taxpayer
is notified before a report is made. It would be impossible an)~vay in many instances of
automated repor~g, where lists of transactions are transmitted. The revenue authority
should, as part of its compliance program, publish the wide range of information that it is
entitled to collect. It should also explain how the infurxnation is used and the procedures it
follows to keep fl~at information confidential. MaW revenue authorities do Otis as a matter
of course. It falls witltin the principles of good practice.
VOmre additional information is sought from a third party as part of an investigation
0t audit, the circtmastances are different. Before a revenue authority exercises its powers of
seaxch and/or seiztrre (discussed brow), it may wisb to gather further information from a
wide range of sotu:ces. Again, the power to make such requests should be legislated, even if
it is part of a general po\ver of administration.
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Should the taxpayer be notified before an order to produce such infomaadon is made
to a third party? There is a danger that noti~,ing a taxpayer nfight result in the taxpayer
obstructing the investigation. However, taxpayers xvould be concerned that a request for
mfomaation outside the automatic reporting requirement inmaediately tells the third patty
that they are under investigation. T!fis coLtld negatively impact on a taxpayer; for example,
where a bank delays or refuses a loan request because the bank is made aware that the
taxpayer’s tax liability is under investigation. In the US, the rationale for requiting
notification of a taxpayer is to give the taxpayer the oppormnit3, to prmdde the information
before an approach is made to a third party.13s
The US approach does not appear to be common)36 However, it could be hsted as a
recommended right. Even then it may be too stth~gent for general adoption and should be
ameliorated by the reqtfirement that notification need not be given if the revenue officer
has reasonable grounds to suspect that prior notification would result in the taxpayer
obstructing the investigation..37 The reasonable grounds should be written and approved by
a senior officer m the revenue authority. Tiffs additional step then provides support for the
revenue officer ha the event of a subsequent investigation by the otnbudsman.
Certain third parties are exempt from providing information on request and this is
considered below under pri~filege. Where a third pat~y wilfully pro\rides fraudulent
informafion about a taxpayer this should constitote an offence and the taxpayer should be
able to bring a civil action for damages or compensation)3s
(c)(1) proltibits tim [RS from contacting any person other fl~an the taxpayer x~4fl~out givi~g d~e taxpaye~
reasonable notice prior to fl~e contact.
2006 OECD Comparative Survey, above n. 88, p. 88 and OECIT), above n. 74, p. 16 and Table 7, p. 44 el
D. \Xtilliams, ’United Kingdom Tax Collection: Rights of and against Taxpayers’ in D. Bentley, above n. 7,
p. 331, p. 339.
For example, see Internal Revenue Code ~7434(a). Discussed hx A. Greenbaum, above n. 89, p. 364.
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Exchange of I~nualion with other Revenue Autho*ilies
Globalisation has resulted in previously unprecedented flows of capital across borders and
mansformation of economies)39 Concomitant xvith these changes has been the increasing
presstlre on national revenue authorities to maintain their tax base and ensure tax
compliance. It is reflected in the wide range of co-operative activities that revenue
authorities noxv undertake. Among these, information exchange is seen as particularly
important. Whereas previously it was used as a means to enst~te that double tax agreements
were properly applied, it is increasingly now found as an important component of a well-
managed domestic compliance program.~4°
The legal basis for the exchange of information is usually fotmd in a mix of domestic
legislation and bilateral and multilateral conventions and agreements. The OECD Mamta/
dO the Implementation of I~tformation Provisions for Tax Proposes (’OECD Manual’) provides an
extensive list of international legal instruments used as a basis for information exchange,m
Probably the fl~ree most xvell used models are Article 26 of tim OECD Model Convention
on Income and on Capital (’OECD Model’), the 2002 OECD Model Agreement on
Exchange of Information on Tax Matters (’OECD Agreement’) and tile Council of
Europe/OECD Convention on Mutual Administralive Assistance in Tax Matters (’Council
of Europe!OECD Convention’)..4~ Infommtion exchange is higlfly sophisticated in
Europe, particularly, for example, tile Nordic Assistance Convention, file EC Directive on
For a colourful description of the transfozmadon, see D. Yergin and J. Stanislaw, The Commmtditg Heights
(New York, Touchstone, 2002).
See, e.g., ATO, Compliance Program 2006-07, above n. 95 and OECD, Manttal on the Implementation of
IofOn~mtion Provisiom Jot" Tax Puqooses: Modtde on Gum’a/and Legal A.5Oects of E:,.cha~ge of It*fom*atiot~ (Paris,
OECD, 2006), p. 4, <www.oecd.org>, 1 November 2006 (’OECD Manual’).
OECD Manual, ibid, p. 5.
All three are available at <www.oecd.org>, 1 November 2006 and the Council of Euscope/OECD
Convention and its ExplanatoD, Report, <conventions.coe.kat>, 1 November 2006. For a useful earl),
survey and discussion, see Conunittee on Fiscal Affairs, Tax Iofommlion Exchattge Between OECD Countries:
A Sun,ey of Cunvnl Practices (Paris, OECD, 1994).
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Mutual Assistance and Council Regtilation 1798/2003 on the administration of the laws on
VAT.m
The Explanatot3, Report to the Council of Europe/OECD Convention, in conmmn
with most such insmmaents, identities as its object, ’to protnote international co-operation
for a better operation of national tax laws, wbile respecting the fundamental rights of
taxpayers’.~4~ It goes on to say that ’The Convention specifically ensures that taxpayers’
tights under nadonal laws are full), safeguarded’,m Given that these instruments have
sigmficant international agreement, they are the appropriate guides to best practice in
taxpayer protection in matters concerning the exchange of infomaafion.
The OECD Manual identifies the main forms of infomaation exchange that take
¯ 146place and these can be surrm~ar~sed as:
exchange of information on request between jtu:isdictions;
automatic exchange of infota~nation, usually in standard format: typically used for
routine transfer of information comprised of multiple individual cases of the same
type, such as dividends, royalties, interest, pensions etc.;
spontaneous exchange of information, where a party obtains infomaation in the
cottrse of administering its own tax laws, wlfich it believes will be of itlterest to a
treaty partner, and passes it on without any request;
exchange of information obtained under a shmfltaneous examination by two or mote
jtmsdictions, each on its own tet~dtory, of one or more taxpayers in which they have a
colnn~on interest;
Directive 77/799 EEC as updated on Direct Taxatio*~ as updated. For a comprehensive discussion of
information exchange in the Em:opean Union, see L.W. Gormley, EU Ta.\’atiotl Law (Riclmmnd,
Ric|maond, 2005), p. 15 elseq.
Council of Ettrope/OECD Convention Explmaatory Report, above n. 142, para. 1.
Ibid., para. 7.
OECD Manual, above n. 140, para. 18-19.
380
Ana~ds of Secondary Lega{ and Admhdstralive ~Ughts
exchange of reformation during an authotised visit by foreign revenue authoriry
officers to gather informatiori in the host ufisdiction, often through participation m
a tax examination; and
exchange of information on an industry-wide level to obtain a broader view of that
industry or econotnic sector as a xvhole.
Different jtmsdictions take different approaches to exchange of information. It is therefore
useful for die Model to take an approacl~ based on general principles. These can then be
adapted to the context of each jurisdiction, the wider framexvork of txiles in wttich
infomaation exchange is based, and the particular types of information exchange ha wttich
the jurisdiction is engaged.
a    Authodsation
Information exchange should be approved at the most senior levels within the revenue
auflmrity)4~ Treat}, obfigafions may require a senior official in the Ministiy of Finance or
Foreign Affairs to be designated as the competent authorit}, to sign off on the exchange of
information. Tiffs does not mean that every exchange of aW infomaation requires approval.
Obviously automatic and some forms of spontaneous information exchange require direct
contact between revenue officers at many levels of the revenue authority. In cases of
automatic exchange, initial authorisadon will govern a substantial quantum of infor-mafion
exchange over a long period, subject only to regular audit and review. In others
authorisation is required on each request, vcqmt is important is that there are clear
pt0cedoxes and guidelines for all exchanges of information once the t3q3e of information
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exchange has been approved at the highest level. The procedures should ensure that
revenue officers automatically escalate matters of particular sensitivity or importance and
that the characteristics of such matters are clearly set out in the guidelines so that they ate
easily recognisable by field officers.
b Scope
Exchange of information is for clearly designated proposes. Although it is iutended in most
agreements that they shottld incorporate a very wide range of infomaadon, it is not
intended that there should be ’speculative requests for mfomaation that have no apparent
nexa~s to an open inquiry or investigation’.14~ "][’his is not applicable to industry-wide
infomaadon exchange, where such arrangements allow revenue authorities to identif),
tt’ends and other factors that \viii enhance its general compliance program. The tema,
’foreseeable relevance’ is commonly used.149 In making a request for reformation, a
requesting jurisdiction should proxdde sufficient relevant reformation to allow the
requested jurisdiction to make a decision on the relevance of the request.
c Guidelines and Pmcedmvs
The OECD Manual provides a number of checklists of information that should be used by
each part), to an infomaation exchange; for example, Modttle 1 on Exchange of I~formatio~ on
Reques! (’OECD Manual: Module 1’) sets out the information that requesting parties should
14s Ibid., p. 9.
149 Used in the OECD Model, art. 26; the OECD Agreement, art. 1; and the Comacil of Europe/OECD
Co**venfion, art. 4, above n. 142.
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il~clude xvitli any request for the exchange of infomlation.~s° The advantage of the
guidelines and checklists set out in tile Manv~l is that they ensure procedural protection of
taxpayers’ tights in accordance with accepted practice under tile majority of international
agreements. Although the protection of taxpayers’ tights is intended under information
exchange agreements, how the protection works during the process of exchange is not
always spelt out. It is therefore appropriate for best practice if revenue authorities ensure
that they either adopt tile OECD Manual or develop their own guidelines that provide
equivale*lt procedures to ensure taxpayer protection, There should be regular audit and
~evimv of the application of procedures and guidelines to ensure proper compliance.
d Equivalent Protection to the Home State
Article 21 of the Cotmcil of Europe/OECD Convention sets out what is meant by tile
requirement that nofl~lg in an agreement or convention should ’affect file fights and
safeguards secured to persons by the laws or administrative practice of the requested state.’
The principle of reciprocity in tiffs counection is fundamental to file protection of
taxpayers’ rights. The principle and its interpretation in Article 21 can be said to represent
accepted international best practice and should therefore be included in the Model.
Article 2l(2) is set out below with ti~e provisions and a parapbxased meaning in italics taken
from file Explanatoi3~ Report providing ’Conmaenta*3’ on file Provisions of the
Convention,.~s*
OECD Manuah Module 1, above n. 140, p. 3.
COUncil of Europe/OECD Convention, above n. 142.
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2     Except in the case of Article 14 (whA’h allows that time limits remain those of the
~querting state), the prmfisions of fl~s Convention sh~ not be cons~ed so as to
~pose on the requested state ~e obfigafion:
a. to caD, out measles at vaiance x~ its own laws or a&~fis~afive practice or
the laws or a&mnis~afive practice of ~e appficant state;
(This t~stti~a" the agreement to powo~- attd pmctices that the pmlies have i~1 common and p~ven# a
state firm usitg indi*~ct~ gre~ter powets in anothetjm#diction than it pos*esses un&r its own law.)
b. to carg, out measures wlfich it considers con~ to pubfic po~q, (or&e pubfic)
or to its essential interests;
(States will not jeopm’dise their own public poliO’ or essential interests, including public secmiO, and
economic interests, to provide assislanee Io another state.)
c. to supply infomaation which is not obtainable under its own laws or its
administrative practice or under %e laws of the applicant state or its admi~tistrative
practice;
(This restricts the suppD’ of infommtion to that obtainable by a state under its own laws and
administration and *~i~tves safeguat~ts sm’h as proteclion of seo~9’, legal professional pffvilege or
similarpdvilege, bank seo~, and otherpmcedut’al fights and safeguaMs. Hor ex’ample, it ~slffcts a
state firm trade*caking a speda/ investigation that it would not undoCake for its own proposes Io
obtain the ittfow*mtion.)
d. to supply information which would disclose any trade, business, industrial,
commercial or professional secret, or trade process, or information the disclosm’e of
which would be contrat3, to public policy (ordre public) or to its essential interests;
(Discussed below.)
e. to provide adnfittistrative assistance if and insofar as it considers the taxation in
the applicant state to be contrary to generalJy accepted taxation principles or to the
provisions of a convention for the avoidance of double taxation, or of any other
convention which the requested state has concluded x*4tta d*e applicant state;
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(This exdusion pmte~rs taxpayets in the event that the requested state considm; for example, that the
app!fi~b/e tax laws in the other state a~a co~flrcatoty or that the pto*ishment for a tax" q~em~ would
be exce*sive.)
to provide assistance if fl~e application of this Convention xvould lead to
discritnination between a national of the requested state and nationals of the applicant
state in the same circumstances.
(This provides pmtectio*t against disoimination and apD/ies to mailers of both subs/a*tce and
Although Article 21 (2) covers the matter of secrecy, it is a controversial area and dese~es
further comment. It is covered by Article 22 of the Council of Europe/OECD
Convention. Before releasing hfformation to another jurisdiction, a revenue authority must
be satisfied that all infozmaation relath~g to a taxpayer will remain confidential, with at least
equivalent protection to that enjoyed in the home jurisdiction.*sz Tiffs is the basic hurdle
d~at must be overcome before an), information exchange can proceed. In addition,
disclosure of the information is restricted to:
persons or authorities (including courts and admhzistrative or supe~4so*T bodie~)
involved in the assessment, collection or recover}, of, the enforcemeut or prosecution
i*~ respect of, or the determination of appeals ha relation to, taxes of that Party.
Oal), these persons or authorities may use the information and then only for the purposes
set out.
For example, OECD Agreement, art. 7, above n. 142.
Council of Eu~ope!OECD Convention, art. 22, above n. 142.
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Secrecy is particularly important for trade, business, h)dustrial, corm~ercial or
profe.ssional secrets or trade processes,ls4 In these cases there is normally no oblfgadon to
provide such infor’rnation under an reformation request, even xvhere the secrecy provisions
m the requesting countZ3’ ate equivalent. Once legal protection is established, the
justification for refusal m provide information is largely concerned with politics and trust.
Tanzi and Zee give the example of the unlikelihood of the US and France exchanging
reformation on the actix~ides of Boeing and Aithus.*ss Where the secreW provisions m the
requesting jurisdiction are adequate and it is other reasons that result in a decline to
exchange information, it is sufficient protection that the refusal to provide mfm’mation
should be restricted to the secrets themselves. It would not apply m financial or similar
information which, although related m the secrets, would reveal nothing about the content
of the secret infurmation.156
In some jtufisdictions, there is a requirement to notify the taxpayer before exchange
of information occt~s.157 Ti~is is probably not widely accepted enough to make it a
recommended right in all instances. However, given the inaportance of trade, business,
industrial, commercial or professional secrets or trade processes, it would be appropriate
xvhere there is a request for information that might affect such secrets or processes to
notif3, the taxpayer before the infomaation is given. Tiffs would then allow the taxpayer to
make application, if desired, as to why the infomxation should not be provided.
Providing notification to the taxpayer in such circumstances would constitute best
practice and is consistent with the nature of the protective clauses inserted into excbange
of inforanation agreements. It is often ot~ly the taxpayer who has the knowledge and
expertise to explain \vhy a secret or process is deserving of particular protection. If no
Ibid.                                                                                         ?’
V. Tat:zi and H.FL Zee, ’Can Information Exchange be Effective in Taxing Cross-Border Income Flows.
in K. Andersson, P. Melz and C. Silfvetbe~g (eds), Liber Amico*~¢m Sven-OlofLoditt (Stoc-ldmlm, Kloxve~
Law Internationa], 20011, p. 259, p. 266.
OECD Manual, above ix. 140, p. 14.
For example, Germany, the UK and the Netherlands have varying degrees of additional pmtec6on.
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reference is made to the taxpayer, the protective clause in an agreement loses some of its
effect.
Articles in exchange of information agreements provide for matters tliat fall outside
the pu~,iew of the Model. Batik secrecy and similar issues shottld be dealt with elsewhere in
tlie domestic law.
B Audit and Invesligalion
1    The Audit Model
Audit and investigation comprise some of tile most controversial exercises of tile revenue
authorities’ powers. Tttis section deals first with file rights of taxpayers ill connection xvith
tax audits, followed by an examination of search and seizure powers. Legal professional
pmdlege and txlles against self-incfimhLalion are discussed in tile context of search and
seizure.
The audit process is an essential tool for managing effective and efficient tax
administration, particttiatly in jurisdictions using self assessment or automated
administrative assessment)ss The focus of file modern audit can be gauged from OECD
documents and tile published compliance models and approaches of revenue authorities.
A twofold aim is: to create an enviromnent that encourages and supports high levels of
For a sun, ey of tim foundational audit research in this area, seeJ. Hasseldine, ’How Do Revenue Audits
Affect Taxpayer Compliance?’ (t993) 47 IBFD Bulletin, 424.
OECD, £1~*glheni~lg Ta~; Audil Capabililies: Genera/ Pffmiple~ a~d Approaches, above n. 10; OECD,
Stre~gihening Ta~ Audil C}tpab~7ilies: Auditor Workfon~ Matmgement, above n. 10; OECD, Sloe,gibe*ring Ta~"
Audit Capabililies: bmovative Approache~ 1o I*~tvve the Effden9, and Eflbctivettess ( [ndim’t Income Measmvment
Methods ~ads, Cerise for Tmx Poficy ~d Ad~s~afion, 2006); and ATO, Cott~/iance Ptvgram 2006 07,
above n. 95.
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vohintaty compliance by strategic use of an audit program;~ and to idenfif3’ areas where
the law is either not operating in accordance with its policy intent or is producing
sig*fificant compliance costs.~6~ The former ensures effective use of resources and the latter
ensures efficient operation of the system, in line with the principles set out in Chapter 3,
Revenue authorities mostly no longer use random auditing. Rather, they undertake
comprehensive risk management analysis to identify the taxpayers or market segments
where there is the greatest risk of non-compliance)62 This alloxvs them to allocate most of
their resources to those areas where the risk of non-compliance is highest, while
maintaining sufficient presence across all taxpayer and market segments to ensure that
taxpayers are aware of them.~63 The ATO, for example, has found that this is a useful
approach.164 For the ATO it works for managing risk and responi~ing quickly to changing
circumstances. For taxpayers, it educates them as the ATO consttlts with taxpayers and
representative bodies to explain in advance the profile of high risk areas and to make clear
what is expected of taxpayers ha the event of an audit)6s
There is a wide range of audit types. The}, vay in scope and intensity.166 Depending
upon the jurisdictional thne lhnits, audits can cover a number of years. Most important in
the exercise of the search and seizure powers of the revenue authority, audits *nay take
place in xvhole or in part in locations including revenue authority offices, taxpayer business
prenfises, taxpayer residentL~l premises and the premises of tlfird parties. This is discussed
in more detail in the following sections.
1@ j. Aim, B.R. Jackson and M McKee, above n. 75.
16t OECD, Sl~gtheni*g Tax Audit Capabi~ilie;: Ge~e~l P~indp/e.r a*M App~mhes, above n. 10, p. 8 and ATO,
Co,~pliance Program 200607, above n. 95.
~62 For example, see the research undertaken by the IRS, some of wlfich is described in K.M. Bloomqulst,
above n. 83. T!ffs includes the development of compliance research in controlled laboratoq’
enviromnents: see J. ~adm, B.R. Jackson and M. McKee, ’The Effects of Communication among
Taxpayers on Compliance’, Publication 1500 (2004) IRS IL*sea,rh Bulleli& 37, <xmwv.irs.gov>, 1 October
2006. Fttrther, J. Slemrod (ed.), Why People Pay Taxes: Tax Co~,~pliance and E~rcement (A~m Arbor,
Universiiy of Miclfigan Press, 1992).
163 ATO, Co,t~pliance Program 2006-07, above n. 95.
*~q Ibid.
165 Ibid.
166 OECD, Sl~r*glhetff~g "Fax’A~dit Capabigilies: GeneraIPdndple.r aMAppmaches, above n. ! 0, pp. 9-11.
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In ekamining the best practice approaches to revenue audits and investigations, the
modem compliance model heady distinguishes between the two main approaches diat
revetlue authorities take and the consequent rights that a taxpayer needs for protection. Fbr
taxpayers who want to comply, but xvho may make ignorant or careless mistakes, the aim
of the audit is generally to edtlcate them and to help them to hnprove their voluntary
compliance,ls~ For non-complying taxpayers who are either intentionally avoiding or
evading tax, die audit is a sta’ong enforcement tnechanism.16~
There is a gradation of rights flat should be afforded to taxpayers going through the
audit and investigation process. Where auditors are engaging with taxpayers to encot~cage
voluntat3, compliance and instil confidence hi the system, most of the lower level rights will
fom~ part of the good practices of an}, revenue authority. As an audit or investigation
becomes more serious, the rights become more concerned with ensuth~g due process and
natural jusdce. Thuronyi notes an inaportant difference in audit procedure between
common law and cixdl law country audits)69 Whereas the procedt~tes in cotmnon law
countries are fairly informal, those in civil law cotmtties tend to be set out formally and in
detail.~v°
A review of flIe rights in the different jurisdictions does not produce sigtfificant
differences hi their content. It is rather the means of enforcement that differs. Informal
procedures contained in a revenue manual or audit guideline ate likely to be primary or
secondary adininisttative rights. Formal procedures set out in legislation ate secondary legal
tights, often supported by secondary admLqistrative rights that provide die administrative
ATO, Campliance Program 2006~7, above n. 95; OECD, Sh*ttgthe~d~g Tax Audil Capabih?ies: Gom~l Pth~dples
andAppmaches, ibid., p. 8; and National Tax Agency, above n. 70, p. 42.
Ibid. See also, K.M. Bloomquist, ’Multi~gem Based Simulation of the Deterrent Effects of Taxpayer
Audits’, h~ National Tax Association, above n. 83, p. 159.
V Thuronyi, Comparative TaxLaw (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2003), p. 213.
Ibid, pp. 2"i3-214. See further, C. Daiber, above n. 7, pp. 18’I-185. K. Isbimt~ra, above n. 113, p. 237,
notes that Japan conducts rmme~ous voltmtary audits, \vlfich are more informal and seen as a form of
administrative guidance.
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process to implement the legal rights. Or~ce again, tl~e rights are usually shafilar, but the
content and form differs according to the jurisdictional context.
For many jurisdictions, a sophisticated compfiance model is simply beyond their
capabilities.~71 The rights set out below are not tied to a particular compliance approach.
However, the detailed content and extent of indix~idual rights will grow as a revenue
authoritT develops additional resources. Most are closely aligned to the improvement of
voluntatT compliance and form a logical part of any procedures implementing a
compliance program.
One of the most important issues facing revenue authorities is the capacity of their
staff to perform audits at the required level.~72 To do tl~s in a developing country there are
several prelhninatT issues that must be dealt with, whicb have to be assumed for the Model.
Yet, they go to the heart of an ability to implement the Model. If tax auditors are not paid
enough and are coming into direct contact with taxpayers, the temptation to accept bribes
and to pttrsue other corrupt practices is significant)73 Tax payments should be made
tl~ough banks and not clkectly to revenue officers; auditors need sufficient trairfing; they
need to understand the *~ale of law applicable in their jurisdiction; and they need to
understand the principles of good tax adnfinisttation outl~ed above.I74 The audit process is
often the litmus test of whether a tax administration has reached the level of matufit3T to
begin implementing taxpayers’ *~ights. If the system is inherently arbitrat3, and corrupt, as
discussed in Chapter 7, respect for the rule of law needs to be established before taxpayers’
rights can have aW meaning.
1~1Discussed m the context of ~emedial tneasares in OECD, Sttvttglhet~itg Tax" Audit Capabililies: Audttor
WorkJbn~ Management- Stm~q), Fit~dittgs at~d Obsen~aliotts, above n. 10.
172 Ibid.
193R.M. Bird, above n. 1, p. 141.
*v~Ibid and see C. Grandcolas, above n. 97.
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The Audit Process
Flowing from the reqrfirement for legal certainty and the provision of a legal basis for tile
exercise of adininistrative discretion, it is important that there should be a legal framework
providing the provers to conduct audits and to impose sanctions.*vs The legal basis for the
exercise of powers of tax administration is discussed in Chapter 7. Suffice to say, there is
benefit in being specific in identif3~ing the audit and investigation powers in legislation, as
oflaerwise there is a degree of uncertainty, which invites taxpayers to seek judicial
clarification. If file uncertainty is intended by the executive, there is a danger that the
powers will be exercised arbitrarily.
The advantage of set~aag out clearly tile legal framework for audit and investigation is
to overcome challenges that may occur on the basis of discrknination or that the scope of
an audit is too wide (fishing expeditions). Taxpayers wRl always try to invoke rights to
attack legislation that may seem to offer support for their position. Hoxvever, the lfistory of
such actions on these gronnds to restrict audit powers properly exercised is not strong.
Nonetiaetess, the general p~nciple of proportionality, and the requirement that discretion
must be exercised hi a way tila{ is appropriate and necessat3’ to acbieve the objectives
legil~nately pursued, should apply. Tbey wfil place limits on the infomaation that the
taxpayer has to provide, the time and resot~tces that the taxpayer should be expected to
invest in the audit, and the scope of the audit m file taxpa}er s par~cular circumstances. It
would not be approptqate, for example, for a revenue authoritT to hnpose requirements that
would seriously impede the taxpa) er s ability to can3, on its business, without good reason.
In the context of file legality of an audit, it is important to note the protection
provided by the requirement that the revenue authority should be autonomous, discussed
tvs OECD, S t~*t~glhet*ittg TaxAudit Capabilitie*: Gene~u/Ptit~eiples a~dApproaches, above n. 10, p. 12.176 See the flavou* of ECJ decisimxs’in M. Lang (ed.), Ditvct Taxaliott: Recent ECJ Developmettls (Tile Hague,
Kluwer Law Intemafiona!, 2003), and Canadian Charter decisions in J. Li, above ~. 121.
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in Chapter 7}77 The US reinforces this autonomy in the context of tax audits and
investigations, by making it an offence for a member of the Executhm to interfere,
including a prohibition on requesting that an audit be cotmnenced or terminated.~vs The
provision also requires the IRS official approached to report the matter to d~e Chief
Inspector of the IRS. Other laws will normally prevent this type of interference in dm
activities of the revenue authority. However, where they do not, this is a reconWaended
right to protect both taxpayers and revenue officers.
The revenue audmrity will prepare for an}, audit and will take full advantage, where
necessary of the record keeping obligations contained in the relevant tax rules,t~ It will also
use the information gathering powers discussed above. The informarion gathering powers
are somefmes used outside the formal audit process. Where this occurs, similar tights
should be afforded to a taxpayer. This xvill be particularly relevant xvhere a taxpayer is
required to attend an inteta4e\v to provide information and evidence. The rights set out
below would usuallj apply both to an audit and a formal intera, iew of this kind. Once dm
revenue officer(s) concerned are read}, to begin the audit, there are a number of procedures
that should be followed in an}’ audit:tS°
The revenue authority should have a clear set of guidelines for its staff, setting out
procedures to ensure consistent appficadon of delegated authorit3’, standards
developed for audits, audit policies, audit procedures, and how and by whom
interpretation of the law applicable to the audit xvill be carried out)st Under best
practice guide~nes, ’Audit policies and procedures should be based on pr4nciptes of
See die concerns raised hi Soudl Korea, in J.K. H~mn, above n. 31, p. 345.
Internal Revemm Code ~7217. Discussed in A. Greenbaum, above n. 89, p. 368.
O ECD, S lt~gthem)tg "Fax’Audit Capabilities: Ge~m’al Ptindples and Approaches, above n. 10, pp. 13-14.
See, e.g., ATO, Audit Proms, and Taxpayers’ Chatter: Explanaton, Booklet 10, I.fyou’re subject to enquio’ or
attdit, <w~v.ato.gov.au>, 1 November 2006; IRS, Inlovtal ~evenue Marina/ <x~amv.irs.gov/irm>, l
November 2006; and tim German Fiscal Code, AbgabetmMmog. Some of flxe issues are taken from the
ATO response to K. Burges, Reporl on the Cbncerm of a Nttmber of lhe Largesl CompaMe* in the LaW Busit~e.,s
Segmo*t, with ATO Audil, It, vestigation, and Adt&e Procedure (2005), <\~v.ato.gov.au>, 1 November 2006.
OECD, Stt~@thetdt~g Tax Audit Capabililies: General Ptindp/es aM Approaches, above n. 10, p. 22.
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accuracy, efficiency, fairness, objectivity, transparency, completeness, consistency and
defensibilit3,’.182 There should be separate guldelhaes for activities specifically
authorised by law, to ensure that the legal requirements are met. For example, the
ATO has a formal access manual to cover the application of the section of the law
alloxving the ATO access to tarot’marion.
Audit guidelines should provide for conflict of interest, where for example an auditor
knows the taxpayer in some capacity)s3
A reco~ranended right is that the revenue authority should not conduct an audit on a
non-business taxpayer for two yeats in a row where there were no additional taxes
payable after the first audit.~sa
Taxpayers should be given prior notification of an audit, with brief details of the
expected nature, scope and duration of the audit, the information and records that
will be required, and the names and contact details of the revenue officers managing
the audit.
Taxpayers should be given the opporttmity to request postponement of the audit if
they have good reasons.
Tax auditors should alxvays clearly identi~, themselves, particularly where there is any
risk of confusion, for example during a significant audit camed out over a long
period of time and involxfing many revenue officers working at a taxpayer’s prenfises.
Before the commencement of the audit the audit process should be explained clearly
and simply. The taxpayer should be given the opportunity at this ~ne to ask for
clarification and answers to questions, although this should not be seen as an
opportunity to delay or l~inder the audit. Explanations should include in some detail:
why the taxpayer is being audited; the types of taxes and the relevant years; the
Ibid., p. 33.
Ibid., p. 24.
Ibid.
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information and records that will be required; full details of how the audit will
proceed and relevant fimeframes for the audit. If there is benefit to the tax-payer in
making voluntat3, disclosure, for example a reduced level of penalty, tiffs should also
be explahaed at the begim~ing of the audit.
Explanation of the audit process should include: the rights and duties of the taxpayer
din’Jag an audit, the settlement practices of the revenue authorities and the avenues
for objection and appeal against assessments arising out of the audit.
Taxpayers should be advised of their right to have professional representation dm~ing
the audit.*ss Professional advisers can slow the conduct of an audit, as flaey attempt to
protect their client’s interests, but this should not preclude their involvement. The
right encompasses la\wers and other tax specialists. It is a common problem that
lawyers do not always have the necessat3, tax expertise to provide appropriate
representation, xvlfich means that taxpayers should have the right to representation
by a tax specialist.186
An audit sbould not interfere unreasonably xvith the proper t3ma~lg of a tax-payer’s
business or cause it to suffer conmaercial loss as a direct result of the audit activity.
Mee~gs or interwiews should take place, where possible, at mutoally convenient
t~nes. Audits should usually take pl~ce in normal business hottrs unless otherwise
agreed.
Taxpayers should be given a reasonable thne to collect information required unless
search and seizt~te powers are exercised because the integrity or existence of
documents is at risk)~v
Tax-payers should bare the right to take notes of any conversations or interviews.
N.E. Olseta, above n. 81, p. 1244.
See the discussion in C. Geppaart, ’Thresholds for Access to d~e Tax Court’, in D. Albregtse and l-L Van
Arendonk, Taxpa3’erPmtection in the Eut~pea~t Union (London, Kluwer Lax,., International, 1998), p. 35, p. 41.
ATO, Taxpayers’ Charter: ExplanatoD, Booklet 10, !fy0u’~r subject to euqui*y oraudit, above n. 180, p. 5.
Ibid.
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Taxpayers should have the fight to request the recording of all audit interviews and
be given a copy of the recordil~g at the conclusion of the interview}s~ Recorded audit
iutet~dews can prevent subsequent disputes over what has been said or agreed
between tile parties.
Durhlg the audit the taxpayer should be given the opportunity to discuss matters
arising in the audit with die tax auditor. There should be discussion of the final issues
arising out of the audit that will affect any assessment raised as a result of the audit,
including disputed facts and their legal consequences. In the discussion, reasons
should be given for adjustments, and opportunity should be given for the taxpayer to
explain the circumstances that might justify a ~eduction of penalties or interest.~w
The outcome should be documented and provided to the taxpayer in wfifng witltin a
reasonable time, together with any rights of remew and remedies that may be
available to the taxpayer.I°t
Iu some audits, there can be negotiations to settle the outcome of the audit where
these are petTnitted by law.192 Negotiations should take place ha the context of
proper, fair and consistently applied settlement processes, recognised by law. The
terms of any settlement agreement should be documented and the taxp~iyer provided
with a copy.
Taxpayers should normally be advised as ear]5, as possible of an intention to seek
prosecution as a result of an audit so that rules of crm~nal proce&tte may apply.
Ibid. See also, Internal Revenue Code ~7520. Discussed m A. Greenbaum, above n. 89, p. 350.
ATO, Taxpayers’ Charter: Explanatory Booklet 10, If)’ou’~ subjecl to e*lqtd*y or audit, above n. 180, p. 7.
N.E. Olsen, above n. 81, p. 1251.
See, e.g., ATO, Code of Selllemen! Practice, <www.ato.gov.an>, 1 November 2006. The Australian courts
have accepted a ’good management role’, wlfich allows settlements that are ’sensible and objectively
iuslifiable in terms of good management and administration’, para. 2.1.2. See G,vJ~m P~), L/d v. FCT (1997)
36 ATR 493 and Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cfl0, s. 44. The Australian position
is analysed comprehensively in L.J. P6estley QC, ’Commissioner’s Powers of Settlement and
Compromise’ (2002) 12 Revenue kalvJom~tal, 40, including an analysis of the UK cases of Inland R~ve,me
Commissionet~ t,. 1Nra/ioIta/ Fede~lion of stir-Employed and Small Bminess Lid [1982] AC 617 and Aii Fa3’ed v.
Advocate General [2002] ScotCS 349.
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3 Sea*rh and Seizm~
Search and seizt~e powers are usually used in the context of reformation gathering leading
to or during tax audits, shQuld be subject to strict lm~its, and should be used as a last
resort.1~3 However, given that revenue authorities rely on taxpayers to provide the
information to assess the correct amount of tax, m certain circumstances search and seizure
powers ate necessary to obtain die information required to make the assessment,t~4 There
is scope for abuse of these powers. They have therefore been the subject of controversy in
many jurisdictions.
Tile 2006 OECD Comparative Sm’vey sho\ved that all of the revenue authorities
sm’veyed had powers to obtain relevant infot~nafion from.taxpayers and third patdes..9~
Most had broad access powers to taxpayers’ business premises and dwellings to obtain the
hlfotanation needed to verify or establish tax liabilities; if necessary by seizing those
documents,tg* The point of contention is often whether a revenue officer should have to
obtain a warrant before gaining access to premises. In almost two-thirds of countries
sure,eyed a search warrant xvas reqttired to enter a taxpayer’s dwelling for any purpose.
Hoxvever, only approximately one fllird of couut~es sutamyed required a search warrant to
enter business premises and about one half of the countxies required a wa~ant to seize
taxpayers’ documentsffs
To understand why a warrant should or should not be required, the Canadian and
South African examples are instructive. In Canada the tight to privacy is guaranteed by
section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Li notes that the original search
1~3 l~uropean Convention on Human Rigbts, art. 8. Reference can also be made the International Covenant
on Ci,41 and Political Rights, art. 17, dealing wifli privacy tights.19, M. McLennan, above n. 68, p. 34 el seq.
~gs 2006 OECD Comparative Sut~,ey, above n. 88, pp. 83 84 and pp. 88 90. See for detail on additional
countries, A. Greenbaum, ’Tmx Admitfisnation: A Comparative Look at Information Gathe0ng Powers’
in C. Evans and A. Gteenbaum, above n. 25, p. 315.
19~ Ibid., p. 84 and pp. 88-90.
,9~ Ibid.
19s Ibid.
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a~d seizure powers xvere exerdsable if the b!finister believed that they xvere ’necessar2¢ for
any purpose related to the adininistri~tion and enforcement of the Act’.199 This is similar to
the previous powers of the Commissioner for Inland Revenue in South Africa, and the
e:dsting powers of the Australian Commissioner of Taxation.z°° In Canada, reasonable and
probable cause was introduced in 1972 as an added requb:ement and application to the
co~t for a search wa~ant bad fo be supported by evidence under oath.~°1 It xvas
nonetheless found to violate section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the 1980s
so that in 1986 and again in 1994 further atnendtnents were introduced to overcome legal
impediments reader secdon 8 to valid search and seizuxe.~°x Section 231 of the Income Tax
Act provides that there must be a warrant; the judge must have judicial discretion ha
granting the xvarrant; there must be reasonable grounds to believe that a docmnent or thing
that may afford evidence of an offence is likely to be found; and d~e document or thing is
likely to be found in the building, receptacle or place specified in the application.=°3
There were a number of distinctions drawn ha the corttts’ consideration of privacy
and die requirement for a warrant. Privacy for a personal residence, which reqtfi*ed a
warrant for audit purposes, was seen as more ituportant than for business premises, xvhich
did not; and the expectation of privacy for business records was assessed as relatively
low.~°~ However, dm exercise of cmninal investigative powers does reqttire a search
warrant.20s
In South Aft{ca, Section 14 of the Constitution provides an extensive right to
privacy. The search and seizure provisions of the Income Tax Act were amended to take
J. Li, above n. 121, p. 109.
South African Income Tax Act no. 58 of 1962, s. 74(3); and the Australian Income Tax Assessment Act
1936 (Cth), ss 263 and 264
j. Li, above n. 121, p.109.
Ibid., p. 110.
Ibid., pp. 109 110.
Ibid., p. 110.
Ibid.
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account of die ne\v constitutional requirements in 1996.2°6 The courts, in considering a
shnilar provision, retied heaxdly on the Canadian cases.2°7 They accepted the lh~fitation on
the constitutional right to privacy for search and seizure in a case similar to taxation, but
followed die Canadian requirement for a war~ant requiring judicial discretion.2°~
International and national human rights instruments have growing application. They
ahaaost invariably include a right to privacy. It is accepted that ~earch and seizure fox tax
matters should limit flaat right.~°9 There is not a general consensus that a warrant is required
to search business premises or to seize business records. However, a majorit3’ of developed
tax systems do require a war~ant for search of private dwellings and the seizure of personal
records and documents. A warrant is almost universally required for ct%ninal investigations
involving search and seizure. The Model should therefore reflect these practices.
~ghen applying for a warrant, there are usually reqtfirements for reasonableness and
pmporfionallt3,.~° That requirement will be fulfilled if the magistrate or other judicial
officer is satisfied that the revenue officer making application for the warrant has exercised
her or his discretion in accordance widl Article 6 of the Model. Article 6 of the Model
applies also to exercise of search and seizttre provers in ~elation to business premises and
business records where a warrant is not required.
Normally, the powers of search and seizure are widely drawn to encompass random
audits and information gathe~g from taxpayers and third parties. This can be justified on
the basis fl~at the more draconian powers are normally only used where the risks to revenue
~06 Discussed m B. Croome, above n. 72.
207 D.A. Park-Ross v. The Ditvcto~; Qffice for the bwestigalion of Soious Economic Qffettces 1995 (2) SA 198 (C).
Discussed in R.C. Williams, ’Taxpayers’ Rights in Soutb Africa’ in D. Bentley, above n. 7, p. 282.
~0s R.C. \’(rRIJams, above n. 207, pp. 292-294.
20~ A. Hultqvist, ’Taxpayers’ Rigbts in Sweden’ in D. Bentley, above n. 7, p. 298 discusses dae rationale ha
more detail, p. 302 el seq.
~u) For example, Internal Revenue Code ~7605.
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are greatest and access to information is hardest to acquke.21. Hoxvever, the powers should
be used for their proper pttrpose.212
There are additional rights associated with exercise of poxvers of search and seizure.
Ut~ess the revenue authority believes that there is reasonable cause why it would lfinder the
propose of the search, the taxpayer should be informed prior to the search taking place.
Searches should take place during normal business hours or by appointment, unless file
ckctm~stances are exceptional. Taxpayer should nom~ally be invited to attend during the
search together with a representative. Opportunit3, should always be given to claim
privilege on documents (discussed below).
Tax authorities bave file right to seize information dlucing an authotised search.~13
This would include computer disks and doxvnloading computerised and other electronically
stored data. Taxpayers would nomaally have a dug, to translate or interpret infomlation in a
different language or form from the official language of file jurisdiction. However,
taxpayers would have file right to a detailed receipt for anytlfing taken, and an indication of
when it would be returned. The taxpayer should also be able to insist that the tax authority
copy the information, rather than taking an original, unless file original is crucial to file
investigation, xvhen the taxpayer should be per-ruStled to make a copy before file
mfor~nation is taken. There are numerous situations that a revenue officer nfight face in
enforcing access powers. It is therefore important for both revenue officers and t~xpayers
that the revenue authority publish guidelines on hoxv access powers involving access to
premises, searches and seiztrce of information will take place, together xvith details of the
fights and obligations of taxpayers.2~4
D.R. Tillingliast, above n. 109, p. 38. See also, Irish Revenue Comnfissioners, Statement of Practice, SP
GEN/1/94 (Revised 2006), ’Revenue Powers Exercised h~ Places Other than at a Revenue Office’,
<\vww.revenue.ie>, ! November 2006.
Discussed m dm l~ading Australian case of I~td~sl~ialEqui~ Lad v. DFC oft (1990) 170 CLR 649.
For example, the Malaysian Income Tax Act 1967, s. 80, and of the Singapore Income Tax Act, s. 65B.
For example, ATO, Access Manual, <w,vw.ato.gov.au>, l November 2006.
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4 RepmentatioJl and Pffvi/ege
It is generally aclmowledged that taxpayers have the fight to representation in tax matters.
It flows from the principle of adnainistrative fairness (discussed above) and forms part of
the fight to make representation, which is often through a specialist adxdser.2ts Compliance
with complex tax laws is difficult. Failure to comply may lead to cfiminal sanctions. In
most countries, revenue authorities rely on tax specialists to represent and assist taxpayers
to meet thek tax obligations,m6 In many jurisdictions, representation in tax matters is often
by non-legal tax specialists.2t7 Accordingly, in any fortnal dealing with a revenue authotit3,
,
taxpayers should be advised of their tight to representation by a tax specialist and be given
reasonable opportunit3~ to seek it. Revenue authofit3, procedt~tes should not attempt to
circumveut fllis fight, for example, by asking for pfivate inter~,iews without a representative
being present, or by intimaling to the taxpayer that there might be a more favourable
outcome if dm taxpayer does not ask to be represented.
Certain information in most jmqsdicfions is protected as professionally pfivileged or
secret.2t~ Usually in both common and civil law jurisdictions it is based on the concept that
certain communication between an individual and their confidential adviser should remain
secret. In civil law jurisdictions dais often extends to priests and medical practtttoners. In
M. McLem~an, above n. 68, p. 45.
Discussed in V. Thuron}d and F. Vanistendael, ’Regttlation of Tax Professionals’ in V. Thuron3d (ed.),
above n. 68, p. 135 and in V. Thuronyi, above n. 169, p. 228.
V. Tlmronyi and lv. Vanistendael, ibid., p. 142 discuss tim reladonslfip between legal and nondegal tax
advisers.
Ibid., p. 146. See, J, Fisb, Regtt/aled Legal Pt~fissiotm/s attd Professio~lal Privilege tvithilt the Etn~peatt Unio& the
Em’opean Economic Area aM SwitZerland, and cettah* otlm" Em~peatt fmisdl?lio**s (Brussels, Com~cil of fl~e Bars
and Law Societies of fl~e European Union, 2004) and ’Privilege: A World Tour’ (December 2004/Januat3"
2005) Global COlt/He/26, <xwvw.practicallaw.com>, 1 November 2006.
For example, see C. Daiber, above n. 7, p. 173 and R.A. Sommethalder and E.B. Pedder, ’Protection of
Taxpayers’ Rights hi The Nefliedands’ in D. Bentley, above n. 7, p. 310, p. 314.
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common law jurisdictions, it is inextricably bound up in the adversarial system,a°
p~ofessionally p~vileged or secret liiformation is generally designed to protect:
Confidential communications bet~veen a lawyer and client, confidential
cotrmaunications between a laxwer and third paxdes when they axe made for the
benefit of a cfient, and confidential material tbat records the work of a lawyer carried
out for the benefit of a client unless tim client has consented to the disclosure¯
pri~dleged professional information means that the revenue authority is not endded to d~e
information contained in the documents covered. Tim basis for pl:ivilege is found in the
confidential natttre of advice given by lawyers and oilier privileged persons. It is seen as
fundamental to the freedom of die individual.
The effective operation of the law and the legal system relies on lawyers being able to
ad~fise their clients as to the correct operation of die law. Such advice is based on a full and
frank disclosttte of the facts of" each case.z= If- clients suspect that any information that they
give might be revealed to a fllird part3~
, 
the}, are unlikely to proxdde the necessarT
infomradon and the system breaks down. Advice is given on die basis of incomplete
information, and there is a strong risk that the taxpayer would act unlawfully.
Depending upon the jurisdiction, fire restrictions on privileged information will
differ. For example, it has long been lield in the US that the information that is privileged
must be for the purpose of confidential cotlmmnication to die attorney, who must be
It is seen as tmderphming the administration of common law justice, per Lord Brougham LC, in Gtaenough
v. Gaskdll My. & K. 103, 39 E.R. 621.
McH,agh j in the Australian lqdgh Cmtri in Commissiotm" for Aus/mlia~t Federal Police t,. PtvpoM Fittattce P~, LJd
(1997) 188 CLR 501, p. 350.
Set out, e.g., in the Australian cases of Gratttv. Dowtts (1976) 135 CLR 674 and Baker v. Campbell (1983)
153 CLR 52; in Canada, So/onsky v. Catmda (1979) 105 DLR (3d) 745, pp. 755-757; in German),, die
German Fiscal Code, Abgabotordmog, s. 102(1); in New Zealand, Commissioner q[ IMattd Revetme v. We.rt-
IVa/ker[1954] NZLR 191, p. 219; and in the US, Fishery. United Slates 425 US 391, p. 403 (1976).
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acting as an attorney,z~ It is important to taxpayers, however, that wifllin the fmtnework of
the legal system in xvhich they reside, there is die protection of professionally prixdleged or
secret in foz’madon.
The rationale for privilege means that there is logic in extending it to all professionals
giving advice on the interpretation and application of the tax tXlleS.224 The interest of the
cormnunit3, in having effective representation by specialist tax advisers out~veighs the
disadvantages that arise from keeping such advice confidential. In many jurisdictions,
accountants or their equivalent have taken over much of the traditional role of laxwers and
advise on all aspects of the tax rules. They can sometime represent their clients in revenue
tribunals or cotters. It makes sense for privilege to extend to clients of these advisers where
the advisers have a role to which privilege would attach if the role were undertaken by a
laxwer. The issue does not appear to be as divisive in civil law jmisdicdons, where the basis
of privilege is not linked so closely to representation in court proceedings.=s
MaW common law jurisdictions have become more open to extending pdxdlege to
non-lawyers providhig tax advice.22a The US and New Zealand have both legislated
extension of privilege to comtnunicadons betxveen taxpayers and tax practitioners,a~
Australia has had a long histoty of providing administrative extension of privilege to
accountants,z~ It is becoming more widely accepted d~at clients of tax practitioners, who
are exercising the adi,isoU role once don~nated by laxwers, should be given the same
This does not include financial accounts given to a In\wet to complete a tax return, see Co/tou t,. Uttiled
Slates, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962) and it affects tax attorneys with wide-ranging tmx practices, see C.
Brooks, ’A Double-Edged Sword Cuts Both Ways: How Clients of Dual Capacity Legal Practitioners
Often Lose Tbeir Exddenfia~3, Pd~41ege’ (2004) 35 Te:~’a~ Tech Law Review, 1069.
R. Fisher, ’Confidential Tax Commtmicadon: A Riglu or a Prixdlege?’ (2005) 20 Auslralian Tax Forum, 555.
For example, in Gem~any: fl~e German Fiscal Code, Abgabenotdm#g, s. 102(1); and ~mder Swedish law: see
A. Hultqvist, above n. 209, p. 302. Compare The Netherlands, where tax cons~tltants are ~ven
administrative pfixdlege only: see R.A. Sommethalder and E.B. Pechler, above n. 219, p. 314.
R.R. Oliva, ’The CPA-Client Pri~41ege tmder IRC ~7525: The Elusive Definition of "Tax Adxdce"’ 2004
(2) Jourt~al of Legal "l’ax Resean-h, 103, discussing die US position; and K. Kendall, "Prospects for a Tmx
Advisors’ P~ixflege in Australia’ (2005) 1 Jom~tal of the Auslmlasia*~ Tax Teachers Assodalio& 46, compa~g
the posidon in Australia, fl~e US and New Zealand.
Internal Revenue Code ~7525 (US) and "lax Admimstration Act 1994, s. 20 (New Zealand). See the
discussion in R. Fisher, above n. 224.
ATO, Access aM I~formatio** Gathetitg k4amtal and A TO, Guiddit~es to Accessi~tg Ptvfessiotta/Accototti~tg Adviso~x’
Papers <www.ato.gov.au>, 1 October 2006, discussed h* K. Kendall, above n. 226.
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prixdlege as they would receive had the advice been given by a lawyer. Given the
discrepancy in approach between jttrisdiction~, it is approp~Late to recoima~end dais tight in
tl*e Modal as an example of best practice.
To the extent tl~at privilege may be claimed on coummnications relating to tax
matters, taxpayers should always be given the opportunit3, to claim that pt]vilege.
Otherxvise, the basic rights of the taxpayer may be undeta’nined by administrative process.2~9
5 P~ivilege against SelJ:inc~imi~ation
The European Court of Human Rights has consistently upheld the privilege against self-
incrimination, w!fich incorporates the right of silence and the tight not to be compelled to
produce inculpating evidence.~3° In Heaney and McGui,~ess v. Itv/andTM it was fmmd to be a
generally recognised international standard, essential to a fak legal procedure:xs2
It protects the accused against improper compulsion by d~e authorities, thus reducing
dm risk of miscarriages of jusdce and embodying dm equalit3, of arms principle. The
prosecution must prove its case wiflmut resort to evidence obtained darough coercion
or oppression.
Can dais extend to investigations of tax matters where diere are no crmainal proceedings
pending? Where most revenue authorities have extensive powers enabling diem to require
taxpayers to produce information and to answer questions, should the privilege against self
incrinainadon apply?
Discussed extensively in the Austxali,~m case of FC ofT ¢5~ Ors. v. C??ibattk Ltd (1988) 83 ALR 144 and FC
ofT & 0~. v. Ciliba**k Ltd (1989) 20 FCR 403.
Commission of tl~e Euncopea~ Communities, Gt~en Papetr The P~gttmplio~ ofIttnocet~ce COM(2006) 174 final,
pp. 7 8.
Case No. 34720/97 (21 Decembe~ 2000).
Commission of tl,e Emcope~m Co*rm~umties, above n. 230, p. 7.
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The European Cou~t of Human Rights has ex~plored the concept of a fair trial
included in Ardcle 6 ECHR. The right to procedural equality, (known as the equality of
arms) is seen as implicit in the concept,z~3 This includes the p~5vilege against self-
incl:iminadon.TM The privilege has been extended by the European Court to cover not only
crim~al but also civil proceedings, xvhere the latter deal w-ith adn~tistrative tax penalties or
Saunders v. UMted Ki*tgdom~6 shoxvs file particular relevance of the privilege to the
power given to revenue authorities to reqtfire the provision of infomaation and to question
taxpayers before any charge is made or penalties imposed. Smear provisions reader section
434(1) of die UK Companies Act 1985 xvere used to request information relevant to an
investigation and to reqnixe Mr Saunders to appear before the investigators to answer
questions, before any charges were laid. In later proceedings, tire information obtained
from iX~c Satmders was used to refute what he said in his trial,a37 The European Court of
Human Rights held it inapprop~date that there had been legal compulsion to give evidence
that was later used to incriminate Mr Saunders.~8 It found that:TM
The transcripts of the applicant’s ans\vers, xvhether directly self-incriminating or not,
were used in the course of the proceeding~ in a manner which sought to incrhninate
fl~e applicaut.
See generally, S.N. Fronlmel, ’The Etucopean Cotuct of Human Rights and the Right of the Accused to
Remain Silent: Can It be Invoked by Taxpayers?’ (1993) 7 Tax Notes I**tematiottal, 1245 and S. N. Frommel,
’Tbe Right of Taxpayers to Remain Silent Under the European Convention on Human Rights’ in D.
Albregtse and H. Van Arendot~k, above n 186, p. 81. Noted specifically in Bo*ge*s v. Belgim*~, judgment of
30 October 1991, Series A, vol. 214-B.
Fmtkev. F~ance, judgmant of 25 Febmat3, 1993, Sedes A, vol. 256A.
S.N. Fronmael, ’The Right of Taxpayers to Remain Silent Under the European Convention on Human
Rights’, above n. 233, p. 82 and see P. Baker, ’Taxation and the Emcopean Convention on Human Rights’
[2000] Bdlish Tax Review, 211, p. 243.
(1997) 23 EHRR 313.
Discussed in S.N. Frormnel, "The Right of Taxpayers to Remakt Silent Under tbe European Convention
on Human Rights’, above n. 233, pp. 83 85.
Ibid., p. 85.
Ibid., and Sau~tde~a v. UmtedK~tgdom, abme n. 236, pat’a. 72.
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Frotmnel contrasts the extent of file European fight to silence with file narroxver privilege
against self incrimination in the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution, which does not
extend to the contents of subpoenaed business records or to legal persons.~4° He notes that
the fight to remain silent in European laxv extends beyond ct~tninal proceedings or
potential criminal proceedings to any proceeding that could lead to the imposition of
penalties or fines by tax authofities.241 Tiffs is not the case in many }ufisdictions.z4z
lloxvever, given file moral force of file European Court of Human Rights, this shotild at
least be a recommended fight in tiae Model.
IV ASSESSMENT
Self-assessment has become the main form of assessment; and xvhere administrative
assessment is used, it is largely automated,a4~ This is consistent with the principles of
efficiency and effectiveness. For taxpayers in any form of assessment system, as noted in
Chapter 3, it is important also to have as much certainty as complex tax systems allow.
Taxpayefs (and revenue authofities) need to anticipate in advance tim tax consequences of
a transaction, including knowhag \vhen, where and how the tax is to be accounted.
In flae interests of both certainty and fairness, it is important that as much
information about tile tax assessment process is published. That is why it ~vas suggested
above that the Mode! should require revenue authorities:
to publish tax roles;
S.N. Frommel, ’The Right of Taxpayers to Remain Silent Under the European Convention on Hmnan
Rights’, above n. 233, p. 92.
Ibid., p. 93.
P. Baker and A.-M. Groenbagen, The Protection oJTaxT~ayets Rights - At~ l~tet~talio~mi Codification (London,
European Financial Foram, 2001) p. 50.
2006 OECD Comparative Sutwey, above n. 88, p. 57 and the "Fables on p. 69 etseq.
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to publish and disseminate a wide range of information in an appropriate form to
assist taxpayers in understanding and complying x*dth dick full range of obligations;
and
to undertake a specific program of conwnmtit3, education to develop and reinforce an
understanding of the importance to the communit3, of the tax system and compliance
with the obligations imposed by it.
Advance rulings represent a practical and mostly effective response to taxpayers’ requests
for clearer information on xvhat are the revenue authority xdews on tax matters.
A Advance Rulings
Revenue authorities increasingly use advance ,xdings to aid certainty and predictability and
rulings have become an integral part of most tax systemsf~ AL! countries participating in
file 2006 OECD Comparative Stmmy except Russia issued either public or private
rulh~gs.2~s In most countries file rulings were binding in some form.2~ Public rulings usually
provide general guidance on matters affec~g classes of taxpayers and originate with the
revenue authority. Private rulings usually prox~ide guidance on specific matters raised by
individual taxpayers in the context of particular facts and circumstances; they originate x~dth
file taxpayer. Public rulfi~gs can be binding on file revenue authorities, where the facts and
circmnstances of die taxpayer fall exactly wiflfin fl~e ambit of the public ruling. In some
24~ For a comprehensive sur~,ey, see D. Sandier and E. Fttks (eds.), The lnler, taliottal GMde to Advance Rallilgs
(~am~sterdam, IBFD, 199%2003). Rationales for ma~ny cttrrent features can be seen h~ early discussion, e.g.,
E. Andersson, ’Advar~ce Rulh~gs by fl~e "Fax Authorities at the Request of a Taxpayer’ (t965) SOB Cahiera
De Digit Fiscal htter~talio~al, 7.
=45 2006 OECD Comparative Survey, above n. 88, p. 87.
246 Ibid.
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iurisdictions they are for guidance o*dy.247 Private rulings are generally binding on the
revenue authority, but the), may also be offered only as advance guidance.~4s
Advance rulings provide taxpayers with the opportmdt3, to determine the tax
consequences of a transaction or arrangement m advance. Where tax rates can impact on
commercial rates of return, this is an hnportant business advantage. Taxpayers can decide
whether transactions are worthwlfile based on all of the facts, including those relating to
taxation. They can also change the stracmre of transactions, where there are no adverse
consequences, so that they fit more easily within the tax rules. It is partictdarly useful for
taxpayers to obtain certainty in decisiommaking in jurisdictions where different revenue
offices deal with their affairs. Where decision-malting wifl~in the tax administration is
decentralised to regional offices of the revenue authority there may be insufficient
resources to ensure that all decisions across the jm’isdiction are consistent. By obtaining an
advance ruling taxpayers can have the assurance that they can rely on a decision that applies
to all offices of the revenue authority.
When a revenue authority uses t’ulings to help taxpayers plan their transactions in
advance, it has the potential advantage of reducing the incidence of dispute and litigation
between the revenue authority and the taxpayer,a49 The advantage works both xvays, as the
revenue authority obtains information about the types of transactions that taxpayers are
entering into. Where thq, can identify trends in taxpayer activities, revenue authorities can
provide appropriate general guidance, or suggest changes to legislation to remedy
shortcon~ngs in the current law. It provides a way both for the revenue authority to
Counter emerging avoidance practices, while also protecting taxpayers who may be falling
prey to widely marketed tax schemes that are held out to save them substantial tax. Rulings
’~ Ibid.
’~ Ibid.
"~ ~Mthough tiffs depends upon whether tim taxpayer takes advantage of appeal rights in tim ruling process:
see D. S.’mdler, ’General Introduction’ m D. Sandier and E. Fuks, above n. 244, p. x. See further, D.
Bemley, ’A Proposal for Reform of the Australian Rulings System’ (1997) 26 Au*t~u/ia*~ Tax Review, 57 and17). Bentley, ’Advance Rtdings: Lessons from tim Swedish Model’ (i 997) 51 IBFD Bulleti& 210.
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are designed to assist voluntary compliance, give taxpayers a sense that the revenue
authofity is giving fak xvaming of x~hat actiot~ it is likely to take on a particular transaction,
and generally reduce compliance costs.
in deteranining best practice, there are some rights that flow £rom underlying human
fights. There are other fights that have only a general basis in the fights literature, but make
sense as an accepted practice across a wide range of jtmsdictions. Tiaey offer benefits to the
administration of the tax system and are gmtmded fmnly in the generally accepted
principles set out in Chapter 3. A tulh~gs system is the latter kind of fight. It has become
sufficiently widely accepted as best practice that all revenue authofities should try to issue
rulings.
The 2006 OECD Comparative Survey shows that advance rulings in most OECD
and many non OECD jufisdictions are legally binding on tim revenue authofities,as° Tiffs is
recommended best practice. However, for revenue authofities which do not have the
resources to provide the necessary quality controls and adinhfistrative infrastructure to
operate an effective system of legally binding txdings it may be too burdensome a
requirement. Each system also needs the legal framexvork for a binding rulings system to
operate. Accord&xgly, the proxtsion of binding t~tlings is a recommended right in the
Model.
However, dais gives rise to a problem for taxpayers in flmse jur’isdictions where
rulings or adxfce are not legally binding. Where a revenue authofity holds out a particular
interpretation of the laxv to be correct, or follows specific procedures in implementing the
law, and the taxpayer relies ha good faith on the viexv of a revenue authority, a revenue
authorit3, should be bound by its approach even if this is only as an adixainistrative
concessionffs~ In cixtl law jurisdictions, the principles of good faith and legitimate
25o 2006 OECD Comparative Sur~,ev, above n. 88 p. 87.
~sl For example, see D. Sandier, ’Canada’ and L. ~Iarris, ’Israel’, in D. Sandier and E. Fuks, above n. 244.
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expectation may apply,as2 In common law jurisdictions, the revenue authority may be
bound under the principle of estbppel.2s3 Most hnportant, a taxpayer should not be
penalised in any way for follovimg exactly an approach to a transaction or arxangement that
was apparently authofised by the revenue authority.
Wliere r~alings are binding, due process suggests that there should be an appeal in
some fo~n available against an adverse ruling. Some jurisdictions, such as New Zealand,
take the view that an appeal agahxst a ruling wastes time and resources.~s4 The argmnent is
that taxpayers and the efficiency of the tax adininistration process are equally well served
by the opportunity to appeal against file assesstnent raised on file basis of file txiling?ss It is
said that taxpayers may even have an advantage, in that they are not bonnd by a r~ling and
may withdraxv their application before it is made, xvhen they receive an indication that the
ruling is likely to be adverse. A flaw in these arguments is that taxpayers often do not enter
into cormnercial arrangements which are, or are likely to be, the subject of an adverse
It is difficult to take s~tong issue with an advanced tax jurisdiction, such as New
ZeaLand, xvhere tax adnfinistration practices are among the best in tile world. However, it is
perhaps different for a developing countrT that is tr3,ing to implement best practice in an
enviromnent where the administrative infrastt~acture is not xvell established and resources
are stretched. If binding rulings are introduced in such a jurisdiction, the practice of
providing an appeal in some form against the issued ruling should be preferred. It favottrs
~s~ For example, see C. Romano, ’Italy’ i,~ D. Sandier and E. Fuks, above n. 244.
-~s~ For example, see W.T. Cunnmgbam, ’Ireland’ in D. Sandier and E. Fuks, above n. 244.
2~, For a comprehensive comparison of the Australian and New Zealand binding rulings systems, see A.J.
Sawyer, ’What are the Lessons for Australia from New Zealand’s First Comprehensive Remedial Rex4ew
of its lYmding Rulings Re~wne?’ (2000) 29 Attstmlia,~ Tax Review, 133. Saxwer raises concerns that tim
major flaw with the New Zealand rulings system is that there is no appeal against rtthngs made. It is
discussed further ha a UK analysis: W. Cban, ’Binding RuL{ngs’ (1997) 18 Fiscal Studies, 189. Sawyer
discusses the arguments from New Zealand, on wlticb this paragsaph draws, in Iris earlier comprehensive
analysis of the New Zealand system in A.J. Sawyer. ’Binding Tax Rttlings: The New Zealand Experience’
(1997) 26 Attstmlialt Tax" Revieu,, 11.
~s This is the x4ew taken in a number of cotmtries. See, D. Sandier and E. Fuks, above n. 244.
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consistent due process and may encourage those making rulings to take more care if their
decisions are open to review.
The form of the appeal will depend upon the review mechanisms that akeady exist in
the relevant jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions will allow a ~eview by a corot,as~ Some requite a
request for a review or resubmission of tile ruling request to be filed with the revenue
authority, xvhere a different revenne officer will review the original txfling for erxors,as~
Others tt3* to keep the review mechanism shnple by offering an administrative review by a
different body from that wkich made the original rating, such as the Mi~fistt3’ of Finance.~s~
The critical issue is that the time taken to appeal mnst not defeat file efficacy of the appeal
259process.
B Assessment to Tax
The assessment process detern~nes the amount of tax that taxpayers must pay. Under selg
assessment, taxpayers assess their own tax in the first instance. Under administrative
assessment an assessment is issued after either automated or physical verification of a tax
return (where a tax return is required). In both types of assessment, verification and
auditing may result in amendments or new assessments where a revenue authority finds
discrepancies.26° Significant effort is aimed at continually improving the ’design and
operation of effective and ~fficient administrative arrangements for collection of tax and
For example, Australia allows an objection against a ruling decision under the Taxation Admkfisnation
Act t953 (Cth), s. 14ZAZA, in tim same way as an assessment, which takes fl~e review to the
Administ~cative Appeals Tribunal and the Federal Court.
Fo~ example, Thailand: see P. Tewkhm~thong and V. Jangjedrew, ’Thailand’, in D. Sandier and E. Fttks,
above n. 244.
For exanaple, the Republic of Korea: see Don Yang, ’Republic of Korea’, in D. Sandier and E. Fuks,
above n. 244.
D. Sandier, above n. 249, p. xiv and see as an example, the Australian decision of CTC Resources NL v. PC
oft (1994) 48 FCR 397.
2006 OECD Comparative Sttnmy, above n. 88, p. 60.
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the determination of taxpayers’ fiabilifies’.2~1 The more tax collection can rely on tlfitd
parties wiflflaolding tax at source, the less scrpe there is for tax avoidance and evasion by
dm taxpayer. Tire more tax verification can rely on efficient and effective data matclfing
processes, tile more confident a revenue authority can be in the validity and accuracy of its
assessments. Third part}, withholding of tax and third party infomaation reporting is
integral to tile operation of modem tax adnfinis~ation.26z
For the taxpayer, it is impotrant that taxes are imposed by law, and that the laws are
accessible and certain. Tills \vas discussed in Chapter 6, as these are pfimarT legal rights.
Taxpayers should duly have to pay the right amount of tax and any legal or adininisttative
process dmt facilitates this should be encouraged. It is consistent with the principles in
Chapter 3. However, taxpayers need certain assurance where tax they owe is collected from
a thkd party, who is reqtfft’ed to withhold amomlts payable to those taxpayers at sot~tce,
and remit .those amounts directly to the revenue authorities.
Any amounts withheld must be sanctioned by law. This is critical to the operation of
tim law. Occasionally, it can lead to difficulties in the adn~3istrafion of the system. For
example, where tax rates change in the annual budget, the tax widflmlding rates must
change. In Australia, the legislation to give effect to the budget changes is somethnes
delayed, which can cause adn~nistrafive difficulties. However, it is hnportant that any tax is
wiflaheld only where the law is in place to allo\v it. Tlfis protects both taxpayers and the
witlfllolder.
The 2006 OECD Comparative Sl~t~,ey notes the process involved in the pre-filled
personal tax return systems used by Nordic countriesff6~ It sets out tire fimelines that are
required for effective operation of tile system. This is consistent x~dth the effective
R. Highfield, "Pre-populated income tax returns: The next ’big firing’ in reform of tim adtim’dstration of
2mstralia’s personal income tax system?’, paper presented at the 7ill International Tax Admmistrafion
Conference (Sydney, Australia, 2006).
2006 OECD Comparative Su*x,ey, abm,e n. 88, p. 55 etseq.
Described m more detail in R. Higbfield, abm,e n. 261.
IiI
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operation of an), system for collecting or withholding tax. All parties must have adequate
notice of the requirements and procedures that they must follow to comply properly with
theix obligations under the law. It should be included as a right for both taxpayers and
withholders that the revenue authority must publish clear guidelines xvith reasonable
timelines for any administrative process imposing an obligation to pay or withhold tax, or
to report information.
Any infota~aation passed to the revenue authority must be kept confidential. This has
been dealt with above. However, particularly where infomaation provided by someone
other than the taxpayer is used in making an assessment, the taxpayer should have the tight
to make sure it is accurate. Tiffs may be done easily through the process of making an
obiection to an assessment. It does depend upon the information provided to a taxpayer
either with or on the notice of assessment.
~i]~e process of assessment of any kind should be governed by the principles of
administxation outlined above. This includes such issues as the provision of reasons for an
amended assessment, timeliness in responding to quedes and that any discretion is
exercised appropriately.2~4 The bad feeling engendered among taxpayers where they
perceive that they are not receix~ag appropriate infot’mation can be seen in the codification
o£ information that must be provided on US assessments following Taxpayer Bill of Rights
1. Greenbaum argues that codification assists the IRS, as it knows exactly what information
it must provide and that dais will in itself reduce litigation,z~s The appropriateness of this
approach depends upon the system operating in any )urisdiction. The important principle is
that there should be sufficient information given to taxpayers so that they know whether an
assessment is accurate and therefore whether to obiect to the assessment made.
\~Tbere a revenue autho~il3’ is reviewing a self-assessment or an earlier administrative
assessment, file revenue officer should ensure that the taxpayer has paid tile co~:ect
Internal Revenue Code ~7522.
A. G~eenbaum, above n. 89, p. 350.
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amount of tax,266 Tile reqnirement is implicit that the revenue authority should correct
errors m file taxpayer’s favour. For example, this can happen where an assessor finds that a
taxpayer is entitled to tax relief, deductions or refunds not prmdously claimed.267 However,
u01ess it xvas file revenue autho~ity’s fault that a chin~ was not made, the duty to inform file
taxpayer would be lhrfited to the relevant time lin~its.
Where a taxpayer is found on assessment to have paid too much tax and a refund is
due, the refund should be made automatically. Interest should be paid on the refund.268 If a
revenue authority has the use for a period of funds to wlfich it is not entitled, it should pay
for them. Otherwise, it is a further exaction of revenue from file taxpayer that should be
authorised spedfically by law.
It is important that there are procedures m place to regulate amendments to
assessments. Normally there are time liurits for amendments.~69 The obvious exception is
where there is intentional fi’aud or tax evasion by a taxpayer; for example, where the
taxpayer has intentionally provided incorrect infumlation, entered into concealed
transactions, or ~rfisled the tax authority. Thne litmts for amendment also normally coincide
with the thne lhnits for keeping tax records. This is appropriate, as once a taxpayer no
longer has to keep records, it is unfair to allow a revenue authority, to amend the taxpayer’s
assessment.
An a*ea of sigoificant contention between tax authorities and taxpayers is where the
revenue authority decides that file filformation on which it is to base an assessment is
insufficient or incorrect. On xvhat basis can the revenue authority create an assessment?
Most jurisdictions reqttire some rational basis for an assessment: the revenue authority
M. McLerman, above n. 68, p. 37 ,’rod p. 41.
It wmdd not be the case if the relief, deductions or zefuqds were optional and the taxpayer had chosen
not to exercise that option. In other wo~ds, it is not the responsibility of the tin,: authority to act as a tax
planner for the taxpaye~c. See further, OECD Taxpayers’ rights and obligations, above n. 74, para 2.20,
where it is noted that not all com~tdes automaticatly give tax relief where it is due, ’even if all the
information is available to the authorities’. Failure to give relief in such circmustances would seem to be a
breach of the dug, to prope~:ly administer the tax system.
OECD Taxpayers’ Rights and Obligations, above n. 74, p. 20.
Ibid.
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cannot simply pick a figttte out of fltin air. However much sympathy there may be for
revenue authorities which have to deal with large numbers of recalcitrant taxpayers, it is
precisely m such situations that taxpayers need protection of their basic rights and revenue
authorities should maintain the moral high ground. It is important for the credibilit3, of the
tax system and the general compliance behavio0r of taxpayers that the revenue authority
obser~res due process m situations where it could be excused for not doing so. It is not
enough to argue that if the taxpayer does not agree xvith the assessment that they can
appeal. Accordingly, revenue authot’ities should maintain fairness and txansparency by
identifying and publicising m advance the procedttres they will follow when assessing
taxpayers in tiffs situation,
V SANCTIONS AND ENFORCED COLLECTION
A Sanclions
Where the ordinary processes of assessment and collection are unsuccessful, revenue
authorities require powers to impose criminal and admfitisttadx, e sanctions of some kind on
those who refiise to comply in accordance with the law and to enforce collection of tax
payable.2w Collection enstuces that the government is able to raise the amotmt of revenue
due and payable by taxpayers. Sanctions are designed to prmdde a combination of
incentives to comply wifla tax rules, and penalties for non-compliance. Dealing 17t~st xxdth
sanctions; they have been the subject of intense scrutiny over the years and constitute their
~0 j. Braittt\vaite, above n. 105, describes the growing enforcement challenges tax admitfistradons face wida
the growth of aggressive tax planning mtemadona|ly.
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own field of research.2vt A work of tiffs kind can ouly incorporate those principles that
appear to be accepted as best practice to govern the mariner in which sanctions are
hnposed.
A New Zealand report to tim Treasurer and Mh~ister of Revenue by a cotmnittee of
experts endorsed an earlier and similar kind of study on tax penalties in the US that:z~a
Penalties can encourage those taxpayers who do not coinply to do so, first, by setth~g
and va~dating ’standards of behaviour’ expected of taxpayers, secondly by deterring
departures from flaese standards, and, t-really, by providing taxpayers who depaxt from
fl~ese standards with flieir just deserts.
Gordon argues that, ’sanctions are perhaps one of the most overrelied upon, and poorly
understood, tools for enhancing tax compliance’.273 Gordon reviews literature pertinent to
taxation and sets out some useful principles that should underpin any framework of
sanctions in taxation. They can be smmnarised very broadly as follows:2v4
As a deterrent of unwanted behaviour, sanctions should apply to negligent or
unreasonable behaviour resulting in underpayment.
Sanctions should be fair, involve fault, not be harsh or disproportionate, and should
follow dne process.
In flae tax field, see J.G. McCubbin, above n. 96.
Treasm3, (New Zealand), Tax Compliattce: Report to the Treasurer a~td Mit~ister q[ Reve~tue b), a Commi~lee q[
Ea~berts oft Tax Co~*~pliattce (1998), p. 210, reviewing a stud),, US Internal Revenue Ser~ice, Report of the
Commissioner’s Executive Taxk Font ott Civil Petmllies (1990).
R.K. Gordon, ’Law of Tax Adnfinistration and Procedttte’ in V. Tbutonyi, above n. 68, p. 95, p. ll7.
Supported by J. Braithwaite, above n. 105, p. 177 el seq. who describes the tendency of tax adn~,istrators
and legislators to see-saw be~veen punishment and persuasion.
R.K. Gordon, ibid., pp. 117 134.
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Fhaancial sanctions may be imposed to deter and enconrage earl}, settlement of
disputes but should not be Used to raise revenue: that should be the place of tlie
taxes themselves.
The level of sanction or penalty should reflect society’s view of the heinousness of
the behaviour and can include a retribution component.
The level of publicity about the sanctions, the effects of non-compliance, and the
rates of detection of non-compliance, depend vet3, much upon the particular
jurisdictional and societal context. However, sanctions will be ’ineffective unless
taxpayers believe that there is sufficient likelihood that they xvill be caught and that
the sanctions will actually be applied’.2~s
Sanctions that are easily applied and detetanined are usually easier to admimster and
less arbitrary. Therefore, automatic financial penalties calculated as a percentage of
the atnount involved are likely to be most effective. The}, should be applied to
negligent or uttteasonable failnre to pay the correct amount of tax or to pay it on
To encourage earl}, dispute resolution, a penalty framework could reqdire that:
disputed amounts and penalties should be paid at the outset, or interest should be
paid on outstanding amounts, and/or penalties should reduce with earl}, setdement.
Evasion and fraud are difficnlt to prove, but should form part of the framework of
crimh~al sanctions. The general roles of criminal procedttre shmtld apply to these
crimes.
Penalty regimes varT significantly, but Gordon’s principles provide a sound basis for the
design of tfigher level protection of taxpayers’ tights that \xdll cover most such variations.276
Ibid., p. 130.
See fl~rfl~er, a]ong sunilar lines, N. Brooks, above ~. 78, pp. 30~31.
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It is in the specific and particular context of penalties that the best approach for the Model
is m focus on general principles. It would be too complex and would likely prove unhelpful
to attempt to address the plethora of jm’isdictionat variations. The Model would lose its
meanh~g as a guide to best practice.
Penalties should be distinguished fi:om interest charged on late payment of tax.
interest is almost invariably applied.27v However, it \viii often haclude a penalty by way of a
surcharge,27~ and the same principles are applicable to such penalties as they are to other
sanctions,z79
Wbere sanctions are laid do\vn in statute, they xvill usually follow a common
approach to sanctions applied across the legal system; although Gordon notes daat tiffs
ca~mot be asstuned.=8° In an}, event, the primary legal rights applicable to the imposition of
taxes and set out in Chapter 6 and the first part of the Model apply equally to the
imposition of sanctions associated with taxation. They include the requirements for the
proper exercise of discretion by the revenue authority. The latter will prove particularly
important where the sanctions depend upon satisfaction of different tests of
reasonableness that are assessed by revenue officers. For example, both Australia and New
Zealand have developed comprehensive penalty regimes that depend in part upon an
assessmeut of ’reasonable ca~ce’ and ’reasonably arguable’ or ’unacceptable’ positions.~St
Application of these rules addresses Gordon’s explicit and implicit requirements that
the sanctions are not arbittatT, but are cert,~, pubhshed, fair, consistent, proportionate,
linked to the seriousness of the offence, and recogmse due process in their application.~8=
2006 OECD Comparative Sum,e),, above n. 88, p. 84 and pp. 93 96.
Ibid.
Treasm3, (New Zealand), above n. 272, p. 205.R.K. Gordon, above n. 273, p. 118.
Extensive explanation of the systems m both countries can be fmmd on fl*e ~especfive revenue authority
websites: Australia, <wwx~t.ato.gov.au>, 1 November 2006, and New Zealand, <wxvw.ird.govt.nz>, 1
November 2006.
Reinforced in The Neflmrlands context, m A. Stair, ’The Taxpayer, tim Tax Inspector and Admimstrative
Fines’ in D. Albtegtse and H. Van z~xendonk, above n. 186, p. 95.
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Nonetheless, given the importance of these principles, it is valuable to reiterate those that
are specific to the application of satiEdons in the Model.283
There should be a clear basis for the imposition of penalties and interest.284 Where
revenue authorities have discretion as to the level of penalties and interest, it should be
clear how and why the discretion is exerdsed.~s In the exercise of discretion the principle
of proportionality requi~es that the penalty should be proportionate to d~e offence,a~6
The general principles governing exercise of discretion in Ardcle 5 of the Model ate
particularly releyant to discretion as to the level of penalty.2~v As they stand, they are cleat
enough: natnely, that they should be based on reasons, applied consistently, fairly, and
impartially; that the reasons are based on a framework of equally intelligible standards
wkich can be seen fairly to fall within and be the basis of the discredonatT powers; and daat
the exercise of any discretion to impose penalties is fair and reasonable in matters of
procedure and substance.~ss Care needs to be taken in tailoring penalties to a range of
situations, as it can make them very complex and difficult for taxpayers to understand.~9
Revenue authorities are vet3, aware of the importance of these principles in pursuing
best practice. A major focus of an Australian review of the self-assessment regime was to
’mitigate the interest and penalty consequences of taxpayer errors arising from uncertainties
in the self assessment system’=9° and ’to hnprove the transparency and fairness’,ag~ This was
Supported in the French context, in C. Daxdd, ’Taxpayer Protection and Tax Fines in France’, hi D.
Albregtse and H. Van ~rendonk, above n. 186, p. 99.
See die problems in R’Iongolia mid South Korea, where penalty provisions are rarely implemented: J.K.
Hytttl, above n. 31, p. 345.
OECD Taxpayers’ Rights and Obligations, above n. 74, para. 3.29 and para 3.37 et aeq.
j. Braithwaite, above n. 105, pp. 181-182, argues that this requires adequate and escalating penalties to
cater for die growing seriousness of the offence. Fie argues also, p. 199 el seq., using a restorati~m iusdce
framework, that the heaxdest penalties sbould be teseta~ed for the advisers and promoters of fraudulent tmx
schemes and not file taxpayers.
A. Stair, above n. 282, p. 97.
Treasut3, (New Zealand), above n. 272, p. 210 and in the US, see R. Maturing and D.F. Windish, ’The IRS
Restructuring and Reform Act: ~M~ Explanation’ ~uly 6, 1998] TaxNotes, 95-103.
Treasm3, (Austra~a), R*potl ott Aspects of Se[fAssessmenl (Canberra, Cotmnonwealth, 2004), pp. 3947, and
V. Thuron)d, above n. 169, p. 222.
Treasttt3, (Australia), above n. 289, p. 5.
Ibid., p. 4.
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similar to the earlier approaches taken m the US and New ZeaLand. B pracdce suggests
that them should be some flexibility in renfitting penalties where there are exceptional
circumstances relevant to the taxpayer,a95 However, Thuronyi points out that any discretion
in Lmposing penalties opens the possibility for coreaption or heavy handedness,z94 A
recommended tiglit should therefore apply in those jurisdictions where there is exercise of
discretion in relation to penalties that there sliould be clear and transparent guidelines as to
when waiver of a penalty will occnr.
Crhninal penalties for offences sucli as fraud and evasion are best contained in the
c~ninal laxv code. The rationale for thi~ is that the general rules of criminal procedure
should apply.~% Where criminal penalties are imposed in different codes, it is normal for
special procedures to apply nonetheless to a crhninal mvestlgatto . It has important
practical consequences, in that when a civil case rams into a crin~nal case, there are
different rules goveruing procedure, including such matters as the privilege against self-
inctiminafion, discussed above¯ However, most jurisdictions have no problem with the
revenue authority conducting a case that may result in cthninal prosecution until such dine
as it is turned over to the department responsible. It is logical given the special skills of
revenue authority itxvesdgators in interpreth~g available information. However, given the
stricter requirements governing the use of evidence in cthninal trials, die revenue authority
officers involved in such investigations ~dll need appropriate training to ensure that they do
not undem~e an effective prosecution case by using methods that are unacceptable in
Above n. 272.
OECD Taxpayers’ fights and obligations, above n. 74, para. 3.26; Treasury (Australia), above n. 289, p.
41. See also, the faixness legislation h~ Canada, xvhich allows account to be taken of personal misfortame or
cixcmnstances beyond a taxpayer’s control: J. Li, above n¯ !21, p. 120.
V. Thuronyi, above n. 169, p. 221 and G. Turley, above n. 16, p. 37.
V. Thuronfi, above n. 169, p. 222.
R.K. Gordon, above n. 273, p. !34.
V. Thuronyi, above n. 169, p. 226.
ql]mronyi supports this xfiew in his comparative analysis of the treatanent of tax crones, ibid., pp. 223-227.
Ibid., pp. 226-227.
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Taxpayers should be provided protection against uureasonable discfinfinatory
prosecution on the basis of such dfings as race, religion or status under Axdcle 10 of the
Model. For example, because of the publicity such prosecutions engender, prosecution
policies may well identify public figures as providing a more effective detelxent to other
taxpayers than would an unknown taxpayer;3°° but that shonld not be the only basis for a
prosecution. The prosecution should have a te~thnate aim.
B Et orced Collection
The 2006 OECD Comparative Survey suggests that ideally enforcement powers and
procedures should be included in a single comprehensive laxv on tax administration that
covets all taxes.3°I There w~ always be some overlap with other legal provisions and care
needs to be taken in ensuring that the tax administration provisions work with other
existing rules.~°~ Given the vatfiations in approach, the Modal can provide only general
principles applicable to enforced collection of tax debts.
The general principles already contained in the Model and applicable to sanctions a~e
equally applicable to enforced collection of tax debts for the same reasons. In particular,
there must be a clear basis for aW decision to pursue collection through enforcemem.3°3
Where revenue authorities have discretion to pursue collection d~rough enforcement, it
needs to be made clear how and why the discretion is exercised.3°4 In the exercise of
~00 OECD Taxpayers’ tights and obligations, above n. 74, p. 19 and Deak, above n. 122, p. 212.
301 2006 OECD Comparative Survey, above n. 88, p. 85.
30~’ V. "I3mmnyi, above n. 169, p. 220.
50~ OECD TaXpayers’ Rights and Obligations, above n. 74, para. 3.33.
sol G. Tutley, above n. 16, p. 113.
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discretion the prhxciple of proportionality requires that the means of enforcement should
be proportionate to the tax payable.3~s
It is impossible to determine at what point enforcement proceedings should be taken
against taxpayers: it depends upon the circumstances of each case and the risk that the tax
authorities believe that there is to the revenue. The decision is a matter of judgment.
However, the general principle reqtfiring reasons applies and taxpayers should be entitled
to be given reasons xvby a decision has been taken. They should also have the right to
appeal against enforced collection decisions as part of the general appeal tights discussed m
the next sec~on.3°6
In the US, Co!lecdon Due Process Hearings were introduced in 1998 as it was felt
that taxpayers needed an earl), independent review of proposed IRS collection acdons)°v
Nadonal Taxpayer &dvocate Olsen argued strongly that they represent an early hearing
opportuniU to bring the sanity of a third party, in this case the court, into what are some of
the tensest dealings that taxpayers and a revenue authority can have.~°~ The rationale
coincides with those for early collection hearings in other coun~es, includh~g the very
success~t~ prelhninary conferences held in Australian Athninistradve Appeals Tribunals.~°~
Olsen makes the point that there will be frivolous arguments at these hearings, but
the taxpayer is heating from a court that they are frivolous, rather than from the IRS, and is
less likely then to continue pursttmg the issue tl~ougb the cou~t process in protracted
proceedings.~° She also notes that the hearings have identified several major breaches of
taxpayers’ rigbts that are ongoing matters of principle, and have ensured that the focus in
In Sweden, see A. Hultqxfst, above n. 209, p. 307; ha Japap, see National Tax Agency, above n. 70, p. 85 et
seq.
In Australia, see K. \Vheelwfight, above n. 118, p. 84.
Internal Revenue Code ~6320 and ~6330.
N.E. Olsen, above n. 81, p. 1248.
Discussed in L Bouale, fi,ledialion: Ptindples, Pt~cesa; Practice (2nd edm, LexisNexis Bunerworths, 2005), p.
127 et seq.
N.E. Olsen, above n. 81, p. 1249.
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collection proceedings is on substance rather than form)u These are issues that fit squarely
widm~ the dispute resolution modei discussed in Chapter 5. It is therefore recommended
that where a jurisdiction has the resouxces, an early collection heating should be available to
taxpayers on the due process of the collection.
Taxpayers should be given appropriate notice and reasonable dine to comply with
demands for payment before enforcement measures are taken,stz All such notices should
include details of the taxpayer’s rights and obligations in relation to enforcement, including
the right to representation and the availability of legal aid.
The 2006 OECD Comparative Su~Tey notes a number of powers that are widely
used to enforce collection and several of these reqttire the exercise of discretion by revenue
officers)t~ Two of the most important are the discretion to grant extensions of dune to pay
and to formulate tax payment arrangements)14 Revenue audaorides should provide clear
guidelines on exacdy how the discretion will operate and how they will make decisions
involving enforcement. Normally special arrangements in relation to enforcement will be
based on hardship)*s The onus of pr0~6ng hardship in such cases shottld be reasonable.
Agreements that allow a taxpayer to use payment methods that differ f~om normal
collection requirements, such as instalment payments, should be binding on the tax
authority)~6 Guidelines on the operation of deferred payment arrangements should include
such matters as the quantum of basic living allowances that will be taken into consideration
while taxpayers pay off their tax debts, the consequences of failure to meet a payment or
instahnent, and when the tax authotily can resile from an agreement. More than in most
adn~nistradve decisions, there should be a right of review of the decision of the revenue
authorities in hardship cases.
~11 Ibid.
~12 C. DNber, above n. 7, p. 186 discusses flae legislative reqttirements in German),.
313 The 2006 OECD Comparative Stm~ey, above n. 88, p. 86.
~14 OECD, GAP002, above n. 23, p.
sts R. Manning and D.F. Windish, above n. 288, 97-99.
316 In Canada, seeJ. Li, above n. 121, p. 119.
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Protection for the taxpayer shotdd increase with the severity of the enforcement
measures. Common collection methods include collection tl~tough specific third parties
wbo owe money to a taxpayer or hold money on their account; the use of offsets against
amoullts owed to taxpayers for other taxes; seizure action; and bankruptcy or liquidation.3~7
Liens, travel restrictions and disqualification from tendering for goverrmxent contracts are
odaer methods used.3~8
A general expectation is that the revenue authority would take such actions vet’},
seriously and prm~ide clear lines of authorisation and mo,~itoting mechanisms to ensure
that the exercise of such powers did not breach its obligations. For example, injunctions
takeu out by a revenue authority to prevent a taxpayer disposing of property, or placing
restrictions on a taxpayer’s movement, require careful monitoring to ensure that due
process is followed.
There are areas of concern to affected taxpayers that xvill arise in each jurisdiction
depending upon the particular txtles. Although they are usually covered under the general
principles of administration, they should also be included specifically in the guidelines
governing decision-making on enforcment. For example, where a tax authority exercises its
right to seize and dispose of a taxpayer’s property file tax authority should take steps to
realise the property for the best possible price. There should be limits on the seizure and
sale of property that has a lfigh value, \vhere file amount of tax owing is vet3, small in
comparison. The tax authority should also have guidelines that enforce restraint and
negotiation with the taxpayer where tax owing is seized from tlfird parties that hold
property for, or bave debts due to the taxpayer. Otherwise serious damage can occur to a
taxpayer’s reputation or business, which may be out of all proportion to their tax debt.
Tbere are oilier con~non sense principles that fall wifl~hl tile broader principles of
reasonableness and proportionality, xvl~ich are generally applicable and sbould be covered
~t7 Ibid., mad R.K. Gordon, above n. 273, p. 108.
~8 Ibid.
423
in the derision-making guidelines. For example, taxpayers should be left with sufficient to
allow them to live without being im unnecessat3’ burden on the state. The issuer of a
warrant to seize assets \vould have to take into account the principles of proportionalit3,
and reasonableness in setting tire conditions for the exercise ot7 the watxant. It is pointless
depriving taxpayers of their means of livelihood in order to pay a tax debt, if they are
thereby reduced to penury, lose their ability to make any future repayments, and ate forced
to rely on benefits provided by the state to survive. The rights of cttildren and those xvitl~
disabilities should be protected elsewhere in the law where enforcement proceedings ate
taldng place. If tbey are not, then the tax roles should make specific provision for them.
Where a taxpayer has been restrained from dealing with an asset tmtil a debt is paid
or other atrangements are made, the payment of the debt or effecfing of other
arrangements does not necessat’ily ensure release of the restrictions over tl~e asset.
Bureaucratic delays can mah~tain the restriction for unnecessarily long periods. A
requirement that release should be witifin a specified time period protects taxpayers in tltis
situation. Failure to rdease a restxiction witlfin the specified thne should leave the taxpayer
with the right to compensation, usually for actual econo~rfic loss and reasonable costs,
under the right to compensation outlined below.
Cross-border enforcement of tax obligations usually takes place under bilateral or
*mtltilatetal agreements in much the same way as exchanges of information, discussed
above)~9 The protection requked is similar and is included in the Model with that relating
to infottnation exchange,
For a comprehensive analysis, see M.A. Grau Ruiz, M¢¢tual AMsta~tce for the RecoveO’ of Tax" Claims (The
Hague, Kluwe~ Law Intematio*~al, 2003).
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OBJECTION AND APPEAL
A Appeal and Natural Juslice
The IMF Manual on Fiscal Transpa~anff notes the importance of the ability to challenge the
legality of actions and decisions xvidfin the tax system)2° The tight of appeal was seen as
fundamental to the operation of the tax system h~ the 1990 OECD sttrvey of taxpayers’
tights and obligations)=~ It is defined?=
The tight m appeal agahlst any decision of the tax authorities applies to all taxpayers, and
to ahnost all decisions made by the tax authorities, whether as regards file application
and interpretation of the law or of administrative railings, provided tim taxpayer is
directly concerned.
Much of the content of tire Taxpayers’ Cbatter contained in the OECD Centre for Tax
Policy and Administration Practice Note on Taxpayers’ Rights and Obligations comprises
details of a taxpayer’s appeal rights in practice.~z~ Baker and Groenhagen argue that the
consistency of international consensus on appeal matters allows fire setting of international
standards for tax adnfidistration.3~4
Taxpayers require the right to object to Fssessments, have access to dispute
resolution mechanisms and to appeal to a court or administrative tribunal of independent
status)2s Access to dispute resolution rnechaMsms, both wiflfin the revenue authority and
Fiscal Affairs Department, Mamtalo~t Fiscal Tratt.~oat~ttD’ (Wasl~ngton DC, IMF, 2001), p. 11.
OECD Taxpayers’ rights and obligations, above n. 74, p. 12.
Ibid.
OECD, GAP002, above n. 23, p. 9.
P. Bake; and A.-M. Groenhagen, above n. 242, p. 50.
Nadonal Tax Agency, above n. 70, pp. 116-118.
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to dfird pardes, was discussed in Chapter 5 m relation m enforcement of taxpayers’ fights.
The same rights of review and dispute resolution mechanisms generally apply to the way
the tax law is administered. Hoxvever, objections to tax decisions themselves and appeals
on tax matters are primarily concerned with die application of the full range of substantive
tax rules to taxpayers and the objection and appeal rights ~ce therefore much x~dder.3s6
Nonetheless, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 7, disputes are best resolved early and quictdy
and Article 12 of the Model provides for a dispute resolution system designed to provide
an informal med~anism for early resolution of disputes arising betxveen taxpayers and tim
revenue authority. The principles of good practice identified in Chapter 7 require that a
revenue authofitS’ should clearly identi~, its complaint procedures and provide easy access
to them for taxpayers. Most disputes are resolved in Otis way. It makes administration more
effective and compliance easier.
However, not all disputes are resolved at this level and most jurisdictions have a
lfierarclfical range of appeal procedures wlfich alloxv them to contest the merits of a tax
assessment,s’v In sotne jurisdictions this extends to allow the contest of adverse txdings and
other matters.3=8 The rigbt of appeal is an essential ingredient hi the principle of opermess
and accountabillts’ in govermnent. The office of ombudsman, described in Chapter 7,
provides avenues of complaint against adnfirdstrative procedttres that are not othetnvise
subject to review by a court or tribunal.
Most appeal processes begin with an internal review of an objection before the
decision is confirmed and an appeal is taken ftttther.3a9 This allows the identification of
obvious errors. The right of subsequent appeal is usually to a tribunal of some kind that is
32~ Lord Woolf, ’Tax and Judicial Review’ [1993] Btilish Tax-Review, 219.
327 OECD Taxpayers’ Rights and Obligations, above n. 74, p. 12 and p. 21.
3~ See the discussion on Ralings above, and see, e.g., the countries m tim 2006 OECD Comparative Su~,ey,
above n. 88, p. 87, with binding ru~ngs. Several of flmse jurisdictions allow review of adverse rulings.
32~ R.Y-L Gordon, above n. 273, p. 105.
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independent of the tax administration. MaW jurisdictions have found that a tribunal
specialising in tax matters is most appropriate at this level.33° There is a range of couutry
practices as to die operation and constitution of tribunals.3~1 Interestingly, it was found in
Australia that introducing mediation/arbitration in die form of conferences preliminary to
a tribunal heating, reduced the cases that xvent forward to a full heating by over 80 per
cent.~z Many tribmlalS use informal procedures rather than using the futanal ~equirements
of a court heating)~3
From the first level of appeal, most jnrisdictions allow firtther appeal, sometimes to a
tax court and sometimes fl~tough the normal court appeals procedures.~4 Tl~e analysis in
Thnronyi and Albregtse and Arendonk demonstrates the wide variation in courts and
procedures.~s Thuronyi notes, for example, that once US tax appeals move into the general
court system, there is little uniformity of approach and even the Supreme Court ’leaves the
laxv in as confused a state after its decision as it was before’)~6 Thuronyi further points out
flaat the court system can offer taxpayers very low rates of success and gives Japan as an
example of ’where the low rate of success of taxpayers in court is striking’)~v
Given the erratic outcomes ill the normal court system for tax matters, there is a
strong basis for supporting the recoiurnendations that there should be a specialised tax
court or tribunal at least ~t the first level of appeal.3~a Despite the idiosyncrasies of the
Recommended also in W.M. Hussey and D.C. Lubick, Basic World Tax Code alld Commentary (Arlington,
Tax Analysts, 1992), p. 178 and p. 253 aad commonly used: OECD Taxpayers’ Rights and Obligations,
above n. 74, p. 12.
OECD Tmxpayers’ Rights and Obligations, above n. 74, p. 12; V. Thuronyi, above n. 169, p. 220; and
R.K. Gordon, above n. 273, p. 106.
L. Boulle, above n. 309, p. 127 el seq.
For example, the Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal exercises the powers and discretions of the
Commissioner of Taxation Jn its detezminations. See further, D. ~fighal]s, ’The AAT or Federal Comet -
Which is the Appropriate Fortun?’ (2005/6) 40 Taxalion iltAttslralia, 90.
OECD Taxpayers’ Rights and Obligations, above n. 74, p. 93.
V. Thuronyi, above n. 169, pp. 215~220; and D. ~Mbregtse and H. Van A~endonk, above n. 186.
V. Ttmronyi, above n. 169, p. 218.
Ibid.
OECD Taxpayers’ Rights and Obligations, above n. 74, p. 22. Tiffs was the rationale for the introduction
of a National Tax Tribunal in India in 2005, rather than conth~uing to send appeals to the High Courts,
see A. Pomtiah, ’Asia-Pacific: 2005 Developments’ (2006) 12Asia-PadflcTa.\’Bu/Mitt, 117, p. 128.
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different systems, as Baker and Groenhagen suggest, there are certain standards that
characterise best pracdce in review hearings, Whether at tribunal or court level.
As noted above, taxpayers should have the ~ight to object to assessments and to
appeal on as wide a range of decisions and actions of the tax authority as possible,s~9
Taxpayers should be informed of their rigbt and an}’ thne limits that apply.34° Most revenue
authorities include a notice of complaint, review and appeal fights with each notification
they give to a taxpayer of a decision. Tiffs is logically a very effective way to ensure
taxpayers are aware of their fights. Practically, the notice will include contact details for
taxpayers who requite further infomaadon or assistance (including, for example, an
interpreter) in understanding theix fights and obligations.
The conrt or administrative tfibunal should be independent. The extent to which the
fight to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention on Hmnan Rights
(’ECHR’) is applicable m tax tnatters is disputed,s4~ However, once the right of appeal or
review is accepted, it offers useful guidance on the content of that fight in an accepted
international context. The European Conmaission on Human Rights has emphasised the
inaportance to review proceedings of having at least one level of review that is independent
from both the department of the executive wkich made the decision under reviewand also
from the executive arm of govet~m~ent itself,s4z The independence requirement did not
mean that the executive could not appoint members of the tribunal or coutr, as occttrs in
most jufisdictions,s4s
See further in respect of criminal charges, fl~e 1948 Umve~sal Decla~ation of Human Rights, art. 10, and
ECHR, art. 6, wlricb states that ’evelyone is entitled to a {;air and public healing within a reasonable thne’.
For tax matters specifically see e.g., OECD, Taxpayers’ lights and obligations, above n. 7,t, p. 12 and
W.M. Hussey and D.C. Lubick, above n. 330. For general discussion in a tax context, see S.N. Fronmael,
’The Euxopean Cou~t of Human Rights and Taxpayers: The Right to a Fair Trial’, above n. 233, p. 1723.
I. Saunders, ’Judicial Revie\tc Successes for the Taxpayers’ (19971 2 British Tax" Revien,, 105; and Sir
Anflmny Mason, ’The Importance of Judicial Review of Administrative Acdon as a Safeguard of
individual Rights’ (1994) 1 Mustralian Jour, ml of 11m*m~ RiCh& 1, discuss specifically the inaportance of
opening appeals as widely as possible.
OECD, Taxpayers’ Rights aa~d Obfigations, above n. 74, p. 12 and OECD, GAP002, above n. 23, p. 9.
Analysed comprehensively in P. Baker, above n. 235.
HWK v. 2Mlzer]attdApplication No. 23399/94, discussed in P. Baker, ibid, p. 241.
P. Baker, above n. 235, p. 242.
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There are t~vo elements to reasonableness of time. The review or appeal should be
beard within a reasonable thne. Baker notes that there have been several cases before the
European Court ti~at have considered d~is issue, but that it is difficult to gauge what a
reasonable thne is.~ Tbis is an issue that is peculiar to each jurisdiction depending upon
the review structure, its resources and capacity. It is important, however, to stipulate tliat
die hearing should take place xvid~in a reasonable thne. Tiffs provides grounds for review in
the context of tile particular jttssdiction. There is otherwise a danger that the revenue
authority or the taxpayer could unnecessarily delay proceedings to prevent a hea~g. The
second dme element, that a tight of appeal may be subject to time limits, is along the same
lines. The cdtetion of reasonableness should be applied for sinfflar reasons. Hoxvever, it
also means that time lhnits sliould be stipulated in order that flmy may be reasonable.~4s
Unless dmy are cleardy set out for taxpayers, flley become arbitrary.
The conduct of the review or appeal should be subject to due process or a fair
heating. Tiffs comprises a number of elements, discussed in turn. Tlie heamag should be
finpartial. Tiffs means that tile hearing is before a judge or member of a tribunal who is
neither personally biased, nor biased on the basis of her or his actions in the proceedings)4s
’Publicity is seen as one guarantee of file fairness of trial; it offers protection against
atbitxar3, decisions and builds confidence by allowing the public to see justice being
administered.’~47 MaW jurisdictions do not hold public hearings at all levels for tax and
administrative decisions, but a public heating at some stage of tile appeal process supports
tlie fairness requirement,s48 Taxpayers *nay xvish to waive their tight to a public heating, or
at least publication of the decision. They may have legitimate concerns that publication of
details of flleir case xvoutd unnecessarily prejudice their business or their reputation.
Ibid., p. 239.
OECD, Taxpayers’ Rights and Obligations, above n. 74, p. 22 and O12CD, GAP002, above n. 23, p. 9.
Discussed in fl~e context of EC!ffR, azt. 6, in C. Ovey and R. \’~qfite, above n. 37, p. 160.
Ibid., p. 163.
Ibid. P. Baker, above n. 235, p. 242; and OECD, Taxpayers’ Rights and Obligations, above n. 74, p. 22.
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Alternatively, they may be concerned not to have thek pfivate financial records discussed
in a public forum and induded xvithout preset’vafion of anonymity ha a public record of the
decision. Taxpayers should be able to waive thek fight to a public heating.349 Waiver may
be opposed by the reveuue authority where one of the purposes of the action is to generate
as much’publicity as possible. Tiffs may legitimately occur, for example, where the revenue
anthofity is uudertaking a high profile campaign to publicise the effects of non-
compliance)s° It would be up to the court or tribunal to determine whether the fairness of
the proceedings would be undermined by a public heating.
Due process includes the fight to representation by a lawyer.3s~ In addition to legal
representation, most countries recognise dae fight to representation ha tax proceedings
before a tribunal, and some~es a lower court, by a representative other than a legal
adviser.~s~ There is no general requb:ement fo~ legal aid to assist taxpayers in bringing tax
appeals, utfless it involves a ct’iminal charge.3s~ In most developing countries the resources
shnply do not extend to providing comprehensive legal aid and it is premature to require it
other than as a reconm~ended fight.
Rules of ewidence and proced~e differ markedly bet~veen jtufisdicfions. The
European Court of Human Rights has overcome the difficulties in prescribing detailed
t’ules by set*lug out several principles that should apply to court proceedings in member
states. Those applicable to tax proceedings include: procedural equality, an adversafial
process and disclosure of evidence, a reasoned decision and effective participation.3s4
Procedural equality or ’equality of arms’ requires that there should be a fair balance
between die parties and each part}, should have a reasonable oppormnig, to represent their
~a p. Baker, above ~. 235, p. 243; and C. Ovey and R. ~q~ite, above n. 37, p. 169.
Go~don, above n. 273, p. 123.3s0 See the discussion in R.K~ntemattonal Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ar~. 14, and diere is, no,
3s~ It has flowed from the     " "    ¯ ,     ’ ~ ¯ resentation should be de,tied. OECD Tsxpa}ers
suggestion in any tax case that the ~gnt to mga~ tep
Rights and Obligations, above n. 74, p. 22 provides country examples of different representation rights.
ss~ Discussed in die European context in D. Albregtse and H. Van Arendonk, above n. 186 and inure
generally in OECD, Taxpayers’ Rights and Obligations, above n. 74, p. 22.
~s~ p. Baker, above n. 235, p. 245.
3s4 C. Ovey and R. \X,3~tte, above n. 37, pp. 155-160.
430
Ana.!),sis of Seconda~ Lega/ and Administrative IUghts
case.355 Tiffs is particularly important in tax cases involving individual taxpayers, where tile
authority and resotu:ces of file revenue authority could easily inthnidate a taxpayer. The
~bunal or court needs to enstuce that there is procedural equality and tiffs may require
intervention in tile proceedings on behalf of file taxpayer. In Australia, the Administrative
Appeals Tribunal takes a strongly intet~Tenlionist approach in its proceedings to ensure that
those least capable of presenting thek case are able to do so, particularly where riley are
uurepresented)s6
An adversarial process means that file parties should have full knowledge of and be
able to con~tnent on file observations filed or evidence adduced by file other party.3s7 Tiffs
requkes the provision of full information about file issues being contested and file
exchange of all relevant documentation xviflfin a reasonable time before file hearJng.3s8
Without such information, it is difficult for a review or appeal to be fully effective.
However, there are occasions where file col~rt or tribunal should allow non-disclosure of
elddence where it might adversely affect a thkd party. For example, file revenue authority
may have used comparable information from another taxpayer to draw a conclusion as to
file veracity of inforanafion provided by file taxpayer seeking reviexv in a transfer pi{cing
Sinfilar prhaciples underlie the requkement for a reviewing body to provide reasons
for its decision as apply to file giving of reasons for file proper exercise of adilmfistrafive
discretion. The taxpayer should be given the reasons for why a decision is made and tile
Ibid., and see Dombo Beheer BV v. ?x~elherlands, Judgment of 27 October 1993, Series A, No. 274-A; (1994)
18 EHRR 213.
Described in detail in R.H. WoelLqer, S. Barkoczy, S. Murphy, and C. Evans, Austmliatt Taxation Latv (16fla
era, Sydney, CCFI, 2005), p. 1,842 el seq and see B.J. McCabe (SM) in Case 3/2004, 2004 ATC 119.
parr_Mateds v. Spaitt, Judgment of 23 Jtme 1993, Series A, No. 262; (1993) 16 EF£RR 505, discussed in C.
Ovey and R. kXqfite, above n. 37, p. 156.
R.K. Gordon, above n. 273, pp. 106-107.
M. Markham, above n. 39, pp. 177 184.
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facts on \vhich it is based. The reasons need not cover all points but should demonstrate
that the reviewing body has not misged an issue fimdamentat to its decision.~6°
The final point relevant to a fai~ tax hearhag is that the taxpayer must be an effective
participant ha the proceedings to the extent he or she is not represented and is suffering
from a disability.3sl This may require the provision of an interpreter or other special
facilities for taxpayers suffering fxom disabilities.
There are further fairly complex issues that relate to rex~iew and appeal. Should tax be
suspended pending the review or appeal? Treatment among OECD countries is
inconsistent. The position vafies from automatic suspension in countries such as Belgium,
Finland and the US, tl~rough suspension on certain conditions in countries such as
Australia, France, Greece and the UK, to no suspension in Italy and Turkey)s2 Thuronyi
notes that developing and transition countries tend not to allow suspension to prevent
abuse and frivolous appeals.~s~ There is insufficient consistency in approach to warrant any
form of fight in this regard. However, it is recormrrended that suspension of tax should be
allowed at least by application to the reviexv body at the conunencement of proceedings
where there is a prhna facie case and the taxpayer can show hardship.TM
~rhere taxpayers are successftfl on appeal, their costs of undertaking the appeal
should be paid.~as Whether they should be compensated for any significant loss or damage
incurred as a result of the action of the tax authofity depends upon the broader legal
remedies. Article 14 of the international Covenant on Civil and Political Rigiats and Article
3 of the 7a’ Protocol of the ECHR contemplate that where there has been a miscamage of
360 C. Ovey and R. Wtfite, above n. 37, p. 158.
361 Ibid., p. 159.
~62 V. Thuronyi, above n. 169, p. 218.
~6~ Ibid.
~64 p. Bakfir and A M. Groenhagen, above n. 242, p. 52.
~6s Ibid., p. 51; OECD Taxpayers’ Pdghts and Obligations, above n. 74, p. 20; and R. Manning ~nd D.F.
Windish, above n. 288, p. 83, wlfich sets out the introduction of changes to improve the rules governing
the award of costs and fees to taxpayers in the US and to allow cix~ damages for negligence by IRS
officers.
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justice compensation should usually be paid. This would normally relate to criminal
injm3,.3~6
Assume a revenue officer commits an offence and causes personal or economic loss
to a taxpayer, for example, by releasing, without aufllorisation, co*mnercially sensitive
infm~nation on a taxpayer’s file, either generally, or to another taxpayer. There should be
some form of remedy for the taxpayer in such instances.36~ The taxpayer would have to
show toss. In cotrmaon law jurisdictions, there may be actions for negligence and breach of
dug of cate.~68 There may be a cap on compensation and taxpayers would usually have to
take reasonable steps to n~timise an), losses.~69 However, any remedy must be carefully
tailored so that file revenue authority is not resttahled in its proper ptt~suit of tax evasion
and fraud for fear of facing large damages claims in file event diat it ca*mot prove its case.
VII CONCLUSION
This chapter has set out the secondat3, legal and administ*ative rights that should be found
in all tax systems, together with a number of reconunended rights. It will be recalled that
many of these rights can be hnplemented either legally or adn~nistxatively depending upon
the structure of the rules hi a particular legal system. Their content xxdll usually differ
dependhlg upon the means of enforcement.
The chapter begins by articulating the principles that should govern tile
administrative action of a revenne authority. These principles ate overarct~qg in that riley
Cover all administrative decisions and actions. There is often overlap with specific rights,
~.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyth, above n. 2, p. 796.
K. Wtmelwrigl~t above n. 118, p. 69, notes that in ~,ustralia, an ’act of grace’ allows payments to be made
to taxpayers or tax payments to be waived tmde~ the Audit Act 1901 (Cdt).
M, McLennan, above n. 68, p. 48.
Ibid.
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but where these provide additional protection, that protection is described in file context of
those rights.
As discussed in Chapter 3, principles underlie all tax systems in some fotan, xvhether
or not file), are competing and quite often contradictor3’. The advantage of codifying these
principles either legally or adininistrativeli’ is that it ensures that they do not then have to
be ’discovered’ before they can be appfied. Certain jutisdicdons, such as Geranany, have
illustrated tiffs approach in this and other chapters. Germany has used legal codification. In
countries such as Austrafia and the UK, where these principles are drawn from a range of
statutes, the common law and admiuistrative guidelines, the position is much less clear.
Tl~is can work to the disadvantage of both the taxpayer and Ore revenue authority, despite
the element of flexibility that comes with uncertainty.
Wlfich approach should be used for best practice ha tax administration depends upon
tile jurisdiction and context. However, it is easy to fudge file quesdon of whether a
jurisdiction is operating in line with best practice, by saying that file legal remedies that
apply across the legal system will meet tim standards set out in the Model. \X/hat is needed
is a detailed review and analysis of exacdy hoxv the standards are met, by wlficb txfles,
xvhether legal or adrnimstrative, and xvhether the protection provided is sufficient.
The chapter sets out the specific rights applicable to each of tile major functions of
tax adnfiuisttafion. It is encotrcaging that despite the variations between legal families and
tax families, there is a consistent understanding of tile mare !Torms of protection that
should be afforded to taxpayers. It is quite often based in an understanding in other legal
areas developed in tile context of human tights and the practice of international law on the
one hand, and the practical implementation of economic globalisation on the other. At the
functional level there is wide variation evident in tile ways that indixfidual rigbts are
obsera~ed and implemented. Tiffs is inevitable give~ the completely different contexts in
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wlffch tax a&ninisttafion operates. Nonetheless, there is a co~rnnon core content that
allows the clear articulation of standards of best practice in taxpayer protection.
Tiffs chapter, together with Chapters 6 and 7, flo\v directly into the Model set out in
Chapter 9. The Model provides the best practice standards of taxpayer protection that
should be found in any tax system, together with reconmnended rights for advanced
systems. Tiffs and flae earlier chapters have provided a rationale and relatively brief
commentary on the meaning of these best practice standards.
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CI~\PTER 9
A MODEL OF TAXPAYERS’ RIGHTS~
I INTRODUCTION
Tltis Chapter provides a model of taxpayers’ rights based on the analysis in Chapters 6-8. It
is not designed as the basis for an international convention or instrument requiting
ratification. The focus of this chapter is to provide a guide to best pracdce in tax
admimsttation along the lines of the OECD, Getm’al AdmiMstrative Pdn@les - GAPO01
Principles of Good Tax" Administt’atioo and GenetM Admit~istra/ive Principles - GAPO02 Tax’payers’
ILiJ~ts a*td Obligatiom.
The analysis in Chapters 6-8 provides tim comanentat’y on dm model for the
purposes of tiffs thesis. Subsequent adoption and development of the model may see
concurrent development of a *::ore specific and agreed co*mnentat3’.
As the aim is to provide a co*tin:on standard of taxpayers’ tights for inclusion in
domestic legislation, it is unlikely that all tights in the model will be adopted as a separate
code in most jurisdictions. It is only where reform of the tax system includes a new tax act
that adoption of tiffs kind will be feasible. However, dements of the model may be
included as timy stand into existing tax acts as a separate section.
D. Mbtegtse and H. van Asendotzk, Taxpayer Protection & the Em~pean Union (The Hague, London/Boston
Kluwet Law International, 1998); A. Sawyer, ’A Compafison of New Zealand Taxpayers’ Rights with
Selected Civil Law mid Coma-non La\v Countries - Have New Zealand Taxpayers Been "Short-Changed"?’
(1999) 32 VanderbiltJout*mlofTmnsnalionalLatv, 1345; P. Baker, ’Taxation and the European Convention
on Human Rigbts’ [2000] Bdlish Tax Review, 211; P. Baker, and A-M. Groenhagen, The Protection of
Ta:,payets Pu~hts - An International Codiflcatiott (London, European Financial Forum, 2001). Oflaet valuable
works dealkag wifla individual fights or mdixddual jurisdictions are foomoted. H.J. Ault, Comparative Income
Taxation ~II~e Hague, Klmver Law International, 1997); S. Peers and A. \Vard (eds), The Em~pean Union
Charter of Fundamental Rights (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004); M. Lang (ed), Dim* Ta:,’aliom Recent ECJ
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For maW jurisdictions the model will provide a standard to act as a form of qnafit3,
control. Tax policy makers will be able to measttre the quality of the fights afforded to
taxpayers against an objective international standard. It will provide legiOmaW and
reassurance xvhere pohcy makers are striving to achieve best practice. Domestically it will
provide support for revenne authority compliance programs. It will also assist revenue
authorities and the judiciat3’ by allowing them to assess issues brought before them
comparatively, taking account of decisions on sinfilar issues elsewhere that may helpfully be
decided on a uniform basis. It is likely that commonafit3’ of problems in the administxadon
of tax systems will increase, even if the move towards hatvnonisation of substantive t~ales is
Flowing from the analysis in Chapters 6-8 and the issues of interpretation identified
in Chapter 3, it is clear that the model will need adapting to the context of each jurisdiction.
States \viii need a degree of latitude in the implementation of the individual tights. This
requires the model to remain relatively broad in its articulation of t~les to maintain that
flexibillt3,. That said, the value of the model will depend upon a genuine attempt to
implement the fights contained in it.
As indicated ha Chapter 2 the model is txvo-tiered. This provides developing
countries unable to comply with all fights contained in the model the opportm~it3’ to ensure
that the basic tights at least are protected in their jurisdiction. The ~nodel therefore
identifies the basic fights in each article, with a list of recommended fights, wltich should
be present in all sophisticated tax systems.
In drafting the model it is useful to note the draffitag principles applicable to tax eales
generally.2 In particular, it should be understandable, xvbich includes ’elegance, brevity and
Deve/opmet~ts (II,e Hague, Kluwer Law international, 2003); S. van "l]fiel, EU Case Law o~ I~tcome Tax
(Amsterdam, IBFD Publications, 2001).          ’ ’ ’ h V.
See, for example, V. ql]~uronyi, ’Drafting Tax LeDslataon ~ Thuronyi (ed.) vol. 1, Tax Law Design attd
Dtnfiitg (Wasltington DC, IMF, 1996), ch. 3.
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clarit3r of expression’ but without being cryptic) Clarity is important given ’that
considerable adaptation, if not wholesale revision, of the language of tim model vBll likely
be required in order to meet the particular needs of the country in question’.4
Finally, it is important to note that much of the wording and ideas of the model is
draxvn from a range of sources clearly identified in preceding chapters. Although it is
inappropriate to produce a heavily footnoted model, it is appropriate to acknowledge that
the content relies heavily on a wide range of existing sources identified in the earlier
analysis and con’unentary.
II MODEL OF TAXPAYERS RIGHTS
Chapter 1: Scope and Definitions
A~ticle 1
This document sets out the rules governing the exercise of tax achninistxation in the
adopting state: to provide for tax law and tax administration that is certain, lawfifl,
reasonable and procedurally fak; to promote effective and efficient administration and
good governance; and to create a cttlture of accountability, openness and transparency m
tax administration.
A~*ic/e2
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Tiffs article shall include the defmititsns required m the legislation of the adopting state.
Chapter 2: Parliamentary Protection and Judicial Intetl?retation
At¢ide 3
When legislation on matters affecting taxation is introduced into parliament, flmre
shall be an accompanying statement identifying the potential hnpact, if any, of the
proposed legislation on exisdng legislated fights or on existhlg achninistrative
guidelines governing taxpayers’ fights.
(2) There shall be established a pre-legisladve scrutiny commitree to examine and ~eport
m parliament on bills affecting taxadon to ensure that there is no contradiction,
incompatibility or inconsistency bet~veen proposed legislation and the tights already
enacted for the protection of taxpayers. The comtrdttee shall have dae right to
request reformation from die executive at’m of government and from other pardes at
its absolute discretion. The reports of the committee shall be laid before pafiiament
and shall be published.
Any standing orders or guidelines for the drafting of legislation affecting taxation
shall require consideration of the past reports of the relevant pre-legislative scrutiny
conunittee when &afting nexv legislation.
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(1) So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation
governing flae administration of taxadon must be read and given effect in a xvay
which is compatible with the lfigbts contained in this [law].
(2) Where an appeal court is satisfied that a provision of primatT or subordinate
legislation is incompatible with a tight contained in dfis [law], it may make a
declaration of that incompatibility.
(3) A report containing all declarations of incompatibility shall be made annually to the
Minister responsible for revenue and a copy of the report shall be laid before
Parliament.
Chapter 3: PfimatT Legal Rights
Atlide 5
Primary legal tights arfictflate the fundamental principles on xvtfich a tax system is based
and shall apply to all tax rules, whether legislative or admitfistrative.
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Attic/e6
(1) Taxes, duties, fees and charges shall be imposed by laxv.
(2) Where an administrative discretion is given it shall be authorised by la\v.
(3) A law auflmrisiug an adininistrafive discretion shall proxfide criteria for, and lmxits on,
its exercise where:
(a) the content and matter of the discretion is significant;
03) the biuding quality or effect is substantial; and
(c) the potential application is broad.
(4) The laxv shall be applied and administrative discretion shall be exercised:
(a) in a \vay fllat is appropriate and necessary to actfieve the objectives legitimately
pursued;
(b) so that where there is a choice between several appropriate measures recourse
shall be had to the least onerous; and
(c) so that where disadvantages are caused they are not disproportionate to the
aims pursued.
(5) Any exercise of discretionatT powers shall be:
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based on reasons, xvhich shall be applied consistently, fairly, and impartially;
and
(b) die reasons given for a decision shall be intelligibly related to a framework of
equally intelligible standards which can be seen fairly to fall widma and be the
basis of the discretionary powers; and
(c) the exercise shall be fair and reasonable in matters of procedure and substance.
A~lide 7
(1) All rules applicable ha the tax system shall be compiled and published acct~tately and
in a form that is accessible to all users.
(2) Publication of tax rules or material relating to their interpretation by a govermnent
agency shall be impartial and unbiased.
A~tic/e8
(1) Tax laws, delegated legislation and admimstrative ddscredon shall not bave reO:oacfive
effect except to die extent that they are:
(a) reasonable, which may include consideration of one or more of:
(i) the lhnited consequences of retroacfvity;
(ii) the error, tack of clar{ty or contxadiction they ahned to correct;
(iii) ~rgent public interest;
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(c)
ser’ving a legitimate purpose; and
proportionate in striking a fair balance between the state and taxpayers.
(2) Where the Government announces that it intends to enact legislation that wilt take
effect from the date of the announcement:
(a) it shall do so nomaally only to correct etxors or anomalies, introduce
concessions or to prevent tax avoidance or arbitrage;
(b) it shall provide sufficient detail in the announcement for taxpayers to order
their affairs in accordance xvith the proposed laws;
(c) it shall provide appropriate transitional provisions if the subsequent legislation
differs in substance from the ammuncement;
(d) it shall introduce legislation to give effect to the atmouncement witlfin a
reasonable ~me.
A*¢ide9
(1) Tax roles shall be certain. If a provision is absurd, ambiguous, contradictor},, or does
not make sense, it shall apply to the taxpayer’s benefit.
(2) If a tax provision or an), part of it is so uncertaiu that it carmot be applied, the cot~rt
or administrator responsible for its application sball not apply that provision or part
of it.
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(3) There shall be roles governing file interpretation of the tax roles where t~vo or more
laws contradict.
(4) \v-cqmre taxpayers can show that there are genuine and reasonable circumstances that
prevent thelaa from complying with the tet~ms of the laxv, tile l~evenue autllority shall
have the discretion to grant appropriate relief.
Recommended Ra[ghts
The revenue authority shall have responsibility for fi.mding a test case litigation
program to resolve taxation issues that are important to the general administration of
the tax system.
(2) in respect of all its litigation, the revenue attthority shall:
(a) Formtflate a document that sets out its litigation philosophy, approach and
policy;
(13) Provide oversight of litigation by a senior officer of the revenue authorit3T m
ensure consistency in management of the program;
(c) Apply risk management techniques to tax litigation issues;
(d) Provide for independent input into the litigation program;
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Fund taxpayers’ expenses in defending all cases where the revenue authority
has been unsuccessful ~t any stage of the litigation; and
Commmficate file application of fmalised court and tribunal decisions in a
standard form.
At¢ide 10
(1) Taxpayers shall pay only the amount of tax required by law.
(2) Taxpayers that oveqpay tax shall be endded to a full refund or offset against other
amounts owing.
(3) Except xvhere specifically legislated, tax-payers shall pay domestic tax only once on
the same components of the tax base and sball receive relief for tax already paid in
the calculation of further tax on the same amount.
Atlide 11
There is a presmnpfion that the tax law shall not discrinainate bem,een taxpayers in
the same position and sha[l allocate taxes fairly between people in different
circumstances.
(2)
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Where the presumption is not met, in any action before it, a court shall nonetheless
upbold tim rule:
A Modal ofTa~,7~®,e~’s’ R*~hls
(a) where the treatment under the rule pursues a legitimate aim; and
(b) the means employed are proportionate to the legithnate aim.
Chapter 4: General Powers of Administration
A,lide 12
There shall be an administrative body charged with the achninist~ation of the tax system
(the revenue authority). The revenue authority shall be structured and shall operate in
accordance with principles of good governance. The revenue authority shall ensure
compliance m all areas of its responsibilit3’ with the International Monetat3r Fund Code of
Good P,’aclices on Fiscal Tra*~pap~**~,. The ath~maistrative application of the tax laxv and
administrative txtles shall be subject to procedural safeguards.
A~¢ic/e 13
(1) The revenue authority shall be independent in its exercise of the powers of
athx~anistration, collection and enforcement from external influence, including but
not lhnited to, other Govermnent ministries or departments and Members of
Parliament.
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(2) The head of the revenue attthotity shall bave security of tenure, which shall extend
beyond a single term of the body of elected representatives, and shall be removed
from office only in the event of proven misbehaviour, physical or mental incapacity,
or other circumstances that compromise her or !ris ability to act.
(3) The revenue authority shall be accountable. In addition to its annual reports to a
Govermnent n~lister responsible for the revenue authority, the designated head of
the revenue authority shall provide annual reports to Parliament either directly or
dirough the relevant Govermnent mhfister responsible, wlficb shall be published.
(4) The revenue authority shall develop admitfistrafive p~inciples designed to ensttte
good administrative practices that shall govern its relations with taxpayers, its
employees and other revenue authorities.
(5) Provision of adequate resources to enable the revenue authority to function properly
shall be a budget priority.
(6) The revenue authotky shall measure its performance fl~tough a t~ansparent process
of quality asstecance based on published objective measures on which it shall report
(7) Tbe revenue authofit3~ sball be subject to annual audit by a national audit body or
equdvalent orgatfizadon, which is independent of the executive and reports to the
legislature and the public on the financial integrity of the revenue authority accounts.
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There shall be external overgight of the revenue authority, such as a parliamentary
committee, or a governing or advism3, board that has the power to report to the
relevant minister and, if necessat3’, to parliament.
(9) The revenue authorit3, shall publish a doctmaent setting out the achninisttative fights
and obfigations of taxpayers. (A model document is included at Appendix 1 .)
(10) There shall be constituted a Revenue Ombudsman or similar office to investigate, in
response to a complaint by a taxpayer or other interested party, where there is no
practical alternative avenue for independent review, the conduct of the revenue
authorit3T and other government departments or public authorities responsible
directly or indirectly for the administration of the taxation system.
(11) There shall be constituted a dispute resolution system designed to provide an
informal mechatfism for early resolution of disputes arising between taxpayers and
file revenue authority. The system shall be based on the principles set out in ISO
10002:2004, the International Orgaifization for Standardization Quali~ managemalt -
Customer sati{factio~ - GuideLines for complaints ha*Mling in otganiwtiom (as amended or
updated from time to time) and shall incorporate the following elements:5
(a) Prevent unnecessary conflict through notification, consultation and feedback.
(b) Create ways of reconciling the interests of those in dispute.
Adapted from W.L. Ut% J.M. Brett and S.B. Goldberg, Gellt)tg Disptttes Resolved: Designitg Sytems to Cut the
Cosl of Cot~lict (Cambridge, ~,LA, P~:ogxam on Negotiation Books, 1993), ch. 3. Explained fully in Chapter 5,
449
(c) Build in ’loop-backs’ to negotiation.
(d) Provide low-cost alternatives where negotiation fails.
(e) Create sequential procedures moving from low-cost to high-cost.
(~) Provide the necessary motivation, skills and resources to allow the system to
(g) Provide effective mechanisms for measm’ing qualitative success.
(h) Provide mechanisms for monitorklg, review and con0nuous improvement
both at individual and systemic levels.
A~¢Me 14
O) The revenue authority shall establish a systematic approach to decision-making to
ensnre consistent, transparent, fair and inlpar6al decisions can be made across the
organisation at all levels. The system shall include but is not restricted to:
(a) The establishment of policies and procedures governing decision-making and
file exercise of discretion;
(b) The development of internal manuals, check-lists and other aids;
(c) A clear policy governing escalation of decisions and procedures for checking
and review;
(d) Tile development and inaplementation of quality assm’ance measures; and
(e) Regul,qx review of the system with procedures to implement necessalT changes.
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(2)
A Mode! ofTa~payos’ RiAhts
Whenever a taxpayer is entitled to a decision or action by the revenue authofit3T, it
sball occur either withha a specified period or witlfin a reasonable time.
(3) Wheuever a taxpayer is reqlfired to do sometlfing, provide information, or otherwise
assist file revenue authority, it shall be after the giving of reasonable notice, unless it
is clear that such notice would reasonably inapact on file success of the relevant
administrative action.
(4) To give effect to procedurally fair adininisttative action, except where specific
provision is made otherwise, revenue officers shall provide:
(a) adequate notice of fl~e nature and purpose of proposed administrative
action;
(b) a reasonable opportunity to make representations;
(c) a clear statement of file adinhfisttative action;
(d) adequate notice of an), right of review or internal appeal, where applicable;
and
(e) adequate notice of the right to request reasons.
(5) Tax administration shall be conducted in accordance with the general principles that:
There sbalt be publication and dissenfinadon of a xvide range of information in
all appropriate form to assist taxpayers in understanding and complying with
their full range of obligations; and
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There shall be a specific program of community education to develop and
reinforce an understafiding of file hnportance to the community of the tax
system and compliance with the obligations inlposed by it.
(6) There shall be prmdsion made by the revenue authority to assist taxpayers in
understanding and colnpl)fing widl their full range of obligations, including additional
assistance for those widl special requirements or needs, such as speakers of foreign
languages, taxpayers with disabJ~ties, eflmic minorities, and taxpayers lixdng in
remote areas.
(7) Revenue officers shall act ethically and professionally in file discharge of their duties
in accordance xtdth clear and well publlcised standards of behaviour.
(8) Revenue officers shall not draw an adverse inference when a taxpayer chooses to
exercise available legal or adininisttadve rights.
RecommeMed Rights
(l) Individual taxpayers should have the right to judicial review of the application of
t~les that do not fall within designated exceptions on file basis of general principle.
(2) It shall be an offence for any person outside the revenue authority to interfere with
an audit or an investigation of a taxpayer by the revenue authority. The offence shall
include a request to commence or terminate an audit or investigation. An), revemm
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officer approached by a third part), xvith a request that might reasonably be consmmd
to fall within the offence, shrill report the matter in~=ediately to her or t~is superior.
Chapter 5: Information Gathe*’ing
Arlide 15
Officers of the revenue authority shall be subject to secrecy provisions. The content and
extent of the secrecy provisions shall be articulated for the protection of both revenue
officers and tax, payers. They shall include rules governing the collection, storage, securit),,
access to, correction of, use and disclosure of information pro{~ided. They shall extend to
third parties xvorking for or contracted to the revenue authority.
Attic/e 16
(1) Taxpayer infmmation shall be treated as completely confidential.
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Taxpayer information shall be used only for the assessment, enforcement and
collection of tax, and f6r social security purposes.
(b) There shall be clear t~_lles gover’ning the disclosure of taxpayer mfurmafion to
other,government departments, other taxpayers and tbkd parties and the duties
and responsibilities of those persons in relation m the taxpayer information.
(c) Officers of a revenue authotit3’ shall access taxpayer information ot~ly when
requb:ed to do so in the performance of tlmir duties.
(d) Unauthorised access to taxpayer information held by the revenue authority by
an}, person, unauthofised browsing of such infur:tnation and an}, unauthorised
release of such information to a third party shall be an offence. Where the
person is not a revenue officer, that person shall be personally liable, and when
that person is acting for or on behalf of a company or orgamsation, that
company or urganisation shall also bear liabilit3,.
(e) Revenue officers, by virtue of thek position, shall be personally liable for any
misuse of information.
Taxpayers shall have the tight of access to information held about them by the
revenue authotit3, and the abilit3, to correct that infomaation except in limited
circumstances, including:
(i)    where release of the reformation \vould prejudice thkd pardes, or
(ii) wbere ~elease of the information would prejudice an ongoing
investigation.
(2) The dut3, by a third part3~ to report infom~ation for an}, purposes under the tax law
shall be legislated:
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(a) Where a third party wilfully provides fraudulent information abont a taxpayer
dais shall constitute an offence; and
(b) The taxpayer may bring a civil action for damages or compensation.
Information requked by the revenue authority shall be restricted to fliat information
relevant to the tax affaLrs of a taxpayer except to die extent fllat the revenue authority
is required by law to perform other functions requhSng additional information.
(4) Information exchange and mutual assistance agreements shall prmdde equivalent
protection to that set out hi Ardcle 21 and Ardcle 22 of the JoiJ~t Comwi/ of
Em’ope/ OECD Conve~*tion o1~ Mutual Administrative Assista*m in Tax" Matters with the
meaning given to each Article as set out in the Commentary on the provisions of the
Convention.
(5) Exchanges of information and mutual administrative assistance in tax matters shall
require approval by die most senior levels of die revenue authority.
(a) There shall be clear procedures and guidelines for all exchanges of infor~mation
and mutual administrative assistance, which shall include the identification of
the characteristics of matters of particular sensitivity or inaportance so that they
can be escalated automatically for approval at higher levels of authority.
(b) Exchange of infotanadon or mutual administrative assistance relating to a
taxpayer shall be foreseeably relevant to die determination, assessment and
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Chap~r9
collection of taxes covered by the relevant agreement, the recovery and
enforcement of tax claims, or the investigation or prosecution of tax matters.6
(c) The approval procedures for an exchange of information or mutual
administrative assistance shall set out clearly the information or action required
by the revenue authotit3’ before a decision can be made.
(d) The revenue authorit3, shall either adopt die OECD Manual Oll the ItJ~plementation
of ~’change of b~rmalion Pl~visions for Zax Pulposes or develop guidelines that
provide procedures to ensue equivalent taxpayer protection.
(e) There shall be regular audits and reviews of information exchange, particularly
automatic and spontaneous exchanges of infomlation to ensure compliance
with procedures and guidelines.
Recommended Rights
O) Before contacting any person other than the taxpayer to request additional
information beyond that reported by law, the taxpayer shall be given reasonable
notice prior to the contact, so that die taxpayer has an opportunity to provide the
information requked. T!ffs requirement shall not apply if a revenue officer has
reasonable grounds to suspect that prior notification would result hi die taxpayer
obstructing the investigation, sets out those grounds in writing, and obtains approval
from a seuior revenue officer.
Taken largely from the 2002 OECD Model Agreement on Exchange of Information on "Fax Matters, art.
1, <w~av.oecd.org>, 1 Novembe~ 2006.
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In matters involving trade, business, industrial, coiurnercial or professional secrets or
trade processes, where there is a reqtiest by anodmr state under an exchange of
information agreement for information fllat might affect such secrets or processes,
the revenue autlmfity shall noti~, fire taxpayer before fl~e information is given, to
allow the taxpayer to make application, witl~in a specified lime, for tim information
not to be provided.
Chapter 6: Audit and Investigation
A~lic/e 17
Tlie revenue audiotity shall have the legal power to conduct wide-ranging audits and
investigations, including po\vers of search and seizure, to ensure compliance witl~ tim tax
laxv, but in doing so shall provide taxpayers wifl~ d~e protection set out in fl~is Chapter.
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Rights
AUDIT
The revenue authority shall have a clear set of guidelines for its staff, setting out
procedttres to ensure consistent application of delegated authority, standards
developed for audits, audit policies, audit procedures, and how and by whom
interpretation of the law applicable to tim audit will be carried out.
(a) Audit policies and procedures shall be based on principles of accuracy,
efficiency, fairness, objectivity, transparency, completeness, consistency and
defensibility,v
There shall be separate guidelines for revenne authority activities specifically
authorised by law, to ensure that flie legal requirements are met.
(c) Audit guidelines shali provid~ for conflict of interest.
(2)
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Taxpayers shall be given prior notification of an audit or a request to attend an
inter~qew, with brief details of the expected nattu:e, scope and duration of tile audit
or inter~riew, the infoi~nation and records fliat will be required, and the names and
contact details of the revenue officers managing the audit or intet~l,iew.
(3) Taxpayers shall be given the opportunity to request postponement of the audit or
inter’view if the), have good reasons.
(4) Revenue officers shall always clearly identify themselves.
(5) The audit or interview process and timeffame shall be explained in detail to the
taxpayer or its representalives before an audit or interview commences, with the
opportunity for discussion and clarification, including:
(a) Any benefits of voluntatT disclosure;
(b) The rights and duties of the taxpayer during an audit or interview;
(c) The settlement practices of the revenue authority; and
(d) The avenues for objection and appeal against assessments arising out of the
audit.
(6) Taxpayers shall be advised of their right to have professional representation during
an audit or intetndexv.
(7) Audits shall not interfere um’easonably with the proper t-untmag of a taxpayer’s
business or cause it to suffer co,mnercial loss as a direct result of the audit activity.
7 OECD, Slmgthening Tax Audit CapabtTities: General PthMpks attd Approaches (Paris, Centre for Tax Poficy
459
(a) Meetings or interviews shall take place, where possible, at mutually
convement times.
(b) Audits shall usually take place in normal business hours unless oflletwise
agreed.
(8) Taxpayers shall be given a reasonable dine to collect mfomaation reqtfired unless
search and seizure powers are exercised because die integrity or existence of
docmnents is at fisk.8
(9) Taxpayers shall have die tight to take notes of an}, conversations or interviews.9
(10) Taxpayers shall have die fight to request the recording of all mteta, iexvs and be given
a cop), of die recording at die conclusion of die intendew.1°
(11) During die audit file taxpayer shall be given die opportunity to discuss matters
arising in die audit wifll file tax auditor:
and Admiaistradon, 2006), p. 33.
ATO, Taxpayers’ Charter: Explanatory Booklet 10, If you’re subje,’l 1o et~qtdty or attdit, p. 5,
<\x~wv.ato.gov.au>, 1 November 2006.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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(a)
(c)
There shall be discussion of die final issues arising out of the audit dlat xvill
affect any assessment raised as a result of the audit, includh~g disputed facts
and their legal consequences;
Reasons shall be given for adjustments, and opportunity shall be given for the
taxpayer to explah~ the circumstances that might justify a reduction of
penal6es or interest;11 and
The outcome shall be doctnnented and provided to the taxpayer in xvrifing
witlfin a reasonable time, together x,4th information concerning any rights of
reviexv and remedies that *nay be available to the taxpayer.
(12) Negotiations shall take place to settle the outcome of the audit where these are
petanitted by law:
Negotiations shall take place in die context of proper, fair and consistently
applied settlement processes; and
(b) The terms of an), settlmnent agreement shall be tlocumented and the taxpayer
provided xvith a copy.
(13) Taxpayers shall be advised as earl), as possible of an intention to seek prosecution as
a result of an audit or inteta4ew.
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SF~a~RCH AND SEIZURE
Where the revenue authority has a reasonable belief that for any purpose related to
the administration or enforcement of the tax law it is necessaW to gain access to
premises for the purpose of searchii~g those premises and/or seizing documents ot
other property or information:
(a) a warrant provided at the discretion of a judicial officer is required if the access
is to a private dxvelling, wlfich discretion shall be exercised in light of Article 6;
(b) a warrant provided at the discretion of a judicial officer is required for any
criminal investigation;
(c) the decision to gain access in circumstances where no xvarrant is required will
be carried out in light of Article 6; and
(d) all powers related to access shall be used for their proper pm13ose.
(15) In conducting authofised searches, revenue authorities shall:
(a) normally inform the occupant before the search takes place unless this cmfld
reasonably be expected to harm the investigation;
(b) not~nally conduct searches in business hot~s or by appointment;
(c) noranally permit the taxpayer or occupier to attend the search together with a
representative;
(d) ahvays provide the opporm*fity to clain~ privilege on documents or
information;
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(e) ahvays provide a det,~ed receipt for anything taken, with an indication of when
it will be returned;
normally take a copy of documents or information raffler than the original
unless file original is critical to the investigation;
(g) where the original document or information is seized, nomaally give the
opportunity to copy file document or infolanation before it is removed; and
(h) publish guidelines on how access powers involving access to premises,
searches and seizure of info~aaaation will take place, together with details of file
~ghts and obligations of taxpayers.
REPRESENTATION ~’M’qD PRD2"ILEGE
(16) In tax matters, taxpayers shall have the right to representation, be advised of that
right and given the opportunity to exercise it.
(17) Tile law shall protect confidential communications between a la\vyer and client,
confidential cotmnunicafions between a lawyer and third parties when they are made
for the benefit of a client, and confidential material that records file work of a lawyer
carried out for file benefit of a client unless file client has consented to die
disclosttte.l 2
McHugh J ha the Austrafian High Court ha Commissioner forAttsltttlian Fede*ul PoZice t~ Ptvpend Fittattce P~ Ltd
(1997) 188 CLR 501, p. 550.
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Recommended Rights
(1) The revenue authotit3’ shall not conduct an audit on a non-business taxpayer for two
years in a row xvhere no additional taxes were payable after the first audit.
The protection afforded to confidential communications in the relationship between
a lawyer and client shall extend to similar confidential conununicadons in the
relationship between a tax practitioner and client.
Infomaadon obtained in a tax investigation from a taxpayer shall not be used to
incriminate the taxpayer in a subsequent criminal or civil proceeding arising from
which criminal or civil penalties *night apply.
Chapter 7: Assessment
A,fide 19
The assessment process determh~es the amount of tax that taxpayers must legally pay. It is
fundamental to the effective operation of the tax system. The following fight~ are designed
to enhance voluntat3, compliance while maintaining the integrit3, of the tax system.
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Rights
(I) Revenue authorities shall provide advance rulings on bow die}, will treat transactions
or arrangements.
(2)
(3)
(4)
Advance rulings shall be consistent in their interpretation and application of the tax
fades both between taxpayers and to the same taxpayer over time.
Where a revenue authority holds out a particular interpretation of d~e law to be
correct, or follows specific procedures in hnplementing the law, and the taxpayer
relies hi good faith on die view of a revenue authority, a revenue authorit3, shall be
bound by its approach.
An obligation to withhold tax shall be required only by legislation, wlficb shall
provide for tim obligation and procedures for xvithholding and payment of the
amount to die revenue authority.
The revenue authotit3, shall publish clear guidelines with reasonable thnelines for an},
administrative process hlaposing an obligation on any person to pay or wifl~hold tax,
or to report infomxation.
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(6) Where information provided by someone other than the taxpayer is used in making
an assessment, the taxpayer shall have the right to make sure file infom~adon
provided is accttrate.
(7) There shall be sufficient information given to a taxpayer on or with an assessment, so
that tile taxpayer can make an informed decision as to the accuracy of the assessment
made.
(8) Where the revenue authority discovers xvithin the relevant time lhnits that a taxpayer
has failed to make a claim for any form of tax relief, deductions or refunds to which
the taxpayer is entided, the rmmnue authority shall amend file taxpayer’s assessment
to grant those entidements.
(9) The revenue authority shall automatically refund overpayments of tax.
(10) Interest shall be paid on overpayments of tax.
(11) There shall be set time litrdts for the amendment of assessments except in cases of
fraud or evasion.
(12) Thne limits for tile amendment of assessments shall coincide with the requirement
for taxpayers to retain records.
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03) The revenue authority shall identify and publicise m advance the procedures it will
follow when assessing taxpa}ers where there is insufficient information to make a
norTnal assessment.
Recommended Righls
(1) Advance rulings shall be legally binding on a revenue authority.
(2) There shall be a right of appeal against an adverse binding ruling.
Chapter 8: Sanctions and Enforced Collection
A~lic/e21
E:,7O/anation
Sanctions and enforced collection are designed to reinforce the integrity of file tax system
where voluntary compliance has failed. Clear procedural safeguards ensure that taxpayers’
tights are protected in file face of legal and admitfistrafive action taken by the state to
protect file revenue.
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Rights
(1) There shall be a clear basis for the imposition of penalties and interest.
(a) Where there is discretion as to the level of penalties and interest, it shall be
made clear how and xvhy the discretion is exercised.
(b) In the exercise of discretion the principle of proportionality requires fl~at a
penalty should be proportionate to the offence.
(2) Criminal penalties shall be imposed in accordance with procedures applicable to
other crimes of the same kind.
(a) The revenue authority shall set out the criteria it uses in deciding xvhether to
recon~mend prosecution of a taxpayer,
(3) There shall be a clear basis for any decision to pursue collection t!~tough
enforcement.
(a) Tax collection and enforcement procedures shall be documented clearly and
s~mply, and provided to taxpayers affected.
(b) Taxpayers shall be given appropriate notice, and reasonable tinae to comply
\vith demands for pa3maent before enforcement measures are taken. All such
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notices shall include details of the taxpayer’s fights and obligations in relation
to enforcement, including the right to representation and the availability of
legal aid.
(c) Where there is discretion to Dttsue collection through enforcement, it shall be
made clear hoxv and xvhy the discretion is exercised.
(d) In the exercise of discretion the principle of proportionality requires that the
means of enfomement should be proportionate to the tax payable.
(e) The revenue authority shall provide clear guidelines governing its exercise of
enforcement powers.
(f) The revenue authority guidelines shall cover, in particular, how it will exercise
its discretion to grant extensions of time to pay and m fom~ulate tax payment
arrangements. The onus of proving hardslfip in such cases must be reasonable.
(g) Agreements that allow a taxpayer to use payment methods that differ from
normal collection reqttirements, such as instalment payments, shall be binding
on the revenue authority. There shall be clear guidelines governing the
operation of these methods.
(h) The revenue authority shaU institute clear lines of authotisation for
enforcement of tax debts and appropriate monitoring mechanisms.
(i) Clfilclren and those with disabilities shall be protected by laxv dutSng
enforcement proceedings.
0) Release of restrictions over an asset once a debt is paid or other arrangements
are made with the revenue authorit3T, shall be effected wifllin a specified dine
or compensation will be payable.
Recommended Rights
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(1) Remission of penalties shall dllow account to be taken of exceptional circumstances
relevant m the taxpayer.
(2) There shall be clear and transparent gttidelines governing waiver of penalties.
(3) There shall be a collection due process heating by a tribunal or a court at the request
of a taxpayer before enforcement proceedings coimnence.
Chapter 9: Objection and Appeal
Arl£’le23
Tiffs chapter sets out the basic fights and procedures that flow f~om the fimdamental right
of every taxpayer to object to and appeal against decisions and actions of the revenue
authorit3,. In doing so it acknoxvledges the limits applicable to taxpayers in certain situations
in exercising these rights. It is important to note that protection for taxpayers in criminal
proceedings is found in the laws governing criminal law and procedtuce.
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l ’ghts
(1) Taxpayers shall have the fight to object to assesstnents and to appeal to a court or
administrative tribunal of independent stares \vithha a reasonable thne.
(2) Any time limits on the tight of appeal shall be reasonable.
The ~ght of appeal shall apply to all derisions and actions of the revenue authority
except where dais is specifically excluded.
Taxpayers shall be informed ~learly and have easy access to ~[nformation about their
rights of objection and appeal together with aW time lhnits that apply.
The conduct of the appeal should be subject to due process and a fair hearing, which
shall include:
(a) An impartial heating.
(b) A public heating at one level of appeal, \vhich may be waived on application by
the taxpayer at the discretion of the court or tribunal.
(c) The fight to representation.
(d) Procedural equalit3~ between the parties to the proceedings.
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An adversarial process with f~tll disclosnre of evidence, mfless the court or
~bunal specifically allows non-disclosure.
The provision of reasons for a decision.
The provision of facilities for taxpayers suffering from disabilities or other
impediment to their effective participation.
(6) Where a taxpayer’s appeal is successful, the revenue authority shall pay the taxpayer’s
appeal costs.
Recommended Re~ghts
(1) There shall be a specialised tax court or tribunal at the first level of appeal.
(2) There shall be access to legal aid for those otherwise unable to appeal against a tax
decision.
There shall be suspension of tax payable during a review, on application to the
review body at the cotmaaencemm~t of proceedings, wbere the taxpayer has a prima
facie case and can demonstrate batdship.
(4) ~rbere a taxpayer suffers personal or economic loss as a direct restflt of the action of
the revenue autho~it3T or its officers, the revenue authority shall be liable to pay
compensation.
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Chapter 10: A Statement of Goals
A~tide 25
The revenue audlorit3, shall publish a statement of administrative goals dlat will provide
ser~Tice standards for its dealings with taxpayers. Each goal will be supported by a
perfomaance indicator or oilier objective benclmaark by \vhich to measure performance
against daat goal. In its annual report to fl~e minister file revenue audlot{ty will provide an
analysis of its performance on each measure xvith an explanation for significant variances.
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Appendix
Principles of Good Practice and an Example Administrative Charter
Whether in a charter or similar document, revenue authorities should adopt the following
principles generally accepted as principles of good practice for revenue authorities:
1. Act professionally in all dealings with taxpayers.
2. Treat taxpayers with courtesy, consideration and sensitivity.
3. Listen to taxpayers’ concerns.
4, Consult with key stakeholders or their representatives before significant changes are
introduced.
5. Take account of a taxpayer’s particular circumstances, especially individual, cultural
and special needs, to the extent allowed by law.
6. Treat taxpayers as being honest in their tax affairs mfless they act othe~xvise.
7. Mhfimise the costs of complying with tax obligations.
8. Provide assistance to taxpayers to help them understand and meet their tax
obligations.
9. Make sure publications and other co~urnmfications are clear, accurate, helpful and
easy to understand.
10. Keep looking for new and better ways to give taxpayers advice and infomaafion.
11. Conduct general education programs for both existing and potential taxpayers.
12. Provide taxpayers with easy access to and identification of contact details.
13. Be accessible and attend to enquirers, whether by telephone, mail or in person,
\viflfin specified fimes designed to mininfise delay.
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14. Deal with urgent requests without delay, whether by telephone, mail or in person.
1 $. Answer telephone calls promptly and without mmecessar3’ transfer.
16. Make an effort to ensure the taxpayer is put in touch with the appropriate person the
17.
first time.
Try to get all aspects of interacdon with taxpayers riglit first time by making best use
of all of the informadon available.
18. Folloxv tl~ough on what they say they will do.
19. Ensure that their staff ate well trained, competent and up-to-date with changes m the
law that affect their roles.
20. Stdve to provide qualit3~ service across the organisadon.
21. Apologise for errors, fix them quickly and explain what went wrong and xvhy.
22. Make it clear that taxpayers can quesdon the informatiou, advice and sendce they are
given and infom~ them of options available for resolving disagreements.
¯ 23. Monitor its performance in living these principles fl~rougb collection of infor~nafion
and regular sm-~mys, wlfich ate made public and used internally for continual
hnprovement.
The OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration has prepared an example taxpayers’
cliarter: General AdmiMs/ralive Pd~@/es- GAPO02 TaxT~ayers’ Rigbts and Ob/igaliom.
Example Taxpayers’ Charter using the Basic Rights and Obligations in this Note
Note: Tiffs is only an example using elements that might be found in a taxpayers’ charter. It
would need to be tailored to reflect the relevant policy and legislative enviromnent,
administrative practices and culture of a tax administration seeking to use it.
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The Taxpayers’ Charter
In~oducfion
In our society our tax taws requires that we pay taxes and other charges in order to fund a
range of government programs and community services, sucb as education, welfare, health,
defence, law enforcement and transpotradon infrastructure, that help our society to
Your tax achninisttation, in collecting these taxes and charges, operates on the fundamental
principle that cidzens and non resident taxpayers will act in accordance with the law when
they are ~eated with respect and fairness and provided with all the information, advice,
assistance and other services they need to comply with their obligations.
Tiffs Taxpayer Chatter broadly smnmafises ),our important rights and obligations under the
tax system. We have published it to help set in place the co-operative reladonslfip we seek
xvith the cotmnunity - one based on mutual trust and respect.
Your tights:
Your ~ight to be informed, assisted and heard
We will treat you with courtesy and consideration at all times and \viii, in nomaal
ci*cumstances, stxive to:
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o
help you to understand and meet your tax obligations;
explain to you the reasons for decisions made by us conceruing your affaks;
fmalise reftmd requests [witl~l ... days]/[as quicldy as possible]13 and, where the law
allows, pay you interest on the amount;
reply to written enquiries [within ... days]/[as quickly as possible]; ~4
deal with urgent requests as quickly as possible;
answer your telephone call promptly and \vithout urmecessaty transfer;
return your tdephone call as quickly as possible;
keep your costs in compl)olg with the laxv to a minhnum;
give you die opportunity to have your cerdfied legal or taxalion adviser present
during any investigation;
Send you, by die end of the investigation or [xvithin ... days o~]/[as quickly as
possible after]*s its completion, the relevant ruinutes or a xvtitten advice of the result
of tliat investigation and die reasons for die decisions we have taken;
Send you, where an assessment has been issued, details of how the assessment was
calculated.
Your right of appeal
We will, in normal circumstances, strive to:
full), explain your fights of review, objection and appeal if you are unsure of them or
need clafificadon;
Note: Jurisdictions having expficit taxpayer se~’ice ~ne benclm~ar~s may wish t° insert the~ relevant time
standard at Otis point, oflxer Jurisdictions may prefer to use ’as quJcldy as possible’ or ’in a reasonable
Ibid.
Ibid.
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reviexv your case if you believe that we have misinterpreted the facts, applied the law
incorrecdy or not handled yoar affairs properly;
ensure that the review is completed in a comprehensive, professional and inaparfial
manner by a representative who has not been involved in the original decision;
determine your objection [within ,.. day4/{as qtticldy as possiblep6 unless xve requi~e
more information to do so, or the issues are tmusually complex;
give you reasons if yot~r objection has been completely or partially disallowed;
request ftttther information from you only where it is necessary to resolve the issues
in dispute.
Your right to payno more than the correct amount oF tax
act xvith integrity and impartality in all our dealings with you, so that you pay o*fly
the tax legally dire and that all credits, benefits, refunds and other entitlements are
properly applied.
Your right to certMnty
We xxdll, in nor~nat circumstances, strive to:
provide you with advice about the tax in~plications of 3’our actions;
let you know [at least ... days] /[as soon as possible]~ before the conduct of an
intet~fiexv or a request for the production of documents;
16 Ibid.
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advise you of the scope of an interview and our requirements;
arrange a suitable thne and place for the interview and allow you time to prepare
your records.
You; dght to pdvacy
ogly make enquiries about you when required to check that you have complied xvith
your tax obligations;
only seek access to infomaation relevant to our enquiries;
treat any information obtained, received or held by us as private.
Your right to confidentiality and secrecy
We will:
not use or divulge an), personal or financial information about yon unless you have
authorized us in writing to do so or in situations where pemfitted by law;
oi~ly permit fl~ose employees xviflfin the a&xfidistration who are authorized by laxv
and require },our personal or financial information to administer ottr programs and
legislation, to access your reformation.
Andyourobfigafions
Ibid.
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Your obligation to be honest
We expect you to:
o
o
o
provide complete and accurate information as and xvhen required;
declare all your assessable income in your income tax return;
clakn only deductions, rebates and credits to which your are entitled;
answer questions completely, accurately and honestly;
explai~ the full facts and circumstances when you seek tax adwice or when you
request a private ruling.
Your obligation to be co-operative
We expect you to:
co-operate with tax administrators and treat them with courtesy, consideration and
respect, as we do in ottt dealings xvith you.
Your obligation to provide accurate hn£ormation at~d documents on time
We expect you to:
0
o
foe correct returns and documents ~4thin time limits specified;
provide complete and accurate infomaation by certain dates;
take reasonable care in preparing ),our tax returns, documents and information;
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inform us of relevant events such as incorporation, opet~ing a business,
correspondence ad&ess changes, moving die place of business, ceasing business,
with required taxpayer identifiers in a thnely maturer so that we can administer tax
legislation properly, efficiently and effectively.
Yowc obligation to keep records
We expect you to:
keep sufficient records and books to enable you to meet your tax obfigadons;
keep sufficient records and books for die required retention period;
take reasonable care in preparing your records and books;
allow us access to records and books so that we can check your tax obligations.
Your obligation to pay taxes on tirae
We expect you to:
pay the full amount of your taxes by die due dates;
pay the fu~ amount of any balance outstanding resulting from assessment or
reassessment;
help us develop a tnutually acceptable payment arrangement if you ca~mot pay aW
outstanding balance in full and have exhausted all reasonable possibilities of
obtaining the necessat3, funds by borrowfl~g or re-arranging }Tour financial affairs;
withhold and renfit by due dates all taxes withheld or collected on behalf of others;
o advise us as soon as practical if some event beyond your control has affected },our
ability to pay you* taxes on time so that appropriate arrangements can be put into
place to assist you.
Risks of non-compliance with the obligations
If yotz do not meet your tax obligations
the law may provide for penalties and / or interest to be imposed;
prosecution acdon may be taken in more serious eases.
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CONCLUSION
I CONCLUSIONS ON THE HYPOTHESIS
The hypothesis \vas that it is timely and beneficial to attictflate a Model of Taxpayers’
Rights as a guide to best practice in tax a&rfit~istration. Chapter 2 provided an important
basis for prm4ng the hypothesis. It drew on legal theory to show that taxation is not a
fundamental good in itself. Rather it is a limit on property tights as it requires a
contribution of property from taxpayers to fund file operation of tile state. The role of
taxpayers’ tights is in turn to provide limits on the taxing powers of the state. Discovering
tile content of those lhnits on taxing power formed much of tile substance of the thesis as
it sought to define enforceable rights and file mechanisms for their enforcement.
Chapter 2 found that the argument that there are no universally accepted standards
from a subjective and relativistic perspective is overcome through file human fights
literatuze, which recognises that some hmnan rights are universally accepted and applicable.
That tax systems are so diverse also does not present an impedinlent to tile discover), of
acceptable standards of best practice in taxation law. Rather it suggested that for
developing countxies a lower benclmlark is reqtfi.ted. A two-tier Model of this kind has
some disadvantages and they included that: states may adopt only tile basic level; states
tnay not want to acknowledge that they are adopting only the basic level and therefore not
adopt it at all; and a single standard is clearer and easier to adopt. However, the advantages
of a two tier Model included: a two-tier model is already in use in other areas of tax
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administration; it could form a firmer platform for the existing d~alogne between tax
admLrdstrations; it recognises the realit3, of the international em~onment; and it provides
support for foreign investment if a state can at least achieve the basic benct~mark. The
advantages also demonstrated that articulation of taxpayers’ tights is both timely and
beneficial.
Flowing from the proposition that a two-tier Model is feasible, the Chapter showed
that a Modal is also realistic. It demonstrated how states are increasingly accepting tights as
lh~its on their sovereignt3, both domestically and internationally. It showed that the Model
should not include obligations as that xvould expand it to constitute a Model tax code.
Instead, the Model should focus on providing a benchmark for best practice in the
provision of taxpayers’ rights, for which there is a ctmtent need: The basis for the tigbts
chosen should be general acceptance and conformity to accepted general principles of law
and practice. The incentive for states to adopt the Model would be to improve voluntary
compliance, enhance revenue collecfon, and improve the perception by taxpayers that
their system is fair.
Chapter 2 provided the clear theoretical basis for a Model of taxpayers’ tights. It also
analysed why a Model is realistic, thnely and beneficial in the current international poliW
em~ironment - and feasible as it is possible to articttlate acceptable 9ommon standards for
inclusion.
Chapter 3 first analysed a wide range of major reports that have examined the reform
of tax systems. Although they have used co*mnon tmanJamlogy, it was necessar’y to analyse
the content of the principles and to develop and synthesise a comanon core of accepted
defirfition and meaning. Best practice in itself requires a basis for acceptance and Chapter 3
proxdded the tools to analyse the content and context of the tights articulated in
subsequent chapters. The Chapter then examined how the content of the tights might be
inteq0reted and xvhether there could be sufficient co~m-nonality to provide a core of
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meaning to the rights chosen. It identified the difficulties that could arise in interpreting the
rights contained in the Model based on an analysis of cnrrent international experience.
Hoxvever, it concluded that an understanding of the underlying pth~ciples in tim context of
divergent legal systems provided a strong foundation for the development of common
standards.
Chapter 4 first assessed the need for a guide to best practice in relation to taxpayers’
rights in the context of both national and international developments. It found that the mix
of expanding govermnent and an international focus on increased legal and administrative
protection provided a firm basis for developing a comprehensive and complementary
framework for the protection of taxpayers’ fights. It then set out a classification of rights
based on whether they are enforced legally or administratively. The classification built upon
d~e theory established in Chapter 2, the principles and basis for interpretation examined in
Chapter 3 and provided a comprehensive definition of each t3,pe of right that should be
included in the Model and why. The analysis drew together legal, administrative,
international and domestic threads from a range of sources, recognising the nuances in
classification that are essential in the creation of an effective Model.
Chapter 5 built on the analysis in Chapter 4 and provided a critical and foundational
basis for tmderstanding the nature of rights through their method of enforcement. It
demonstrated from an in-depth analysis and application of constitutional and alternative
dispute resolufon theory that there is scope for a wide range of measures to enforce
taxpayers’ rights effectively. The Chapter analysed each method of legi~httive and
administrafve enforcement and concluded that the method of enforcement in its particular
context is critical to the scope, content and effectiveness ofa ~ght.
Chapters 6 to 8 provided a detailed analysis of individual r’ighta to be included in the
Model based on methods of enforcement described in Chapter 5 and an analysis of
internationally accepted standards of best practice. The investigation required a number of
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excursions into literature from related disciplines and to explore the impact of a range of
international and domestic measureg on the development of taxpayers’ fights. All of these
external influences served to reinforce the critical need for an articulation of best practice
standards in taxpayers’ tights: both in respect of its thneliness and the benefits it will bting
to policy development.
Chapter 6 drew together the pfimary legal fights that underlie the fundamental
operation of the tax system. Althougli they are draxvn from a wide range of constitutional,
human fights and other legislation in the different jurisdictions, the), are founded in legal
theory and ate widely accepted as rotating the basis for the effective operation of the law
governing taxation. The Chapter recognised that in jurisdictions where primary legal tights
do not exist, there is not o*~ly the most it~mediate need for them, but it will prove most
difficult to introduce them.
Chapter 7 analysed the features of good tax administration and the tights that flow
from it. The role, structure and accountabilit3T of revenue authotides is commonly analysed
in the context of management and compliance theoties. Chapter 7 prmdded a detailed legal
analysis. It provided support for principles of good governance essential to the effective
adi~h~istradon of a tax system. Flowing from this, it analysed the appropriateness of
principles of good practice, including service standards, perfornaance indicators and
elements of chatters of taxpayers’ rights. It was found that they provide the practical
athuhfistrative framework necessat3’ for the protection of taxpayers’ fights. Chapter 8
analysed tights xvlfich flow from the essential functions and operation of the tax
administration. It used a functional analysis to examine fl~e tights attacl~g to information
gathering, audit and investigation; assessment; sanctions and enforced collection; and
objection and appeal. Drawing from a wide range of sources and materials it articulated
standards in each area that atd supportable measures of international best practice. Ftirther
support for the rights xvas found in the underl}Rng principles established in Chapter 3. Wide
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vafiation in laxv and practice was discovered in the detailed implementation of laxv and
procedure. Hmvever, there xvas a c6tmnon core content that allowed the clear articulation
of best practice standards.
Chapter 9 allowed the rights identified in earlier chapters, with those elements of
enforcement that could be included in the Model to flow direcdy into it. It proved the
hypothesis by articulating a Model of Taxpayers’ Rights as a guide to best practice in tax
administration. Previous chapters showed that the Model is dmely and will prove
beneficial.
II IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY
The thesis provides a theory of taxpayers’ rights grounded in general legal and rights
. theory. This is a nexv field of knowledge. As with all original exploration it requires
development and will change as it matttres tiu’ough discussion, analysis and refinement.
However, it does contribute the fi~st step ,along this path.
Chapter 3 refines in a new way the definition and application of generally accepted
principles that underlie tax systems, building on earlier work by Alley and the author. The
common definition can be applied in all areas of tax administration.
Again building on earlier work by the author, Chapter 4 provides an origmal
classification of taxpayers’ rights linked to their method of enforcement. Its early form has
been shown in the relatively lhnited literature available in the area of taxpayers’ fights to
have influenced or proved useful to most writers in the area. The deve!opments in tiffs
thesis are likely to continue to provide the framework for analysis of taxpayers’ rights.
The analysis of enforcement mechanisms and their application to tax adinhtistration
is innovatixm and btfilds on earlier work by the author.
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Chapters 6-8 draw together a comprehensive model of taxpayers’ fights fi’om existh~g
theory and practice. Each of the individual tights has been explored in great detait
individually elsewhere in the literature. The analysis and synthesis draws from a broad range
of diverse materials across disciplines and jurisdictions to provide a comprehensive set of
standards of best practice in tax adininisttation. It has not been carried out before in this
depth and is likely to prove a useful aid to further comparative analysis and its practical
hnptementation. This will follo\v the example of earlier comparative studies on substantive
taxation law and tax adnmtistration more generally.
III IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE
It is hoped that the research in dais thesis will provide useful material to assist a range of
different policy makers, academics and practitioners, including:
policy makers, officials and consultants advising on standard setting, and tax
legislation and drafting, particularly those in developing countries and countries in
transition, for xvlfich the content of the thesis will provide a rationale for including
taxpayers’ rights in tax laxv together with practical guidance on how to aclfieve it;
revenue authorities and their advisers who can draw on the work to provide both a
quality contxol measure of substantial elements of their adnfinistt’adon of the tax
system and an example of what they need to do to aclfieve best practice;
taxpayer representatthm organisadons and infotaned taxpayers, who can use relevant
material from the thesis as support for subnfissions to government and revenue
authorities and know that it is appropriately grounded in legal theory;
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tax practitioners, who can apply relevant parts of the thesis to assist in framing advice
for clients in the area of taxpayers’ rights; and
academics interested in comparative law and practice as the basis for further research
and to inform their students.
The best outcome wood be for the international standard setters at organisations such as
the OECD and CIAT to draw substantially on the mate~dal in the thesis to establish a
comprehensive framework for taxpayers’ rights.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
There are several areas that would benefit from further research including:
the analysis behind the Model xvould be strengthened considerably by a collaborative
comparative project desbgned to include a range of theories and examples from
jurisdictions representative of the different families of laxv and stages of
development;
the content of the standards of best practice and their relative importance could be
enhanced by a targeted smokey of international consultants who regularly review and
advise on reforms to hnprove the stmcttuce, organisation and effectiveness of tax
systems; and
the validity of both the content and enforcement processes articulated as standards
of best practice warrants detailed analysis in a range of individual jurisdictions
representhag the different famih~s of law and stages of development.
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The research in this diesis supports tim contention that it is timely and xvould be beneficial
to articulate a Model of taxpayers’ rights as a guide to best practice in tax administration.
The process of articulation provides a substantial body of analysis and recommendations.
They can be used as a series of benchmarks for an important component of tax
administration.
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